Delegates to the International Forum 2002 had the good fortune to be in the care of the President and staff of the Jordan Institute of Diplomacy who demonstrated throughout the Meeting and in the preparations for it unsurpassed efficiency, thoughtfulness and the generous hospitality for which Jordan is justly famed.

Participants were honoured by invitations from His Excellency Dr Taleb Refai, Minister of Tourism and Antiquities, His Excellency Mr Nedal Al-Hadeed, Mayor of Amman, Ambassador Professor Abdullah Al Mousa, President of the University of Jordan, and Ambassador Farouk Kasrawi, President of the Jordan Institute of Diplomacy. The Meeting was enlivened by celebrations of Jordanian culture.

Monday 23 September

Ambassador Kasrawi welcomed participants and paid tribute to Ambassador Kamel Abu Jaber whose initiative and drive had brought the meeting to Amman.

Keynote Speech

His Royal Highness Prince El Hassan Bin Talal opened the Meeting with a speech (circulated at the Meeting) which addressed both regional issues and the wider profession of diplomacy. He called for a moment of reflective humanitarian meditation for all those caught up in conflict in the Middle East.

Prince El-Hassan observed that it was an irony that we should be meeting to discuss diplomacy in a region and at a time when trust and communication had broken down. The Middle East was an orphan region, lost somehow between Asia and Europe, without corporate identity and thus without effective representation in the councils of the United Nations. Countries of the region, cocooned by oil revenues, had failed to provide for their own security and development, relying instead on outside powers and paying protection money to extremist organisations.

His Royal Highness reviewed prospects for peace in Palestine/Israel. Attempts at conflict resolution now were focussing too exclusively on military security. It was essential to embrace the interrelated dimensions of human security in order to forestall an explosion of frustrated aspirations amongst the dispossessed. Programmes of education, exchange and co-operation would help to create bridges of understanding between peoples as partners in humanity and development.

Substantive policy analysis could forge a civilised framework for disagreement and a return to dialogue. Diplomacy could help to build a dynamic centrist platform through the noble art of conversation which, importantly, was not a martial art.
**Introduction of New Institutions:**

**Algeria**  
Institute of Diplomacy and International Relations  
represented by its President, Mr Smail Benamara, and the Director of Training, Mr Abdelhak Ayadat

**Kyrgyzstan**  
Diplomatic Academy  
represented by its Rector, Ambassador Nurjazy Kemelbaev

**Lebanon**  
Diplomatic Academy for International Relations  
represented by its Director, Professor Samir Michel Daher, and Ambassador Jean-Marie Dalilat

**Poland**  
PWSBIA  
represented by its President, Professor Tadeusz Kozluk

**Romania**  
Academia Diplomatica Bucarest  
represented by its Director, Ambassador Constantin Ene

**United Arab Emirates**  
Emirates Institute of Diplomacy  
represented by its Director, Dr Yousef Hassan

**Introduction of New Representatives**

**Brazil**  
Ambassador Joao Almino  
Director, Instituto Rio Branco

**China**  
Ambassador An Yongyu  
Vice-President, Foreign Affairs College  
Professor Heng Xiaojun  
Assistant President and Director, Foreign Affairs College

**Croatia**  
Ambassador Zoran Bosnjak  
Acting Director, Diplomatic Academy

**Egypt**  
Ambassador Mohammad Rifa’a Tahtaoui  
Director, Institute for Diplomatic Studies

**European Commission**  
Mr Christian Falkowski  
Director, External Relations Directorate
Germany
Ambassador Dr Gerhard Nourney
Director, Aus- und Fortbildungsstätte des Auswärtigen Amtes

Greece
Mr Letsios Dimitrios
Director of Studies, Diplomatic Academy

India
Mr Kumar Santosh
Dean, Foreign Service Institute

Italy
Mr Maurizio Serra
Director, Istituto Diplomatico

Indonesia
Mr Najib Riphat
Junior Diplomatic F.S.O, Centre for Education and Training

Republic of Korea
Ambassador Shin Sung-oh
Chancellor, Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security
accompanied by Mr Sul Kyung-hoon

Peru
Ambassador Oscar Maurtua de Romana
Director, Diplomatic Academy

Saudi Arabia
Dr Saed bin Abdelrahman Al Ammar
Director, Institute of Diplomacy

Tunisia
Mr Raouf Said
Director, Diplomatic Institute

Turkey
Ambassador Deniz Uzmen
Director, Foreign Service Training Centre

United States
Ambassador Katherine Peterson
Director, National Foreign Service Training Centre, Foreign Service Institute

Yemen
Ambassador Saidi
Reports of Regional Groups

Africa

*Mr Okon Udoh* reported that membership had increased this year from two to four, with representatives from Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria and Tunisia. The group hoped to encourage representatives of other institutes of diplomacy in Africa to attend the Forum, and looked to the Diplomatische Akademie Wien for assistance in making contact with them. It was hoped that co-operation on diplomatic training within the region would be strengthened.

Asia:

*Ambassador Farouk Kasrawi* reported that innovations amongst institutions within the group included specialist programmes for attachés, programmes for diplomats from other countries, bilateral exchanges of instructors and students, co-operation in language training, and new curricula for women diplomats.

Europe:

*Dr John Hemery* reported that 22 institutions from 15 countries had been represented at the meeting, some engaged in the study of diplomacy, some in diplomatic training and a number in both.

Co-operation in the study of international relations was increasing with a meeting of European institutions scheduled in Amsterdam in 2004 and a world forum in 2005, the European venue still to be decided. The University of Westminster was mounting two conferences, one on Media, Governments and Terrorism on 25 October, 2002, the other on Diplomacy and Gender on 7-8 April, 2003.

Programmes of EU studies were proliferating. The European Commission was developing a strategy for the training of officials of the External Service, and was encouraging the study of EU institutions, policies and practice in the diplomatic services of the Member States and Candidate countries. Meetings at Vienna in December, 2001, and at Madrid in May, 2002, had discussed ways in which co-operation could be improved between diplomatic academies and the training departments of Ministries of Foreign Affairs.

It was noted with regret that, due to the demands of the Italian Presidency of the EU, the Istituto Diplomatico would be unable to host the 31st Meeting of the Forum in 2004 as had been hoped. The group welcomed the generous invitation of the Diplomatic Academy of Croatia to hold the Meeting at Dubrovnik.

Latin America:

*Ambassador Rolando Stein* reported that representatives of four countries had met: Brazil, Chile, Cuba and Peru. They hoped for closer co-operation amongst institutions of the region, and greater participation in the Forum in future. Brazil, Cuba and Chile warmly supported the proposal by the Diplomatic Academy of Peru to host the 33rd Meeting of the Forum in 2005, on the occasion of its 50th anniversary.
North America

Ambassador Katherine Peterson reported that the representatives of the United States and Canada had discussed common challenges in the face of cuts in training budgets. It was necessary to institutionalise training as a priority, and it would be helpful to coordinate training partnerships with organisations outside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They planned to promote meetings of senior staff of the two institutions on a more formal basis to exchange ideas on improving training.

Human Security: A new approach to security

Dr Atef Odibat
Director, Regional Human Security Centre, Amman

Dr Odibat reflected on the new global reality, in which conflicts were now predominantly intra-state (108 of 118 in the decade 1990-1999, and 23 of 25 in 2001) and victims mostly civilian (up to 90%, from 10% in 1900). The weapons involved were predominantly small arms and light weapons (‘the new WMD’, causing half a million deaths a year). The primary actors were non-state entities operating outside international law.

A new approach to security thus was needed transcending boundaries and the application of military force, a people-centred security ensuring freedom from fear and want. It could not be provided by states alone but through cross-border partnerships of governments, NGOs and international organisations working to eliminate the root causes of insecurity. It required the integration of human rights, democracy and development.

The human security agenda included:
- protection of civilians
- peace support operations
- conflict prevention, including promoting indigenous capacity for local conflict management
- governance and accountability
- public safety

Key responses to human security threats included improving local democracy and governance, public goods allocation and health policy, local policing, legal, constitutional and juridical processes, and co-ordinating trans-national aid and trade strategies.

The concept of human security had entered the language of international intercourse in such landmark documents as the Ottawa Treaty on Anti-Personnel Land Mines (1997) and UN Security Council Resolution 1296 (2000). There was now a UN Commission for Human Security, and a Human Security Network comprising thirteen member countries from all continents. The 20th century had been an era of hot and cold wars. It was to be hoped that the 21st would be the century of human security.
In discussion:

- The international community had only just achieved state security after centuries. The system was still Westphalian. Human security was a valid aspiration, but needed mechanisms to support and institutionalise it. Otherwise new ideas could endanger established pillars of international order such as the inviolability of sovereignty.
- The concept of states’ ‘duty to protect’ was being used increasingly in place of the ‘right of humanitarian intervention’. There was a role for non-state entities to encourage states to act in defence of individuals.
- The essential problem was that intervention was normally for political rather than humanitarian reasons. Human security was a comprehensive principle but was applied only selectively.
- The EU concept of subsidiarity perhaps could be applied to conflict management: leaving things to the lowest level appropriate, and intervening only where the lower level demonstrably could not or would not act to ensure human security.
- There clearly was a need for preventive diplomacy. But when it broke down there was as yet no effective framework of interaction between the humanitarian agencies and formal diplomacy. Intervention was typically rationalised ad hoc. International law was always catching up after the event. Humanitarian agencies often led the field, de facto, and only later governments intervened. There was in the interval a problem for humanitarian agencies whose political neutrality could be seen to be compromised.
- Active promotion of human security was mainly identified with small countries thus far. There was a need to involve the greater powers. Nevertheless the aggregation of smaller interests could exert collective pressure and influence.
- Secretary-General Annan was increasingly identifying the UN’s own activities under the Charter with human security by focussing attention on the need for the practical implementation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
- There was a growing need and demand for training of diplomats in human security. A number of Forum institutions (such as the Fletcher School at Tufts University) already had such programmes.
- A workshop would be welcome in which interested member institutions could develop an agenda and structures for training, and could consider how human security could be integrated more effectively with traditional security studies.

Technology and Learning

Using technology for diplomatic training

Adrian de Hoog
Director General, Canadian Foreign Service Institute

Adrian de Hoog introduced a paper (distributed at the meeting) on the advantages and challenges of computer-based learning for diplomacy.

The Canadian Foreign Service Institute had developed a Virtual Campus with some four dozen courses in English and French. Officers could log on at home or at work, enter a ‘study room’, and pursue discrete modules in subjects such as Sustainable Development for perhaps 30 minutes a day.
Experience showed that modules of 20 to 30 minutes were the most productive, and none should be longer than an hour.

Courses of three months proved to be too long. It was necessary to make progress with an end in sight. Six-week courses worked well, with three half-hour modules per week.

Each module concluded with a multiple choice or Y/N test for self-evaluation. Some tests offered fill-in answers requiring instructor response.

The role of an instructor had a critical impact on completion rates (up from an average of 40% to more than 65%). Instructor response helped participants to feel connected to the task and to the Institute.

Individual progress was monitored in a database, with results and courses completed entered on an officer’s personal record accessible by both candidate and supervisor.

Entry-level officers required 50 learning credits before becoming eligible for posting. Online learning enabled candidates to pick up classroom-based training that had been missed, and to continue Ministry-based training when posted abroad.

There had been a sevenfold increase in the uptake of such courses since their introduction.

Thus far three principal conclusions had been drawn:

1. Officers would take up the opportunity for computer-based learning, especially abroad, if the technology worked smoothly and the course contents was right. Locally engaged staff in particular appreciated feeling included and valued.

2. Designing good computer-based learning required skilled specialists who understood both diplomatic training and technology. There was therefore a need to train trainers.

3. Most importantly, such programmes offered the means of bringing people together across countries and boundaries, working together to develop opportunities.

In discussion:

- Online learning was well-adapted to meeting relatively simple needs with simplicity of purpose. The technology was simple and was not appropriate to complex analytical training.

- A real-time classroom could be provided through video conferences linking up to 10 embassies in a single time-zone, with VCR cameras hooked to computers and voice links through the telephone network. It was not difficult or expensive. Such links had facilitated online discussions, for example, of consular client service, the development of communications skills, and accounting procedures for posts.

- Feedback from participants confirmed that they appreciated structured opportunities for acquiring additional skills. Managers valued online learning as both a skills-enhancing and motivational tool.
In the absence of suitable commercial software the Canadian programmes had been developed entirely in-house. Each course had been developed by one trainer and one ICT specialist. Costs therefore were largely a function of consultants’ or in-house trainers’ salary time. A typical course might take twenty working days to create.

Course software included hyperlinks to source materials in university libraries and professional journals. The key challenges were choosing the right materials from the vast amount available, and keeping course materials current.

Latterly:

[Adrian de Hoog kindly circulated to participants at the Forum an offer of free access to the CFSI Virtual Campus. An access portal was created providing a small sub-campus with self-paced e-learning courses of interest to Forum participants and/or their students. These included an instructor-led course in English writing. Thus far 25 Institutes have registered. This experimental programme will be evaluated in mid-2003, and the results presented for discussion at the next meeting of the Forum in Dubrovnik.]

Training in Multilateral Diplomacy

Negotiation, lobbying and interest aggregation in a multilateral environment: ‘Ambivalent Engagement’

Ambassador Donald McHenry
Former Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations

Ambassador McHenry observed that a multilateral institution was much like a giant legislature, a political body with the familiar attributes of horse trading, mutual tickling, compromise and alliance-building. The difference, however, lay in the fact that the members were states, with all the baggage entailed.

A new phenomenon in multilateral institutions was the growing presence of NGOs, both national and trans-national, taking an active role. These together with representatives of multinational corporations with whom they co-operated brought increasingly effective pressure to bear on states.

The Internet multiplied opportunities for non-state entities to play a role (as seen at Seattle and Johannesburg), facilitating exchange of information, enabling groups to rally in quick time and build working alliances, but also empowering anarchists.

Domestic agencies of government also played a direct role alongside representatives of Ministries of Foreign Affairs.

(There were policy implications from this structural change. The interests of NGOs pressing global agenda of higher wages and environmental constraints were not always consonant with the interests of developing countries for whom low wages and lax regulations represented their only comparative advantage.)
Turning to the practicalities of multilateral diplomacy Ambassador McHenry observed that much was traditional, common sense diplomacy but on a larger scale involving complex and shifting constellations. He introduced

**McHenry’s Rules:**

1. resist the temptation of the démarche
   - don’t go over the head of the delegation to the Ministry (which may not know as much about the issue anyway)
   - more especially if a secret ballot is involved, as they may say *a* but vote *b*

2. respect all parties, especially small countries
   - the rules of behaviour apply to all
   - increasingly, small countries are well-informed, Web-based and enjoy good communications with their own and other capitals

3. be prepared to let others take the lead
   - especially if you are a big country it may be more effective, more influential to *follow* a strong lead from others

4. respect alliances and groups
   - *but*, it is essential to look for alliances within those groups wherein states may have divergent views on specific issues

5. know the positions of adversaries and other participants as well as or better than they do
   - know your own bottom line, theirs too; agreement comes from reconciling the bottom lines of the various participants

6. the most difficult relationship is with your own capital
   - they are not there in the multilateral, and see only their own objectives
   - they have to be educated, brought along (and occasionally if necessary ignored)

7. be open to *ad hoc* groupings
   - a few countries determined to devote time and energy to an issue can achieve a result.

Responding,

*Ambassador Ernst Sucharipa*, former Permanent Representative of Austria to the United Nations, concurred with Ambassador McHenry’s analysis and maxims. A multi-stakeholder approach was the key to success in multilateral diplomacy. It required empathy with the sensitivities and priorities of others.

But each international institution was *sui generis*. The UN was not the EU. It was necessary to understand completely the rules of each particular game; the principles, the legislation, the procedures.

Procedure, however, was only part of the game. It was essential as well to know the issues, to do your homework.
Drafting skills and teamwork were more important in multilateral negotiation than in bilateral relations; and it was tactically effective to hook up with a specific partner within a group.

Turning to training for multilateral diplomacy, Ambassador Sucharipa observed that there no longer was time in crowded syllabi for simulation exercises running continuously over three weeks. They needed to be short – no more than two or three days for the actual exercise, but should be integrated into the core syllabus. Preparation, elaboration of instructions and evaluation should be spread over an extended period (perhaps 3-4 months in a one-year course).

The typical simulation exercise offered at the Diplomatische Akademie Wien began with an introduction to the general background and theme, and early advice on source materials. Participants then were introduced to the structure, decision-making processes and rules of behaviour of the particular institution.

Roles were distributed (nationals were not given their own countries to represent), and participants wrote their own country reports (2 – 3 pages on national interests, infrastructure, objectives, strategy).

The concrete exercise then was introduced. Participants wrote their own instructions, moderated and if necessary amended by staff.

Regional and political groups met in sub-plenary at the outset. The exercise then was played out in plenary and corridor according to the scenario. It was necessary to create deadlines, and essential to leave sufficient time for effective feedback.

In discussion:

- Training ideally needed to be provided before the representative found himself or herself behind the country plate.
- It was necessary to pitch training at an appropriate level. Most under training were going out to be First or Second Secretaries in Working Groups, not Ambassadors. Simulation exercises needed to reflect the reality of the experience to be encountered.
- Participants reported gaining more from exercises dealing with real issues of the day, presenting opportunities to model practical institutional behaviour, rather than representing fictitious countries or dealing with long-dead issues. At the same time the source materials and background briefing provided useful substantive learning on current international affairs.
- It had proved effective to include participants from NGOs and other government departments in multilateral training for diplomats, and to use cross-cutting issues as the content of exercises.
- It was instructive to have two groups playing the same exercise in parallel, with instructions reflecting traditional and less traditional approaches, and to compare the results.
- Effectiveness in multilateral diplomacy was not only about negotiation. It also involved the skills of managing and manipulating a meeting. Training was needed in chairing, in the quick analysis of a situation, and in thinking politically.
- Training was needed in interacting with an international institution as a non-member, as well as in working within the institution as a member state.
• There was a growing need for trained people in the Secretariats of international institutions (now numbering more than 400). Training needed to include drafting in the language of the international community. A special centre might be created for the preparation of international secretariat skills.

Tuesday 24 September

Religion, Politics and Diplomacy

Professor Alan Henrikson presented a paper on the complementary contributions of religious leaders, politicians and diplomats to achieving world order.

From Talleyrand to Huntington religion and civilisations had been central to international relations, addressing the challenge of bridging cultures. There was much to learn from the history of the ecumenical movement, though little had been written about it.

Religious leaders contributed understanding; they made things clear. Politicians contributed power; they made things safe. Diplomats contributed skill; they were facilitators who made things easy or feasible.

Order meant regularity; rules that bound us, constrained us, provided a legal and moral sense that kept us walking a straight line. The rule of law at home and abroad, as Annan had observed, maintained international order under the UN Charter.

The international community was seeking to achieve common standards and norms of international behaviour, with justice and human dignity, and a system of security defended by all.

The 1980s had seen the end of the Cold War. The 1990s had seen the prospect of a New World Order, when there was no longer nuclear confrontation, when the United Nations could begin to work again, and there was hope of more widely distributed global prosperity. The 2000s were beginning to be seen as what Shimon Peres had called the ‘New, New World Order’, a new genesis within a framework of interdependence transcending borders in which powers great and small combined to combat the challenge of international terrorism and to realise the positive potential of globalisation.

Was this trend driven simply by a generation of leaders that had lived through the Second World War and the Vietnam War? Or was it teleological – the ultimate goal to which mankind was inexorably drawn?; the federation of man, the victory of socialisation, unification, spiritualisation, self-realisation, as Teilhard de Chardin had suggested, over the biological forces that had kept peoples and nations at war.

Religious faith was both non-rational and extreme rationalisation. Religions could approach one another through moral philosophy, shared frameworks of values, a common understanding of the need for ‘true and planetary ethics’ and a common aim – the renewal of humanity.
The three Abrahamic religions, sharing a common god, had become progressively differentiated and distinct, with different stories. Yet the leaders of all had acknowledged that god was greater than religions. They thus shared the prospect of a ‘journey of discovery hand in hand with other human beings’, a dialogue among religions under the concept of divinity. Dialogue, however, was not a capacity of those who considered themselves to be the sole proprietors of Truth.

Despite the notional separation of Church and State, politicians often represented a certain moral absolutism. In the United States a series of Administrations since the Second World War had carried on what amounted to religious war against the absolutist movement of Communism, though security considerations were primary. Critics could see the White House itself as effectively a faith-based institution, conscious of its role at the head of the ‘promised land’, with a divine mission to promote justice as well as to safeguard the American homeland and nation.

Diplomats had a role to play in facilitating dialogue amongst civilisations. The Vatican exemplified ecclesiastical diplomacy.

Responding:

Ambassador Professor Kamel Abu Jaber, former Foreign Minister of Jordan, reminded the Forum that they were meeting in the shadow of the shared holy places of three faiths, where the clash of symbols had blighted the Middle East for 1500 years.

Religion, dismissed as the ‘opium of the masses’, had outlasted seventy years of Communism. God, pace Nietzsche, appeared to be alive and full of activity. People thought with their souls, not with their hearts and minds; their passions were untempered by reason. Their politics, consequently, were defined in terms of good and evil, by faith rather than by logic or rationality. In the West it was more private, but little different in reality to Islamic theocracy.

Every age was an age of transition and uncertainty, though ours seemed rather more so than some. There was a conscious clash of knowledge, of concepts and ideas. This followed from the application of divine law to human law: if there was equality before God, then equality before the king or state, then equality before the law. Thus in Western thinking human rights were devolved from God to man.

This moral justification of policy was bewildering to developing societies rudely invaded by colonial powers, adding a layer of confusion to the cultural invasion.

Civilisations were dialectical - economic, civil and political dimensions interacting with spiritual symbolism. Identity was entrenched in faith; identity defined, however, in opposition to others. Faith provided the justification for political actions.

In the Middle East in particular, the crucible of sects, one’s faith defined one’s psychology; one’s standing in the communal religion determined one’s political and economic activity. In the Middle East religion came first, the state later. Governments, being weaker than society, embraced and encouraged religion to bolster their legitimacy. Myth and reality interchanged, lending a certain mental entrenchment to policy.
Historically an equilibrium had been achieved, a delicate co-existence of religion and politics. The advent of modern transport and communications had shattered this cocoon. It was an irony that democratisation, education and rational legal frameworks should have threatened the traditional foundation of social stability and had broken the concordat between the religious and political establishments.

Responding:

Giandomenico Picco, Special Representative of the Secretary General for the Dialogue of Civilisations, observed that religions had done more harm than good, claiming with a terrible and dangerous arrogance to be the sole possessors of the truth, of what to be and do. People who thought differently were not simply mistaken, but were wicked or mad and had to be destroyed.

The 1990s had been a decade of confusion in international life, with a proliferation of marginal or ‘failed’ states. This opened new possibilities for mafias, drug cartels and terrorist organisations whose Holy Grail was to put an end to the structural state.

In a world of equal access to knowledge, communications and electronic financial transactions asymmetry had come of age. Small now affected big. Despite the unchallenged power even of the United States, all shared an equality of vulnerability which could not be combated with tanks or deterrence.

In this new uncertainty, in which the rules of engagement had been changed for states large and small, dogma and ritual provided comfort. In a war against an ill-defined and invisible enemy with no predictable end it was necessary to focus on ‘possible victory’; all had to believe they *could* prevail.

New rigidities thus crept into international affairs. Common rules, conventions and values were challenged by fundamentalists and ideologues who used force as a tool of choice, belittling the rule of law. Conflict fed their dogmas.

The vision of an inclusive world of win-win solutions thus was under challenge from a darker vision of bellicose exclusion. The dream of European unification had been realised at a time when treaties and comfortable accommodations were proving inadequate defences against terrorism.

Osama bin Laden and the Al Qaeda network had reacted to the marginalisation of the Middle East and the Islamic world, without an adequate voice in the key international councils (G8, UN Security Council, Shanghai Group) and with emerging competitors in oil production undermining economic prosperity.

Despite earlier attacks in Russia and Asia, the West had not been unduly worried by Islamic extremism. Kashmir had been too complex a conflict in which to become engaged. When the attacks of September 11 made the United States a direct target the international order changed, with new rapprochements between Washington and Moscow, Washington and New Delhi, even between Washington and Beijing.

These realignments offered possibilities for a new alliance between Europe and the Middle East. Not all European states shared the American vision of the world. Europeans and Arabs lay in geographic proximity and shared at present a common relative marginalisation. Europe, with a declining population, needed 30 million workers. The European spirit of settlement might be brought to bear on Middle East conflict.
If God was invoked by governments, countries were usually at war or eager to go to war. Diplomacy was under heavy attack. It had always fared badly against dogma, where diversity and compromise were seen as a threat to the sole possessors of truth.

In discussion:

- In a disordered world, in the absence of rules, religion was not necessarily only the cause of conflict but also a possible solution by providing philosophical orientation; divinity was linked to development.
- Buddhism offered a model of inclusive, non-violent universality amongst states.
- It was important to keep religion out of politics. The purely scientific study of Islam and other religions was useful to help people understand each other.
- It was essential to include religion in the training of diplomats, to combat extremism through understanding.
- There was already considerable coverage of Western moral and political philosophy in diplomatic syllabi, but more needed to be known about Islamic thought.
- Complex social-cultural systems had a number of dimensions: economic, technological, legal. One model of intercultural studies was taught in three modules: (i) comparative world culture, including the theory of culture; (ii) globalisation, addressing cultural plurality; (iii) intercultural communication.

The Middle East Peace Process and Diplomacy


The Common Agenda of September, 1993, leading to the Jordan-Israel Treaty of October, 1994, offered a model of mutual understanding and accommodation based on justice and the common good without sacrificing rights or international legitimacy.

There had been eight dimensions of agreement:
1. confirmed boundaries
2. an end to belligerence and co-operation on mutual security
3. full diplomatic relations
4. allocation of water
5. freedom of passage by land, sea and air
6. co-operation in transport, communications, tourism, environment, energy, health, agriculture and economic development
7. co-operation in combating crime and drugs
8. an agreed framework of negotiation on refugees and displaced persons

Jordan was working now with the United States, the EU and Israel, as well as with Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia and the Arab League to sustain the peace process despite recent setbacks. Jordan had played an active part in Arab summit meetings in Amman in March, 2001, and in Beirut in March, 2002.
Talks amongst the Committee of Four, comprising the United Nations, the United States, the European Union and Russia, had been complicated by the events of September 11 and relations with Iraq.

Responding:

*Ambassador Edward ‘Skip’ Gnehm*, United States Ambassador to Jordan, observed that diplomacy was about convincing all sides that settlement was in their own interests. It was necessary to dwell in the realm of the possible. The United States was trying to help, but it required commitment and compromise on both sides.

President Bush had offered in June, 2002, a roadmap to a comprehensive settlement by 2005 based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. It presupposed two states living side by side in peace and security; an end to the occupations of 1967; the creation of viable Palestinian institutions entailing political and judicial reforms and an end to official corruption; and assistance to economic reform and development from the United States.

The Quartet was pursuing a three-phase process:
1. Palestinian elections and reform of the security services
2. Palestinian institution-building
3. negotiations leading to a permanent settlement

The peace process had interlocking political, economic, humanitarian and institutional dimensions. It required reciprocal steps by both parties. The security situation needed to be improved first, with guaranteed access for humanitarian agencies.

The eventual settlement would be a pragmatic package of measures: the essence of diplomacy.

*Ambassador Terje Rød-Larsen*, Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Middle East, observed that the peace process was enveloped currently in a cycle of violence and retribution. The UN Secretary-General and the international community called for an end to the destructive reprisals and siege. Israel had the right to defend itself, but not in a way that hurt millions of Palestinian citizens. Israel *had* to change its security policy. Palestinian desperation, rage and hopelessness led only to a power vacuum, growing lawlessness, more extremism and more violence.

The multilateral Quartet offered a ray of hope, addressing the problem in a communal way, looking to the long term. It was a process driven by both performance and hope.

Israeli tanks could not simply impose peace. With 50% unemployed, 60% living in poverty and over a million people under 24-hour house arrest, Palestinians had no hope. They had to have hope of an end to occupation, of a viable Palestinian state, and of the possibility of planning for the future.
Israel demanded an end to terror attacks and institutional and political reforms. But there were no civil and political structures left to reform. Forcing capitulation would never work. It merely weakened the moderates and strengthened the extremists.

It was necessary to concentrate on diplomatic initiatives with workable goals and enough traction to transcend isolated acts of violence. There were four interlocking dimensions: security, political reform, economic recovery and development, and humanitarian relief.

Security had to be addressed first, but could not be dealt with in isolation. Steps of reciprocity were required. Three performance benchmarks were foreseen:

1. **to mid-2003**: Israeli withdrawal to positions as at 28 September, 2000; free, fair and credible Palestinian elections; meetings of international donors with the Palestinian National Authority to map out the reconstruction and reform process
2. **to end-2003**: the creation of a Palestinian state within provisional borders
3. **from 2004**: direct negotiations between Israel and Palestine

Third-party monitoring and assessment of performance and progress would be required, redressing the flaws of the Oslo process which had made no provision for international monitoring of compliance.

A Palestinian state would be contingent on comprehensive political and institutional reform. Israel would be required to restore freedom of movement within the Palestinian territories, an end to further Israeli settlement, and withdrawal to the positions before 28 September, 2000.

Two new phenomena gave hope of eventual resolution: (i) the development of a deep consensus in the international community on *how* the conflict must end; and (ii) that the majority of both peoples supported it, if not yet the majority of their leaders.

The principles underlying a settlement were familiar:

1. Israel to be guaranteed security, and freedom from attack and the threat of attack;
2. Palestine to be guaranteed a permanent, independent and viable state, and an end to Israeli occupation;
3. the removal from Palestine of Israeli settlements, reform of the Palestinian administration and the restoration of the Palestinian economy;
4. shared administration of Jerusalem, and a compromise on the return of refugees.

Peace could be founded only on one common vision, one common future. There were daily reasons to despair, to give up. There was an equal need to continue, to summon the will the make lasting peace a concrete reality, to fulfil the deep aspirations of both peoples for freedom, security and prosperity.

**In discussion:**

- If Israel was unwilling or unable to give up controls on security, and the Palestinians were unwilling or unable to provide guarantees of security, how could peace be achieved without the application of outside force? Did this not imply the deployment of an international force in the Occupied Territories; a trusteeship formula with a robust international security presence to offer Palestinians the prospect of security and statehood, and the Israelis security.
• There were broadly four possible scenarios:
  1. continued confrontation leading to the military destruction of the PNA;
  2. continued standoff in which the PNA survived but impotent and controlled;
  3. a return to the Oslo table – highly unlikely;
  4. trusteeship.

• The parties to an effective settlement required will, ability and legitimacy. The Palestinians had the will, but neither the ability nor the legitimacy with the economy broken, Arafat humiliated and near-anarchy in the streets. The international community needed to provide the ability and the legitimacy.

• Suicide bombings prevented any chance of Israeli engagement in peace. They were totally counterproductive to the Palestinian cause.

• Without defined Israeli borders no viable Palestinian state could be discussed. Occupation snuffed out hope; imposed capitulation produced violence. The period of calm and growing prosperity in the 1980s and 1990s had brought hope to the Palestinians. The search for peace implied taking risks; a genuine process could sustain occasional outrages. But practical justice was required along the way.

• The major players in the peace process at present were sovereign states. The diplomatic efforts of the Quartet might concentrate more on human security, engaging non-state actors – Israeli and Palestinian elites and civil society – in the peace process.

• The Middle East Peace Process perhaps was not a good case for the study of diplomacy, since it was an example of ‘sticking plaster diplomacy’, trying to solve a problem not ripe for solution. In the cases of South African apartheid or Rhodesian rebellion, the problems had become ripe for solution when effective pressure had been applied. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict could continue as long as Israel was not under pressure. But neither the United States nor Europe would press Israel to settle, for historic and ethnic reasons.

• At present the peace process was process only. The Quartet was a big step forward, as the United States could not credibly act alone, and the EU was seen to be similarly non-objective. But the process was fatally flawed as at required step-by-step confidence-building, when on both sides there were parties that didn’t want a settlement on terms acceptable to the other. The Oslo process had left out the end game; all the difficult questions had been left until last. By contrast, the Namibian peace process had made the outcome clear in advance, thus isolating the extremists. In Israel-Palestine the end was not known, so there was no interest in making compromises to reach it. They needed a package on the table to sign up to comprising refugees, compensation and Jerusalem.

• The Quartet process was a substantive advance over the Oslo process as a Palestinian state was now on the agenda. The perception of deep crisis also facilitated movement; both sides were now edging towards the roadmap.

• Timing was important. Ripeness was crucial. The Mitchell Plan was a halfway house to a third-party presence in the Occupied Territories, providing monitoring.

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**Training Diplomats in Interacting with the Defence Community**

*General Bo Wranker*, Force Commander of the United Nations Defence and Observation Force (UNDOF) on the Golan Heights, presented a brief review of the structure and mission objectives of the UN Preventive Deployment Force in Macedonia (UNPREDEP) and of UNDOF.
The mission of UNDOP was to observe, supervise and maintain the ceasefire. Their mission was not to fight, it was not a political role, but to deter by being pro-active. The force commander had no political advisor. He relied on local embassies for the political context of military operations.

The mission of UNPREDEP had been to establish a presence, to monitor and report, and to preserve the peace through deterring by its presence.

Peace support operations (PSOs) were international in nature but always ad hoc, hence training and education had to be specific to the task in hand. This led to weaknesses: forces often had had no training before deployment; the leadership was often chosen for political reasons rather than on the basis of relevant experience.

The PSO’s tasks might include the administration of cities or entire countries, the supervision of law and order, and the preservation of human rights. Yet often there was no clear objective nor defined end state. The military might need to write its own objectives to achieve security, civil administration or market economic mechanisms in order to create a viable environment for political progress.

It was necessary to politicise the military, to provide them with diplomatic skills including understanding of international law. Training diplomats in interacting with the defence community would increase the efficiency and effectiveness of both diplomacy and military operations. The military aspect was only one part of any successful operation; it always had to be co-ordinated with a diplomatic strategy.

The objective of such training was to improve mutual knowledge and understanding, especially of the rules of engagement. Misunderstanding of the tools available and their use could lead to the failure of the operation.

A programme of training should include:

- Lectures
  - transforming political objectives into military action
  - how the military could support diplomatic actions and vice versa

- Seminars
  - the study of successful and unsuccessful PSOs (why they did and didn’t work)
  - how to integrate military, diplomatic and humanitarian elements into a single operation

- Exercises
  - a Command Post exercise, mixing experienced personnel with trainees
  - formulating objectives, strategy and tactics

The Nordic countries and Jordan offered examples of good practice. Personnel from political, military, diplomatic and humanitarian agencies attended courses of integrated training at military bases.

There was scope for co-operation between diplomatic academies and Staff Colleges in the further development of joint courses.
Responding:

*Professor Casimir Yost.* Director of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University, observed that diplomats and the military needed to appreciate their respective strengths and weaknesses. There was usually intense diplomatic activity before military intervention, or intense military activity before a diplomatic initiative, then a crucial transition from military to civilian control.

Military operations demanded quick entry by a cohesive force to establish military dominance. They needed to be well-resourced and well-focused. Civil operations by contrast were often slow, with multiple moving parts and no clear lines of authority.

Kosovo offered a good example of the gradual and effective transfer from military to civil operations. The UN force maintained security. The EU provided the resources for economic relief and recovery. UNHCR attended to human rights. The OSCE set about re-establishing democratic institutions.

Operations in Afghanistan were not working as well as in Kosovo. Essential security had not been completely established, with warlords at large. Civilian operations were not adequately resourced. Indigenous leadership was fragmented; the central authority was not in command of the countryside. Reconstruction of the national infrastructure was too slow.

What were the implications for training? Civil-military operations were complicated and variable; each was *sui generis.* The military trained and exercised for variation (even if sometimes reluctantly). Civilians on the other hand often were not trained or prepared. There was no cohesion, except over time as people learned on the job.

Diplomats needed to appreciate military organisation and mentality. There was a potential role for diplomatic academies in helping diplomats to prepare, especially for post-conflict stabilisation. (Examples included programmes offered by the US Institute for Peace and the Carnegie Institute for Preventing Deadly Conflict.)

In discussion:

- The Italians had experience as hosts of the Balkan PSOs; they had trained diplomatic advisors to the military commands.
- The United States Foreign Service Institute trained diplomats with the US Marine Corps in crisis management and evacuation procedures. Officers of the State Department were seconded to the National War College.
- It was necessary to train civilians before joining PSOs, especially in the psychology of traumatised people. There were a lot of nitty-gritties to deal with – how to live, how to integrate with the community. Diplomats joining the leadership of a mission needed to understand the concepts and nuances underlying the operation.
• Rules of engagement could be either too limited, which was militarily ineffective, or too wide, which was politically dangerous. During the war in former Yugoslavia a peacekeeping force had been put into the field initially under Chapter 6 with the Secretary-General notionally as force commander when there had been no peace to keep. (At Srebrenica the Dutch battalion had been hostage to political inaction and isolation from military command.) After the Dayton Agreement peace had been established, but a fighting force had been put in with every capability.

• Croatia offered an example of a successful PSO, with the peaceful integration of Eastern Slavonia. The reasons included:
  - a precisely defined objective
  - talented leaders
  - experience of the dynamics of a multiethnic community
  - a clear choice offered to the locals of ‘integrate or else’
  - close adherence to the rules of engagement, retaining a scrupulous neutrality.

• The Deputy Director of the Canadian Mission to the Balkans, commenting in an *Adelphi* paper in July, 2002, on the prevailing misunderstanding, confusion and distrust surrounding the NATO engagement, observed that his biggest challenge had been to get coherent and honest policies into the minds of the crooks and villains with whom he had to deal every day.

• The UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC, 1992-93) offered a further example of a clear mission forcefully implemented under strong leadership (a function more of character and personality than of political correctness), with effective co-ordination between the military and civil authorities.

• Part of the psychological force of military deployment was simply physical presence – body language communicating power, resolve and will to potential adversaries. But it had to be backed by political will. (The experience of the United States Marines in Lebanon offered a cautionary precedent, deployed as tethered hostages and then unceremoniously withdrawn.) In peacekeeping the international community had to be committed to the fulfilment of the objective.

• It was possible to learn the wrong lesson from the last war. The failure of the peace operation in Somalia led to non-intervention in Rwanda.

**The concept of an International Open University under the Auspices of the United Nations**

*Professor Alan Henrikson* presented a proposal which had originated at a Wilton Park conference on the Dialogue of Civilisations, and which had elicited some interest within UN agencies and associated groups. Secretary-General Annan recently had encouraged exploration of the idea by those who could advance it.

The United Nations was itself a dialogue among civilisations. A UN-based Open University could offer education across international, inter-regional, inter-cultural, inter-symbolic lines, building links especially amongst the young, in developed as well as in developing countries.

It might have its own campus (associated with or complementary to the training centre at Turin and the UN University at Tokyo), but also would offer Web-based distance learning, creating ICT networks – ‘the new Silk Roads’. The use of ICT would further extend the reach of the initiative among developing countries.
Courses would be offered at MA level to those with a demonstrated interest in international service. Giandomenico Picco’s *Crossing the Divide* could be a core text. Human security and intercultural programmes would form part of the syllabus.

Courses might be offered in the first instance on existing campuses in Turin, Tokyo, Tehran, Brasilia, Paris and Boston. These would be partner universities of the international open university, knitting the system together, with possible funding from the World Bank (‘the Learning Bank’), foundations, corporations and other donors.

The product would be a bright cadre of civil society workers with open cultural attitudes, a force for global public good. They could have a multiplier effect, offering intelligent dialogue over coercion and conflict.

**In discussion:**

- There was broad support for the concept from members of the Forum.
- Residential programmes were expensive. Substantial funding would be required. The Kellogg Foundation might be an additional source.
- The initiative needed to be located within the UN system.
- It needed a single *animateur*.
- Models of good practice in multinational, multicultural education and distance learning were offered by:
  - the UN Academy for a Better World
  - the University of South Africa
  - the University of the South Pacific
  - UPaz, the University for Peace in Costa Rica
  - the Andean University
  - El Tech, in Monterrey, Mexico
  - the Europaeum – comprising eight, soon to be ten European universities
  - the Open University in the United Kingdom, now in its fortieth year
  - the Arab Open University, opening in Beirut in 2002, with assistance from UNESCO
- Diplomatic academies similarly helped to prepare workers for peace through programmes offered to foreign nationals.

**Any other business**

**Forthcoming meetings:**

The Forum accepted with thanks the generous offer of the Diplomatic Academy of Croatia to host the 31st Meeting of the Forum at Dubrovnik on 29-30 September, 2003. It was hoped that these dates would avoid coinciding with the meeting of the EU Heads of Training.

The 32nd Meeting would be held at the Diplomatische Akademie Wien, at the end of June, 2004, to commemorate the 250th anniversary of the Oriental Academy (the predecessor institution of the Diplomatische Akademie), and the 40th anniversary of the Akademie itself.

The Forum accepted with thanks the generous offer of the Diplomatic Academy of Peru to host the 33rd Meeting at Lima in 2005, on the occasion of the Academy’s 50th anniversary.
Proposals for the Meeting at Dubrovnik:

- fewer topics, greater depth, wider participation
- two types of topic:
  - issues in international relations
  - training as such – more needed in detail
- circulate papers and documents in electronic form
- subsidise the participation of diplomatic academies in developing countries
- build in opportunities for bilateral contact

Proposed Agenda topics:

Diplomatic Training:

- 60-90 minutes on a comparative study of the ideal curriculum:
  - the skills and knowledge to be acquired
  - programmes for new entry and mid-career officers
  - overall structure
- mid-career training - approaches and mechanisms
- managing mini-missions – challenges of morale and staff selection
- training of Locally Engaged staff, especially in political work
- training in the developing world – overcoming problems of funding and educational resources
- selection – democratic process or affirmative action?
- services of diplomatic academies to other government departments, NGOs and the private sector

Issues in International Relations:

- the diplomacy of the Balkans
- the diplomacy of EU Enlargement
- trade negotiations – evaluating the post-Doha development round

Conclusion

The co-chairs of the Meeting, Professor Yost and Ambassador Sucharipa, warmly thanked Ambassador Kasrawi, his staff and all their hosts for an excellent meeting.

Professor Kasrawi thanked the members of the Forum for coming to Amman, and hoped that all would return.

Wednesday 25 September

Petra

Following the Meeting the Ministry of Tourism kindly facilitated an excursion to the ancient city of Petra, with guided tour and luncheon.

Dr John Hemery
Rapporteur