



INTERNATIONAL FORUM ON DIPLOMATIC TRAINING

44th Meeting of Deans and Directors of Diplomatic Academies
and Institutes of International Relations

Santiago, Chile

6 – 8 September 2017

“Diplomatic Training on the Content and Implementation
of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”

Wednesday, 6 September

Welcome Reception

Ambassador Juan Somavía, Director of the Diplomatic Academy ‘Andrés Bello’, welcomed members of the Forum to Chile, and to the academy. In a sense, the 44th Meeting was already a success, in that representatives from as many as fifty-five institutions from forty-eight countries had made the long journey to Santiago. It was especially pleasing to have so many academies in the Ibero-American region represented.

The Academy ‘Andrés Bello’, one of the oldest diplomatic academies in the world, was located in a grand private house built at the end of the nineteenth century – an echo of income distribution at the time – and with its portraits of distinguished Chilean diplomats lining the halls, lent an aura of tradition to their work today.

At the same time, the Meeting was to benefit from the active participation of the Academy’s newest young diplomats, looking to the future.

Thursday, 7 September

Opening Ceremony

H.E. Mr. Heraldo Muñoz,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, formally welcomed members of the Forum to Chile.
(translation kindly, and expertly, made by the Meeting organiser, Gissela Remolcoy Yucra)

“I welcome you all to this new Meeting of the International Forum on Diplomatic Training. Representatives from 46 countries and 53 institutions have come to the south of the world to dialogue and seek answers, to understand the future of diplomacy in the world of the twenty-first century.

You have set yourself an essential goal: to train diplomats of the future, while today we are living in a confused time. This highlights the need to identify the essentials of this task.

First of all, we are witnesses of a post-Cold War world that is far from the peace we were expecting in the 1990s. Despite the fact that the nuclear threat is still in force, or is being abused - as we see in North Korea these days - the greatest threats come from other sources: terrorism, cyber-terrorism, pandemics, climate change and humanitarian crises. Global governance is weakening not only because power becomes diffused, but also because of protectionist pressures, nationalist strivings and a deficit of global leadership. This is compounded by conflicts old and new. The international order is in a period of transition, in which uncertainties predominate.

All this happens in a deeply inter-connected world, where the social base knows that it can use digital networks as its main weapon for protest. This protest relied in the past on the crowd, in its manifestation on the street. Today, the great joys, but above all the discontents of the crowd, their anger and all this entails, are manifested in social networks. The proximity generated by Facebook or Twitter, and the wide availability of smartphones, makes us experience the hopes and frustrations of the world directly and in real time.

The digital age has accelerated life at amazing speed. What allowed us once to talk about the future in a calm way, today can happen the next minute. Digital transformation, the development of wireless and the Cloud, have allowed people to be connected with much less physical infrastructure than in the past, and we are little prepared for that. We are even entering the age of artificial intelligence.

In this context, the phenomenon of post-truth expands. Objective facts influence less the formation of public opinion than emotion and personal belief. It is the predominance of emotion, belief and superstition over reason. Populism is leading to disdain for experts and knowledge; "the death of expertise" as *Tom Nichols*, a leading sociologist, says in a recent book. It is the death of knowledge, when people give more credit to received opinion than to reality.

This phenomenon occurs in different corners of the world. Post-truth brings rage against enemies: immigrants, Muslims, Latinos, Wall Street, EU bureaucrats, in short, the different. The problem with this is that we need a sense of community. As *Zygmunt Bauman* said, social networks can create a 'community substitute' (the network belongs to you, and you can add or delete friends); but, dialogue and real action is to interact and work with those who think differently.

This is the task of today and the future: to know how to create conditions for dialogue, to face and understand others, the different, and to seek the consensus needed to move forward.

When I think about the meaning of the task that calls you to be in our country today, I recall a few words of the Turkish writer *Orhan Pamuk*, winner of the Nobel Prize for Literature: "The entire world was like a palace with countless rooms, whose doors opened into one another. We were able to pass from one room to the next only by exercising our memories and imaginations, but most of us, in our laziness, rarely exercised these capacities, and forever remained in the same room."

Pamuk is right. We live in an increasingly inter-connected world. Memory - which keeps the past alive - and imagination - which anticipates the future - allow us to go from one room to another, from country to country, creating a common vision that opens new doors.

For Chile, this is a fundamental objective. Open doors, learn from new worlds, welcome others, and jointly develop common solutions to global challenges; which also corresponds to our national interests, promoting an essentially inclusive development with a human face.

You will seek answers to these challenges from the diversity of your experience, culture and interests; diversity that enriches dialogue and encourages the emergence of new ideas.

This is our objective when we promote convergence in diversity within our region. That is, focus on what unites us instead of emphasizing differences. This way of approaching our interlocutors respectfully is what has allowed the Pacific Alliance - which we have set up with Colombia, Mexico and Peru - to develop joint actions with Mercosur - which includes Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay - as an opportunity to work for our countries and the region as a whole. We are pursuing this approach also in our bilateral relations. An innovative example is the Chile-Argentina Strategic Dialogue Forum 2030, which is seeking those areas where we can work together to address the challenges of the future.

Chile is interested in its own development, but at the same time we are interested in achieving this goal in conjunction with other countries of the region. We know clearly that opening of trade, inter-connectivity, and technological acceleration has brought millions of people out of poverty, and has created new middle classes. According to the World Bank, the number of people living below the poverty line fell to 10.7% of the global population in 2013, from 39% in 1990, despite the fact that the inhabitants of the planet increased by almost two billion at the same time. But, the benefits have gone disproportionately to a small fortunate minority, leaving many stragglers on the road.

Seventy million Latin Americans have ceased to be poor in the last decade. Our region is one of the richest on the planet, yet at the same time its development is impeded by societies that throughout history have reproduced patterns of inequality and exclusion, and has made us the most unequal area, with the largest proportion of poor at the global level, highly vulnerable to change. The absence of policies that effectively promote social cohesion weakens feelings of solidarity, belonging and social identity.

That is why we commit ourselves to work intensely in contributing to the achievement of Sustainable Development, quality education and health as fundamental rights, eradication of poverty; all based on principles of equity, equality, inclusion, participation, collaboration and respect, principles that we all share in our region.

Regional efforts will be essential to fulfil the 17 Sustainable Development Goals and the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development, to which our country and our Foreign Ministry are fully committed.

Chile is opposed to the protectionism that has arisen recently. We believe that unfettered trade policy favors development. We have 26 trade agreements with 64 countries, representing over 60% of the world's population, and more than 85% of global GDP. This has allowed Chile to have an annual commercial exchange of over 120 billion dollars in 2016. That is job creation. That is prosperity creation.

Our trade policy has yielded economic growth, job creation and poverty reduction. However, we need to make another leap forward. In addition to diversifying our product mix, we have started negotiations to update our trade agreements, for example with China and the European Union, so that they cover areas not included before, and that support our productivity agenda.

At the same time, we are working with partners in the region to face future challenges, for example in promoting bi-oceanic corridors, energy interconnection, or bi- and tri-national tourism. We look forward to the installation of a transpacific fibre-optic cable with Asia.

Matters like these are part of daily diplomatic work, and our Academies must prepare the professionals who will be responsible for it in the coming decades. The challenges they face will be tremendous, not only because of the problems of global governance, but also because of the tremendous commitments that must be fulfilled to ensure the existence of the planet.

A year ago, the international community adopted the Paris Agreement, which sets out a global plan of action to avoid the dangers of climate change by limiting global warming to below 2°C.

But, sadly, things are not going well.

Chile is one of the most vulnerable states. In March 2015, the temperature in the Antarctic Peninsula was 17.5 degrees Celsius, the highest ever recorded. Three days later, it rained in the Atacama Desert, the first time in fourteen years. Mudslides have cost many lives and caused immense material losses. All this directly related to climate change.

We are among the 146 States that have ratified the Paris Agreement, (in addition, 48 other countries have signed it). Chile undertook, through its Determined National Contribution, to reduce its emissions per unit of GDP by 30% by 2030, and to increase this number to 45% if international support is provided. Also, a forest target was set, among other measures, consisting of the afforestation of 100,000 hectares, mainly with native forest.

In addition, President Michelle Bachelet presented recently the National Action Plan on Climate Change, which has sixteen specific objectives, with corresponding lines of action.

In this environmental framework, Chile is working also for ocean protection. We are designing an Ocean Policy, which should be completed by the end of the year. We are one of the main drivers of the "Our Ocean" initiative, which addresses the different facets of sustainable use of the sea. We participated recently in a high-level United Nations summit on the implementation of SDG 14, directly linked to the conservation of marine spaces.

We are proud that Chile is making significant progress in terms of marine conservation, with the creation of the Nazca-Desventuradas marine park, which prohibits fishing off Caldera city, and the protected marine areas of the Juan Fernandez Archipelago, where through self-regulation the fishermen themselves contribute to conservation. Thus, 13.6% of our Exclusive Economic Zone is now protected, meeting the goal established under the Convention on Biological Biodiversity (CBD).

I wish to celebrate also that on this past Sunday, the Rapa Nui people, in a democratic exercise that is part of an indigenous consultation under the 169th Convention of the World Labor Organization (ILO), approved the creation of a Multiple Use Coastal and Marine Protected Area which covers the entire Exclusive Economic Zone of the marine eco-region of Easter Island, more than 700,000 square kilometers of ocean.

This Marine Protected Area will be managed jointly by the Chilean State and the Rapa Nui people, recognising their conservation-friendly ancestral methods of fishing, while adhering to MPA regulations. It will aim to protect the biodiversity and unique marine ecosystems present in the sea off Easter Island, as well as the seabed and seamounts.

Reflecting our leadership in this area, this week we are hosting the fourth International Congress of Marine Protected Areas. We are working hard also in Antarctica.

Dear friends, as you can see, we are carrying out initiatives that are linked directly to the central theme of this Meeting, which is diplomatic training for compliance with the 2030 Agenda of Sustainable Development, approved by the entire international community. It seeks to promote a development where two objectives are achieved: better living conditions for humans, and preservation of the planet where we live. We as a country are determined to fulfil our commitments.

Perhaps because here in Chile we have the most transparent skies to look at the universe; perhaps because we are so close to Antarctica, a common heritage established by multilateral treaty, for the protection of which we work with great dedication; perhaps because our geographic diversity extends to the immensity of the Pacific Ocean, to the care of which we also give special attention. For all this and more we are always keen to understand better what happens near and far from our physical boundaries.

We thank you all for meeting us in Chile. We know you will make an invaluable contribution to a shared task. Your presence, moreover, reinforces the importance of the work that our own Diplomatic Academy has been doing at the national and international level. Your questions are also ours. And, in the same way, the answers that you will find, we want to make ours."

Ambassador Juan Somavía noted that Agenda 2030, the focus of this Meeting, had been welcomed and approved by all 193 members of the United Nations in 2015, but a difficult road lay ahead to make it happen. It was, though, an inevitable path, full of opportunity.

Much of government and business still operated in silo-mentality. Yet there was growing awareness that our investment and consumption patterns had to change to be sustainable. Agenda 2030 told us that we had to be integrated, holistic, centred on human and earth needs, if to generate a sound economy. It was to be a whole-society exercise, involving all countries and a range of actors with competing and conflicting interests. The solutions could not be imposed by powerful countries, or winners in a conflict; they would be the result of dialogue.

This Meeting's two-day agenda would focus on how we were to help diplomats to develop the awareness, policy tools and skills needed to advance Agenda 2030. There would be differences in national realities, but all shared one key goal: to promote dialogue between professionals from different countries – to talk, listen, understand and eventually to agree.

The capacity to communicate started with being open to ourselves, in order to hear others. In the family, with friends, at school and at work, the capacity to dialogue – to respect the other as an equal, despite differences – was essential to the quality of our lives. It was important, though, to be careful of the word tolerant – from the certainty of my own truth, I tolerated. From there, it was a short step to the imposition of my truth.

The turmoil of present events could obscure long-term vision. But that had been a constant of diplomatic life. Our training needed to be tuned to helping professionals to manage the complexities of continual change.

Ambassador (ret) Barbara Bodine, Director of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University, and co-chair of the IFDT, gave special thanks to *Ambassador Somavía* and his staff, and to *Nadja Wozonig* and the team at the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, for the friendly and efficient organisation of the Meeting. She observed that good educators were good students; they were here to learn from one another, and to think about the future of diplomacy.

Susanne Keppler-Schlesinger, Deputy Director of the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, brought best wishes from *Ambassador Dr Hans Winkler*, Director of the Academy until his retirement in July, and personal thanks to the organisers from his successor as Director and co-chair of the IFDT, *Ambassador Emil Blix*, former Austrian ambassador in London and in Moscow.

Opening Address:

The Honourable José Miguel Insulza, former Secretary General of the Organization of American States (2005-2015), former Minister of the Presidency, Minister of Interior and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, former Director of the Diplomatic Academy of Chile

The profession of diplomacy had a crucial role to play in the current turmoil of world politics. Dialogue and co-operation between nations needed to be the main instrument of conflict avoidance.

Progress had been made since World War II, with de-colonisation and the declaration of universal human rights. But there also had been continued use of power and force, and enduring inequality of states and people. Diplomacy was essential to peace; more needed to be built on the achievements of the past.

The international community needed to respond to the weakening of European Union, the collapse of order in the Middle East, the rise of protectionism, the North Korean threat, delay in recovery from the Financial Crisis in 2008. As *Richard Haass* had written, the world was in disarray.

And yet, the doomsayers had been exaggerated – we had been here before, in the crises in Berlin and Cuba, and in the long war in Vietnam. The advances made in the last seven decades had been unprecedented. Global wealth had multiplied by four; median income had grown from USD 450 to 10,000; average life expectancy had increased from 52 to 72. The Cold War had ended. China had embraced global trade. Progress had come with the spread of mass communication, and global demand for better life conditions. The international system was more resilient than its critics suggested.

When the IMF, the World Bank and regional organisations started to be criticised by their founders, people became anxious. Yet these advances in institutionalised dialogue were robust. On its 100th anniversary, the American Society of International Law had identified three hundred ways in which advances in international law had affected our lives. In asserting human rights, in moving beyond the security of the state to human security, in addressing climate change and managing pandemics, in the development of the European Union, in Agenda 2030, the international community had consolidated successes.

In Latin America, there had been no international conflict in more than a century. Milestones had included the San José Agreement on Human Rights, and the Mexico Conference on Inter-American Co-operation. A mindset had emerged of collective efforts at strengthening human security.

Diplomacy strengthened what had been built. It was our only defence against conflict.

Panel Discussion 1:

“The Global Scenario: The Challenges of Diplomacy in a World of Uncertainty”

Chair: *Ambassador Juan Somavía*, Director, Diplomatic Academy of Chile “Andrés Bello”

Panelists:

Ambassador Allan Wagner (Director, Diplomatic Academy of Peru “Javier Pérez de Cuéllar”)

Ambassador Horst Freitag (Head of the Foreign Service Academy, Federal Foreign Office of Germany)

Geoffrey Wiseman (Director, Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy, Australian National University)

Yolanda Spies (Chair in African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy, University of Johannesburg)

Ambassador Juan Somavía

There were three key points to bear in mind when considering global challenges in a world of uncertainty:

1. the importance of diplomacy, sometimes dismissed as a relic of the past
2. the vision of Agenda 2030, negotiated by diplomats in the framework of what the UN system offered: collective thinking and decision-making, the capacity to negotiate beyond the national focus
3. in the multilateral field of economic and social issues, development financing, building societies, there was for the first time a consortium of developing *and* developed countries, interests aligned at last. (The same could not be said on the political side, as in the Security Council.)

Ambassador Allan Wagner

Questions for discussion:

In the area of peace and security, two questions had to be addressed:

1. Stability in East Asia was threatened by the aggressive policy of the DPRK, diplomacy by long-range missiles and nuclear tests. We needed to look back to *Kim Il-sung* and *Kim Jong-il*, who also had pursued a policy of testing the ground. Now there was a different level of aggression, with correspondingly bellicose rhetoric from *President Trump*. China now had less influence on the North Korean regime. Enhanced sanctions were being discussed in the Security Council. How should we respond?
2. Peace talks to resolve the Syrian crisis were not progressing. Refugee flows, the humanitarian crisis, terrorism continued, despite reduction in the capacity of ISIS. How to break the deadlock?

In the area of the European Union and Brexit: how to minimise the damage?

In the diplomacy of climate change: *President Trump's* withdrawal from the Paris Agreement had been a setback, despite the counter-response from other US authorities. The key challenge was, how to continue to pursue the Paris agenda, until the US returned to the fold?

Ambassador Horst Freitag (Head of the Foreign Service Academy, Federal Foreign Office of Germany)

In preparation for this Meeting, students at the Academy in Berlin had been asked to list the key questions of international policy and practice that needed to be addressed:

- How could foreign policy and foreign services best adapt to the IT revolution?
- How to satisfy the growing demand for human rights and economic prosperity, and to build the institutions of the rule of law?
- How to meet the increasing demand for public diplomacy, to close the disconnect between publics and government? As the boundaries between the domestic and the foreign became blurred, it was necessary to justify foreign policy positions to the domestic audience.
- How to deal with the growing number of national and international non-state actors? Vibrant civil society fostered inclusive dynamic debates. It was essential to bring them into the policy debate, helping them to understand how their special interests could fit into the policy space. Government policy gained credibility from the interaction.
- What could diplomatic history tell us about dealing with current dilemmas, helping us to understand better where we came from, what had happened before, providing depth of analysis? Practical case studies could help.
- How to reinvigorate the EU, the only European institution with supra-national authority? Brexit had reminded people what they would be losing if the EU weren't there – a motor for peace, stability, coherent transport and energy policy. Without the EU, Germany would have to do more to achieve its national goals. So it was vital to help the EU to reform and develop.
- How could states remain the drivers of a rules-based international order? The private sector had their own interests to the fore. The financial crisis had demonstrated that some banks could benefit from being 'too big to fail', but the victims had been the citizens. So diplomacy had to integrate the interests of the citizens in creating international rules.
- How to reform the international institutions, to enable sustained international dialogue and co-operation? There had been dismay at Brexit, and the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement.

In summary – there was urgent need for reform at home and abroad, to re-generate trust and confidence-building.

Geoffrey Wiseman

These were indeed unsettled times. There was no agreement on the causes, though two groups of cause could be identified:

- state-based uncertainties: for example, the rise of China
- issues-based uncertainties: populism, nationalism, migration, cyber security, stable development.

Where was the role of diplomacy in all this, especially as foreign ministries faced increasing workloads and declining budgets; and how could diplomatic training contribute?

There were five principal challenges for diplomatic education and training:

1. framing national interest and values:
as the Canadian academic, *Andrew Cooper* [Professor at the Balsillie School of International Affairs and the Department of Political Science, University of Waterloo], had observed, diplomats were the most coherent interpreters and custodians of national interest and values. At the same time, the foreign ministry needed to give up the gatekeeper role, and to embrace a whole of government approach in both policy and training
2. representing a government under populist leadership:
how did a diplomat represent *Modi, Trump, Duterte, Xi*? Was it the responsibility of the diplomat to echo the dubious, incoherent statements of a populist leader? Was it legitimate to deliver a different message in public to the one in private?
3. dealing with dissent:
to what extent could or should the individual register objection to government policy or practice? (Since the Vietnam War, the US State Department had had a 'dissent channel', where critical views could be lodged without retaliation or recrimination.)
4. bridging the gap between headquarters and the field:
5. bringing in non-state actors:
increasingly, diplomats were operating in a poly-lateral system of state/non-state interaction.

Yolanda Spies

Africa used to be called the 'Dark Continent'; now things were looking comparatively sunny, in relation to the circus in the White House, in Caracas and Pyongyang.

But things were not as bad as was made out – all had been magnified by social media and the 24/7 news cycle. Diplomats were suffering from depression at the (down)turn of events. It was necessary to get back to basics – '*ubuntu*' – the essence of humanity: 'I am because you are; I exist in terms of your existence.' Diplomacy would not exist if it weren't for 'the other'. It predated the nation state; it had existed as an activity since the beginning of time.

International relations was normally state-based, but could focus on different levels. Diplomats represented 'the people' of their country, but were finding it difficult to connect with their own '*ubuntu*'. They needed to be in closer touch with their own people, rather than just mixing with each other. Part of their task was to help overcome the sense of alienation and marginalisation in societies: human-focused diplomacy, representing *people*, not just impersonal entities.

In discussion:

- It was true that we were training people, not robots, helping to instil in them pride and values – but whose values, whose principles? in highly diverse societies, how to avoid being hijacked by one or other?

- It was important to help diplomats to connect with social realities, and values expressed in the constitution. But governments had different ideas and priorities, and civil servants had to represent them faithfully; each individual had to decide how closely to toe the line. How did you train diplomats in a Ministry that was hierarchical and traditional?
- There was a problem with hierarchical authority structures: millennials were more horizontal, less formal, more practical, wanting quick results; they were frustrated if not able to express their individualism.
- Diplomacy was widely seen as 'small c' conservative, unimaginative, risk averse and beset by group think. Fifty-seven new entrants had joined the UK Foreign and Commonwealth this year, but without guarantee of career-long advancement. How were diplomats to be motivated, especially if in a regime of political appointment?
- There was a generational divide with different mentalities – the typewriter versus WhatsApp. Many millennials had a broader outlook because they didn't think in 'national' terms; they were searching for meaning, doing useful things for their people.
- A personal choice had to be made – some left the ministry out of frustration, others were snapped up by trans-national corporations. The solution perhaps was to 'draw on their energy and ideas, and hope that the most energetic would leave the service'.
- The concept of '*ubuntu*' was well-understood, but how did we get there? The young were questioning the growth model; what about work-life balance? They were commuting by bike instead of car – making choices at a personal level. They were questioning the purpose of borders – to manage and govern an area, because you couldn't have a world government? For them, borders were made to be overcome. How did you deal with their dissent, with the dilemma of encouraging an 'open society' while still having a government line to adhere to? There was no problem when something was plainly unconstitutional; it was more difficult when the issues were blurred.
- It was easy to represent a country loved by everyone in the world; more difficult when the government became unpopular. When representing a country overtly in transition, it was clear that you had to have a new mindset. It was more complicated if in a settled industrial society – you needed then to train for transition – '*transitology*'.
- Training was too narrow a concept. Diplomats needed conceptual training and education. Diplomacy was not a hermetically-sealed profession representing the national interest. What was the national interest? They needed to think about it, about who they were, what their interests and values were. Every diplomat was a *John Bolton* – with his or her own values, own personality, an individual interpreter of the national interest, and how to pursue it. They were remaking Chile, reflecting back to Chile their experiences of the rest of the world.
- Diplomats were usually from elites – you needed to send people out to get to know their own country and society, especially in the tough places. You needed to train people to respect their own people, their well-being, as well as international society. South African diplomats abroad represented not only South Africa, but SADC, the African Union, the G77, the Global South – diplomats had layered identities; it was necessary to teach them to embrace every level of their identity.
- *Jürgen Habermas* had stressed the importance of 'communicative action'. The identity of the diplomat resided in the language. Diplomacy had its own rules and norms; but in an asymmetric world, we should be aiming to address values, ethics, international law, the essential ink between peoples and respect for differences. Proactive diplomacy was needed.
- Ethics was at the heart of the curriculum in India – 'the whole world is a family'. It was essential to integrate the foreign and the domestic; each diplomat 'adopted' a state, got to know it in depth, sought to understand how to foster linkage between the community and the nation state. Greater integration was being achieved through social media, and with it greater accountability.

- Ethics and accountability were not the problem; there was scope for whistle-blowing. But how did you train for confidentiality? In the age of *Snowden* and *Wikileaks*, there was no more secrecy; how would diplomacy survive?
- Diplomacy had to join with civil society, because they were taking the lead. The Internet was a force in itself. International society was moving fast, and diplomats were increasingly out of the decision-making process, as for example in the field of air transport, which once had been organised by government, but now by consumers.
- Globalisation as we used to know it was over, killed off by the revolt of the marginalised and dispossessed. It was now in every national interest to acknowledge that, and to reform the old institutions. It needed speed, determination and coherent leadership.
- Diplomats themselves had to change their approach to incorporate the voices of the non-state actors. UNITAR was engaging with academia, business and civil society in pursuit of Agenda 2030. There was a strong common theme from all areas represented, demanding corruption-free societies.
- Diplomacy had a key role to play in promoting co-operation to combat corrupt practice, through the OECD and regional organisations.
- How were we to deal with ‘hybrid diplomacy’? National diplomacy would not go away; but there was also ‘network diplomacy’ without borders, with civil society, in the digital environment. How should we train for managing multi-speed diplomacy? – the individual had to be enabled to do both.
- The ‘trans-professional’ needed to be able to reach out to all the other diplomacies [cf. *Transprofessional Diplomacy*, Costas Constantinou, Noé Cornago and Fiona McConnell, (Brill, 2016)]. There had been too much emphasis on the bilateral and multilateral; it was essential now to focus on the poly-lateral.
- The dynamics of rapid change were apparent. The challenge was how to translate these perceptions into a training plan of studies. What messages, tools and skills were needed to combat terrorism and human trafficking? How did you train for social networking, for practical competence in the use of social media? Training for leadership was essential, and respect for all cultures, but what new skills were needed for ambassadors, as well as for new entrants?
- A recent study had suggested that by 2030, eighty percent of current professions wouldn’t then exist. Would there still be a role of ambassador to be trained?

Panel Discussion 2: “The Regional Scenario: Tackling Key Political and Development Challenges and Opportunities in Latin America and the Caribbean”

Chair:

Rebeca Grynspan, Ibero-American Secretary General

Panelists:

Ambassador Celeste Koch (Director, National Foreign Service Institute, Argentina)

Ambassador Luis Maira (Chilean Representative to the Peace Dialogues of Colombia, 2014-2018, Executive Secretary of the International Relations Council of Latin America and the Caribbean)

Ambassador Luis Padilla (Director, Diplomatic Academy of Guatemala)

Dr Khellon Roach (Manager of the Diplomatic Academy of the Caribbean, Trinidad and Tobago)

Rebeca Grynspan

The Ibero-American group comprised all twenty-two Spanish and Portuguese-speaking countries of Latin America. Founded in 1991, it had now twenty-six years’ experience of promoting regional co-operation.

It had achieved a successful record of economic and social development. Poverty had decreased (though 28% of people were still vulnerable); the middle class had expanded to include some 80 million people; there was less (though enduringly stark) inequality.

Progress had been made also in peace processes. But there was enduring mistrust of and dissatisfaction with politicians, despite there being stronger and more democratic institutions. Much work still needed to be done to promote integration in the region.

Ambassador Celeste Koch

The region faced many challenges, but there were also opportunities. Much progress had been made, in economic growth and reduced inequality. Latin America had developed its own voice; MERCOSUR and the Pacific Alliance had promoted integration and dialogue. In Colombia, a peace agreement had been reached with the FARC, and a ceasefire with the ELN.

Latin America was a zone of peace; it had recovered institutionality and democracy, overcoming the shadow of dictatorship. It had made a major contribution to the codification of international law. Growing prosperity gave voice to the demands of the new middle class, which had to be heard.

MERCOSUR was engaged in intensive dialogue with the EU. There was no conflict in this endeavor between MERCOSUR and the Pacific Alliance. Challenges could be managed only by trans-national co-operation.

Ambassador Luis Maira

It was not easy to describe Latin America in so many words; it was an evolving concept.

Three different post-World War II stages of relations with the United States could be identified – from Truman to Johnson, then the Nixon-Kissinger era, latterly the single policy of good neighbour.

There were four sub-regions, and two groups – one of ten, another of twelve countries, Latin America of the South.

There had been three stages of political evolution, three bipolarities: of democracy and dictatorship; of progress and stagnation; and of liberals and conservatives.

Regional organisations were becoming weaker; they couldn't manage the challenges to be overcome. The Security Council of International Relations of Latin America, for example, required a new basis of operation, greater productivity, improved quality of leadership and administration, and more enlightened focus on care of the environment.

Ambassador Luis Padilla

2017 was the thirtieth anniversary of the peace agreements that had put an end to the long conflict in the 1970s and 80s in Central America. The countries of the region had appealed directly to the United Nations when US President *Ronald Reagan*, in the depths of the Cold War, had been completely opposed to the negotiation process. In 1986, the election of *Marco Vinicio Cerezo Arévalo* in Guatemala had signaled the end of the military dictatorship in that country. Peace accords had followed in Nicaragua in 1990, El Salvador in 1992 and Guatemala in 1996, all of them through the mediation of the United Nations.

Popular dissatisfaction in the region now was not with democracy, but with inadequate satisfaction of basic human needs. Central American governments had to incorporate the seventeen Sustainable Development goals and targets within their own national development plans. That required co-ordinated regional policies to reduce poverty in countries like Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras, and to decrease the migration of poor people to the United States. Increased social investment would require tax reform, and determined action against corruption, which was bleeding public resources.

Despite obvious flaws, it was possible to say that democracy was working relatively well, even in Guatemala, where the courts (especially the Constitutional Court) had become more powerful than the executive or legislative branches of government.

Obstacles remained to the implementation of the SDGs, if governments continued to promote the classic middle-class consumption policies of their predecessors – the ‘culture of squandering’ (*cultura del descarte*), as *Pope Francis* had called it in his encyclical, *Laudato Si’*.

Other important matters, including nuclear disarmament, were being addressed at a regional level by the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC).

Dr Khellon Roach

[see Powerpoint presentation ‘Panel discussion 2: Dr Khellon Roach’, attached]

As *Amitav Acharya* [Professor of International Relations, School of International Service, American University, Washington DC] had observed, contemporary international relations was a multiplex world – a number of feature films, each with a different director, showing on several screens at the same time. Global production, finance, supply chains and networks all were interdependent, their layers inter-penetrated, with no overarching hegemon. Power and resources were moving steadily from the west to the rest; the combined GDP of China, India and Brazil now equalled that of the G6.

The states of the Caribbean were commodity exporters (of oil, gas and minerals) and service providers (of tourism and offshore finance). They were small economies, highly vulnerable to shocks.

They faced six principal challenges:

1. trans-national organised crime, which was stalling economic growth
2. health – the incidence of communicable and non-communicable diseases was rising
3. climate change – a sea-level rise of 0.9-1.5 metres would lead to the loss of more than 30,000 km² of agricultural land, 1% of the total
4. recurring natural disasters, causing the loss of 1% of GDP per annum
5. energy security – all but Trinidad and Tobago were net energy importers. More was being done on renewable energy exploitation, but needed external finance
6. access to finance – graduation to high-income or middle-income country status prevented access to foreign aid.

Without economic clout or military power, the states of the region relied, therefore, on the capacity and forcefulness of their diplomacy. More needed to be done in deepening collaboration and co-operation between the Caribbean and the countries of Latin America.

In summary:

Rebeca Grynspan

There had been positive gains in democracy and in the peace processes, yet some signs of regression to social and political crisis. There was a mismatch between the speed at which the people were moving ahead, and at which the institutions of governance were responding to the changes.

But in the past, a generalised crisis would have followed, as the institutions were then much weaker. Now, it could be seen as essentially a recession. Brazil and Argentina had had difficulties, but were making progress again.

Development in the region was asymmetric, requiring flexibility and skill in government. Greater integration was needed, without losing the independence the states of the region had enjoyed.

For the states of the Caribbean, the vulnerability index was perhaps a better indicator than GNI as the criterion for aid and development. With the shift from aid to co-operation, a new paradigm could be embraced, including South-South co-operation.

There was a role for diplomatic academies in preparing foreign services in the region to meet these challenges.

In discussion:

- Progress had been made from dictatorship to democracy, but the economies of Latin America were still mostly mono-culture dependent: Venezuela 72% on oil, Chile 50% on copper. They were unprepared for the third and fourth industrial revolutions. They didn't have the tools to face crises. Governments lacked legitimacy, with lack of trust in parties and in congress, and political participation below 40%, some as low as between 1% and 20%. The void was filled by dark forces. People had to be drawn back into representative government and political activism.
- The proportion of 15-29 year olds in the population was higher than ever. There was a new opportunity to draw on the young to take advantage of the fourth industrial revolution. But they didn't connect to 'democracy', which was just a word for them. The key challenge was how to do this.
- There was satisfaction *at* democracy, but not *in* democracy. There was, for example, the enduring problem of organised crime, and mistrust of the police. In Argentina in 1983, when *Raúl Alfonsín* was elected, it had been an unimaginable event; all had felt themselves to be stakeholders in the newly-recovered democracy. A judge under the dictatorship had come to talk to the students. It had been the start of an inter-generational conversation, getting to know how it had been, considering which model to be followed, each with restraints and possibilities.
- It was important to be precise about the meaning of democracy – moving to a society model required a true political system, where people had a modicum of power. Asymmetries in society made one group an 'empire', another 'victims'. Hope, however, lay in youth, who were more optimistic.
- The region would be damaged by the Trump Administration's decision to revoke DACA. Sustainable development policies were needed to reduce migration by integrating young and indigenous people in the economy. Chile, Uruguay, Costa Rica and Panama had made important investments in health and education. There had been no 'dreamers' from those countries.
- Corruption and loss of legitimacy undermined growth and democracy. What role could academies play in educating young diplomats in this aspect of their national life?
- Educating diplomats in all these fields was a huge challenge, but we needed to be idealistic and optimistic, to make progress by force of will. The experience of Central America in 1987 could be instructive, two years before the fall of the Berlin Wall. In pursuit of a peace settlement, they had just pushed on regardless, despite the opposition of the White House.
- Challenges needed strong institutions to meet them, multilateral institutions that were robust and well-organised, respecting international agreements, strengthening the instruments of soft-power.
- How might the Ibero-American and European experience be compared? How could the upcoming Austrian Presidency of the Council of the European Union help move forward inter-continental co-operation?

- The EU-Mexico agreement was being refreshed; the EU-Chile agreement was on the table, too. The oldest agreements needed updating. The EU-MERCOSUR association agreement applied to all states of the region except Bolivia and Venezuela. All were approximating the *acquis communautaire* – it would have a huge impact, avoiding multiple bilateral micro-agreements. Regional integration through the EU! There was, still, however, a certain reluctance on the EU side. Classification according to GDP or GNI was an issue. The Austrian Presidency could play a crucial role in prioritising development.
- Care was needed in classifying countries according to GDP or GNI; each had its own peculiarities. The Caribbean region did not have the finances to move forward on implementing the Sustainable Development Goals. Storms were increasing, funds were short, Caribbean states were vulnerable. A conversation was needed between donors, governments and civil society.

IFDT Bazaar

Following the IFDT tradition, members offered brief presentations on recent developments in their institutions.

Co-chairs: *Sangeeta Bahadur*, (Head, Foreign Service Institute of India)
Ambassador Fernando Reyes Matta (Diplomatic Academy 'Andrés Bello')

Armenia

Discussions at the Forum meetings were always very interesting, but it might be helpful to have a one-page online questionnaire with five or six questions, including key challenges, tabulated and distributed to members. This could serve as a helpful guide to the programme for subsequent meetings.

Austria

The Diplomatic Academy of Vienna had been founded in 1754. They offered programmes in three sectors: academic, short-term executive training, and conferences: a two-year MA in International Studies, currently with 185 students; a two-year MSc in Environmental Technology and International Affairs, in partnership with the Technical University; and a one-year Diploma course in International Affairs, with a student body from all over the world, one-third of them Austrians. Generous sponsorship was available for those unable to pay the whole cost. They had partnerships with Stanford, MGIMO, the Korean University and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Tailor-made inter-disciplinary programmes were offered to about 700 diplomats and young officials from Africa and the Western Balkans. A summer course was conducted in August, in German. They were active on social media, including Facebook and Twitter.

Bulgaria

The Diplomatic Institute had been created in 2003. They offered training for work in periods of transition, as during the EU Accession process. Their course for young diplomats was half lecture and half interactive. They were in the EU Presidency Trio with Estonia and Austria, working together to develop practical diplomatic skills. They would host the European Diplomatic Programme in 2018, with two young diplomats from each Member State. The Institute fostered regional co-operation, sharing knowledge and opportunities with neighbours in Macedonia, Montenegro, Croatia and Romania.

India

New recruits were increasingly technical in orientation, half engineers and doctors, also lawyers and investment bankers, all needing to be re-orientated to the new profession. They were encouraging specialist learning, including development, and languages such as Persian, Japanese, Korean and Hebrew. The training programme had been decreased recently from one and a half years to five months.

Indonesia

The Academy had been established in 1973. They offered programmes at three levels: junior (a seven-month induction course plus a two-month internship in missions abroad), mid-career (2.5 months) and senior (270 hours). The Junior course was for newly-recruited diplomats; all were graduates. The Mid-career course was a compulsory hurdle for promotion to First Secretary (the prime drivers of every unit). Their course included one week in the provinces, working in groups, focusing on teamwork, expanding networks with businesses and local government. The Senior course focused on leadership. Participants also went out to study at universities in Australia, China and the United States. The Academy offered specialist courses (ISO certificated from the British Standards Institute) twice a year for 12-15 mid-career diplomats from Africa, Asia and ASEAN, as well as courses for the diplomatic corps in Jakarta.

Montenegro

The Academy had a hard task, having a limited diplomatic network, with few diplomats in each mission. Montenegrin diplomats had to be trained to be both generalists and specialists. They undertook a fifteen-week induction programme, before sitting the foreign service exam in order to attain diplomatic rank. They were eligible then to apply for posting. Their subsequent training was specific to the requirements of the posting, including preparatory visits to public institutions in Montenegro. They prepared a thesis for final oral presentation to the leadership of the Foreign Ministry. The Academy organised an International Summer School for young diplomats, with contributions from scholars and practitioners from all over the world (this year, including a panel on Agenda 2030, chaired by the head of UN agencies in Montenegro).

Netherlands

The Clingendael Institute had been established in 1983, a useful place to come and study, with a lot of diplomatic activity in The Hague. Their programmes focused on skills and practicalities, linking knowledge to competences and work processes. They offered 34 diplomatic and specialist courses to some 500 diplomats, including specialist and generalist programmes such as cyber-diplomacy, European integration and Accession, as well as skills-based courses (networking, lobbying, chairing), curriculum development and training of trainers. Their programmes included specialist training for peace negotiators in Africa, Asia and Latin America, using negotiation trainers for mediation training. (If to mediate successfully, you would need to be a better negotiator than the negotiators negotiating.) They were also helping to set up mediation units in regional organisations such as ECOWAS, and had developed new specialisms in humanitarian diplomacy, training aid workers in the tough skills of hostage negotiation, gaining access to hostile territory, and dealing with refugees. Altogether, they trained some 2,500 diplomats and officials per year.

Paraguay

The Diplomatic and Consular Academy offered something new, different and working. Being a bilingual country, they placed a lot of emphasis on culture and history. They practised open recruitment for an open career; no graduate degree was required. (The millennials were glad that 'everyone could be a diplomat'). Programmes were offered at three levels; diplomats returned to the Academy to move from one level to the next, providing useful cross-fertilisation of experience and ideas. They were considering creating a platform of virtual courses to replace the mid-level programmes.

Portugal

The three-month induction course at the Instituto Diplomático included the new diplomacy of the 21st century – training to think outside the box, coping with new situations, connecting with civil society and the corporate sector. The course included practical simulation exercises. They offered refresher training for diplomats being posted or in transition between posts, and also for other categories of staff. They were growing a suite of online courses, which were cost-effective and capable of reaching people in posts abroad, while also connecting people at post to conferences being conducted in Lisbon.

Singapore

The Academy was ten years old, still developing the institute and curriculum. New entrants went straight to the desk, and attended a short six-week introduction within six months. The training for diplomats included 10% formal training, 20% experiential training and 70% on-the-job training. To make up for the lack of academic rigour, diplomats with seven or eight years service were sent to attend Masters courses at universities in China, Japan, the United States and elsewhere. Sabbaticals had recently been introduced for more senior diplomats, with attachments to think tanks overseas and locally. A new course for HoMs-to-be was introduced in 2015, focusing on administration and finance, ethics, psychology, stress management and social media. The Academy had stepped up the use of case studies, policy-gaming and simulation exercises, for example in crisis management. Special preparation on UN negotiation was offered for those reinforcing the Mission in NY during UNGA, including officials from other agencies.

South Africa

The Academy offered three accredited programmes: one year of diplomatic training; one year for mission administration managers; one year for mission administrative assistants. Additional programmes were offered twice a year: a three-month programme for Heads of Mission, a mission-orientation programme for spouses, and a mission-orientation programme for staff nominated for placement abroad. Language training was offered in French, Spanish, Portuguese and English. Separate units offered short courses in foreign service strategy, structured collaboration with other institutions, economic diplomacy, problem-solving, communication, networking, public speaking, project management, report-writing, conflict resolution, negotiation and mediation. Training focused in particular on youth and women. There was a special programme for unemployed graduates.

Spain

The Escuela Diplomática offered traditional training of juniors, with a high bar for entry. The first six months were basically practical, including training in communications and social media. Progressive four-week courses were offered twice a year on new topics in diplomacy, for up to twenty participants. Half the participants in the one-year MA programme, taught in Spanish, were from Spain, the other half from foreign countries. Each year there were two each from China, India and Japan, as well as participants from other countries. The Escuela offered courses also to officials from other government departments.

Thailand

The Devawongse Varopakarn Institute of Foreign Affairs trained diplomats and non-diplomats, offering traditional courses in history and international relations, as well as practical courses in diplomatic writing, negotiation skills, and the diplomacy of human rights, migration and climate change. New courses were given by outside specialists from government, business and academic institutions. Young diplomats undertook a 4.5-month programme of action learning, with exeats one day a week to other government departments and non-state organisations. New recruits went out to development centres in ten provinces, spending two weeks with local authorities, farmers and fishermen. Many had been educated abroad, and were Bangkok residents; they needed to understand the problems of the country at root cause, so to be able to appreciate and represent the majority of the people of Thailand. Senior diplomats attended a one-week module on management at business school. Workshops were offered at mid- and senior-level with CEOs of prominent international companies.

UNITAR

UNITAR's core mission was to work with ministries of foreign affairs and others to improve knowledge of and skills useful to working with and within the UN system. They had many partnerships also for bilateral co-operation. There was a new Masters programme, with the University of Geneva, incorporating an internship in the UN system. Their MA in International Affairs was soon to be accessible online. They offered a two-year joint programme with MGIMO,

one year in Moscow, one in Geneva. There was an inter-agency programme of skills development for women delegates to UN bodies. They were developing a suite of online courses. UNITAR had a network of 40,000-50,000 alumni, each of them having free access to online courses and MOOCs.

Members of the Forum had the privilege of a guided tour of the exhibition, '*Chile before Chile*', at the Chilean Museum of Pre-Columbian Art, followed by a Gala Dinner, at which they were welcomed by *Ambassador Milenko Skoknic*, Director General for Foreign Policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Chile's role in international affairs had grown fast since the end of the military regime. They now had a resonant voice in the world not only through their diplomacy, but through literature, cinema and art.

Ambassador Skoknic was proud to be a career diplomat. It was a true profession, requiring quality education and training. Diplomatic academies were producing the latest version of Renaissance man and woman, capable of mastering all manner of tasks.

Diplomatic training was a particular challenge in a time of rapid and continual change, defining and producing the new skills needed, including responding to the growing demands from citizens. There was little space or time for reflection. They were training, above all perhaps, for adaptation.

Diplomacy was the search for peace, understanding and dialogue. *Ambassador Skoknic* had spent two years helping to facilitate the negotiations between the FARC and Government of Colombia. It had been extraordinary to be sitting at the table with guerrillas. It had been necessary to know that it was going to be successful; if you didn't believe it would work, it would not. Initially, the parties had been in opposite worlds; gradually they had come to accept that they were not looking for guilt or blame, but common ground. Now they were celebrating that peace could be achieved not just with an AK-47.

The members of the IFDT had a contribution to make to this process by providing the skills of peacemaking to the next generation.

Friday, 8 September

Keynote Address 'Diplomats for the future'

Alicia Bárcena, Executive Secretary, United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), former Under Secretary General and *chef de cabinet* to Kofi Annan, former biologist

[see Powerpoint presentation 'Keynote Address', with text and graphics, attached]

The IFDT brought together the directors of diplomatic academies to consider how best to prepare the diplomats of the future, and in particular this year to position Agenda 2030 in the context of multilateral diplomacy.

There were currently five common mega-trends:

1. the geopolitical re-organisation of power between the United States, Europe, Russia and China. (A key question was whether the Security Council would be able to achieve a single decision, or only a divided decision. China's role had changed, with greater international co-operation under the Belt and Road Initiative.)

2. demographic transition, and massive migration. (A global compact was being negotiated at UNGA, not as a humanitarian initiative, but as development issue – a new approach. Switzerland and Mexico were the co-chairs.)
3. growing inequality
4. climate change
5. disruptive technological change, generating new challenges.

The international economy had undergone a radical transformation in the fourteen months since the Brexit referendum in June, 2016. There had been an unexpected backlash against globalisation, with four main characteristics:

- the return of protectionism
- the rise of economic nationalism and extreme political movements
- increased domestic and international conflict
- weakening of multilateralism, for example in managing abuses of the international tax system.

Two contrasting narratives of governance of the global economy had become more sharply defined:

- hyper-globalisation, the prevailing model of liberalisation in trade and finance, and market de-regulation, without safeguarding global public goods or compensating the losers
- open multilateral co-operation to regulate markets, manage tensions, reduce inequalities and safeguard public goods and shared prosperity.

Economies were highly heterogeneous – in technology, resources, institutions and capacities. The tensions and polarisations that had grown up between them did not correct themselves automatically: growth was weak, unemployment was high (especially in Europe), wages had stalled, migration flows had soared, labour in developed countries had been left behind under intense competition from Asia in manufacturing and technology. As a result, the marginalised and dispossessed – the resentful middle class – had begun to push back.

So what to do? – hence diplomacy.

Agenda 2030 had come from long negotiations, almost three decades of work since the 1990s, in Rio, Cairo and Beijing, ending with the Millennium Declaration, transferred into eight Millennium Development Goals. But it had not been not a negotiated text, just a prescription from the North. Gradually it had come to be recognised that that recipe for development was not sustainable.

Consequently, the 17 goals, 169 targets and 231 indicators of Agenda 2030 had been developed through intensive, comprehensive negotiation. They had not been imposed; they were owned by the 193 governments adopting them, reflecting consensus on the need to change the prevailing development pattern, if to end poverty in all its forms, achieve equality and ensure responsible stewardship of the environment.

Equality had been the driver of the goals. Only multilateral co-operation could correct the asymmetries that blocked progress, and lay the foundations of an open and stable international system that imposed fewer restrictions on national decisions.

Agenda 2030 was the practical expression of seven core principles:

1. a multilateral community of interest, with common but differentiated responsibilities
2. political agreements for a universal covenant, with equality at the centre
3. a culture of collective action for development, with tolerance for diversity

4. strategic vision with an inter-generational approach, promoting agreements between state and non-state actors
5. building institutional capabilities to manage big data, to enable access for all to information, participation and justice
6. democracy and the rule of law
7. independent monitoring and measuring of progress.

Keynes had said that the global economy would prosper only if the leading economies stimulated the system. There was money out there, but it was locked up in derivatives, not working in the real economy; it was in few hands, monetized rather than productive.

The new middle class in emerging countries (especially China) had been the winners of globalization. The losers were the middle class in the developed countries (especially the United States and Europe). The classical elite, the richest 1%, never lost.

[see comprehensive data graphics in Powerpoint presentation 'Keynote Address', slides 10-23]

The new global political economy posed risks for Agenda 2030 and the SDGs, the Paris Agreement and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, the Sendai Framework [for Disaster Risk Reduction], the SAMOA Pathway [Small Island Developing States Accelerated Modalities of Action] and the [IMO's] Global Compact for Migration, and with them for the possibility of an international economy based on multilateral co-operation. No government wanted to do things in isolation, to bear all the costs alone.

The challenge was to recoup the multilateral co-operation agenda, which risked being weakened by hyper-globalisation and emerging unilateralism.

In short, there were five elements to the effective implementation of Agenda 2030:

1. global, regional and national governance:
 - production of global public goods
 - reduction of power asymmetries in the global governance of monetary, financial, trade, technological and environmental matters
 - institutional co-operation and co-ordination within and between countries
 - development of low-carbon regional production chains
2. building the SDGs into national development plans, budgets and business models
3. measuring what we collectively decide, with new indicators
4. mobilising the means of implementation: finance, technology, fair trade and access to information
5. inter-sectoral and inter-institutional co-ordination, in coalitions between state, market and citizens

The public sphere was all of us – it was time to move away from the culture of privilege, and embrace a long-term vision of equality and prosperity.

In discussion:

[deferred to the following Panel]

Panel Discussion 3: Diplomatic Training on the Content of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, “Critical Elements and Opportunities for Cooperation on Diplomatic Training in Different Regional and National Contexts”

Chair:

Nikhil Seth, Executive Director of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research and UN Assistant Secretary-General

Panelists:

Dayu Qi (Executive Vice President of China Diplomatic Academy)

Ambassador José Estanislau do Amaral (Director-General, Rio Branco Institute of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Brazil)

Susanne Keppler-Schlesinger (Deputy Director, Diplomatic Academy of Vienna)

Nikhil Seth

It was possible to be optimistic that many of solutions to the problems of poverty and hunger, to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals, were to be found in technology and innovation.

How could Agenda 2030 inform the content and quality of diplomatic training, bringing human concerns and aspirations together under one umbrella? What kind of diplomat would be needed to help realise those aspirations?

The UN Charter and Agenda 2030 were two parts of the same story. The UN system was still antiquated and soiled, but the SDGs brought together the security, development and environmental agenda in pursuit of peaceful and just societies.

Twenty-seven core issues defined in Rio 2012 had been resolved into the seventeen goals, 169 targets and 231 indicators of Agenda 2030. These two IFDT panel discussions had been divided into the consideration of its *content* and *implementation*. Yet the two were not easily separated; it was necessary to come out of our little silos, and address issues in a more holistic way.

The SDGs offered five lessons:

1. The SDGs were a matrix of relationships. They were not prescriptive; it was left to each country to decide where to put its priorities. It was not a North-South enterprise, but universal – an effervescent process, with deep interaction with the UN, with academia, civil society and business – a whole-of-society approach, the universalisation of engagement.
2. Sharply defined national interests and priorities provided useful material for election campaigns. In the negotiation of the SDGs, however, traditional groupings had broken down, (eg Iran, Nepal and Japan had worked together); the normal unionism of state interests had been irrelevant. Climate and environment considerations had been woven into the final outcome. Collective regional interests had come to the fore – an agenda for eradicating inequality.
3. The negotiations highlighted the relevance of diplomacy in nurturing and managing multi-stakeholder partnerships, wider than single-issue engagement.
4. SDG 16 emphasised the importance of good governance and diversification of interests in achieving peaceful and just societies.
5. The data revolution had made possible more reliable evidence-based planning. The Web was a huge asset, but with a dark side. It wasn't always possible to verify the information you needed for effective decision-making.

The genesis of the SDGs represented a new age of diplomacy, breaking down silos, working with diverse stakeholders. We needed to ride this rising wave, or risk failing entirely to realise Agenda 2030.

Ambassador Dayu Qi

The China Foreign Affairs University had been created in 1945, under *Zhou Enlai*. The China Diplomatic Academy, newly-established in March 2016, was affiliated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and shared the administrative and academic resources of the university.

China was committed to peace and development. Its diplomacy, under the leadership of *Xi Jinping*, had made important progress in this regard, introducing new thinking and new proposals with Chinese characteristics.

On the political front, they sought mutually beneficial co-operation, with win-win outcomes. On security, their interest lay in co-ordinated, long-term peace and stability. On the economic front, the Belt and Road Initiative was the product of extensive consultation, with over a hundred countries participating in the joint enterprise.

China continued to deepen reform and opening up. By 2014, foreign investments had reached USD 140bn. 250 million Chinese had travelled abroad in 2016. China was the largest contributor of UN peacekeepers of the five Permanent Members of the Security Council. Over 6,000 diplomats were participating in international co-operative exchanges, and 100,000 officials nationwide.

All were faced with an increasing amount of diplomatic work, so there was a need for more and better diplomatic training. During the past year, the China Foreign Affairs University and the Diplomatic Academy had conducted more than 90 workshops, with more than 7,000 attendees. 77% of them had been diplomats, 20% local authority officials, and 3% foreign diplomats.

Even though the Academy was young, they felt they had developed effective practices:

1. They gave priority to diplomats to be posted overseas, at senior level (new Heads of Mission were given training for six months to a year in management, accountability and leadership), and to new entrants.
2. As to content, they wanted their diplomats to be aware of the realities of social and economic development in China, and of the impact of government policies; trips were organised to the countryside. They aimed to increase training in media, social media, consular work, welfare, mental health and security overseas.
3. Their methodology included lectures and seminars, case studies in all programmes, and, increasingly, interactive simulations.
4. Their trainers were mostly career diplomats ('diplomats teach diplomacy'), and officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They also invited outstanding current and retired senior officials from other government agencies, think tanks and academic institutions.
5. They had a comprehensive assessment system, measuring thirteen areas of performance, to provide feedback to sending departments.

After 62 years, the China Foreign Affairs University continued to play a role in the formation of young Chinese diplomats. Amongst their 20,000 graduates were 500 ambassadors and consuls general.

Confucius had advised, 'combine action with knowledge learned, to go further'. By attending this Forum, we had had the opportunity of thinking about the problems we all faced in diplomatic training. In posing the questions, we were closer to finding their solution. The University and the Academy encouraged you to visit, to pursue our common studies.

[Tsinghua University, UNITAR and the Graduate Institute in Geneva were working together to develop multidisciplinary courses to address the SDGs.]

Ambassador José Estanislau do Amaral

Having hosted Rio 92, and Rio 2012, Brazil had developed considerable professional experience in Agenda 2030, with a small but high-quality core of diplomats steeped in the SDGs.

It was important, however, to be realistic about how much could be taught – the scope of the Agenda was vast and challenging. The training of their own diplomats had been confined to the process of negotiating the Agenda. They were not advocates of poverty eradication, climate, health or education – they were enablers and facilitators.

The Instituto Rio Branco was responsible for recruitment to the foreign ministry. There were 6,000 applicants for thirty places a year. All Brazilian ambassadors were career diplomats, a motivating factor for the juniors to reach the top.

Their curriculum included, *inter alia*, courses on negotiation skills, sustainable development and intellectual property. The programme included one-to-one coaching with a mid-career counsellor.

25% of course time was spent on foreign language training. All had to have command of English, French and Spanish, as well as moderate command of Russian, Chinese or Arabic. Diplomats needed to be able to reach out and speak to others in their own language.

The primary goal of the Instituto was to enable the enablers.

Susanne Keppler-Schlesinger

Austria's contribution to realising Agenda 2030 was a top priority of government. All ministries had been instructed to achieve their respective Goals. The Court of Auditors had the responsibility of supervising implementation in a substantive way.

Austria's active commitment to the process had started in the 1990s at the United Nations, during the plethora of conferences on standard-setting leading to the Millenium Summit, and to the MDGs. It was especially helpful that such a range of stakeholders – NGOs, diplomats, academics and the UN network – were now all working to the same goal.

The Diplomatic Academy of Vienna had been founded in 1754, by the young, energetic *Empress Maria Theresia*. Their programmes covered all aspects of international co-operation. Serving officials from the many international agencies in and near Vienna contributed to their courses, and a number of their own tutors were active in the UN system.

One-third of the student body were Austrian, two-thirds came from abroad, many from Africa, the Caribbean and Central Asia, with generous scholarship support provided by the Austrian Development Agency. They were helping to prepare people to take responsibility for development in their home countries.

The Academy mounted some 200 events for 20,000 people each year, as well as conducting and publishing research, including on Agenda 2030 issues.

Effective diplomacy was like a symphony: a series of movements in different tempi, needing skilled players, a good conductor, rehearsals – and breaks. Progress towards achieving the SDGs could be made only by co-operation. Diplomatic training was one important means of getting the message out more widely, enabling the enablers.

In discussion:

- There was often still a divide between the foreign ministry and line ministries responsible for planning, finance and statistics. It was important to get the message out to other departments and to sub-state actors on the importance of an inclusive, integrated approach to implementation of the SDGs – for example, in the fields of education and sanitation.
- 169 governments had embraced the Agenda in September 2015, but they had bought only unevenly into the SDGs. This year, 40-45 countries wanted to talk about their progress in implementation. It had political traction everywhere; but the bureaucracy had a role to play in getting politicians with short electoral focus to think longer-term.
- A good diplomat needed not only to represent his or her country, but to stand up to the government, convincing it to act. Diplomats were simply the managers of globalisation, providing technical expertise, eg in science. Without government buy-in, diplomatic academies could do little useful.
- The whole political establishment of a country had to be on board for effective implementation. There was a risk, though, of overstretch, thus of failing to live up to the demands of the SDGs.
- There was a danger, too, of putting new names on old solutions. For example, despite progress in gender mainstreaming since Beijing 2005, still only 1-2% of development assistance went to gender equality. There was a need to focus on feminist international policy priorities, to invest in women's and girls' education and to promote gender-based analysis of trade and security.
- Of all the SDG targets, the maximum multiplier was girls' education.
- Implementation was to be specialised in each country, but partnerships could help spread best practice – for example, in Thailand's exchanges of diplomats and experts with Lesotho and Timor Leste.
- Despite a general enthusiasm for development, there were trade-offs and red lines that impeded progress; for example, the technology transfer initiative versus patents and intellectual property rights, or the openness of the Internet versus cyber-security.
- It was important to focus on opportunities as well as obstacles. Foreign ministries were the most engaged in and knowledgeable about the opportunities for the country presented by Agenda 2030, and the scope for co-operation with others in achieving their SDGs. Chile, for example, produced lithium and copper which were crucial to the expansion of the use of electric cars, and had unique data for the improved efficiency of solar panels. Each country needed to locate the SDGs in their own programmes of bilateral co-operation, as well as in the UN context, looking for win-win associations.
- UNITAR offered MOOCs on training for the SDGs, but there was no template that fitted all. Programmes needed to be tailored to each national situation. UNITAR was ready to customise their courses in partnership with any diplomatic academy developing training for implementing the SDGs.

Panel Discussion 4: Diplomatic Training on the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development “The Challenge of Policy Integration: Diplomats as Enablers and Facilitators in Mainstreaming the Interaction between the Social, Economic and Environmental Dimensions of Sustainable Development”

Chair:

Ambassador (ret) Barbara Bodine, Director, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University

[see her paper 'Teaching Diplomacy as Process (not Event): a Practitioner's Song', attached]

Panelists:

Natalia Saltalamacchia (Director, Matías Romero Institute of Mexico)

Henry Sardaryan (Dean of Faculty of Governance and Politics, MGIMO University of Russia)

Ambassador Woon-Ki Lyeon (Dean of Education and Training, Korean National Diplomatic Academy)

Sangmin Shim (Professor, Korean National Diplomatic Academy)

Natalia Saltalamacchia

[see Powerpoint presentation, 'Panel 4, Mexico and Agenda 2030', attached]

In May 2017, *President Peña Nieto* had launched the National Council for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with five thematic national dialogues. The Senate had created a Working Group, and the Governors' National Conference had formed a Commission for implementation, with many other actors participating.

The foreign ministry had been losing space to other ministries. Agenda 2030 offered a way of coming back. The national dialogues they were responsible for managing, however, were time- and labour-intensive, and the MFA was pressed for human resources.

The programme of the Diplomatic Academy 'Matías Romero' had four elements – knowledge, skills (eg collaborative leadership), attitudes and languages. They aired a radio programme each week, and had created a virtual campus online.

Henry Sardaryan

MGIMO had a tradition of delivering specialism in depth. Fifty-four languages were taught, with associated programmes on the political, social and economic dynamics of the chosen country.

Forty percent of their courses were in the history, theory and practice of international relations; thirty percent in international public law, trade and cyber law; the rest on economics, management and administrative skills.

Their double-degree programmes were very popular – for example, with the University of Macerata, under which thirty Italian students came to Moscow for a year, then thirty Russian students to Italy.

They were optimistic about Agenda 2030, but recognised that implementation was problematic. There were universal targets, but no universal model for reaching those targets. It was a matter not only of economics, but also of politics, dependent on the readiness of governments to implement their SDGs.

There were also diverse models of governance, specific to the history and traditions of the country and its people. Each would interpret its responsibilities under Agenda 2030 in that context.

Ambassador Woon-Ki Lyeon

The discussions at the Forum had been illuminating and interesting, but diplomats were not policy-makers. The role of the academies was to prepare diplomats to contribute to the implementation of foreign policy, particularly through interactive international co-operation. The Korean National Diplomatic Academy offered regular courses on the SDGs, and on Overseas Development Assistance more generally, with lectures from expert practitioners and debates.

South Korea had unique experience of transformation since World War II, and was willing to share that experience with developing countries.

The Academy, in partnership with the Korean International Co-operation Agency, led collaborative efforts with Least Developed Countries on achieving their SDGs, not least through diplomatic training.

Professor Sangmin Shim presented the Academy's programme in support of Agenda 2030:

[see Powerpoint presentation, 'Panel 4, KNDA', attached]

He observed that they were doing a lot, but not yet enough. Greater priority needed to be given to achieving the SDGs.

In discussion:

- There were no generic tools and mechanisms that could be put in place to ensure that the SDGs were embedded. Each system had to be indigenous, rooted in the political and economic realities of the country.
- Foreign policy was often regarded as the content of international relations, diplomacy the implementation. Yet diplomats were also policy-shapers – something in between. Their contribution to achieving the SDGs lay in demonstrating how national and global interests could be combined. Diplomats looked for opportunities, not obstructions.
- A diplomat's job was to give the policy-maker the best possible advice, as analytic as the academic, and as pragmatic as the implementer. Diplomats were constantly dissenting; they were incrementalist, evolutionist by nature. It was essential to have effective information flow up and down, creating constructive dynamism.
- The Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown provided a bridge between the academic study of international relations and diplomatic training. Their staff all had been practitioners; their students came from all over the world, and represented diverse stakeholders. They had introduced a Certificate in Diplomatic Studies, in which students had a core specialist focus, and then moved into a different field to see international affairs from a new perspective, out of their comfort zone. Syndicates of ten students, each with a different background, replicated the inter-agency, international collaborative process. They drew on an extensive collection of case studies, though these were principally America-centric. The Institute would welcome partnerships to translate others' case studies.
- In training to develop knowledge, skills and attitudes, the last was the most difficult. How did you do that? How did you relate it to the other two? How did you tailor things to a particular level of task?
- The Mexican academy had hesitated to include training in Attitudes, as it was polemical, and there was perhaps not enough time to change something so deep-rooted. But they had decided to just try. They had launched workshops to help move things forward, and online discussions with senior ambassadors and specialists, for example in gender. Three had been conducted so far, with eleven ambassadors in each. They were engaged with the Foreign Service Institute in Canada in a collaborative programme on inter-cultural awareness, including a memorably successful one-week workshop in Mexico.
- Universities could provide pre-service learning. Given the pace of change and information overload, a major challenge for academies was to provide life-long in-service learning.

Workshop “Diplomacy, Social Media and the Digital World”

Chair: *Fernando Reyes Matta*, Diplomatic Academy of Chile ‘Andrés Bello’

Ambassador Jon Benjamin, Director of the Diplomatic Academy, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (with 68,000 Twitter followers), former UK Ambassador to Chile, High Commissioner to Ghana and Consul General in New York

Diplomats were too easily given to agreeing; it was important to disagree as well.

Eleven years ago, *Ambassador Benjamin* had attended a presentation in New York about a new innovation from Silicon Valley, called Twitter. He had thought then, ‘I can’t see this working.’

In 2010, he had started Tweeting, without seeking permission. Later, the then Foreign Secretary, *William Hague*, had decreed that engagement in social media was not an option, but obligatory. They had no choice now but to teach it.

Digital diplomacy was simply how diplomats used digital tools to advance their professional work. Too much time was wasted in navel-gazing about whether and how such an innovation was to be used in diplomacy, instead of just getting on with the job.

It was a new form of the diplomatic art, not separate from it. Quiet, confidential conversations and lobbying were still the core, possibly the more important part, of diplomacy. Yet that had always been complemented by public diplomacy, on-the-record communication with other governments and peoples to influence them to do things they otherwise might not do.

Digital diplomacy was the most public form of public diplomacy yet. It was also disruptive – quicker, less formal, and more responsive to people who questioned it.

Tom Fletcher, former British ambassador to Lebanon, had observed that to be effective, digital diplomacy needed three things: authenticity, engagement and purpose. For example, the Tweet ‘Bring back our girls’ had quickly become a rallying cry. But it was important to beware the ephemeral – the circus would move on quickly. Purpose was crucial. If you were transmitting messages that were not being read, not adding to the debate, you were wasting your time.

Diplomats were often seen as remote, elite figures, living in an ivory tower, having apparently great power and influence. Digital tools enabled direct communication with ‘ordinary’ people, to have a dialogue that had never happened before.

Too much of diplomacy was risk averse, safe, small ‘c’ conservative. Being involved in social media could be dangerous. The job of a diplomatic academy should be to empower diplomats to experiment, accepting that they would make mistakes. The only other way of avoiding this danger was to prevent them being engaged in the global transparent conversation, which would be a bigger mistake.

If you asked, ‘Why do I not have more Twitter followers?’, the answer was, ‘Because you’re boring.’ A message that said only, ‘I had a great conversation today with...’ or simply re-Tweeted an official statement, was unlikely to inspire.

So how to train? Interfering in the internal affairs of another country – such as taking sides in an election, was not legitimate. But that was different from engaging in the current debate on key issues.

The social media were a useful tool also for data-gathering and accurate analysis for reporting, for picking up the public mood, the nature of the debate in the country. It was no longer necessary to read the papers, when you could use your smartphone to draw down (free) news analysis from a range of sources. All foreign services faced the same resource constraints, and this was a large multiplier at low cost.

It was important to think about the brand image of your country – the first things people thought when they heard the name of the country. Social media provided a dynamic new means of soft power projection.

Back in the day, diplomats had been the primary channel for inter-governmental discussion. Now leaders communicated directly by text, email or smartphone, without intermediation.

Digital tools were also tremendously helpful in consular affairs, an effective way of helping citizens in trouble overseas. You could no longer rely on citizen registers; you had to push out information quickly in a mass way.

Diplomatic academies now had an important role to play in helping diplomats to be proficient and present in the digital space. You simply couldn't afford not to be part of it. The only question was: to what extent were your diplomats to be engaged, responding, countering, debating the issues in the host country?

In discussion:

[responses by Jon Benjamin in italics]

- Following the upsurge of fighting in Libya in 2014, the US embassy in Tripoli had been shut down, but they had kept engaged online. Eventually, they had just shut down the social media operation, because the trolls (some of them organised) had taken over the dialogue, distorting messages and shutting out the debate. How did you manage the trollosphere?

You had to have thick skin, like a politician's; it could get extremely unpleasant and distressing. If you took the time to respond to people, it could be great; but if they became abusive, you simply had to pull the plug, and not engage with them.

Regrettably, there were state-sanctioned armies of bots, highly-organised and disruptive, sending out streams of messages with exactly the same language and structure. One training tip: a new account with no followers could be an indicator of a bot. You needed to check whether you could identify the other person in an exchange. Was it a civilised conversation – even if with vehement disagreements?

In one sense the digital discourse was doing real damage, for example in contributing to polarisation. People were talking overwhelming only to people who agreed with them, with almost no interaction between the sides, except abusive. The Brexit online debate had been emotional and polarising, an echo-chamber of the like-minded.

- Younger colleagues no longer had an umbilical cord, but a USB port. Abbreviated SMS-writing was undermining prose, the lack of nuance and the use of emojis making communication possibly offensive and potentially damaging.

The younger generation wrote in shorthand. You just had to uphold the standards you wanted to adhere to. A manual of online etiquette, and guidance in care with language, could be helpful.

- When engaging with social media, how did you reconcile your personal feelings with your official position? It could have career-damaging consequences.

The division between public and private views no longer existed. You could not guarantee the confidentiality of your communications – once a message was out, it was out. But there was a lot that you could safely say, whether about politics, music or football. The alternative was to say and do nothing, effectively not to be there. For an ambassador, though, there was little worse than to have been unmemorable.

- The problem usually was over-caution. If you tried to have well-prepared lines, it felt like the official line, and you lost authenticity. In pursuit of a readily understandable policy on the use of social media, the Canadian foreign service had settled on just two rules: (1) you could not make a policy recommendation, either to your own or another government; (2) you could not disagree with your own government policy.

It was essential for diplomatic staff not to make policy recommendations in public. Private in-confidence dialogue was a separate area of the same diplomatic task.

Locally-engaged staff comprised two-thirds of the FCO's total workforce, and three-quarters of the workforce overseas. You had to let them express their views, and learn from their mistakes. They normally got it more right than wrong.

- Were there guidelines for do's and don'ts? Was there to be some limit, for example not posing for a personal photo in an expensive nightclub?

Personal responsibility was nothing new; the social media just offered an additional way of being accountable to taxpayers. There was no difference between public and private; a diplomat was on duty 24 / 7 / 365.

- Political backing at the highest level was needed if diplomats were going to be engaged in the global conversation online. In the Netherlands, digital diplomacy had had a slow start as the then foreign minister had not been clear about what was acceptable and not. The new minister, Timmermans, had said, 'If it goes wrong, I am responsible.' That had opened the floodgates.
- The young Austrian foreign minister, *Sebastian Kurz*, had immediately lifted the social media profile of the Ministry, wanting to make it less aloof. Training courses now were offered to try to bring the government and the EU closer to the citizens.
- The Portuguese academy had been initially cautious, but now had an online course offering simple rules, and dangers to avoid. It had two parts – the strategic objective, and how to do it. It had been a step-by-step approach.

The rules for the use of social media were the same as general rules of behavior. [It could be instructive to look at the Twitter feed of the Russian embassy in London, including about Boris Johnson.] All were still finding their feet, trying to decide what was acceptable, but we were all accountable. Digital diplomacy was a new phenomenon, but the rules were not.

- Estonia was often now thought of as 'E-Estonia'. Their EU Commissioner, *Andrus Ansip*, was in charge of the Digital Single Market. There were issues with the digital giants: were they too big, too powerful? should they be regulated?

Estonia had established a distinctive niche identity, a fantastic soft power image to have.

Digital companies were just non-state actors. Care needed to be taken in their regulation. It varied by country: the United States had the most permissive rules on free speech; in Europe, racist and hate-speech were criminal. The issue was whether the platform was responsible for the content. There were no clear answers to the questions of what was censorship, and who got to decide.

- In Latin America, football was not sport, it was a source of domestic and international conflict.

Sport was soft power. Ghanaian players in the UK Premier League had been greatly influential in getting the High Commission's message on visas out to Ghanaian citizens.

- Was it appropriate for a diplomat to use a private Twitter account to express alternative policy views?

All British posts had a corporate account, as did the Head of Mission. There was no legal ground to prevent an official from having a personal Twitter account. So it was necessary to train, to give guidelines, to give responsibility to sentient responsible adults. You had to accept learning from mistakes. It was better, though, not to say anything on a personal account that you wouldn't want to see in public.

- Tips on growing a following?

The key point was to be authentic. You needed to find your own voice within the parameters of your own government's policy. Lowest common denominator Tweeting was unproductive. Re-Tweeting cartoons had been effective, as had Tweeting in the local language, getting past the local Anglophone elite to reach other sectors of the population.

- The foreign ministry needed to interact with the diaspora. The Philippines academy had a training partnership with Facebook. They had produced a *Handbook on Public Diplomacy*, available from any Philippine embassy.

It was essential to have a good diagnostic of the social media in your country – what the dominant platforms were, for example Instagram or Weibo. (The British ambassador in Beijing was on Weibo in Mandarin). The multiplier-effect for your messaging was potentially huge.

- There had been widespread praise for the instant response of the Minister of Railways, *Suresh Prabhu*, to an SOS Tweet about a hungry infant on a train in India. There was a vast Indian diaspora, now Tweeting to the foreign minister from all over the world, seeking her help. But this overload had produced huge pressure, amplified by the tyranny of the immediate response required.

Given an opportunity to respond, it was important to see what the generic point was, what the underlying complaints were. Then you could address the core issue, rather than making individual responses. By not responding at all, you risked being seen to be aloof.

IFDT Closing Remarks, and Rapporteur Session

Dr John Hemery, IFDT Rapporteur, gave a short presentation on the re-modelled IFDT Website, drawing attention to its various resources and utilities, and in particular to the WebDebates offered online on the first Tuesday of each month. Members were encouraged to put forward suggested topics for future sessions.

The IFDT was grateful especially to the Webmaster, *Dr Jovan Kurbalija*, and his team, for all the imaginative work they had invested in upgrading and updating this primary working link between Forum members, and between the IFDT and the wider international community.

On behalf of all the members attending, co-chairs *Ambassador Barbara Bodine* and *Susanne Kepler Schlesinger* warmly thanked *Ambassador Samovia* and all the team at the Academy 'Andrés Bello' for the perfect organisation, stimulating discussions and generous hospitality. It had been a privilege to get closer to the region, and to learn from the contributions of Chilean and other Ibero-American experts. It had been wonderful, too, when arriving in the sometimes cold and dark mornings, to see the sunny faces of the friendly and ever-helpful Academy volunteers. They wished them success as they joined the family of migratory birds.

2018 was a double anniversary year. It was the 45th anniversary of the founding of the IFDT, originally with only twelve members, now with sixty, and global in scope; it was encouraging that still more were keen to join. It was also the 40th anniversary of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown. Accordingly, the Steering Committee had agreed that the 45th Meeting of the Forum would be held in Washington DC in 2018.

It would commence with a welcome reception in the evening on Wednesday, 19 September, followed by the two-day conference on Thursday 20-Friday 21, and an optional special tour on Saturday 22 September. The Meeting on Thursday and Friday (only) would be held at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, off Dupont Circle [1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036-2103].

The principal themes would be confirmed in due course – though in the current international turmoil, the discussion at this Meeting of values, principles and attitudes in diplomacy perhaps pointed the way. Politics and policy in the United States were likely to provide fuel for discussion.

The 46th Meeting of the Forum in 2019, would be held in Geneva, co-hosted by the Diplo Foundation, the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, the Graduate Institute, and UNITAR.

The 47th Meeting in 2020, would be held in Abu Dhabi, hosted by the Emirates Diplomatic Academy, to coincide with Expo 2020 in Dubai, marrying diplomacy with global trade, finance, technology and culture.

On behalf of the host institution, *Ambassador Juan Somavía* thanked the co-chairs and members for their generous remarks, especially about the contribution to the Meeting of the young professionals currently training themselves at the Academy, augmenting the fantastic work of the organising team, led by *Gissela Remolcoy Yucra* and *Carolina Llanos Bruna*.

The discussions had covered training and education for all aspects of the professional task of the diplomat, in the context of important current issues. They had reflected the rich diversity of the membership.

Agenda 2030, if it moved ahead, was going to change the global framework in which we operated, so it was essential to understand it. It was complex, but offered a sense of hope of finding opportunities, giving meaning and guidance to our work.

The discussion had been mainly about multilateralism, but also about our common or differing views on a range of important issues. It had been helpful to listen to a very frank discussion about the limitations of Latin America, with societies in a process of complex evolution. It had demonstrated the value of this Forum, in its potential for outreach, valuable in the Latin American context.

All of us were thinking now about how we could help it move forward, to deepen its conversations on the nature of the problems to be confronted in an increasingly rapidly changing world, and on the means of enabling our colleagues to observe, to capture the essence of what was happening in the world, as well as at home.

Saturday, 9 September

The Meeting concluded, for those fortunate enough to be able to join, with a visit to Pablo Neruda's remarkable home '*La Chascona*', and to the haunting Museum of Memory and Human Rights.

John Hemery
Rapporteur