Thursday, 25 September

Welcome Remarks from the Host and Co-Chairs

Ambassador Thami Ngwevela, Chief Director of the Diplomatic Academy, welcomed participants to the Department of International Relations and Cooperation. She referred to the challenging context in which diplomacy now operated.

There were stubborn pockets of poverty, resistance to democratic change, chaotic conflicts in which democratic forces were struggling. Where there was a lack of democratic values, change was brought about by undemocratic means. Conflict was driven also by religion, and competition for resources.

In earlier times, conflicts had been easier to define, and easier to teach about. The players and their objectives had been clearer. The world wars and the Cold War had had clear definition, as had the wars of liberation.

Since then, and especially since 9/11, the character of conflict had changed. It cut across all continents, in different shapes and forms. It had no mass movement, nor mass support. It divided communities. It hid in harsh terrain, making it difficult to find. It fed on religion, yet without the support of religious groups. It was difficult, consequently, to capture the essence of the conflict, and of the new phenomenon of hybrid war.

The different institutions represented at this Meeting – government, non-government and academic – had come together to learn best practice from each other. They prepared diplomats to make a difference in the world; they had to be part of the solution, not part of the problem.

Ambassador Barbara Bodine, Director of the Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, observed that if ever there had been a time when diplomacy was simply a gentlemen’s conversation over politics, it had certainly moved beyond that now.

What role was there now for diplomacy, when pandemics, or global warming, were beyond the capacity of states to solve? It was said that almost everyone now was a diplomat.

Not so – diplomacy was a profession, part art, part science; some could be learned, some not. But it was a profession nonetheless, dealing with complex issues, from ethno-religious conflict to an outbreak of Ebola.

A key challenge for trainers was to define the skill sets needed for so wide a brief. Now foreign services were relatively small, and relatively under-funded. But all nurtured the capacity to analyse, to see the underlying dynamic in order to move policy forward.

Old Europe was a very nice place, but it was no longer the centre of the world. New states and governments which had come into being only in the last 25-50 years had a new agenda, with new needs. The IFDT was uniquely placed to help unscramble this charmingly chaotic world.
Dr Gerhard Sailler, Deputy Director of the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, welcomed the fact that South Africa was hosting the Meeting, reflecting the regional balance of the Forum. In 1973, there had been twelve founding participants, two from African countries, Cameroon and Egypt.

Diplomacy was no longer a ‘club’, conversing with each other in secret before emerging with a treaty. The profession now was more open, engaging with many actors, increasingly through digital activity, facilitating networks across borders. The core role of the diplomat remained constant, though – to analyse, to understand, to judge what information to trust.

The original purpose of the IFDT, too, was still valid. There had been four points on the agenda forty years ago – essentially the same as now: to provide for an exchange of views, to analyse common problems, and to consider how best to train new cadres.

The Diplomatic Academy of Vienna remained committed to helping the Forum to progress. They welcomed Ambassador Barbara Bodine, and Georgetown’s continuing role as co-chair. Ambassador Hans Winkler, Director of the Academy, sent his greetings and looked forward to returning to the 42nd Meeting at Warsaw, in 2016.

First Panel:

Contemporary Conflict: a global overview

Mr Vasu Gounden, Executive Director, ACCORD, South Africa
Amb Dr Liliana DeOlarte de Torres-Muga, Director, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar Diplomatic Academy of Peru
Moderator: Jason Worlledge, Executive Director, European Academy of Diplomacy, Warsaw

Introductory remarks:

Jason Worlledge

Had we entered a new era of local, contained, limited conflicts without the engagement of major actors? Or was the international system looking now more like Europe in the 1930’s, perhaps on the precipice of a new global conflict?

Some key questions for discussion:

• were we now living in a more dangerous international society, or driven by the perennial crises of a conflictual media?
• when speaking of a diplomat’s toolkit (negotiation, mediation, facilitation), what could we expect of the effectiveness of these in contemporary conflict?
• what lessons could we learn from recent conflicts, and how they had been resolved (or not)?

Preparing diplomats to meet contemporary challenges in conflict

1. Vasu Gounden

ACCORD had been established in 1992, to help prepare ambassadors and more junior diplomats from South Africa. They had worked in more than twenty African countries, and also in Syria, Palestine and Nicaragua. They sought to encourage and promote the constructive resolution of disputes, and so to assist in achieving political stability, economic recovery and peaceful co-existence within just and democratic societies.

Prior to 1990, it had been a more simple endeavor to deal with conflict. Now there was a more complex environment to navigate, from inter-state conflict to intra-state conflict, with a plethora of players engaged, including non-state actors such as rebel groups and civil society groups.
Disruptive forces included increasing population pressure (from six billion to over seven billion in just the last twelve years) and urbanisation. The larger the concentration of people, the greater the impact of natural disasters and conflict. The major governing entities in future would not be nation states, but metropolitan areas. (There were 200 major cities in China alone; California was already the sixth largest economy in the world.)

Technology, too, was a disruptor, transforming agriculture and industry with bio- and nano-technology. It fueled a more intrusive, more ubiquitous, more aggressive media.

A number of global trends could be observed:
- dominance was gained through buying or selling knowledge, as well as through the more traditional routes of acquiring resources and markets;
- economic power was shifting from West to East;
- military power was still dominated by the United States and NATO (with combined annual defence spending of $500 billion);
- political power was evolving from a bi-polar to a multi-polar world, with shifting alliances.

There were three components of stability: structures (state, private sector and civil society), resources and skills. South Africa had structures and resources, but too few skills.

In the developed world, power and influence were relatively evenly distributed (broadly, 40% public sector, 30% private sector and 30% civil society).

In the developing world, power and influence often were concentrated at the centre, in state structures. A large percentage of people were illiterate, uneducated and marginalized.

The key challenge was to close the gap. Rapid development of infrastructure and of skills was needed, but these took generations to achieve. The result, in the meantime, was continued conflict, inequality, poor health and death.

The solution was not to be found solely in military power. Rather, it lay in the spread of rights (eg to go to court), and in dialogue (through referenda, or mediation). Failing that, progress of a sort could come through war, resolving relations of power; that was how humanity had evolved.

There were causes for optimism: eg progress in Ethiopia from a rural to an urban society, with a fast-evolving modern capital city, in the midst of conflict region. As in Europe, which had developed despite five hundred years of war.

Africa’s immediate threats included asymmetric warfare in northern Nigeria and West Africa, where Boko Haram was employing tactics similar to those of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. There was protracted politico-ethnic conflict in Sudan and South Sudan, and state collapse in the Central African Republic, threatening to engulf the whole Great Lakes region.

What then did diplomats need to cope with these challenges, often in the context of total leadership paralysis?

Some UN institutions were blocked, but there was scope for progress through the Department of Peace-keeping Operations (DPKO), the Peace-building Fund and the African Peace and Security architecture, including the Conflict Management Division.

When considering intervention in a conflict, six questions needed to be addressed:
- whether to intervene
- when to intervene
- with whom
- with what tools – force, diplomacy, development
- to what end – clear objectives
- how to exit – difficult to define in advance in complex conflicts.
Diplomats could make a contribution to conflict management by providing perspective, and analysis of positions, interests and needs. A couple of examples:

Headline – 200 girls abducted by Boko Haram
Facts – profile the stakeholders (primary, secondary, peripheral); who were they? what were their roles? what did they represent?
Analysis – positions, interests, needs; implications for all stakeholders (including for their own country); embassies understood the society, and the politics beneath the service

Position: a president illegitimately seeking a third-term
Interest: to avoid prosecution, keep hands on the levers of resources
Need: amnesty (nullifying the need to alter the constitution, and solving the problem)

It could be helpful for diplomats to consider the continuum of community relationships, from co-operation to competition, then heightened tension leading to conflict and crisis.

The role of interest groups could be both constructive and disruptive. They could engage in resource trade offs, creating value and developing relations of mutual respect.

Equally, they could challenge the status quo, disagreeing over the allocation of resources, and challenging existing processes of conflict management. There could be boisterous public meetings, angry exchanges in the media, demonstrations and lawsuits. At worst, they could attack the status quo, provoking incidents and disrupting public order.

Diplomats needed to be trained to help keep the policy process focused and stable under pressure. There was a role, too, for training in mediation skills.

In discussion:

- Globalization of information and capital had given impetus to civil society interest groups; a concentration of resources and popular will.
- The relationship between the state and the private sector had changed. There were more private companies with GDPs larger than the state revenue (Nokia in Finland).
- A balance needed to be maintained between the power of the state, and of the private and non-government sectors.
- Diplomats needed to transcend the state-centred perspective.

2. Ambassador Dr Liliana DeOlarte de Torres-Muga

Peru’s Diplomatic Academy Javier Pérez de Cuéllar was pleased to participate in the 41st Meeting of Deans and Directors of Diplomatic Academies and Institutes of International Relations, having been a founding member of the Forum forty years ago.

Ambassador de Torres-Muga was complementing the academic / civil-society perspective with the practitioner view.

The maintenance and preservation of peace was the cornerstone of training for future diplomats. Countries had to learn to settle differences by themselves, refraining from the threat or use of force against the independence or territorial integrity of any state. Training was needed in negotiation and mediation, arbitration and conciliation, for representatives of government, civil society and private companies.

The comprehensive curriculum at Peru’s diplomatic academy included international relations theory, international law, economics, assessment of threats to peace and security, UN structures and peacekeeping operations. It offered case studies of conflict, intra-state conflicts and civil wars (as catalogued, for example, in Joshua Goldstein’s study, 'War on War', 2011). It also prepared diplomats for environmental diplomacy (leading, for example to COP 20 in Lima, in December 2014), and for dealing with terrorism, organized crime and drug-trafficking.
Peru’s diplomatic training programme extended to co-operation and exchange with other diplomatic academies in the region, and more widely. The IFDT had a comparable role to play in preparing the diplomats of many countries to contribute to the settlement of conflict.

In discussion:

- Lessons could be learned from the Latin American experience of conflict resolution, ‘the great professor of bad experiences’; e.g. the Peruvian experience of the Shining Path. A ‘museum of the conflict’ had been created to educate succeeding generations in the costs of civil war.
- In training, Indonesia drew on its own experience in the resolution of the Aceh conflict.
- It was important to put development at the centre of foreign policy, to eradicate poverty as a driver of conflict, to provide opportunities for education as a driver of development.
- Diplomats served to provide the context, but were increasingly limited in their freedom of movement. It was a challenge to prevent risk avoidance becoming a central tenet in the management of a post.
- It was difficult sometimes to distinguish between inter-state and intra-state conflict. The diplomat had a similarly complicated role in engaging with ‘opposition forces’, whether bilateral or multilateral, and not only civil society organisations.
- The Nation state was still a vital actor, even in the context of a globalized world. Yet it was only one of many stakeholders, even in inter-state disputes. It depended on who had traction. Civil-society actors could play a role with less baggage than state governments.
- The main objective of a suitor of state mediation might be official recognition; but it could be delivered by private emissaries (or intelligence agencies) to bring people into the settlement process by the back channel.
- The power of the Internet had begun to be constrained by governments. It was a dangerous trend, of which diplomats needed to be aware, and prepared to confront.
- Foreign ministries needed to compete with the media and the blogosphere, which could be faster to the news than the Mission. It was important to speed up the reporting process, but also to be cautious in responding to unverified information. ‘Black swans’ shaped popular reaction. It was critical to have a range of sources.

Second Panel:

The role of enablers in contemporary conflicts

Professor Alan Henrikson, Lee E Dirks Professor of Diplomatic History, Director of Diplomatic Studies, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University

Ambassador Dr Vahe Gabrielyan, Director, Diplomatic School of Armenia

Moderator: Ambassador Rajah Selvarajah, Director, Diplomatic Academy of Singapore

Introductory remarks:

Ambassador Rajah Selvarajah

Singapore, as a small country, had joined in the ASEAN group to maximize their collective throw-weight, seeking to promote peace and stability in the region, principally through bilateral dialogues, later through regional architecture providing the setting for conflict resolution.

The ASEAN peace process was based on the principle of being ‘acceptable to all’. The ASEAN Regional Forum had been founded in 1990, inviting outside powers to discuss issues of common concern. It had been expanded later to the ASEAN+3 Forum; then ASEAN+6 – including China, Russia and United States. These overlapping structures each offered a particular utility.
Singapore and Malaysia had agreed to bring their territorial dispute to the International Court of Justice, and had agreed in advance to abide by its arbitral decision. It was a good example of the peaceful resolution of disputes.

1. **Professor Alan Henrikson**

The role of enablers in contemporary conflicts – and the enabling of diplomats to respond to them: an American perspective

The word ‘enabler’ was not a term of art in international relations theory or law – but it existed in practice. ‘Enablers’ made it possible for conflicts to continue and expand.

‘Contemporary conflict’ was itself an elliptical concept – often not a large-scale military exchange, it might not even entail conflict – merely heightened tension, disruption of stability, a response to fear. (President Franklin D Roosevelt had said, in 1933, ‘The only thing we have to fear is fear itself.’). The antidote to fear was confidence. Diplomats, as Harold Nicolson had observed, were in the business of ‘engendering confidence’.

Dealing with conflicts today entailed generating new structures, new measures, additional knowledge and new skills. New and different kinds of training might be needed.

‘Enablers’ typically were not the policy-makers, nor boots on the ground, whether soldiers of other field workers. They were the intermediaries, the ‘in-between’ people. Chains of command could be long and opaque.

Enabling in conflict today might include:

- infiltrating fighters, often disguised as ‘volunteers’
- recruiting fighters, by incitement
- supplying arms and materiel
- contributing money
- providing technical help, including communications technology and intelligence data
- offering diplomatic ‘cover’, even harbouring combatants
- manipulating the world’s media, and the terminology of discourse (crusade, jihad, war on terror)

‘Enabling’ had negative connotations, but also could be positive:

- investment
- trade
- development assistance

Thus, ‘enabling’ could be seen differently by different parties to a conflict – it was an ambiguous concept, a neutral term.

Among the recurring characteristics of ‘enabling’ were these:

- not directly involved in the conflict
- role unacknowledged, perhaps neither confirmed nor denied; possibly even denied
- to some degree intentional, despite the long chain of command; (often there was no clear line of motivation nor intention)
- having an interest in the outcome – a co-dependent relationship (as in the arms industry, and combatant parties)
- having an interest independent of the outcome (eg, traditional and social media, giving oxygen to the conflict; or a ‘contact group’ which engaged in facilitation, interested in conflict resolution *per se*)
- instrumentalisation of parties, through proxy-war, continuation of cold-conflict by other means; control or management of the conflict.

Diplomats needed to be left out of this process. (It was uncomfortable to become involved in the game of ‘non-intervening, but intervening’ in the affairs of countries in conflict. The role of the enabler was, in this respect, ‘anti-diplomatic’.) Their job was to uphold the Charter of the United Nations and the Vienna Convention, ‘facilitating friendly relations’. (Secretary of
Defense Robert Gates had stressed the importance of bringing resources to diplomacy – ‘the civilian instruments of national security – diplomacy, strategic communications, foreign assistance, civic action, and economic reconstruction and development’.

Nevertheless, there were three ways in which diplomats could become constructive ‘enablers’:

- **the organisation of legitimacy**
  Most conflicts could not be resolved bilaterally (eg the Ebola crisis in West Africa).
  In the absence of a UN Security Council resolution, other forms of legitimacy had to be found. (The Security Council had found itself able to act unanimously, in Resolution 2178 of 24 September 2014, on the issue of confronting the threat from ‘foreign fighters’.) The Global Counter-terrorism Forum co-ordinated a growing body of national action by intelligence agencies, law officers and diplomats. More diplomatic training was needed in international public law, so diplomats could talk with legal experts to work out a common approach.

- **the business of enterprise**
  In areas devastated by conflict, or where development had hardly begun, help in getting ‘enterprise’ started was needed; a future-oriented, constructive effort capable of being sustained locally. Public-private partnership (eg on the largest canvas, the Marshall Plan) would require diplomats having financial knowledge, business acumen and management experience. Gaza and Aleppo would require reconstruction, led by regional neighbours. Diplomats, properly trained, could be the lead enablers of the partnerships necessary for recovery and future growth.

- **the diplomacy of domestic engagement:**
  Most (though not all) of the most pressing problems of the world today were internal to nations’ societies. They arose locally, and had to be dealt with there. Training therefore was needed as much in domestic as in international affairs. Transnational legitimacy was needed, in humanitarian as in military action, eg in dealing with global health issues, requiring tactful diplomacy. It was not enough to know, eg, the EU *acquis communautaire*; diplomats needed also to know the laws of their own country. The domestic aspects of public diplomacy were today becoming more and more important. Diplomats, with their knowledge and skills in negotiation, needed to be available to engage in local mediation.

  Civilisation was now global, indivisible between home and abroad. Diplomats – men and women of peace – needed be enablers of the common good.

2. **Ambassador Dr Vahe Gabrielyan**

**The role of enablers in contemporary conflicts: the Nagorno-Karabakh case**

Two concepts needed to be defined: ‘contemporary’ and ‘enabler’.

Northern Ireland, Arab-Israel and Nagorno-Karabakh all were in a sense ‘contemporary’, yet all had historical background neglected only at one’s peril.

There were alternative definitions of ‘enabler’: ‘those who make it possible for conflicts to continue’ (Henrikson); and ‘barriers to and enablers of agreement’ (Odell and Tingley, 2013). These were contrary meanings: negative, as contributors to conflict: positive, as contributors to agreement. This paper would concentrate on the constructive role.

It was a challenge, though, to teach conflict when you were a party to a conflict. Theoretically it ought to be possible, but that was not the reality.

There were three categories of country teaching conflict studies:

- those not engaged in recent conflict
- those that had been engaged in recent conflict, and might have drawn lessons from it
- those who were parties to ongoing conflict (or enablers of it).
The conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, and the peace process, could be used as a case in teaching diplomats international relations theory and negotiation skills. The involvement of outside scholars could be helpful in bringing external perspectives, and more diverse tools for teaching.

Law was an essential starting point, but even legal frameworks were affected by political processes (as in Eritrea, South Sudan, East Timor or Kosovo). So law itself was not enough.

The only international negotiating framework with a mandate for the peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute was the OSCE's Minsk process, involving eleven countries (the Minsk Group) led by the United States, the Russian Federation and France, the 'primary enablers'. It was not so much integrative as distributive negotiation. Talks were confidential; information was withheld from the parties.

The negotiations involved two recognized states, one unrecognized entity, and three permanent members of the UN Security Council – a unique constellation.

The peace process would not be completed, though, while fighting, or proto-fighting continued; nor when the process or proto-deal was thought to be unfair or unjust. Yet the mediation process attempted to bring the parties to recognize that there was no military solution to the conflict.

The central problem was the absence of trust between the parties. There was a continuing problem of overcoming bias, over-confidence in the validity of each party's own case, and denying the legitimacy of the interests of the other.

Problem-solving negotiation was likely to be more productive in these circumstances.

The Madrid Principles (non-use or threat of force, territorial integrity and equal rights and self-determination of peoples) governed the process. The 'enablers' had deployed a range of tools in pursuit of agreement:

- postponing detail in order to agree first a formula linking issues of territory and status
- introducing a neutral third party (the OSCE) and a specialized negotiating body (the Minsk Group)
- proposing compliance mechanisms
- mediation by the Minsk Group co-chairs
- Track II confidence-building initiatives

One party to the dispute had been unsatisfied with the Minsk Process, and had sought other fora of conflict resolution, such as the Organisation of Islamic Co-operation and the UN General Assembly. The United Nations had not been directly involved, beyond the passage of Security Council resolutions calling for an end to the fighting.

It was possible, given the particular dynamics of the conflict, that the approaches employed by the enablers – linkage, emphasizing opportunity cost, addressing easier issues first – would continue to fail. The core issue – the status of Nagorno-Karabakh – would need to be settled before peace could be achieved.

A final factor in the efficacy of the peace process was the power balance between the mediators. Russia and the United States had had widely differing throw-weight in the 1990s; the situation was more balanced now, making possible neutral mediation.

However, studies of six hundred attempts at mediation appeared to show that neutral mediation was less successful than forceful mediation. Enablers had to judge the appropriate balance of sticks to carrots.
Discussion:

- It was important, in the context of the Forum, to avoid bias. There was no prospect of peace while the parties couldn’t hear each other, and talked past each other.

- Could an ‘enabler’ be impartial? President Carter had tried, from religious conviction and wider world-view (‘righteousness’), and had used resources to reward parties equally, to make it in their interest to settle. If partial, an enabler could modulate and prolong the process, but not necessarily produce the desired result. But a frozen conflict could be the desired end – prolonged influence in the state or region, denying stability, or retaining a stake in whatever settlement might be reached.

- Enablers had a role in private, back-channel contact, in a world of increasing openness in diplomacy.

- What was the diplomat to do when it was national policy to provide assistance that had illegal effect? Indirect engagement might have benevolent intent, but complicit effect, contravening obligations under the Vienna Convention (‘all legal means’).

- Diplomats had to be more engaged in the decision-making process, so they could put the case against policy that contravened the norms of international law and behavior.

- Clandestine activities, intelligence operations had to be consistent with the ambassador’s oath to the Constitution. You were the servant of the President. There were times when every rule was broken, but you could not not-know about clandestine activities in your host country. If you found policy immoral, illegal or otherwise unacceptable, you had the option to resign. (John Brady Kiesling had resigned over the second Gulf War, and had written ‘The duty of diplomatic dissent’.)

- Clandestine efforts were more difficult now – there were more providers, including private contractors – which needed co-ordination at the centre, in a National Security Council or equivalent.

- Diplomats needed to ‘build up social capital now’. They had no control over how their communications might be used in the future. (They ought not to lie, but might have to fall back on ‘plausible deniability’.)

- Enablers could bring to conflict resolution ‘creative ambiguity’, two or more narratives projected on a blank canvas, giving people the means to make their case for resolution.

- Big countries weren’t always the most effective enablers. There was a role for regional players, as in the freeing of Bulgarian nurses from Libya, which had entailed forty-nine visits by Maltese diplomats at ambassadorial and lower diplomatic level, helping to put the parties together.

- Diplomatic academies could be enablers of other diplomatic services, through professional capacity-building.

- Profound changes in the profession demanded change also in training. ‘Hybrid diplomacy’ drew in multiple actors, across borders (including virtual borders), at high speed, under pressure from the media and public opinion. Even the boundary between first and second track diplomacy was now blurred, with the advent of globalized network diplomacy.

- Diplomatic academies had been enablers of networks internationally, through programmes of training and exchange at least since the end of the Cold War. This process could be helpful also at the national level, bringing people together in training from different ministries – foreign, defence, interior, finance, environment, development – forging intra-governmental networks to facilitate whole-of-government diplomacy. Training thus would more nearly reflect the way the international system worked in the field.

- International issues had many dimensions. Training people from different ministries enabled all the dimensions of an issue to be examined from the different perspectives of the departments engaged. Generic training in core diplomatic skills could help secondees from line ministries at post.
• This was not always easy, nor welcome. National traditions varied. Different departments and agencies often were jealous of their positions and policies. There were financial implications as well.

• Overcoming silo-mentality was difficult. Training had a vital role to play in forging interdisciplinary culture (as in Pretoria at present, in which a human rights activist had been brought together with a senior official in the state security apparatus; they had had differences of view, but a balanced discussion about the tension between cyber-security and human rights).

• This was a creative time in diplomacy – for example, the Hague Journal of Diplomacy was launching a special edition on alternative futures for the international system and for diplomacy. Members of the Forum were encouraged to respond to the call for papers.

Friday 26 September

Third Panel:

Trends in Diplomacy

Dr Yolanda Spies, Director, Master of International Studies Programme, University of Pretoria, South Africa
Dr Jovan Kurbalija, Director, Diplo-Foundation, Geneva

Moderator: Professor Alan Henrikson, Lee E Dirks Professor of Diplomatic History, Director of Diplomatic Studies, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University

1. Dr Yolanda Spies

International society, diplomacy and the logic of conflict resolution

There was little evidence of peace and security in contemporary international affairs. It was all the more incumbent on diplomats, and especially trainers of diplomats, to focus on conflict resolution as an integral part of diplomatic studies.

It was possible to think of hope as a currency, exported by people who took certain ideas forward. Diplomats operated within international society, but might not be sufficiently aware of the context. (metaphor: boy: ‘how’s the water?’; fish: ‘what is water?’)

‘International society’, as defined by the English School, posited a society of sovereign states sharing certain interests, values and ideals. They had mechanisms of organisation, and rules of engaging. Diplomacy was one of the foremost managers of this network of rules of engagement, enabling the survival of the English School system.

The ‘constructivist’ concept suggested that international society was subjective.

The notion of an ‘international society’ was more contentious now, as the rules of engagement had been inherited largely from European society. They were mercantilist and deeply selfish, but nonetheless valuable, hence had been embraced at the global level.

Less welcome were some of the issues that went along with diplomacy – the export of particular agendas. Diplomacy then became clouded by its utility, its raison d’être. Former colonial subjects could feel ‘preached to’, having ideas imposed on them as part of the hegemony of the West.

It was important to remember that all societies were continually in the process of change, in order to ensure that shared values were continuously attended to. Norms did not flow in one direction, from the West to the rest. Other societies had equal validity of ideas and values.
Diplomatic teachers had to instil a concept of international society, not just of the nation state.

Conflict resolution was integral to the idea of diplomacy – a bridging mechanism. Negotiation offered a way out of the mess we had created for ourselves, within and beyond national borders.

The study of diplomacy was a growth area, whether delivered in-house by governments or by tertiary education institutions. Most courses included negotiation skills, but few focused on conflict resolution knowledge and skills. There were several reasons to redress the balance:

1. diplomats were uniquely placed to engage in conflict resolution, having institutional-bureaucratic support, international legal protection, global networks and the moral authority of public accountability;
2. the normative imperative: it was incumbent on states to prevent conflict breaking out, and failing that, to resolve conflict and rebuild;
3. the legal imperative: a substantial body of human rights law and humanitarian law had emerged, about which diplomats needed to be informed;
4. expertise in conflict analysis, mediation and preventive diplomacy enhanced the capacity and legitimacy of regional organisations;
5. training a wider clientele than just professional diplomats strengthened the interdisciplinary perspective and practical relevance of diplomatic studies, and assisted polylateral initiatives and networking;
6. the holistic and inter-disciplinary nature of conflict resolution knowledge and skills reinforced other diplomatic skills, such as communication, public diplomacy, negotiation and policy analysis;
7. conflict resolution skills training lent itself to joint venture and public-private partner initiatives, helpful especially to poorer ministries of foreign affairs;
8. conflict resolution offered niche diplomacy for all: for large powers, to become more visible as benign hegemons; for middle powers, to be regarded as good international citizens and bridge-builders; for small or poor states, to acquire remunerated entry into UN peace operations;
9. courses in conflict resolution were an effective way of attracting and spending development aid; easily monitored, and linked with donors' policy goals;
10. prevention rather than cure: investment in capacity-building was less expensive than addressing the long-term consequences of conflict and anarchy.

Discussion:

• The diplomat's role was not just to be nice to people; the core mission was to advance the national interest. Yet a broader vision of the national interest now was needed, reflecting emerging common norms.
• It was sometimes difficult to get beyond the Western norms of developed societies, influenced by history and economic development. It took time to develop alternative norms – eg votes for women.
• Conflict resolution theory helped understand how not to transcend a hierarchy of norms. It was crucial to get beyond linear thinking, to frame human progress as a holistic continuum. Traditional conflicts could be stopped by fiat or agreement. No longer. Hybrid-conflicts were systemic, overlapping, flowing from one to the next. It was necessary to focus on root causes, on the interests of the parties. Zero-sum was short-termist, and counter-productive; others’ loss would come back like a boomerang. Solving a given conflict was likely to be unsuccessful, too; everything was linked.
• It was essential to concentrate not only on conflict resolution, but also on post-conflict peace-building. The Japanese foreign ministry offered a five-week course in Hiroshima in preparation for deployment to conflict zones – eg to Kosovo and Palestine. Africans and other Asians joined this programme.

• This was really where the challenge lay. Once the media caravan had moved on, the real work began. The international community had the responsibility to engage in post-conflict reconstruction and development.

• People usually were more concerned with stopping the conflict, than with forging a settlement that could actually be implemented. This needed training, from conflict onwards. More women needed to be involved in the mediation process.

• It could be helpful to facilitate cultural interchange, which was inseparable from political exchange. Cultural joint ventures encouraged people to start thinking together, rather than individually. The global cultural market affected global diplomatic behaviour.

2. Dr Jovan Kurbalić

Trends in diplomatic practice: cybersecurity as a new area of peace and security

Cyberspace was something like water – deep, dark and largely unknown, filled with fish – mainly sharks and piranha. It was important to understand the sea in which we were swimming.

Cybersecurity affected all of us. While other diplomatic issues were not necessarily a part of our daily lives, given that twenty percent of all family communication had moved online, cybersecurity now had become ‘family security’ as well. (Cybersecurity was the fire engine; cybercrime the fire.)

At the institutional level, diplomatic services worldwide were prime targets of cyber attacks, affecting their modus operandi. (Some had reverted to the use of typewriters.)

More than forty international institutions, such as the UN General Assembly, the OSCE, the African Union and Interpol, now were addressing the issue, which resolved itself into three themes: practical (protection from cybercrime and attacks), diplomatic (the new vulnerability) and geo-political (sovereignty and inter-dependence in the digital space).

Practical Cybersecurity:

Traditional training could not help greatly in increasing practical cybersecurity, as it did not address the habits and routines of individuals using the Internet (cf Daniel Kahneman’s theory of ‘dual reasoning’: System 1 – fast and intuitive thinking; System 2 – more deliberative and analytical thinking).

Most training was based in System 2 thinking, for rational actors weighing costs and benefits to maximize personal, national and international interests. In reality, most people operated on ‘auto-pilot’, with all the usual bias and irrationality.

It could be helpful, consequently, to consider ways in which diplomatic training could be constructed to overcome this obstacle:

1. encourage the development of ‘digital hygiene’ for data and personal computers: (the basics – passwords and PINS, software updates, malware protection, backups, vetting downloads, locking the device, having multiple accounts);

2. acknowledge that the impact of training would be limited by the difficulty of changing online habits and routines;

3. use ‘pathos’ in training; bring in people who had suffered because of lack of digital hygiene; emotional reaction could help people to switch from operating in System 1 (immediate reaction) to System 2 (rational reflection);
4. accept that digital leaks were inevitable;
5. start from the assumption that risk could not be avoided, only managed – balancing ‘need to know’ with ‘need to share’;
6. be aware of ‘unknown unknowns’;
7. use simple but effective tools, such as desk calendars, providing a daily reminder of cybersecurity risks (http://www.diplomacy.edu/2014/cybersecurity/);
8. consult diplomacy.edu for information on resources and online courses.

Diplomatic Cybersecurity:

Cybersecurity was a subset of wider Internet Governance (IG) issues, consisting of more than fifty policy issues classified in five baskets: infrastructure and standardization, legal, economic, development and socio-cultural. Cybersecurity was emerging as a separate sixth basket.

The main cybersecurity issues were:

1. cyberconflict: needed to be addressed through the three main areas of the traditional law of armed conflict – conduct of war, weapons and disarmament, and humanitarian law. The problem was, there was no overall agreement on an international framework of policy principles, legal instruments and institutions.
2. critical information infrastructure protection (CIIP): the vulnerability of the Internet had become the vulnerability of modern society, eg in controlling the flow of energy, water and finance. There was as yet no global regulatory framework nor agreed policy mechanisms; the developed countries tended to favour a bottom-up approach drawing on the existing network of professional organisations; China, Russia and many developing countries preferred a top-down approach through new treaties and new international mechanisms.
3. cybercrime: there was international co-operation in the fight against child pornography, but less in tracing and dismantling the global cybercrime black market, which was extremely well-organised. Some wished to extend the coverage of the Council of Europe’s Cybercrime Convention, with its strong human rights tradition, to a global level, but for that reason it was also opposed.
4. cyberterrorism: motivated not by financial gain, but aiming to cause major public disruptions and chaos. There was no co-ordinated global approach, balancing counter-cyberterrorism measures with the protection of human rights.

There were three ways in which providers of diplomatic training could help address cybersecurity issues:

• organise training in diverse groups, bringing together diplomats, computer specialists, Internet business people, bankers, security officials and hackers; different professional cultures framed the problem in their own way, and could help others’ understanding;
• develop simulations of cybersecurity negotiations;
• offer awareness-building sessions for senior officials.

Geo-political Cybersecurity:

Diplomacy did not operate in a vacuum. Each epoch had its ‘defining technology’, determining economic, social and political success. Control of the defining technology usually had delivered control of society. In the Internet age, knowledge was of central importance. The Internet had had a considerable impact on the geo-political position of countries.
Cables carried about 95% of the world’s Internet traffic, connecting more than 120 countries. Although the Internet was a decentralized system, countries often relied on only a few Internet cables. The concentration of Internet traffic in a limited number of cables created high national and regional vulnerability. The distinction between Heartland and Rimland consequently remained as important in the digital era as in the age of Mahan.

Data was the oil of the modern economy, the basis of the economic model of the Internet industry.

The Internet as a social media platform provided new opportunities for international interaction, linking families, migrant communities and diasporas.

National diplomats had been the representatives of sovereign states. But the Internet had challenged traditional sovereignty in at least two ways:

1. cyberspace did not correspond to the current division of territories. It challenged the state’s claim to govern public affairs alone, to establish a definitive relationship between the citizen and a given territory.
2. nation states had a limited capacity to control Internet commerce. The intangible nature of Internet services made it difficult for states to impose customs controls, and tariff and tax regimes.

Diplomats had to navigate the paradox of protecting national sovereignty while at the same time promoting state participation in the processes of regional and global integration.

The Internet had greatly facilitated the interaction capacity of communities, as well as global interdependence. High interdependence limited the utility of military power, enhancing the importance of diplomacy for managing international relations and resolving conflict.

Diplomatic training could helpfully include study of the digital aspects of geo-politics, and of individual countries’ positions in terms of their interdependence and data flow.

Discussion:

• There was a third kind of environment concept, in addition to ‘international society’ and ‘cyber-space’ – ‘the global commons’, given currency by Arvid Pardo, ‘Father of the Law of the Sea’; NATO’s new strategic concept referred to the common interest in protecting the global commons, including sea lines of communication and cyber-space. The policy was not well developed yet, though.
• All was becoming global; issues were driving structures, both national and international. The South African government had put environmental and health issues at the centre of foreign policy.
• Following the revelations of Wikileaks, many foreign ministries’ principal concern had become protective security. Yet too much security made the system unusable. The social media provided new opportunities for engagement.
• Some foreign ministries saw the new media as a necessary evil, but were not thrilled by getting policy down to 140 characters, and seeing off rumours. Social media was a useful addition, but in no way a substitute for face to face engagement.
• It was necessary to educate younger diplomats in not communicating, for security and policy reasons. Social media posed a threat as well as an opportunity. Diplomats had the right to free expression, but not about everything, all the time.
• Different governments adopted different approaches. The more liberal and open, the more ready they were to take responsibility for mistakes. The benefit of outreach to civil society greatly outweighed the downside.
• It was important to trust the people we had selected. Respect for the boundaries in engaging with any media was a matter of common sense. Many ministries started from the assumption that people would make mistakes, and so missed opportunities for outreach.
• Reaching out to the public at home was not diplomacy; it was more like social engineering.
• Not reaching out, though, was a self-denying ordinance, as more information was available from cyberspace.
• Getting the facts right was crucial, setting the record straight and challenging the lies.
• Another challenge was not to be boring; to make digital commentary relevant and penetrating; not just condemning what was obviously wrong, and praising what was obviously right.
• There was no limit to the new skills to be acquired. Perhaps too much attention was being given to the new and shiny, and not enough to the basic mental and psychological development of the young to be good people, and good diplomats.

Final Session

Strengthening the IFDT

 Ambassador Barbara Bodine, Director, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, The Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University
 Dr Gerhard Sailler, Deputy Director, Diplomatic Academy of Vienna

Moderator: Ambassador Thami Ngwevela, Chief Director, Diplomatic Academy, Department of International Relations and Cooperation, Republic of South Africa

The co-chairs had circulated in advance of the Forum a paper on the Future of the IFDT (copied below), drawing on discussions of the Steering Group at Vienna in September, 2013.

The creation of the Steering Group was in part a response to the general sense at recent IFDT meetings that broader, more inclusive and more transparent governance was required.

PROPOSALS ON THE FORMAT OF ORGANISATION, ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCE

Preamble

1. The International Forum on Diplomatic Training [IFDT] was established in 1972 as a yearly Meeting of Deans and Directors of Diplomatic Academies and Institutes of International Relations, originally at the Diplomatic Academy in Vienna.

2. The Forum is an informal gathering of Deans and Directors devoted to the discussion and exchange of information about recent trends in diplomacy, and experience gained in training for diplomatic and international careers.

3. Participants should be the Directors and Deans of academies and institutions educating graduate students or young professionals in diplomatic-related theory and practice, which are either academic, including Faculties of International Relations within Universities, or are Diplomatic Academies, Foreign Service Training Institutes, and similar education and training institutions dealing primarily with methods and tools for training diplomats at all levels.

4. The Forum serves also as a valuable platform for exchange of views concerning training programs, teaching methods, tools and service requirements, and offers the occasion for networking and cooperation.

Governance
5. The Directors of the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna and of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University serve as co-chairs of the IFDT.

6. The co-chairs provide the central steering and administrative functions of the IFDT.

7. The principal co-ordinating element of decision-making is the Steering Group. It takes decisions on a consensus basis.

8. The Steering Group comprises the following members:
   - the co-chairs
   - the ‘troika+2’ (the two preceding, the current and the two succeeding host institutions)
   - the webhost
   - the rapporteur
   - additional co-opted member(s) as might be invited by the Group

9. Considering the emphasis on regional balance in selecting the host institution(s), the regional balance of the leadership will be broadened as well as the balance of views.

Participation

10. Participation continues to be by invitation, focusing primarily on institutions, public and private, providing training in diplomacy.

11. Any institution which had been invited to attend is entitled to continue to attend.

12. Directors and Deans of institutions which so far have not participated in previous meetings may indicate their wish to be invited to either one or both of the co-chairs, or the institution organising the meeting in that year. The decision whether to issue an invitation to the requesting institution is made by the co-chairs, in consultation with the Steering Group.

13. The principle of inclusion and non-discrimination applies both to participation and to the selection of the host institution(s), which lays emphasis on regional balance.

14. Institutions are to be represented by a single individual, normally the Dean or Director; in exceptional instances by two people.

15. Participating institutions should not be represented by national diplomats posted in the host country.

Organisation/Hosts

16. Commitment to serve as a host institution and in other ways continues to be a significant factor.

17. Letters of invitation are sent out, together with a draft agenda, registration form and other information, preferably at least three months in advance of the date of the Meeting. The Diplomatic Academy of Vienna takes care of sending out the invitations, in the name of the two co-chairs.

18. The organising institution (as of now: host) establishes the agenda of the Meeting in consultation with the co-chairs. The host is free to invite individual academics or practitioners who can contribute as experts in a given field for any item on the agenda of the Meeting.

19. Each institution invited to participate can submit proposals or suggestions for the inclusion of additional specific items on the agenda. The final decision about the agenda will be made by the host, in agreement with the co-chairs.

20. The host bears responsibility for providing the necessary infrastructure for the Meeting, including adequate rooms. This shall also include luncheons and dinners, social events and local transportation to the extent necessary. Participating institutions bear the costs of accommodation, including breakfast, and all travel costs to and from the place where the Meeting takes place.
21. The venue for the next Meeting or meetings up to five years in advance is decided by consensus of all participating institutions at the end of the Meeting, upon offers submitted by participating institutions. The principle of rotation between continents and regional balance should be observed as far as possible.

22. At each Meeting a rapporteur prepares a report about the Meeting, and records decisions agreed by participating institutions. The reports will be published on the web site of the IFDT.

**Financial Management**

23. The adoption of a nominal annual contribution was proposed at the 39th Meeting in Boston, and has been agreed upon by the Steering Group.

24. The principal purpose of the contribution, in addition to being an affirmation of commitment to the Forum, is to meet the cost of creating and managing a revamped IFDT website. It will not be used to defray the costs of the central administration, nor of the host institution.

25. An annual contribution is payable as a commitment to the IFDT, and entitles participation in the annual Meeting, by invitation.

26. The annual contribution is set at EUR 200,00, subject to review.

27. Income from annual contributions, and in time possibly from grants and donations, requires appropriate financial management and transparent accounting. The IFDT’s webhost will establish a dedicated IFDT sub-account, under local law, audited annually for presentation to the Meeting.

28. If a surplus accrues, decisions on disbursements (if any) are taken by the Steering Group.

**Website**

29. The IFDT website, currently maintained by the Diplo Foundation, will be the central vehicle for communication, in co-ordination with the administrators of each year’s host institution, while respecting the need for registration for the annual Meeting with the host.

30. The website needs to be fully interactive and continually up to date, enabling members to keep in touch with each other and to exchange information and ideas between Meetings, such as notices for conferences.

31. The website will include a list of participants at the respective last Meeting, and the reports on the Meetings prepared by the rapporteur.

The Forum was an informal gathering of deans and directors to exchange views, lessons learned, and best practice. All had a lot to gain from each other.

Participation was still by invitation, notably as set out in the Preamble, para 3, including academic and governmental institutions, or a mixture of both, whose focus of activities was on education and training in the theory and practice of diplomacy. There was a need to watch carefully the growth of for-profit entities claiming legitimacy which had not been earned.

There had been discussion of nomenclature – a Steering Group or Committee; Group had been chosen as being more consonant with an informal organisation.

The contribution to be made to become part of the Forum had been set at EUR 200 per annum. It was understood that government budget processes could take time; a clear statement of commitment to the process, a good faith letter, would suffice *ad interim.*
Discussion:

• The timing of the Meeting in late September was problematic. Earlier in September, or in October or November, would be preferable.

• More breakout sessions would be welcome, affording a greater variety of themes, more choice, and more focused small-group discussions.

• A high-speed ‘bazaar’, as conducted at the Meeting in Malta in 2010, would enable institutions to present their work to each other, and to share experiences in particular regions.

• Sessions should concentrate on how to deal with problems, and on innovations in approaches and teaching.

• The invitation from the co-chairs to attend was not intended for visa purposes; a specific letter from the host institution was usually needed.

• The policy of excluding representatives from missions in the host country arose from experience: resident diplomats attended, but offered no contributions on training. Exceptions might be made. It was important to remember, though, that the Meetings were not a forum for policy debate, but for exchanges on progress in professional development.

There was consensus agreement on the document on the way forward for the IFDT.

Venues for Meetings in the coming five years were agreed as follows:


2016 Canberra (a five-day programme, with a two-day Forum, to be convened at the Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy, Australian National University, Canberra, in collaboration with Asia-Pacific partners)

2017 Santiago (subject to confirmation of date)

2018 Geneva (four host institutions: Diplo Foundation; Geneva Centre for Security Policy; Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies; UNITAR)

2019 Washington (the 100th anniversary of the Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service)

[The Diplomatic School of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia would celebrate in 2020 the 10th anniversary of its founding, and offered to host the Meeting in that year in Yerevan.]

A paper prepared by the European Academy of Diplomacy, host of the 42nd Meeting to be held at Warsaw in 2015, offered Guiding Principles for Hosting Institutions (copied below).

GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR HOSTING INSTITUTIONS

About the Forum

Established in 1972, the International Forum on Diplomatic Training (IFDT) is an informal gathering of Deans and Directors of Diplomatic Academies and Institutes of International Relations. This annual meeting is devoted primarily to the discussion and exchange of information about recent trends in diplomacy and experiences gained in training for diplomatic and international careers. The Forum serves as a valuable platform for exchange of views concerning training programs, teaching methods and service requirements and offers an occasion for networking and cooperation.
Selection of Host Institution

- The Forum is hosted annually by one of the IFDT Participating Institutions. The principle of rotation, around five regions, at five-year intervals is observed as much as feasible.
- IFDT Participating Institutions can apply individually to host the gathering. The expression of interest to host should be presented in a written form to the IFDT Co-Chairs and the Steering Group at least a year before the planned event – if no decisions about the host was taken until then, as venues may be decided up to three years in advance - and no later than two weeks before the next annual Forum. The Co-Chairs and the Steering Group can decide whether or not they wish to invite expressions of interest from any other potential hosts.
- The expression of interest is subject to ratification by consensus at the next IFDT Forum.
- The venue of next meeting or meetings is decided up to three years in advance.

Responsibilities of the Host Institution

- The Host Institution is responsible, in consultation with the Steering Group, for planning, mobilising and executing the annual meeting of the Forum. In particular, it is responsible for:
  a) Preparing an initial proposal for action
  b) Preparing a draft agenda
  c) Inviting speakers, including academics and practitioners
  d) Providing necessary infrastructure for the meeting (including organizing luncheons, dinners and coffee breaks)
  e) Organizing social events, excursions and local transportation for participants during the Forum
  f) Promoting the meeting (including website and social media outreach)
  g) Assuring necessary funding to cover key costs such as: venue, meals, social events and local transportation.
- Participating Institutions bear the costs of accommodation (including breakfast) and all travel costs to and from the place where the meeting takes place.
- Maintaining the list of invited institutions and sending out the invitations (incl. a registration form and draft programme, provided by the host institution) is the responsibility of the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna/the Co-Chairs.

Initial Proposal for Action

- Following the endorsement of a Host Institution, the party is obligated – no later than 10 months before the event - to present to the Steering Group an Initial Proposal for Action. The Proposal should contain the following information:
  a) What are the general resources in place that the Host Institution can provide to ensure the success of the meeting? Are there any partner institutions involved (MFA, NGOs, Embassies), and if so in what capacity?
  b) What are the key preparatory activities and what is their schedule?
  c) Who is responsible for them (starting when, for how long)?
- It is expected that in the initial proposal the Director/Dean of the Host Institution endorses the party’s involvement, confirms the proposed dates and assures the availability of the human and other resources necessary to mobilize for meeting.
**Agenda & Structure of the Meeting**

- The Agenda of the forthcoming meeting is put up in draft by the Host Institution for consultations with the Co-Chairs and the Steering Group. It is recommended that the draft agenda be prepared with partner institutions co-hosting panels (if any) and be subject to pre-evaluations of selected IFDT Participating Institutions, representing different regions and organization structures.

- The agenda should be prepared in accordance with the following format:
  
  a) The Forum should normally last for two full programming days and take place at the end of September. It should be noted that the Forum should fall within a one-week core period (Monday to Saturday), including pre-Forum activities.

  b) The Opening Ceremony should include a short message from the Director/Dean of the Host Institution and the Co-Chairs. A prominent personality of the country hosting the IFDT may be invited.

  c) The program should include: plenary discussions, regional meetings and optional breakout sessions conducted concurrently (including simulation exercises).

  d) The Host Institution may decide to add to the agenda an ‘IFDT bazaar’, which allows individual institutions to present (in no more than 10 minutes) significant developments in their training regime.

  e) The Host Institution is also encouraged to organize a book stand/store for those Participating Institutions that are willing to promote their recent publications on diplomacy and international relations.

  f) The agenda should include a social/cultural activity program.

  g) The Forum should be preceded or followed by optional touristic excursions (1-2 days), costs of which are covered by interested Participating Institutions.

- After preliminary consultations, the draft agenda is sent out together with the invitation to the meeting by the Co-Chairs. Each institution invited to participate can submit proposals or suggestions for the inclusion of additional specific items.

- The final decision about the draft agenda will be made by the Host Institution in agreement with the Co-Chairs and the Steering Group.

**Participants & Selection**

- The list of invited parties shall be prepared by the Co-Chairs, in coordination with the Host Institution and the Steering Group. Invitations should be made on a non-discriminatory basis to institutions which are academic (including those within Universities and Colleges), independent Diplomatic Academies or units within Foreign Ministries which are dealing primarily with methods and tools for training diplomats.

- In principle, participants should be the Directors and Deans of the most distinguished academies and institutions, which are educating graduate students or young professionals for careers in international professions.

- As a general rule, institutions and individuals that have participated in previous meetings upon invitation of the Co-Chairs are eligible to be invited to participate also in subsequent meetings, unless the organizing institution, in consultation with the Co-Chairs and Steering Group, on well-founded substantial grounds, decides otherwise.

- Directors and Deans of institutions which thus far have not participated in the IFTD may indicate their wish to be invited to either the Steering Group or the Hosting Institution. Decision whether to issue an invitation to the requesting institution is made by the Dean/Director of the Host Institution after consultation with the Steering Group.

- Participation is limited to one representative from each institution, in exceptional instances by two people.
• Delegation of participation to diplomatic representatives in the country where the meeting takes place is not appropriate.

• Letters of invitation are sent out in the name of the Host Institution, the Co-Chairs and the Steering Group at least 3 months in advance of the meeting. The Diplomatic Academy of Vienna takes care of sending out the invitations with signatures electronically or by mail.

Forum Venue

• In order to accommodate the IFDT, the Host Institution needs to identify facilities that have room for 3-4 breakout rooms with an average seating of 20 persons, capacity for a plenary session(s) of 100 or more people, and a facility/arrangement that accommodates 100 or more for lunch and dinner. Forum attendees often enjoy having an opening reception or dinner at a special site away from the main venue.

• Venue selection should be done to reduce meeting space, accommodation and other costs while serving academic values. If the Host Institution does not have appropriate facilities, the use of university or MFA facilities is a good strategy for keeping costs down.

Accommodation, Transportation & Visas

• Although the costs of accommodation are in principle borne by Participating Institutions, the Host Institution is expected to provide accommodation options and assure hotel availability for the dates of the meeting. The per night room costs are important to Forum registrants and it is critical to identify a range of appropriate venues at different price points.

• The Host Institution should also provide (when necessary) all local transportation that serve the Forum site (buses, shuttles).

• In due time, a table should be provided to participants, representing the relative ease and cost related to obtaining visas to the location of the Forum. When necessary, the Host Institution should supply participants with invitation letters and assist them in contacting the appropriate Consulate of the hosting country.

Financing of the Forum

• It is important that the host organisation be in a sufficiently sound financial position to secure funding for basic costs of organizing the Forum such as: meeting space, lunches, dinners, local transportation and social events.

• The Co-Chairs and the Steering Group support in principle seeking donor funding and will assist the Host Institution in any effort it may undertake to assure such additional funding.

Student Involvement

• Host Institutions are encouraged to include a plan for student involvement through planned pre-Forum events as well as activities/roles for students during the IFDT itself. This may include:

  a) Taking the opportunity of having experienced trainers from other countries to mount, 1-2 days of innovative programmes for their diplomats.

  b) Inviting Participants of the Forum to observe a demonstration of training methodology prepared by the students, as it has been the case before the meeting at Boston in 2011.

Timetable of Key Preparatory Activities
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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Responsible party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>Selection of Hosting Institution</td>
<td>General Assembly/ approved by Steering Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>Preparing an Initial Proposal for action</td>
<td>Host Institution</td>
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<tr>
<td>November-December</td>
<td>Preparing the draft agenda of the meeting</td>
<td>Host Institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January-February</td>
<td>Consultation of the agenda with Co-Chairs, Steering Group and other parties (co-hosts, Participating Institutions)</td>
<td>Host institution/ Co-Chairs/ Steering Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>Consultation and approval of the list of invited parties</td>
<td>Steering Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>Final decision on draft agenda</td>
<td>Host Institution/Co-Chairs/Steering Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March-May</td>
<td>Inviting guest speakers</td>
<td>Host Institution/Co-Chairs/Steering Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>Launching of the Forum website with application form</td>
<td>Host Institution</td>
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<tr>
<td>March/April</td>
<td>Sending invitations to participants</td>
<td>DA in Vienna on behalf of Host Institution</td>
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<tr>
<td>March-June</td>
<td>Reservation of venue, accommodation &amp; other arrangements</td>
<td>Host Institution</td>
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<tr>
<td>April-July</td>
<td>Ongoing Recruitment via website</td>
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<td>July</td>
<td>Deadline for Forum registration</td>
<td>Participants</td>
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<tr>
<td>June-July</td>
<td>Preparation of invitation letters for participants requiring visas</td>
<td>Host Institution</td>
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<tr>
<td>July-August</td>
<td>Finalizing accommodation and other arrangements</td>
<td>Host Institution</td>
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<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>The IFDT Annual Meeting</td>
<td>Host Institution/Co-Chairs/Steering Group</td>
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**IFDT website:**

The IFDT website had been created in 1995. It had functioned since largely as an inventory. Now there was a strong incentive to make it a common space, where participants could promote their events, and share information. The building blocks were there to be brought together. It would be functional – a focus for exchange.

It would provide a platform for two types of activity: public – for promotion, and private – a password-protected area for information-sharing amongst members. A facilitator would interact with participants on their engagement with the website.

It was hoped that the website could serve also as a research facility, with a searchable database of digital papers and new (and old) publications, and as a forum for the collected
experience of the group, as for example, on how to help diplomats understand the science of climate diplomacy. There would be no obstacle to individuals posting a paper, creating a community of interest.

There was general consensus that an interactive website would be welcome, and its development was agreed.

**Final additional session:**

**Brief contributions on the activities of participating institutions**

**Armenia**
The Diplomatic School welcomed co-operation with other partners, and had benefited from the contributions to their training programme of Clingendael, CPDS, the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna and the government of Estonia. They were engaged in a comparative study of training offered in other institutions, in twenty different countries.

**Azerbaijan**
The Diplomatic Academy was now a University, with a new school of computer science and business management. They were progressively overcoming the intellectual legacy of the Soviet Union. The backbone of the Academy was the School of International and Public Policy, which offered functional training to government officials, and tailored programmes for officials of the Organisation of Islamic Co-operation. They welcomed collaboration with other institutions.

**Bulgaria**
The external work of the Diplomatic Institute was focused mostly on sharing experience of negotiating in the region; an EU member state working with non-EU neighbours. Mid-career training was a speciality, focusing on modern trends. Training for seniors posed particular challenges. The Institute was also a research centre and think-tank, but small, with limited resources.

**Chile**
The Director of the Academy had been formerly the Director General of the International Labor Organization. They focused increasingly on the study of social development, including video conferencing with colleagues in China on how to manage the growth of the middle class. They were looking to increase dialogue and partnership with others, to reduce their geographical isolation.

**Estonia**
The Diplomatic Academy had been created in 1990. Since 1999, it had been an independent foundation, more an institute of international relations with an EU-related focus. Since 2005, they had offered courses in English to international participants, a nine-month programme and twenty tailor-made short courses. They strongly endorsed the development of the IFDT website, a useful new tool.

**Georgia**
The Diplomatic Training Centre had been established in 2012. They offered traditional training, and more innovative courses, eg for diplomatic spouses. They provided courses for the local diplomatic corps on understanding Georgia, its society and government. More was needed on inter-cultural negotiation and conflict resolution.

**India**
The Foreign Service Institute, under the Ministry of External Affairs, was 28 years old. Their programmes were grouped in three streams – for new entrants, for mid-career officers, and for foreigners. The programme for new recruits provided training in basic skills, including administration and management. They had attachments with the armed forces, one month in the regions to learn about sub-national governance, and a one-month walkabout at their own
discretion, working for example with civil society organisations. They then were attached to a Desk for ten months, their first exposure to real work. Their first foreign assignment would be to learn the language in their host country, for 1-2 years. Indian mid-career training, for those with 5-8 years experience, was mandatory to advance, but non-mandatory to acquire specialist anchor skills. It was offered partly in India, and partly outside. Group training was offered to support and technical staff. Training for externals included a one-month course offered 2-3 times a year for thirty junior diplomats from the countries of ASEAN and the Indian Ocean Rim, and intensive ten-day courses for regional neighbours, by request. New online courses were being developed, both synchronous and asynchronous.

Indonesia
The Diplomatic Academy had been established in 1945. They offered an eight-month residential induction training programme to 150 new entrants per year, which was followed by a 1-3 month internship in missions abroad. Officers typically served three years at home, then 3.5 years abroad, before returning for four months training to progress to the next grade, eg from counsellor to minister counsellor, including specific training for new roles. The Academy offered exchange programmes for diplomats from abroad, and two-hour familiarization courses for new members of the diplomatic corps, twice a week for three months, including sessions on Indonesian culture. They had agreements for co-operation in diplomatic training with 32 countries and five international organisations.

Netherlands
Clingendael offered competence-based training to junior Dutch diplomats that was 70% skills-based. Their curriculum was founded on a comprehensive needs-analysis of eight political tasks and fourteen work processes. They offered detailed case studies on current policies for those preparing for membership of a trade mission or contact group, as well as training in writing speaking points and speech-making. They provided personal coaching as a contribution to career development – four sessions in three months, two on chosen competences, two mandated by the HR Department, linked to the needs of MFA.

Peru
The Diplomatic Academy provided mid-career training in partnership with the Human Resources Department of the MFA, which had a clear idea of the needs of individuals and groups.

Qatar
The Diplomatic Institute had been established in 2012. It offered a four-month programme, repeated twice a year. Most courses lasted no more than one-week. They drew on outside expertise, and were open to co-operation with other institutions around the world.

Republic of Korea
In 1965, the Korean Diplomatic Academy had become the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security Issues (IFANS). Korea was always in the midst of crisis and conflict. They were trying to educate diplomats in the use of bilateral and multilateral channels, and were focusing now much more on public diplomacy and e-diplomacy, reaching out to people in receiving countries, in the local languages, sharing knowledge with civil society and the media. They offered a highly-competitive one-year, three-semester induction programme; (10% of each intake were dropped). They offered specialist training for ambassadors, including scrutiny of morals, financial details, and assessment of performance in post, while also providing training to some five hundred foreign diplomats a year. It was a dynamic time for the Institute, changing while continuing to work.

Singapore
The Diplomatic Academy had been created in 2007, its first five years as part of the Human Resources Directorate, and since 2012 an independent institution, though linked still to the HR Directorate. Their curriculum included a basic programme for new entrants, plus pre-posting training after three years, and advanced courses for those having ten years in the Foreign Service, including management training for first-time ambassadors. They offered special seminars with guest speakers, including former Prime Ministers and Ministers, to
encourage officers to look beyond their desks. They welcomed 35 foreign diplomats a year. There were e-learning courses, and a growing reference library on diplomatic tradecraft and policy issues. They drew on senior people to be useful mentors for leadership skills development. The best diplomats worked under the best leaders.

Switzerland
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) was celebrating its twentieth anniversary. In addition to their academic programmes and short courses, they hosted diplomatic dialogues. They offered a home for research and study; one- to six-month associate fellowships were available, as well as a post-doctoral programme.

UNITAR was an international institution, a resource open to governments and other international institutions, under mandate of the General Assembly, to help diplomats prepare for their work in the UN systems and agencies. UNITAR also supported national diplomatic academies with UN expertise, and funding. They were at the cutting edge of innovation in training topics – eg on cyber-security. They offered forty e-learning courses a year to over a thousand participants, plus a la carte programmes on core diplomatic skills, eg in preparation for international conferences on post-2015 SDGs and climate change. Their leadership courses now included a programme for women leaders in diplomacy.

United Kingdom
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office would be launching early in 2015 its new Diplomatic Academy, with premises within the FCO. It would draw on in-house expertise and on external providers. It would deliver training in three tiers: Foundation – for all; Practitioner – for desk officers and subject-matter specialists; and Expert – for senior officers having knowledge and experience amassed perhaps over a long career.

The Centre for Political and Diplomatic Studies (CPDS) continued to offer programmes of practical training in international policy and tradecraft to diplomats in a range of countries worldwide, and to a number of international institutions, notably the European External Action Service, the OSCE, the UN Security Council and most recently the headquarters and regional offices of the World Food Programme.

The London Academy of Diplomacy offered MA programmes to some 150 students a year, including members of the diplomatic corps in London, diplomats from abroad at all levels from ambassadors to juniors, and international students from 88 countries.

Closing Remarks:

Ambassador Barbara Bodine commented on the scope and rigour of training that was being provided to meet common challenges, quietly, with much co-operation.

Dr Gerhard Sailler observed that the Forum helped to serve as a clearing house of information and experience, which would be enhanced by the new website.

Ambassador Thami Ngwevela thanked all her colleagues in DIRCO, and the members of the Steering Group, for their support. She reserved special thanks for Nadja Wozonig, the indispensable link at Vienna, holding the fort alone for some time in Ambassador Hans Winkler’s absence.

Hosting the Forum had offered an exceptional opportunity for South Africa’s Diplomatic Academy to open itself to other experts. Gerhard Sailler and Ron Ton had delivered valuable training in policy and negotiation skills. A number of guest speakers had delivered useful comparative studies.

The Diplomatic Academy was now twenty years old, created in 1994, alongside the birth of the new democracy in South Africa. It had been restructured in 2006-7, after looking widely at best practice. You had to be dynamic, to move with the times, or you fell behind. They had a range of international exchanges, with Australia, Germany, India, Singapore and UNITAR, a backbone of external exposure.
They had embraced lifelong learning, with institutionalized personal development plans – signed annual contracts which set out what an officer intended to learn this year (a language, a substantive topic, a specialist skill) in one-, two- and up to ten-day courses. Rotation demanded need-to-know training.

New entrants pursued a one-year programme of induction, followed by two years on a Desk, before going abroad. They needed to understand their own country first, with courses on domestic, economic and foreign policy.

Heads of Mission were offered a twelve-week course, with seminars given by former CEOs, former MPs and former Ministers. The South African foreign service was not yet a hundred percent career civil service; currently 70% were professional diplomats, and 30% political appointees. The course included high-level strategic briefings, and a one-week investment opportunity familiarization in the provinces, related to export and trade.

DIRCO aimed to expand its mandate to build as many international relations opportunities as possible, taking up places in international institutions where Africa was under-represented, and helping other Africans to prepare for the application process. They were drawing on veteran South African diplomats to be mentors to the young.

The Forum drew to a close with a tour of the Academy and Library, followed by a reception and dinner, at which participants had the pleasure of being joined by many serving and retired South African diplomats.

IFDT Excursion 2014

Kwa-Maritane National Game Park, Pilanesburg
24 September 2014

Before the Meeting, thirty participants in the Forum had the good fortune to travel out to the Kwa-Maritane National Game Park, two hours drive north of Pretoria.

Ambassador Thami Ngwevela welcomed her guests to South Africa. The DIRCO host team generously provided a heroic buffet lunch, and had organized a four-hour game drive through the park, led with wry good humour by Park Ranger François Maré.

On a fine sunny afternoon and early evening, the group had the privilege of seeing in their natural habitat elephants, giraffes, zebras, rhinos (three white and one rarely-sighted black), herds of wildebeest, impala and kudu, and one majestic lioness strolling along a stream.

The park rangers managed conflict in their domain by maintaining a balance between predators and prey. There were lessons in the wild for diplomacy.

John Hemery
Rapporteur