The Diplomatic Academy of Vienna hosted the 34th Meeting of Deans and Directors with the professional efficiency and generous hospitality which makes each gathering at Vienna such a pleasure. At a reception given by the City of Vienna in the Rathaus, Herr Thomas Resch welcomed the group on behalf of the Mayor. After the Forum many members had the pleasure of a memorable three-day excursion to Český Krumlov and Prague, including a reception at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic hosted by the Director of the Diplomatic Academy, Ambassador Otto Pick.

**Director’s Welcome**

Professor Jiří Gruša welcomed the Deans and Directors to the Academy for the first time in his capacity as Director. He observed that in ancient times the messenger often had been identified with the message, sometimes to his permanent disadvantage. Later, the diplomat had been effectively distanced from the message by convention and poor communications. Now, in the era of immediate reporting and video-conferencing, the messenger had been re-integrated with the message; a challenge, a risk and an opportunity both for ministries and for training institutions. In an age of international terrorism, truth, integrity and the skills of dialogue were more important than ever. Diplomacy encouraged restraint and moderation (*temperantia*); not a sign of weakness in the face of extremism, but of courage.

**In Memoriam**

The co-chairs of the Meeting, Professor Casimir Yost of Georgetown University, and Mag.Gerhard Reiweger, Deputy Director of the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, opened the Meeting with brief commemorations of the lives of Ambassador Dr Ernst Sucharipa and Sir Robin Fearn. The Forum met this year in Vienna for the first time since Ernst Sucharipa’s untimely death, and remembered with gratitude his many contributions to the growth and development of the Forum during his five years as Director of the Academy. Sir Robin Fearn, who had died suddenly a few weeks earlier, had been a regular and valued contributor to the Meetings for more than ten years, and was sadly missed. Members of the Forum observed a silence in their memory.

**Introduction of new members and institutions represented for the first time:**

- Abdelnasser, Walid (Institute for Diplomatic Studies, Egypt)
- Al-Busaidi, Said Khalifa (Omani Diplomatic Institute, Oman)
- Barros, Pedro Nsingui (Institute for International Relations, Angola)
- Barros Urzua, Pedro (Diplomatic Academy of Chile)
- Basabe, Horacio (Instituto del Servicio de la Nación, Argentina)
- Bastelica, Philippe (Ecole Nationale d’Administration, France)
- Benzarti, Lamine (Diplomatic Institute for Training and Studies, Tunisia)
Professor Yost recognised and thanked the countries and institutions which had hosted recent meetings of the Forum: Jordan (2002), Croatia (2003) and Peru (2005).

**Reports from Regional Groups:**

**Africa** (Maud Dlomo, rapporteur)

Seven countries had been represented. They had discussed ways in which co-operation within and between regions of the continent could be improved. An institutionalised mechanism was needed. The African Union could be a focus for and supporter of programmes of co-operation. Funding remained a challenge.

An inaugural meeting for diplomatic training institutes from the region (an African Forum) would be held at the Diplomatic Studies Institute in Cairo in March, 2007. This would serve as a planning meeting for the 35th Meeting of the International Forum to be held in Maputo in September, 2007. Africa had rich experience of the diplomacy of conflict resolution. This might be a fruitful topic for the agenda of the meeting in Maputo.

**Europe** (John Hemery, rapporteur)

Twenty-three members had attended, representing eighteen countries and the European Commission. Azerbaijan was welcomed to the group for the first time. The principal topic of discussion was the emergence of programmes addressing a ‘European’ diplomacy.

The European Diplomatic Programme (EDP), now in its seventh year, brought together young diplomats from the EU25 plus Bulgaria, Romania, the Commission and Council Secretariat for a series of modules of joint training hosted annually by the two countries holding successively the Presidency of the EU. It was the peripatetic alternative to (and possible precursor of) a European Diplomatic Academy.
The European Diplomatic Training Initiative (EDTI) was an informal consortium of training institutions, convened initially by Ernst Sucharipa at Vienna in 2004, which offered programmes of multinational training delivered by institutions from three or more European countries. They had successfully conducted a five-day pilot Foundation Course in Brussels in 2005. A pilot Mid-Career Course would be offered in Brussels in 2007.

It was suggested that an annual meeting of the European Forum on Diplomatic Training, founded in 1995 but in abeyance, might be revived. The Diplomatic Academy of Croatia offered to host such a meeting at Dubrovnik in 2007.

The UK Forum on Diplomatic Training, held this year at the University of Westminster, had focussed on Defence Diplomacy and Counter-Terrorism.

A number of new programmes were being offered: an online course on Roma Diplomacy (DiploFoundation); an MSc in Global Governance and Diplomacy (Oxford University Foreign Service Programme); a ten-day survival course for young diplomats (Czech Diplomatic Academy in association with the Czech Army) which would be open to participants from other countries from 2007.

Asia / Middle East: (Denis Uzmen, rapporteur)

Seventeen members had attended, representing thirteen countries.

Regular co-operation and exchange had been established between the ASEAN + 3 (China, Japan, Republic of Korea). They had met in Indonesia (2004), China (2005) and Malaysia (2006), and would meet next in Japan in 2007.

The Arab Forum of diplomatic institutes had met in Egypt (2004) and Saudi Arabia (2005), and would meet shortly in Bahrain (2006). Key topics of training in institutes of the Arab region had included dialogue of civilisations, humanitarian law, trafficking, international public health, and co-operation between governments and both international organisations and civil society organisations. There had been a notable increase in the training of women and spouses.

There were a number of programmes of multinational training for young diplomats, including one offered in Ankara for thirty-nine countries of the Middle East and Asia.

Latin America (Horacio Basabe, rapporteur)

Six countries of the region had been represented.

Regional co-operation continued with joint projects of research, publication and e-learning. A regional meeting would be held at Montevideo in October 2006. There was regular informal exchange between institutions by email. Participation in this network by other institutions from within and outside the region would be welcome.

North America (Valerie Raymond, rapporteur)

Two large countries had been represented. They had discussed emerging and evolving issues, such as the implications for training of the transformational agenda in diplomacy. Both countries were engaged in the further development of lifelong learning, with particular attention to the training of Heads of Mission.
There were new programmes of training in crisis management, developed in co-operation with the military but adapted to the needs of the foreign service. Training conducted at embassies abroad incorporated locally engaged staff and representatives of the local civil authorities who would be involved in emergency relief operations.

Increasingly their programmes reflected the concept of ‘3D’ diplomacy, integrating the complementary contributions of diplomacy, defence and development. Public diplomacy remained a priority, representing core values and interests to a wider audience both at home and abroad.

New ways of enabling staff to maintain familiarity with their home country were being sought. Pre-posting training in Canada now included a cross-Canada tour to gain first-hand knowledge of the different regions. They were studying the Chinese programme of secondment to provincial governments as a means of engaging with governance and local issues at home.

E-learning continued to be developed. Ten percent of courses now were offered online. These were both effective and cost-effective, and especially helpful in facilitating training of LE staff.

**Keynote Speech: Managing Reform of the United Nations**

*Franz Baumann*, Deputy Director General of the United Nations Office in Vienna, gave a comprehensive account of recent attempts to streamline the structure and work of the UN. He observed that he was speaking in a personal capacity.


These and other studies, including the widely-consulted ‘In Larger Freedom’ prepared for the Millenium Summit, had identified four key areas of reform:

- Development
- Peace and security
- Human rights, the rule of law and humanitarian law
- Strengthening the United Nations

The Secretary General, Kofi Annan, served as Director of the UN Budget and Head of Personnel and Management in New York (with responsibility amongst other things for staff training). He had been pushing a reform agenda for ten years; but he had no executive powers, and could only propose and encourage.

A massive new proposal had been launched in 2006, ‘Investing in the United Nations’, addressing the need for and large costs entailed in root and branch reform. Over the last twenty years the United Nations had become an operational service provider, but neither the decision-making process nor the budget had kept up with the change. The proportion of the USD 10 billion devoted annually to operations in the field had risen from 10% in 1986, to 50% in 1996, to 70% in 2006. In the same period
the number of humanitarian offices had risen from 12 to 114; the number of Special Representatives from 15 to 45. There were HIV/AIDS operations in 75 countries, and national election observer missions in 100 countries. Over half the UN staff were now serving in the field. The bill for putting the UN house in order might be as high as USD 280 million.

‘Investing in the United Nations’ had offered twenty-three proposals in seven chapters, each having three parts: (i) context and challenge; (ii) vision; (iii) proposals and action. There were detailed proposals on staffing, management, services, budget and finance. The overall objective had been to strengthen management in order to strengthen governance.

The proposals had been introduced to the General Assembly in March 2006, and regrettably had sunk like a stone. The reception had not been hostile, but the proposals clearly were not universally welcome. The General Assembly had welcomed the commitment of the Secretary General to strong governance, but simply had ‘taken note’ of his proposed reforms.

In the vote on the report the General Assembly had divided 110 to 50, with the G77, Russia and China on one side, and broadly the developed countries of the North on the other. (There had been three abstentions: Armenia, Norway and Uganda.) Support had not been solid on either side, though. The need for reform had been acknowledged, but some had been afraid of empowering the Secretary General, only to find that he or she came under effective pressure from strong member states. If the Secretary General were kept weak, so the argument went, the weaker member states collectively could remain strong.

Timing might also have been a factor in the result. Member states had not been prepared to alter significantly the structure and powers of the leadership before knowing who was to be at the helm after Kofi Annan. But more fundamentally, strengthened multilateralism was not wholly accepted in theory, hence not yet in practice. It was a question perhaps to be returned to at a later date.

In discussion:

- There were differences of view between those who wanted a managerially strong Secretary General, and those who believed that the Secretary General couldn’t be managerially strong without also becoming politically strong. In any event, the proposals had suffered by being identified with the United States, and the vote may have been influenced by factors unrelated to administrative efficiency.
- Some sought to weaken the veto power of the five Permanent Members, in particular to enshrine the right of intervention in cases of gross violation of human rights. There was as yet no consensus on this. (The observation occasionally was heard that the only thing united in the United Nations was the Secretariat.)
- With 50% of the budget and 70% of staff now engaged in fieldwork, the traditional focus of career advancement in headquarters had to change. Positive efforts now were being made to redress the balance of gender and regional representation in the UN staff.
- There was to be more flexibility of appointment, with compulsory 5-year rotation, and the possibility of mid-career entry on contracts of up to five years. It remained difficult, however, to remove underperforming staff having served longer than five years, except for criminal offences. (Conversely, tenure protected the independence of international officials from pressure from their national governments.)
The UN was an institution, not just a collectivity of member states. Its most important work was carried out not in the discussions in New York but in the functional divisions and specialised agencies. For example, it was codifying international norms on drugs, crime and corruption which were being transposed into national law around the world.

It was important to recall the reasons for the creation of the United Nations, in the wake of the failures of the League of Nations system: as Dag Hammarskold had put it, not to create a dream on earth but to prevent a nightmare.

European Diplomacy:
The Impact of European Integration on Diplomatic Practice

Jozef Bátor. Research Fellow at the Austrian Academy of Science, offered a three-part analysis of developments in the practice of diplomacy in Europe.

1. Changes in diplomacy under European integration:

From pre-Westphalian times and within the Westphalian system of sovereign states, diplomacy had been a systemic element of the interstate order, an ‘embedded communication device’. Ministries of foreign affairs interacted through a set of rules and norms which regularised behaviour, codified in the Vienna Convention (1961). Diplomats had come to share a professional identity, a specialised professional language, agreed principles and common working methods.

As the global community had changed over time, diplomacy too had had to change. Three models of further adaptation could be observed:
(i) fragmentation – the evolution of alternative parallel processes of international interaction, with different working methods, as in the international campaign to ban land mines;
(ii) metamorphosis – the evolution of new rules and adapted norms, as in the process of trade facilitation in a globalised economy;
(iii) breakdown – the loss of role of diplomacy as a primary means of international intercourse, as the global community became increasingly functionally integrated.

2. The Challenge to diplomacy of European Integration:

Stefano Bartolini (European Institute, Florence) had referred to the growing ‘de-differentiation’ of legal, administrative, economic, social and political structures and processes in Europe, and to the emergence of trans-national structures such as the European Court of Justice. National public administrations were becoming interconnected, with horizontal linkages in sectors across borders. Interstate relations were becoming ‘domesticated’; the distinction between high and low politics had become blurred.

The European Union was emerging as a discrete international actor, serving as an envelope of states and state administrations. There was as yet, however, no locus of European diplomacy. Formal bilateral diplomatic relations were maintained between member states of the EU, though line ministries interacted directly on policy and in practice. Member states still operated separately in multilateral fora, though the EU acted as a single entity in diplomatic relations with third countries, on trade, for example.
Changes in the dynamics of intra-European relations were beginning to be reflected in changes in European diplomacy, at the bilateral level, in multilateral relations, and in the role of the EU as an international actor:

1. Bilateral relations between EU Member States:
   - **Norms:**
     Communitarian relations were evolving, with ‘inter-relational goals’ (Stefan Keukeleire 2003); a ‘higher order agenda of friendly relations’ was emerging (David Spence 2004);
   - **Structures:**
     EU departments had been established in all member state foreign ministries, and there were EU Affairs officers in most embassies;
   - **Discourse:**
     Reference was made increasingly to ‘European policy’, as distinct from ‘foreign policy’;
   - **Processes:**
     The Common Foreign and Security Policy process generated increased sharing of information both classified and unclassified through the Coreu system. (Of 12,381 Coreu communications in 2005, the largest number sent by a single member state was 1,848 (UK). 2,632 had been sent by the General Secretariat of the Council, a rise of 20% since 2000. The central co-ordinating body thus was becoming an increasingly important actor in its own right.)

   There was, however, no common mode of intra-European diplomacy. There was integrated co-operation on consular affairs within the Schengen area, and fiscal co-ordination within the eurozone; but the EU still functioned in variable geometry – primarily as an intergovernmental association in a number of key areas of policy, while exercising supranational authority in others.

2. **The ‘Brusselisation’ of European multilateral diplomacy:**

   The general European interest was expressed by the European Commission, and the interests of European citizens in the European Parliament. National interests were expressed in the deliberations of the Council of the European Union, the filtering point for which was the intergovernmental Committee of Permanent Representatives (referred to in the French acronym, Coreper).

   There were four kinds of negotiator in European multilateral diplomacy:

   - The Member States – which supplied national inputs
   - The Presidency – the semi-annual rotating chair of the Council which provided ‘co-ordinator’ inputs in pursuit of the ‘European’ interest
   - The European Commission – which contributed supranational inputs
   - The European Parliament – which delivered political inputs (directly in most areas of policy through the process of co-decision with the Member States; indirectly in the field of foreign affairs).

   There were layers of ambiguities in the roles and actions of the various actors. It was increasingly difficult to define precisely a purely ‘national’ interest, hence also complicated to formulate and manage a diplomacy to promote and defend it in Brussels and Strasbourg.
3. The EU as an international actor in relations with Third Countries:

European external relations were conducted by the Member States severally, by the country holding the Presidency on behalf of the Member States, and by the European Commission as a supranational entity.

The External Service of the European Commission had resident missions in 123 countries and to five international organisations. Since the signature of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the External Service had taken on more political work, in addition to its traditional roles in the management of trade relations and development assistance.

The Constitutional Treaty had proposed the appointment of a European Foreign Minister, to be concurrently High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy in the Council of the European Union (the intergovernmental body) and Vice-President of the European Commission (the supranational body). A unified European External Action Service would have been staffed by officials of the Commission and of the Council Secretariat, and by diplomats seconded from Member States. The rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in referenda in France and the Netherlands had stalled this evolution.

Despite this setback, there remained a certain momentum in progress towards a European diplomatic service. The weekly co-ordination meetings of Heads of Mission of EU Member States abroad fostered a habit of co-operation. Diplomats were regularly seconded to the foreign ministries of other Member States. The CFSP process generated Common Positions on foreign policy issues. There were instances (still limited) of conjoined representation (for example, in Abuja, Almaty, Minsk and Windhoek). There were obvious advantages of co-operation in consular affairs.

A number of ambiguities remained to be resolved: in the scope of authority of a putative European foreign minister; in the specific competences of the Commission and of the Member States; in the respective roles and contributions of the Commission and Council Secretariat; in the career paths of individual officials from Commission, Secretariat and Member States.

The EU at present was in the process of copying the models and practices of interstate diplomacy. Yet the European Union was not a state. It was possible that there would be radical change either in the way in which the EU conducted its external relations, or in the operation of the global diplomatic system as a whole.

In the meantime, a number of challenges presented themselves for the training of diplomats in EU external relations:

- Member States needed to broaden the scope of their training to take into account the intra-EU dimension of bilateral relations. This included the role of the national government in EU decision-making, and in the process of inter-governmental co-ordination of both intra-EU and external relations.
- National diplomatic training, reflecting varying administrative traditions and political contexts, needed also to embrace the European dimension, with emerging shared norms and procedures, instruments and resources. (In this respect the multinational programmes of the European Diplomatic Training Initiative (www.edti.org) were a step in the right direction.)
- Diplomats from Third Countries needed training in how to engage with the EU effectively; whether to attempt to exert influence in Brussels and/or in Member State capitals; what decision timelines and deadlines applied; what normative discourses within and amongst Member States might affect their external relations.
All international actors faced a strategic challenge: how to manage relations with a ‘multi-vocal actor’. Would the global community revert to a neo-medieval diplomatic system of shared norms? Would diplomacy become ‘Europeanised’, with regional associations such as ASEAN and Mercosur evolving an internal condominium which would interact as functional units with other regional associations? Was this evolutionary process in fact the real ‘transformational diplomacy’?

In discussion:

- There were both practical and systemic incentives to the development of a European diplomatic service, however named:
  
  (i) EU structures and processes had evolved largely by unobtrusive incremental practical steps. The European External Action Service was likely to be no exception. Member States could find it useful to draw on the experience, expertise and networks of EC Delegations/EU Embassies. Secondments of national diplomats to EC/EU missions could offer valuable and cost-effective opportunities for professional development, especially (but not only) for smaller Member States having no global network of posts. This process would be likely to be a net gain, a multiplier of diplomatic reach (bilateral/multilateral relations +) rather than an alternative to national diplomacy. There was thus a functional national interest in the development of a trans-national foreign service.
  
  (ii) In a global community, the EU at Union-level would be the appropriate interlocutor for a range of interactions, especially in trade and finance. It would be in the interests both of both individual Member States and of the EU as a whole to have coherent representation abroad.

That there had never been such sharing of a key attribute of national sovereignty was not necessarily a reason to doubt its eventual realisation. The EU was the most advanced form of governance yet developed. It was the cutting edge of political evolution.

- Line ministries in all countries were dealing increasingly with their counterparts in other countries directly. This reflected the internationalisation of domestic politics and the domestication of international politics. The foreign ministry still had a role to play in the co-ordination of such interactions.

- It was important to disaggregate ‘diplomacy’ from ‘foreign ministry’. Diplomacy was the means of managing human affairs. It pre-dated the Westphalian system and transcended particular forms of political association. Foreign ministries were neither the natural co-ordinators of national external relations, nor automatically the organisational heirs of globalisation.

- The distinction between diplomat and civil servant was likely to disappear. As the complexity of the international system increased, greater flexibility would be required in managing international interaction. Co-ordination units would be required within and between government ministries, in a sense ‘diplomats within’.

- As the EU’s role in international affairs grew, Third Countries would need to train their diplomats in EU structures, processes and external affairs. It would be in the EU’s interest to facilitate such training, a two-way process of communication and co-operation.
Transformational Diplomacy: a new approach to diplomacy

*Ambassador Ruth Whiteside*, Director of the United States State Department’s Foreign Service Institute, offered an account of the concept of ‘transformational diplomacy’ recently promulgated by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, and of its impact on training in the US foreign service.

In a speech at Georgetown University in January 2006, Secretary Rice had observed that ‘the terrain of history was changing beneath our feet’, requiring governments to ‘transform old diplomatic institutions to serve new diplomatic purposes’. The rise in prominence of non-traditional diplomatic issues was driving this change: environmental science, international public health, anti-drugs, anti-corruption, counter-terrorism required diplomacy to be transformational in both intent and effect. There were no longer neat lines between diplomacy and values. The global community was influenced by inchoate forces demanding agile, flexible response.

For the United States foreign service this meant venturing out from behind the fortress walls erected since 9/11, into the city streets, into the towns and villages in pursuit of hearts and minds.

This entailed far-reaching redistribution of resources, both human and financial. For example, a hundred positions had been withdrawn from Europe and reallocated in China, India, the Middle East and Africa. A hundred more such movements were planned by mid-2007. A third round was likely to follow.

The delivery of development assistance was being re-thought. At present it was insufficiently focussed on substantive impact, on ‘transformation’. All US government international agencies were being brought together under the unified coordination of the director of USAID, Randy Tobias.

New emphasis was being placed on regional issues and institutions. The United States had just appointed its first Ambassador to the African Union, recognising the stabilising role the AU increasingly was seen to be playing.

Public-private partnerships with universities and language schools offered opportunities for effective co-operation in service delivery.

The State Department was embracing alternative forms of representation. In addition to traditional embassies and consulates there were now fifteen (soon to be 20-30) ‘American-presence’ posts, each with only one or two US officers having no secure communications nor political reporting responsibilities. With fluent command of the local language and minimum bureaucracy, their primary role was simply outreach to the local community.

There were two hundred ‘American corners’ in university libraries to facilitate contact with the successor generation abroad. There were ‘virtual presence’ posts in particular cities or regions which had no staff at all, but consisted in a website attuned to local issues. A large flag and seal were not essential to effective representation.

These changes had had a major impact on training. There was greatly increased demand for language training, especially in hard languages such as Chinese and Arabic, as well as for training in communication skills, media skills, advocacy and public diplomacy. Training increasingly was offered to officials from a number of Departments and Agencies together, reflecting the diverse make-up of staff at an embassy. More and more courses were offered online (some bought off the shelf, others produced in-house).
Reform of the training curriculum had been accompanied by a restructuring of the path to career advancement. There were now some 800 unaccompanied hardship posts. Rotation had been shortened in some posts to one year. Officers now needed to acquire language facility and to serve in difficult posts in order to get on in the Service.

In discussion:

- New terms to describe changing diplomacy proliferated: the British referred to ‘adaptive diplomacy’; the Danes to ‘frontier diplomacy’. Each attempted to relate patterns of change in the diplomatic environment to the deployment of resources. The question often arose: was it more or less resource intensive? (There were some savings, but enhanced language training was very costly.)
- A public diplomacy effort had to be strategically coherent and timely. (The State Department now had a round-the-clock unit generating new messages on emerging events every morning.)
- Effective presentation of policy could be fruitless if the policy itself proved to be unwelcome.
- How did one decide on the values to promote abroad? Where was the line drawn between encouraging democracy and interfering in the internal affairs of another society? Had more intensive engagement with other societies led to comparably greater sensitivity to other cultures? Was ‘transformational diplomacy’ an export product, or US specific? (The guiding principle was not imposition but partnership, especially with local leaders with shared values who welcomed moral and practical support.)
- Outreach needed to be balanced by ‘in-reach’, ensuring that one’s own society were aware of the efforts being made through diplomacy to promote security and universal values.

Multi-stakeholder Diplomacy

**Jovan Kurbalija**, founding Director of the DiploFoundation, presented a paper on the ways in which diplomacy now engaged many more actors than just governments, and on the implications of this trend for diplomatic training.

As the number of non-state actors multiplied the roles and prerogatives of the state were challenged. New issues now crowded the international agenda (environment, biodiversity, public health, internet governance), bringing new players and new challenges.

Internet governance, and in particular the World Summit on Internet Governance in Geneva in 2005, offered a useful case study of multistakeholder diplomacy. Governments, IFIs, civil society organisations, professional associations, media and the computer industry all had concerns about standards, security, privacy and legislation. Law typically was lagging behind technology, leaving the public, industry and government all vulnerable.

A key challenge was to adjust international law to facilitate the participation of non-state actors. Claims of non-government organisations to be ‘protecting the global public interest’ could not be taken at face value when it was difficult to verify the identity and legitimacy of the claimants. Regulation might be welcome, but not at the expense of crushing the essential vitality of the Internet.
Inter-professional communication could present a problem. There were national cultures, ethnic cultures, organisational cultures and professional cultures, each with its own language and frame of reference. In the rarified technical culture of the Internet, the professionals could exclude other key actors, including governments and international organisations, from the debate. This had forced governments to become more technically proficient themselves in order to engage effectively in the diplomacy of Internet governance.

The ubiquity, informality, brevity and insecurity of e-mail communication presented a substantive challenge to the traditional practice of diplomacy. Foreign ministries had to evolve new strategies for operating within the new global community. Ambassadors were being appointed to NGOs. NGO departments were being established in foreign ministries. Representatives of business and civil society were being included in government delegations to international negotiations. Diplomats were being seconded to other ministries (health, science, trade) who themselves were engaging directly in international negotiations.

There were obvious implications of these developments for training. Traditional in-house training had been an important element in inculcating a professional esprit de corps, but it was now too narrow to address the range of experience and perspectives required for effective diplomacy. The wider the embrace of the training process, the better prepared diplomats would be to operate in the international multistakeholder environment.

Practical skills training also had to be adapted to provide diplomats with the new specialist competences they would require if to be able to hold their own in increasingly specialised international intercourse.

The DiploFoundation would be carrying out further research on inter-professional communication. A course on Multistakeholder Diplomacy would be offered in March 2007.

In discussion:

- Changes in the way international affairs now were conducted had eroded the separation between diplomacy and politics.
- The structure of an embassy’s staff also was changing, with greater demand for seconded attachés au fait with specialist professional cultures.
- There was an increasing amount of co-operation between diplomatic training institutes and non-state actors, who contributed specialist knowledge and expertise in return for access to the foreign ministry’s courses.
- Online learning clearly offered advantages but it also had drawbacks. One learner had become more withdrawn from colleagues in the office, and slower in his work as he worked at odd hours with participants in other time zones. It had taken two and a half months to reintegrate him fully into the department.
- Secure e-mail communication made possible direct linkage between desk officers across ministerial and national boundaries, helping to reduce bottlenecks while at the same time broadening the base and flattening the pyramid of authority. This represented both an opportunity and a challenge for foreign ministries wishing to retain coherence and control of the policy process.
A parallel challenge was posed for the archivist, to make sense of and to record the evolution of policy out of the blizzard of e-mail traffic. (There was already acknowledged to be a black hole in national archives between the mid-1990s and the turn of the century, when electronic archiving systems started to catch up.)

Online negotiation now was possible through the annotation and amendment of a live text. It could affect the shape and outcome of a negotiation, as electronic communication reduced the emotion in the exchange. There could be problems of confidentiality in the process.

E-mail was an essentially informal medium. Its status as an official form of communication was not yet clearly defined. A main challenge was to integrate this and other innovations made possible by rapidly-evolving ICT into existing diplomatic behaviour.

New Challenges for Diplomatic Training in Japan

_Ambassador Koichi Takahashi_, Director General of the Foreign Service Training Institute, outlined the principal challenges which faced Japan and other members of the Asian group of institutes represented at the Meeting. Some were traditional problems facing most foreign ministries; others were new challenges arising from changes in the diplomatic environment.

The foreign ministry of Japan had evolved a four-point action plan to address these issues. Its principal objective was to modernise the consciousness and behaviour of Japan’s foreign service.

**New Entry Training**

- The training regime for new entrants had been modified. They now had one month of initial induction training, followed by two years of on-the-job training, after which they returned to the Institute for three and a half months before going abroad for two to three years of language training.
- All learned English to MA level, and were assigned one of forty-one other languages. Courses were offered in the early morning, in late evening and by e-mail correspondence. There were electronic materials for self-study.
- All now underwent training in consular affairs, not only to gain knowledge and expertise in an area of increasing political salience, but to reinforce the importance of the role of diplomats in serving the people. It was important to overcome the sense of diplomats being a caste apart.
- Until 2002, the foreign ministry had conducted its own exclusive entrance examination. Since then a unified system of admission to the national civil service had been implemented, broadening the base of application to the foreign service.

**Heads of Mission Training**

- A regular programme of training had been established in 2002, augmenting mission-specific briefings, and now was offered four times a year.
- It focussed especially on crisis management and consular affairs, and included case studies, simulation exercises and media training. A key aim was to help heads of mission to appreciate the positive role they could play in managing a crisis.
- Financial and personnel management issues were addressed, and extra language training was provided.
Training for Service

- Japanese diplomacy traditionally had concentrated on interstate relations. Now it was becoming more people-centred.
- With seventeen million citizens travelling overseas each year and one million resident abroad, the embassy was increasingly the immediate point of contact between citizens and the foreign ministry. It could not afford to be seen to be bureaucratic and unfriendly. Service-orientation was now a priority in training.
- Two programmes were offered: one as part of initial training which concentrated on practical tasks such as over the counter service; and one for officers with at least four years of experience which included intensive professional case studies and presentations by specialists, for example in managing the human dimension of disaster relief. Both programmes involved simulation and role play.

Training for Public Diplomacy

- Given the growth in influence of private citizens on diplomacy, it was increasingly important to enable the domestic audience to understand better the contribution of the foreign ministry to their security and prosperity, as well as to encourage in other countries a better understanding of and affinity with Japan.
- Training stressed that public diplomacy was the responsibility of all diplomats, not just of the Head of Mission or Press and Public Affairs officer. All received training in media skills.
- The programme addressed historical issues, focussed on the post-war progress Japan had made as a peaceful nation, and prepared diplomats to represent contemporary popular culture as well as traditional society.
- Of the 3,000 officers posted abroad, one-third were seconded from other ministries. Pre-posting training was provided for them as well.
- A database of foreign policy issues had been compiled, including recent speeches by the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister and examples of best practice in public speaking, interviews and written articles.

In discussion:

- A number of foreign ministries were responding in similar ways to global challenges, with increased emphasis in training on consular work, public diplomacy, language and human and financial resources management.
- Providing training for both specialists and generalists could be a challenge. There was some career specialisation by country, though less by sector except in consular affairs. Consideration was being given to specialisation in multilateral diplomacy.
- As younger diplomats left the service they could be replaced by mid-career specialists from the private sector, academic institutions and NGOs who themselves then required short course generalist diplomatic training.
- There clearly were advantages in importing specialist knowledge at mid-career level, though there could also be difficulties of adaptation to the culture, procedures and mindset of government.
- Economic diplomacy and the support of business abroad continued to be a core pillar of both policy and training, especially for heads of mission.
- A Canadian programme of mentorship had proved to be helpful, in which a first-time head of mission was paired with a senior ambassador who could provide counsel and support outside the formal chain of command.
Co-operation in training between the ASEAN+3 countries had proved to be mutually beneficial. A programme of secondment and exchange between ASEAN members was in place.

The Malaysian foreign ministry offered a three-week course in multilateral negotiation covering elements of high and low politics including issues of international trade and human rights, with practical training in such skills as drafting resolutions. They would welcome the participation of foreign nationals in the programme.

Progress was being made in addressing sensitive regional historical issues. The reinterpretation of history was an endless process. Diplomats needed to be aware of the most recent scholarship and of political evolution on key issues. Training had perhaps to compensate for the fact that most individuals had little historical consciousness.

New Trends in Consular Affairs

Professor Jan Melissen, Director of Research at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Clingendael, and Professor of Diplomacy at the University of Antwerp, offered an analysis of the growth in prominence of consular affairs in diplomacy.

Traditionally consular affairs had been considered to be a second order form of diplomacy, perhaps even distinct from diplomacy, the ‘Cinderella Service’ as DCM Platt had called it, ‘the stepchild of diplomacy’.

Now, however, citizen pressure had pushed things to the fore, especially after 9/11 and the Tsunami. Foreign ministries had discovered that they had a customer base. The three Ps – press, parliament and the public – could not be ignored.

Consular work carried risks, however. Events were inherently not under a diplomat’s control. Ordinary people were not greatly interested in the EU or in distant peacekeeping operations, but were keenly interested in the fate of their fellow citizens. The more human the story, the worse the news, the greater the media attention, the more intense the political pressure on the ministry and applied direct to junior officers.

The image of the foreign ministry and of the country consequently were vitally affected by the way in which consular affairs were handled, effectively or not, humanely or not. (A case in point was the prolonged and highly publicised engagement of the Dutch embassy in Damascus in a marital conflict involving the abduction of children.) Diplomacy, once a high caste profession, had been thus ‘societised’, in the sense that it had been brought into intimate connection with people through the greatly increased demand for what the Canadians called ‘citizen services’.

The role of the consul in ancient and medieval times antedated that of the resident ambassador. With the rise of states consuls had become state officials, but concerned principally with trade and maritime affairs. In the twentieth century, as economic diplomacy had become more professional, consular affairs had come to focus more on citizen’s interests.
In the era of globalisation many of the central concerns of diplomacy now were consular issues: international terrorism, international crime, international travel, migration and immigration. Managing each of them required international cooperation with partners.

Yet consular work was still inherently a national responsibility, especially in the eyes of the press, parliament and public. Even within an integrated European Union cooperation could be difficult, or too slow to meet citizen’s expectations in response to a crisis.

Foreign ministries consequently were conscious of a pressing need for effective training to deliver high quality customer-focused consular services. New programmes were being developed specific to consular divisions, as well as part of general professional development, including training in personal communication and media relations. A common thread running through them was the need to manage citizens’ expectations, helping people to understand the nature of problems to be overcome, and what could (or just as importantly could not) be done to assist them.

In discussion:

- There was still an attitudinal problem in the diplomatic service about consular work. It was necessary to bring it into the mainstream. In South Africa ‘putting people first’ was the new refrain. A new code of practice had been created with clear guidelines of responses, and targets of 24-48 hours for turnaround of cases.
- In Indonesia consular work was no longer considered second class. A new Directorate for the Protection of Indonesian Citizens and Entities had been created, and the protection of Indonesian citizens was ranked third in foreign policy priorities. Consular officers were no longer simply waiting to respond to complaints, but were proactive in meeting the needs of citizens abroad.
- The foreign ministry of the Republic of Korea had established a 24-hour consular call centre, (with Canada) the first of its kind, providing a one-stop service for citizens calling from anywhere, anytime. An e-consul system had been created making it possible to pick up documents issued in Korea from missions abroad.
- The experience of the Canadian mission in Sri Lanka in the aftermath of the Tsunami offered two key lessons: (i) get there, be there, and be seen to be there; follow every lead; you don’t know what you don’t know; (ii) every crisis is unique; you won’t know in advance what is the right or wrong way to go about things; form a rapid response team having a variety of skill sets (media, consular, emergency services); a six-month specialist on-call system could help.
- Amongst the embassies of EU member states the regular habit of consultation led organically to co-operation in emergencies (though the media still found it possible to portray co-operation in a negative light).
- Emergencies constituted less than 1% of consular work, but 99% of the perception of the effectiveness of the foreign ministry. Reputations were coloured by specific, limited, vivid cases. Damage limitation often was the driver in response to emergencies. Ministries needed to be able to cut red tape, to mobilise national resources and react rapidly, but it was important also to highlight the value of the systematic hard work they were doing routinely on behalf of citizens, unglamorous and rarely recognised.
- Consular services were funded in the United Kingdom by a ring-fenced percentage of the cost of every passport issued. The 360 Dutch Honorary Consuls were self-funded by the fees charged for passport services (a system nullified by the introduction of biometric data).
**Training for Chairing**

*John Hemery*, Director of the Centre for Political and Diplomatic Studies, and *Paul Meerts*, Special Advisor to the Director of the Netherlands Institute for International Relations, introduced an interactive approach to training for multilateral negotiation and chairing.

A detailed account of this approach, developed in the course of preparation for the Presidencies of the European Union of the United Kingdom (2005) and Finland (2006), and published in a special edition of the Hague Journal of Diplomacy (Oct 2006) had been distributed in advance, together with sample materials for an exercise.

The essence of the approach lay in defining negotiating positions for a small group of states (normally between five and eight) having conflicting vested interests in an issue. Each participant was provided with written instructions, including a background brief, lines to take and fallback positions. After a period for preparation and pre-negotiation, participants negotiated in plenary and in the corridor as directed by the chair for a total of 90-100 minutes, with the objective of reaching a common position. The chair rotated around the group every twelve to fifteen minutes, giving all an opportunity of experiencing command of the process. A mentor with each group then drew out lessons learned in a debriefing session of 20-30 minutes.

Participants from all ministries in fifty two-day courses had found that active engagement in negotiation and the opportunity both to practise and to observe chairing had been valuable in developing personal skills and building confidence in preparation for multilateral negotiation.

Twenty members of the Forum met subsequently to discuss the methodology in detail, including the formulation of strategy and tactics, the role of the chair, and ways in which national and collective interests could be reconciled.

**Concluding Session**

The generous offer of *Professor Jamisse Taimo*, Rector of the Institut Supérieur de Relations Internationales of Mozambique, to host the 35th Meeting of Deans and Directors was accepted with gratitude.

The Forum would be held in Maputo in the week commencing 23 September 2007, and would include an optional excursion to Kruger National Park.

The 35th Meeting would focus on areas of diplomacy in which African countries had much to offer.
Proposals for topics of discussion included:

- The diplomacy of peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction
- Development diplomacy
  - (inter-ministerial / international co-ordination; rural reconstruction; environmental factors)
- Public health diplomacy
- Managing diplomacy in small states with limited human and financial resources
- Training for locally engaged staff
- Training for assistance to trade and investment, including WTO negotiations
- The diplomacy of regional and inter-regional associations
  - (SADC; AU/UN; EU/NATO)
- Dialogue amongst civilisations and cultures
- The role of diplomacy in managing the movement of peoples
  - (legal / illegal / refugees / asylum seekers)
- Terrorism and diplomacy
- Managing the image and expectation of diplomats

A regional meeting of African members of the Forum would be held in Cairo in March 2007. It would be an opportunity for discussion and preparation for the Meeting in Maputo.

On behalf of all participants at the 34th Meetings, the co-chairs of the Forum gave special thanks to the team at the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, including Gabriele Schultze, Director of Administration, Wolfgang Jung, Conference Manager, and Michaela Zechner, Programme Organiser, and all the staff of the Academy who had organised and supported the event with such skill, efficiency and kindliness.

John Hemery
Rapporteur