The 40th Meeting of Deans and Directors was held in the magnificent new campus of the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy, opened formally a week earlier by President Ilham Aliev.

Thursday, 27 September

Opening the conference, Ambassador Hafiz Pashayev, Rector of the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy and Deputy Foreign Minister, welcomed participants to the Academy, and thanked the co-chairs for the opportunity of hosting the Forum. As Rector, he had taken part in the Meetings of the Forum since the Academy’s foundation in 2006. The Forum had played an important part in the development of diplomatic training in Azerbaijan and beyond.

The new Academy embraced both a new style of learning for Azerbaijan, and new technology in its buildings; 296 holes had been drilled 130 metres deep into the earth, providing geothermal energy for the campus. The government, though currently hydrocarbon rich, thus was investing in a sustainable future. In addition to its role in international public affairs, international relations and business, the Academy was to be a centre for the study of energy and the environment, and of IT engineering.

Dr. Paula Newberg, Director of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University and co-chair of the Forum, added her welcome to the fortieth anniversary Meeting. The brand new buildings in an ancient capital were an appropriate echo of the contemporary and the traditional operating together in the practice of diplomacy.

Ms Nadja Wozonig, representing Ambassador Hans Winkler, Director of the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna and co-chair of the Forum, regretted that Ambassador Winkler had been unable to attend, for family reasons. He had sent his good wishes for a successful Meeting.

At the first Meeting in 1973, there had been no more than eighteen participants. It had been an informal gathering of those from the most distinguished institutions, sharing a deep commitment to diplomatic training. Though it had grown over the years, the Forum had retained that flexible character, providing a setting in which leaders in the field could meet informally to exchange information and ideas on best practice. Ambassador Winkler hoped they would retain that long-standing tradition.

Mr Fariz Ismailzade, Executive Vice-Rector of the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy, explained the philosophy of the programme, which had been developed in partnership with Georgetown and Vienna. The panels addressed both regional and global issues, reflecting changes in the international system and in the practice of diplomacy. Breakout sessions had been planned to focus on the content and methodology of teaching in each theme.
Panel 1:
**Diplomacy of small states: preserving sovereignty and national identity in a fast-globalizing world**

*Ambassador Araz Azimov*, Deputy Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan  
*Prof Sieglinde Gstöhl*, Director, Department of EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies, College of Europe, Bruges  
*Ambassador Mladen Andrić*, Director, Diplomatic Academy, Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, Croatia

Moderator *Dr Kavus Abushov*, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy

*Dr Abushov* observed that there were two ways of viewing the role of small states in a globalized world: a pessimistic view in which small implied weak, forced to play by rules they did not make; or a more optimistic view in which, as a result of global and technological developments, the political stage was no longer dominated solely by the great powers, but shared with a proliferation of state and non-state actors.

*Prof Sieglinde Gstöhl* noted that the study of international relations had focused on power (superpowers, great powers, middle powers, but small *states* having no power), and that traditional diplomacy had focused largely on bilateral relations. But with the coming of globalisation, size had become less important; new actors had blurred the scene, structural changes had produced interdependence.

Small states had been in some sense ‘winners’ of the post-Cold War adjustments, though the danger of domination remained. They had, therefore, to adopt strategies of ‘vulnerability management’, both domestic and foreign.

In domestic affairs, that typically entailed developing specialised niche economies, with small public administrations managing a narrower range of interests. Their diplomats were of necessity generalists, with direct access to decision-makers, deploying a flexible, relatively informal diplomacy, selective and innovative in representation, including joint representation.

In foreign affairs, for small states, many of whom had opted for neutrality in the Cold War, disengagement was no longer attractive, autarky no longer an option, autonomy now a fiction. The solution, therefore was to exchange sovereignty for influence, by diversifying partners and joining regional organisations. (Qatar offered an example of the strategy.) Small states became strong advocates of multinational institutions and the rule of international law, reducing the costs of bilateral diplomacy, and facilitating coalition-building.

Size and political weight could now be balanced by non-material capacities – the persuasion of ideas, the power of reputation, the utility of good offices. To make their way in the modern world, small states had therefore to be *smart* states.

*Ambassador Mladen Andrić* observed that while small might be beautiful it was always small. The diplomacy of small states consequently had five essential characteristics:

1. **expertise** – without the resources to have specialists in different areas, they developed generalists capable of covering the whole range of the ministry’s work, whether at headquarters or at post;  
2. **professionalism** – they followed closely the Vienna Convention, but remained alert to new trends, such as public diplomacy;  
3. **networking** – they were moving steadily towards multilateralism, requiring contacts and communication ‘tous azimuthe’, increasingly through social media;  
4. **dynamism** – they had to be on the spot, up to the minute, especially in reporting and in generating new instructions; this required prioritising interests, and knowing how to choose between them;  
5. **patriotism** – they were dedicated to the cause of accuracy, but had also to keep in mind their own interests, and to report from the angle of their own country.

Diplomatic training therefore had to follow function, supporting these five attributes. To that end, they needed to develop new handbooks, new glossaries, written from the perspective of small states.
Ambassador Araz Azimov reflected on the nature of influence; size meant nothing, but some states had throw-weight. The scale of your population was less important than what you were in your own mind. (After all, in comparison to China, everyone was small.)

The principal challenges for small states included deciding on priorities, and maximizing resources, both natural and created. They had to develop intelligently. Azerbaijan, for example, was in the process of focused capacity-building as a regional hub, a ‘corridor country’, offering smoother, faster, easier transit.

But much depended also on your neighbourhood, whether comfortable or harsh. The small states of central Europe were surrounded by a framework of economic co-operation. Membership of the EU and of NATO had offered a pre-determined way forward. Azerbaijan, by contrast, had to think carefully about ‘balancing’, playing a delicate diplomatic role in a complex region where the spirit of confrontation jostled with opportunities for co-operation.

There was a cost, though, to joining regional associations – loss of sovereignty, and a subdued voice in decision-making. The EU talked about values, but power still determined outcomes. Azerbaijan had decided to take a national path, of managed co-operation and engagement, similar to the successful model offered by the Republic of Korea, with democratic, accountable governance and a high standard of living.

There were challenges to going it alone, civilisational differences to be overcome. You had to establish your identity in a new geopolitical order, transcending outdated stereotypes.

Since the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and then of the Soviet Union, new relationships had had to be forged. Security had come to dominate international politics. Conflicts were resisting settlement. International law proved to be no protection. Articles 39 and 51 of the Charter of the United Nations offered rights in theory, but not in practice.

The Great Game was not over. It was still immanent in global rivalries over arms, energy and nuclear proliferation, and in differential responses to the Arab Spring. Interventions in Iraq in 2003, in Libya in 2011 and now in Syria had been abuses of the Charter.

In discussion:

- Smallness was relative; the GDP of the Netherlands was equal to that of Russia.
- Size was a matter of perception; perception could be modified by public diplomacy and branding.
- Small states could make a difference through the power of ideas: for example, Malta in the origin of UNCLOS (‘the seabed as the heritage of mankind’); Azerbaijan as a model for others on ‘opening up’, and planning for the end of hydrocarbon wealth. This needed to be stressed in training.
- Small states had to be innovative; necessity was the mother of invention. Interdependence provided a relatively more level playing field for small vs large states (for example, Antigua vs the United States on cyber law).
- Context determined outcomes. Membership of the EU conferred opportunities and challenges for small states. Innovativeness was always necessary. The ability to adapt quickly was key.
- Poland’s experience of the EU was the opposite of compromise and limitation; membership had offered great opportunities within an association based on values.
- The Maldives offered a good example of the potential impact of leadership, focus and diplomatic skill. Singapore and Qatar, similarly, maximized their respective strengths.
- The shortest distance between two points in geopolitics was not necessarily a straight line. Small states needed 4x4 all-terrain diplomats.
- The IFDT was committed to friendly and open-minded discussion. It was important to avoid politicising debate. Important, too, to focus not so much on issues, as on training.
Panel 2: 
**Energy and Environment Diplomacy**

*Dr Brenda Shaffer*, Visiting Professor, SFS, Georgetown University  
*Mr Roland Kobia*, Head of EU Delegation, Baku

**Moderator Dr Elnur Soltanov**, Chairman, Caspian Center for Energy and Environment, ADA

*Dr Brenda Shaffer* offered a comprehensive analysis of the geopolitics and diplomacy of energy, supported by detailed data.

Oil and gas production had increased dramatically, both in volume and geographic location. New players were changing the nature of the market.

Oil and gas had to be considered separately; oil was a commercial commodity now, price affected by spot traders. Gas depended on a permanent infrastructure, entailing long-term investment. Governments were engaged in contracts, and in managing neighbourhood relations.

The ‘oil weapon’ was a two-edged sword; producers were in some respects as vulnerable as consumers to disruption in the market. There was scope for diplomacy, through the International Energy Agency (IEA) and other mechanisms for managing anomalies in supply and price.

In the geopolitics of gas, suppliers were similarly as dependent on markets as consumers were on supply. Dependence on pipelines meant that transit states could create less stable supply. There was no interdependent gas trade, so there were no ‘peace pipelines’; there were only political incentives on price, as reflected in US free trade agreements, or Russian deals with clients.

Shale-gas was transforming the industry, and geopolitical relations. The US and Canada would become gas exporters. China’s production would affect her drive for sourcing foreign energy. Domestic subsidy regimes would need to be redrawn, with inevitable political ramifications.

There was notable growth in energy diplomacy. Ministries of foreign affairs were establishing and elevating energy bureaux, and appointing energy officers within embassies. Yet for all the meetings, and earnest declarations, there were few concrete results. There was scope for integrating energy diplomacy in diplomatic training, including the study of the role of state and non-state oil and gas companies in diplomacy.

*Dr Elnur Soltanov* offered a case study of Azerbaijan’s energy diplomacy.

In the 1990s, diplomacy had served energy; foreign policy had been mobilised to favour energy production and sales. In the 2000s, energy had served diplomacy; it had been a tool and had provided a framework for foreign policy which had served to consolidate the sovereign independence of the state and the prosperity of the people.

This development had to be seen in the context of the unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. One in seven people in Azerbaijan were IDPs; twenty percent of the country was occupied. Azerbaijan’s policy consequently was so to engage with neighbours and partners as to settle the dispute. Strongly constructive relations had been forged with some; regrettably, powerful others had not been so helpful. As a result, the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh had become a frozen conflict.

Azerbaijan’s oil- and gas-fueled foreign policy aimed at generating and sustaining good relations with key partners – Russia, Iran, Turkey – and with ‘progressive countries’; no big, bold game-changing moves; just keeping options open as long as it was cost-effective.
Mr Roland Kobia, Head of the EU Delegation in Baku, observed that while global challenges proliferated, more solutions were available to meet them.

The challenges included:
- population growth, with energy resources declining, making resources more costly;
- energy demand increasing by up to fifty percent by 2030, mainly from less-developed countries;
- new market dynamics, with the role of the state rebounding;
- new players overhauling the energy map, and with it the political map;
- a shift, consequently, in alliances, in the aftermath of the conflicts in Iraq and Libya;
- a new energy mix emerging; after decades of the predominance of oil, gas was now entering a golden age.

Nevertheless, energy efficiency had increased. Environmental diplomacy had registered the inevitability of co-operation to ensure sustainable development, buttressed by a global framework of legally-binding commitments.

Yet energy and environmental diplomacy were in conflict over differing priorities. Consequently, more was being done bilaterally, as it was easier to achieve pragmatic accords, even if less efficient at the macro level.

How to bring these two strands of thinking together? As Einstein had observed, ‘Everything has changed except the way we think.’. We were blocked by realist, military-security assumptions. A wiser diplomacy was needed to ensure a sustainable supply of energy from diversified sources across multiple routes. The process itself could contribute to peace and security, a tool of conflict resolution: cross-border infrastructure demanded peace. In a virtuous circle, the necessity of political partnership led to increased trade; greater awareness of interdependence reinforced a multilateral response to the challenges of climate change.

In discussion:

- the market had not produced the anticipated solutions to environmental degradation; state regulation could work as an incubator of renewable energy; further progress lay in raising individual and social awareness, and encouraging corporate responsibility.
- there was no international body to reconcile energy and environmental interests. It started to work at regional level, but not at global level, where all initiatives foundered.
- carbon trading didn’t work; it was like handing out pillows at a plane crash, a dream of law students.
- it would have been helpful to have representatives of non-state actors in this discussion. Public-private partnerships were productive – though care was needed when diplomats went to the private sector and facilitated deals which could be diverted to other ends, for example arms purchases.
- diplomatic training tended to focus on generating access to resources and facilitating contracts; more attention needed to be paid to preserving resources and protecting the environment; (the two portfolios needed to be brought together).
  [the Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy offered a joint MA in environmental planning and management and diplomacy]
- diplomatic training could include short internships with energy traders, or if that were not feasible, at least case studies of how the energy markets worked; officials could be brought in from energy and environment ministries, to contribute to courses and be trained alongside diplomats, together with representatives of corporates and civil society organisations.
  [the Geneva Center for Security Policy, Clingendael and others had developed cases and simulations of conflict resolution in energy/environment disputes in Greenland, Aceh, Québec and the Caspian Sea]
Friday, 28 September

Panel 3:
Landscape Changes in World Politics: Evolving Diplomacy of Regional Organisations

Professor Alan Henrikson, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University
Dr Yolande Spies, University of Pretoria

Moderator Mr Fariz Ismailzade, Executive Vice-Rector, Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy

Professor Henrikson addressed three inter-related elements in world politics: landscape, power, and international governance as it bore on diplomacy.

The landscape was a metaphorical view of the global field, from a point of view – historical, subjective, an interpretation of reality as captured, for example, in Willem de Klerk’s paintings of the Rhine, depicting the river, the community and its people.

Balance of power implied a structure of relations, with formal ties of authority and organisational lines along which power flowed from one source to another – a power-scape. Kissinger had preferred the term ‘equilibrium’ to ‘balance of power’, referring to a ‘structure of peace’ that was inherently stabilising, tending to even out over time, despite recurring fragilities.

Had that equilibrium ended with the end of the Cold War? Not much had changed; the United States remained the hegemon, capable of projecting military power worldwide over a sustained period. US force posture was being ‘re-balanced’, an intra-national redistribution of military power, as Asia became the focus of economic growth and strategic uncertainty.

The economic balance of power, on the other hand, was changing dramatically, with the rapid development of China’s economy. (A recent Carnegie-Pew poll in the United States had found that 59% now felt that economic strength was of greater concern than military power.)

At the same time, economic expansion intersected with military power projection, as reflected in the naval manoeuvres over maritime boundary disputes.

Beyond the economic/military balance, other landscape changes were affecting international politics, not least arctic warming, which was opening up not only new travel routes but also new disputes over ownership of and access to resources. A plethora of international structures was addressing the impact of climate change and the depletion of non-renewable resources. International business was leading on initiatives such as the UN Global Compact, to manage issues of human rights, labour standards, environmental protection and measures against corruption, as expressed in the Ruggie Principles.

New forms and structures of international governance were emerging to meet these new challenges. A new form of diplomacy thus was needed, within the framework of the United Nations. This new terrain had an undulating surface; like a golfing green, you had to study it, to read it, to ride it. Therein lay the role for diplomats, helping the international community to navigate the new uncertainty.

Dr Yolanda Spies observed that diplomatic theory was relatively under-developed; it needed the contribution of IFDT participants.

Polarity had evolved, from the concert of powers in Europe, through Cold War bipolarity, a sudden vacuum of polarity in the 1990s, a brief period of unipolar hyperpower soon challenged by Russia and China, to what Huntington had called ‘unimultipolarity’ – a hegemon with layers of polarity beneath.

Buzan and Weaver had observed that regions were now dominant. Dick Haas had referred to ‘non-polarity’, a non-system of situational, diffuse power relations. From a Global South perspective, polarity was a North-South issue; the have versus the have nots.
Dr Spies suggested ‘poly-polarity’, with several poles (US military might, China’s economic reach, multiple alliances of state and non-state players) with horizontal and vertical linkages, all continually in flux.

Geoff Wiseman had referred to the emergence of ‘poly-lateral’ diplomacy, comparable to Brian Hocking’s ‘catalytic’ diplomacy, reflecting the growth of symbiotic state/non-state relations in the search for diplomatic outcomes. Nordic states had been amongst the first to co-opt the representatives of civil society organisations in official delegations to multilateral negotiations.

Third-party diplomacy was also growing, providing mediation and good offices. In Africa ‘protracted diplomacy’ perhaps could best describe the patient pursuit of peacemaking, peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction, attempting to overcome the artificial boundaries and legacy of colonialism.

Multilateralism was assuming a normative dimension, the preserve especially of middle powers such as Australia, New Zealand and Canada, the Scandinavians, Netherlands and Malaysia, Brazil, India, Turkey, Mexico and South Africa. All were displaying a more assertive diplomacy, often with unconventional approaches – diplomacy à la carte, sometimes with an agenda (IBSA), sometimes without (BRICS).

These trends offered lessons to the established Western democracies, having themselves to respond to poly-polarity transcending traditional notions of power distribution. There were more states, and the system was in many respects as state-centric as ever; yet there was ever-greater complexity, diffusion of power, and uncertainty – which was both exciting and unnerving. The new order posed challenges to theorists and trainers alike.

In discussion:

- the academic study of diplomacy was proliferating; deep research was needed to make sense of these new trends.
- despite comprising 25% of UN membership, there was little study of diplomacy in Africa; developing countries were largely consumers of diplomatic activity; there was a great need to educate the North about the diplomacy of the South.
- the ‘powerlessness’ of states made diplomacy, governance and government more difficult, in the face of the rise of the aggregated power of the individual through the new media; change was happening too fast for governments to keep up; training thus was essential to enable diplomats and their ministries to adjust to new realities.
- it was important at the same time to remember the lessons of history (our ‘diplomatic patrimony’), to understand what we had done and why, as a guide to what to do; the pursuit of peace and democracy required a concept of peace and democracy and human rights, a tradition of co-operation; we shouldn’t just load diplomatic academies with experts in energy and environment.
- Malaysia was a leader in the ‘Global Movement of the Moderates’ (GMM), bringing together governments, NGOs and academic communities to oppose extremism; they promoted ‘moderate diplomacy’, based on universal values and the Islamic principle al-wasatiyyah, ‘taking the middle path’.
- ASEAN operated on the principle of ‘dynamic equilibrium’; it was not the same as balance of power; rather, positive interaction in pursuit of common security and prosperity which diluted relations of power.
- the Fletcher School had conducted a series of conferences on ASEAN, examining inter alia the process of decision-making by consultation and consensus, similar to Quaker practice, and the UNCLOS consensus procedure; this fed into the diplomatic process, as small states contributed to the elaboration of a rules-based international system.
- the complexity of the landscape was belied by the ‘relentless banality’ of public political discourse; election campaigns depicted a simplified view of the world; the challenge for diplomatic academies was to train diplomats to alert their political leaders to the complexity of the world, not dumbly executing policy, but adjusting policy to complexity.

[to this end, OUP had just published ‘Diplomacy in a Globalizing World: Theories and Practices’, by Pauline Kerr and Geoff Wiseman, eds]
Panel 4:
**Evolving Diplomacy of Regional Organisations**

*Professor William Maley*, Founding Director, Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy, Australian National University  
*Professor Dr Lisen Bashkurti*, President, Diplomatic Academy of Albania  
*Ms Liliana Torres-Muga*, Director, Peruvian Diplomatic Academy  
*Ambassador Hazairin Pohan*, Head of Center for Education and Training, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia

**Moderator: Dr Anar Valiyev**, Dean, School of Public and International Affairs, ADA

*Prof William Maley* observed that regional organisations were actors in themselves, not just venues, but they always sat in a wider context of international society and norms which acted as limits to action.

The capacity for decision and action varied from organisation to organisation, according to:

- the degree of integration and coherence  
- the structure of leadership  
- the culture of decision-making  
- the history and circumstances of foundation  
- the interests of members, which might diverge in response to events  
- the possible engagement of other regional or international organisations in regional affairs.

*Professor Dr Lisen Bashkurti* observed that the post-Cold War trend to heteropolar globalization had led to strengthened regional diplomacy:

- more open minds, societies, borders and markets, transcending national boundaries  
- anti-globalist forces, of both Left and Right, seeking protection for their environment, or union rights  
- pragmatic interest-aggregation, sharing power as a multiplier of influence (though when the chips were down, national interest supervened)  
- new challenges (environment/health/water/terrorism/organised crime), which could be managed only multilaterally, and were not susceptible to solution by force  
- decisions at regional level were both more specifically relevant and more achievable than at global level.

*Ms Liliana Torres-Muga* presented a case study of the evolving diplomacy of regional organisations in Latin America:

- the end of the bipolar system had given Latin America greater geopolitical autonomy  
- changes in the production system had demanded regional supply, if to be part of an efficient global supply chain; power had shifted from states to multinational corporations  
- economic growth, increasing prosperity, social inclusion and democracy had facilitated convergence and policy co-operation  
- Latin American states were represented now in varying configurations within international and regional organisations (G20, IMF, APEC, OECD, AIP, ASPA, BRICS, BRICSAM, MIKT, CIVETS)  
- these multilateral arrangements were buttressed by a proliferation of bilateral agreements covering 90% of regional trade; growth was promoted through greater integration and cohesiveness.
Ambassador Hazairin Pohan offered a case study of progress towards the establishment of the ASEAN Community in 2015.

Regional co-operation had begun at Bangkok in 1967, with the foundation of the Association of South East Asian Nations by its five original members (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand). A Treaty of Amity and Co-operation had been signed at Bali in 1976, enshrining the principle of non-use of force. A second Bali Concord in 2003 had formalised the ‘three-pillars’ concept: three ‘communities’ – security, economic and social-cultural. The ASEAN Charter had been signed at Singapore in 2007, creating a legal entity. Bali III in 2011 had provided for further integration to promote stability and development.

The ‘ASEAN Way’ was a fluid concept, a continuously-evolving regional architecture without formal destination, arriving at decisions by consultation and consensus. ASEAN was ‘the nucleus of a complex web of co-operation processes’, including six other regional fora (ARF, ASEAN+1, ADMM, EAFTA, AFTA, EAS).

The East Asia Summit had become the primary forum in the regional architecture. The diplomatic challenge facing ASEAN members was to maintain ASEAN’s centrality as the driving force for enhancing mechanisms of co-operation.

In discussion:

- there was little formal cross-regional learning; more tacit knowledge about what seemed to work (‘we know more than we can say’); on the other hand, the success of the European communities had inspired Latin American regional integration.

- ASEAN states had learned by observation to resist supranational decision-making, and that slow growth could help development.

- the Peace and Security Council of the African Union was playing an increasing role in promoting peace and security in the region. AU peace-keeping operations had been deployed in Burundi, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Darfur, the DRC and Somalia. The AU had mediated a comprehensive peace settlement between Sudan and South Sudan.

- regional organisations had had greater success in the economic sphere, in Latin America and Africa, than in the political sphere, where issues were referred to (and blocked in) the UN Security Council.

- there was no point in rehearsing here structures which could be found in any textbook; the point of the Forum was – how did you teach it? discussion of practical guidelines for preparing diplomats to work in regional organisations would be welcome.

- in most regions (Europe, the Gulf, Latin America, Southeast Asia, Southern Africa) diplomats from a number of states had at least part of their training together.

- Croatia had become a centre for regional and inter-regional training co-operation, with two or three programmes a year at Dubrovnik seeking to develop syllabi and new approaches.

- diplomatic academies had a role to play in teaching national as well as regional co-operation, helping to resolve internal conflicts.

- was there an evolving diplomacy of regional organisations for which training could be developed? this had two dimensions – the diplomacy within the organisation, and the diplomacy of the organisation with third countries and other international actors.
Presentation and discussion:
The way ahead of the International Forum on Diplomatic Training:
sharing experiences, meeting new challenges, opening new frontiers
Dr Paula Newberg, Director, Edmund A Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University
Ms Nadja Wozonig, representing Ambassador Hans Winkler, Director, Diplomatic Academy of Vienna
Dr John Hemery, Director, Centre for Political and Diplomatic Studies, UK

[Copies of the Proposal on the future of the IFDT, circulated in July 2012 to participants in the 39th Meeting of the IFDT in Boston in 2011, were made available to participants before the session, together with the relevant extract from the Report of the 39th Meeting, recounting the presentation and discussion at The Fletcher School on the future of the IFDT.]

Dr Paula Newberg introduced the discussion, suggesting that the Forum had a choice to make, whether to continue in the essentially informal, unstructured way in which it had developed, or to move toward the professionalisation of the group.

She referred to the discussion at Boston in 2011, in which Ambassador Winkler had introduced the notion of a participation fee to cover the costs of an upgraded website and essential administration. The co-chairs had been mandated to bring forward proposals to that end. In the course of investigating how such a funding process might work, however, it had emerged that neither the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna nor Georgetown University were in a position to manage such a fund.

Dr John Hemery had agreed to investigate what would be entailed in establishing an independent body to receive, manage and disburse the putative fee income of the IFDT. Such a body (a non-profit, or in UK terms an unincorporated institution) operating under UK charities law would require a constitution, formal educational objectives, a board of directors, democratic selection and transparent accounting.

These legal requirements had formed the basis of the Proposal circulated earlier. Where money was involved, accountable management structures naturally followed.

Dr Newburg announced that the discussion of new arrangements was timely, as she personally was to leave Georgetown University, and it was not certain that Georgetown would continue to serve as co-chair of the Forum. On the fortieth anniversary of their contribution to the group, it was an appropriate moment to consider an alternative co-chair, perhaps from another part of the world than North America, or another arrangement altogether. She raised the possibility that an interim consultative committee be created to consider the way ahead, perhaps including representatives of different regions.

In discussion:

- A number of participants expressed concern at the introduction of a participation fee, and/or at the level of fee proposed. It was suggested that for a variety of reasons this might jeopardise attendance at future Meetings.

- All faced financial constraints. Participating institutions were free to contribute to the working budget of the Forum as their resources might allow.

- A number of participants encouraged the continuation of the Forum as a loose network without burden of bureaucracy, based on voluntary contributions in kind by willing institutions.

- Professor Henrikson stressed the importance of voluntary contributions. The Fletcher School had been glad to host the 39th Meeting; they had felt that it had been their turn to contribute to the life of the Forum, and it had been a major diplomatic event for the institution. He encouraged the adoption of the ‘troika’, in which the previous host could pass on information helpful to the host in waiting. It would contribute to consensual decision-making.
There was general agreement that the ‘troika’ be added to the decision-making process, in whatever form that proved to be reconfigured.

*Dr Hemery* observed that greater continuity would be welcome. At present, agenda items could be repetitive from year to year. Inclusiveness could be achieved through a ‘committee of the regions’ contributing to the definition of the programme.

*Dr Jovan Kurbalija* joined others in calling for greater transparency of decision-making. He offered for comparison the examples of the Open Government Initiative, Open Government Partnership and Internet Governance Forum which offered different forms of inclusive consultation on the agenda and programmes (proposals by members, ranking of proposals by members, possibility of voting), giving participants a sense of ownership of the process.

[Dr Kurbalija elaborated later a possible timeline for online decision-making for the IFDT: November-December – prospective participants submit their proposals of topics to be covered at the forthcoming Meeting; January-February – participants have a chance to comment on proposals and to rank them in order of preference; March-April – co-chairs, troika and host institution agree the final programme.]

*Dr Kurbalija* also offered the 38th Meeting at Malta as a demonstration that the organisation of the Forum did not need to be complex or costly; it required good communication and continuity between Meetings. They had tried to keep the focus on training, and protocol events to a minimum consistent with the dignity of the host country and institutions. He recommended the concept of the ‘IFDT bazaar’, successfully tested at Malta: participants had presented their activities, courses and projects in the formula: 10 minutes introduction + 10 minutes Q&A. They also had scheduled parallel workshops, making possible the coverage of a larger number of topics in a short time.

*Dr Marc Finaud* suggested that the Association for Security Sector Reform (SSR) Education and Training (ASSET), a loose network of education and training institutions, could be considered as a model for the governance of the IFDT. The members of this network agreed on a constitution, and it was managed by a steering committee consisting of the past, current and future hosts of the annual general meeting as well as representatives of each region selected through intra-regional consultations during the annual general meeting. It held no funds, and relied on voluntary contributions both in kind (such as practice notes, curricula, etc.) and financially by members hosting meetings (which could raise funds from donors). The principle of regional rotation for hosts of annual meetings was enshrined in the constitution. A website [www.asset-ssr.org] allowed the sharing of experience and information, and acted also as a platform for the visibility of members and regional projects vis-à-vis donors. It was funded as a voluntary contribution by one member (who covered the salary of one intern in India).

*Dr Paul Meerts* suggested that the European Diplomatic Programme (EDP) offered a similar example of a loose network of heads of training operating an annual programme by consensus, and on the basis of self-funding. He proposed that the Forum could offer a comparable training initiative, perhaps to be called the Global Diplomatic Programme (GDP), a three-week summer school for diplomats from all over the world, aged 25-35, at the level of First Secretary. The sending governments would pay for travel and accommodation; the host institution would cover the costs of the training.

A number of participants felt that too much attention had been given at Forum meetings to topical issues of policy, and/or to information readily available elsewhere. Greater time and attention needed to be devoted to the exchange of ideas and best practice in training, such as syllabus design and methodology.

A number felt that the Forum would be improved by the addition of representatives of business and civil society, more nearly replicating the way in which diplomacy now worked. Others felt that opening the Meetings to broader constituencies would undermine the unique character of the Forum.

*Ambassador Pablo Cabrerra* offered a demonstration of a blog as a means both of outreach and of communication amongst participants in the Forum.
Midway through the session, Dr Newberg regrettably had to leave to catch a flight. On her departure, Prof William Maley said he was sure he spoke for all in thanking Dr Newberg for her contribution to the Forum in her time as co-chair. Dr Hemery added his personal thanks for all her work for the IFDT.

Ms Nadja Wozonig, speaking on behalf of Ambassador Winkler, reiterated her remarks in the opening session that the Forum had been for many years an informal gathering of the most distinguished institutions in the field to exchange information and best practice; they hoped that this tradition would continue. She thanked Georgetown for their contribution to the Forum for forty years as co-chair, and hoped that that long association might continue, as well. The Diplomatic Academy of Vienna was happy to continue to serve as co-chair of the Forum, and would welcome consultation, with the troika, on the way forward.

Ambassador Hafiz Pashayev thanked the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna for their invaluable help in the preparation of the 40th Meeting. It had been an honour for the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy to host the Forum. He was sure there would be no lack of candidates coming forward to continue the tradition. In the meantime the troika could help serve as the Forum’s institutional memory. He favoured maintaining the informal character of the IFDT.

Dr Bozin Nicolić, speaking as the incoming member of the troika, hoped to welcome participants to the 41st Meeting of the Forum in 2013. The plan was to have an opening session at the Diplomatic Academy in Vienna, then to progress by riverboat to Bratislava, Budapest and eventually to Belgrade. There still were some details to consolidate, not least the boat, but he was confident that they were going to be able to offer a successful Meeting.

In closing the session, Dr Hemery thanked Ambassador Pashayev and his team at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy for all they had done to produce so memorable a Meeting. It was clear, in the absence of both co-chairs, that it would not be possible to confirm final decisions. He undertook to summarise the discussion and to circulate it to participants for further comment.

Optional Thematic Workshops

Participants had the opportunity of taking part in one of three breakout sessions on aspects of diplomatic training:

**eDiplomacy Training – Hype and Reality**
Moderator: Dr Jovan Kurbalija, Founding Director, DiploFoundation, Malta

The curriculum for training in eDiplomacy comprised three elements:
- **the changing environment** for diplomatic activity
  (tectonic shifts in information and communication technology shaping the modern economy; the emergence of new elites; ‘sharing’ as the new business model, overtaking copyright protection)
- **new topics** on the diplomatic agenda
  (Internet governance in transition, control of data stored in the Cloud, cybersecurity)
- **new tools** for diplomats
  (Facebook, Twitter, tumblr, YouTube, Wikipedia, Pinterest, blog)

Ministries of Foreign Affairs were now exposed by social media. In order to be influential you had to *engage* in the conversation going on all around you. Writing implied commitment, enabling you to communicate directly with local communities.

There was a low entry point: it took only a day to learn how to use social media. It took only a month to learn about the organisation and culture of the social media space. Within a year it was possible for the MFA to be using social media effectively.

This implied, though, a change of organisational culture – from a hierarchical top-down approach, to bottom-up empowerment: no problem for digital natives; more of a challenge for those who were at best digital migrants. What was needed was a common-sense approach to the opportunities offered by the new technology.
Content-based Language Instruction for Diplomacy

Moderator: Ms Lisa Donohoe, Education Program Associate, Monterey Institute of International Studies, USA

Ms Donohoe observed that language and intercultural training in diplomacy were often overlooked in curriculum planning for diplomats, though it was one of the most critical skills in international relations. A ‘content-based’ approach trained diplomats in four essential tools: language, intercultural awareness, content knowledge, and ‘appropriacy’—ie, understanding how to make language choices appropriate to various contexts. The cutting edge in language training for diplomats thus went beyond the traditional approach of teaching how language was formed and what words meant; it aimed for true, intercultural and context-appropriate language use in real-world communicative scenarios.

The content-based language instructor:
- provided a learning environment for interactive communication and collaboration
- raised self-awareness of trainee learning strategies
- increased trainee autonomy for the learning process through responsibility for content
- elicited content from trainee experts
- guided trainees toward context-appropriate language use
- facilitated discussion and provided feedback & assessment.

The content-based classroom emphasised:
- co-operative learning
- project-based collaborative teams
- a variety of thinking skills
- information gathering skills—researching, absorbing, questioning
- organising skills—categorising, comparing, representing
- analysing skills—identifying main ideas, attributes and components, relationships, patterns
- generating skills—inferring, predicting, estimating, creating

Research had shown the following outcomes from the content-based approach:
- increased motivation and interest levels
- better long-term academic success rates
- better scores in language proficiency tests
- better retention rates
- greater opportunities for employment
- and most importantly for diplomats, context-appropriate language competence.

Using Reality in Training for Diplomats in Negotiation

Moderator: Dr Paul Meerts, Senior Research Associate, Clingendael Institute, Netherlands

Twenty members of the Forum attended the workshop in which Dr Meerts introduced a film of a multilateral negotiation process in Geneva. The film presented diplomats with diplomacy in action, and was connected to a simulation exercise in which participants had to draft a text. The text provided in the exercise was genuine, with square brackets indicating areas for negotiation, as depicted in the film. Through the negotiation process, diplomats under training would come as close to reality as possible, learning the lessons needed to represent their countries’ interests effectively.

At the closing dinner, Dr Samad Seyidov, Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Policy, reflected on the way in which Azerbaijan was opening up to the rest of the world.

It was a land of great beauty, a multi-cultural, multi-faith society which combined and respected the traditions of both East and West. It had worked hard to establish excellent relations with its neighbours, though regrettably without success so far with Armenia. Azerbaijan wished to live in peace, but with its territorial integrity restored—through diplomacy, not war.

The Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy was to play an important part in this opening—helping others to understand the country, its cultural heritage, its people and their values. The Parliament would do its best to support the Academy in this combined effort of diplomacy and education.
Saturday 29 – Sunday 30 September

A number of participants in the Forum had the good fortune to enjoy the generous hospitality of their hosts on a two-day field trip to Gabala and Sheki, including a lunch in Qafqaz Resort Hotel, Gabala, followed by a dinner at the Karvansaray Restaurant in Sheki. They stayed overnight at the Sheki Saray Hotel, and on the second day visited the Palace of Sheki Khans and the Albanian Church in Kish Village.

Dr John Hemery
Rapporteur