International Forum on Diplomatic Training
29th Meeting of the Deans and Directors
of Diplomatic Academies and Institutes of International Relations
Diplomatische Akademie Wien
and at the Budapest Institute of Graduate International Studies
17 – 21 September 2001

A. Opening Reception

1. **Ambassador Dr Ernst Sucharipa**, Director of the Diplomatische Akademie, welcomed delegates to the Meeting at a reception at the Akademie. The Austrian Foreign Minister was represented by Deputy Secretary General **Ambassador Christian Prosl**.

2. The Meeting opened with a minute’s silence in memory of the dead and bereaved in the terrorist assaults in the United States on 11 September. Amb Sucharipa expressed the shock and dismay shared by all delegates at the tragedy, and the solidarity all felt with their American colleagues and friends. A message of condolence and support had been sent on behalf of the Meeting to **Professor Casimir Yost** and American members of the International Forum (see Appendix A).

3. Amb Sucharipa said that rather than cancel the Meeting it had been decided as a matter of principle to carry on, showing the resolve to continue the work of diplomacy – the antithesis of terrorism – for peace and justice.

4. Prof Yost had hoped to be able to attend but had been unable to leave Washington. He had sent a message of welcome (see Appendix B).

5. **Dean Emeritus Peter Krogh**, co-founder of the Forum, represented the co-chair, Georgetown University, at the Meeting. He observed that despite the tragedy there were silver linings to the attacks of September 11: there was greater solidarity around the world, old ties were being renewed and fundamental values were being reinforced. He said that he would be proud and honoured to deliver to Professor Yost the Meeting’s communication to colleagues in the United States.

B. Introduction of New Members:

**Cuba:**
Instituto Superior de Relaciones Internacionales
represented by its Director, Ambassador Dr Hermes Herrera-Hernandes

**Germany:**
Centre for European Integration Studies, Bonn
represented by Dr Stefan Fröhlich, Director of the European Studies Programme

**Hungary:**
Julius Andrássy Deutschsprachige Universität, Budapest
represented by its Rector, Dr Erich Kussbach

**Iran:**
School of International Relations
represented by its Director, Dr Masud Eslami, and by Mr Mohammed Pournajaf Marandi, Head of the International Academic Co-operation Department

Nigeria:
Foreign Service Academy
welcomed back to the Forum, represented by its Director, Dr O I Udoh

Slovenia:
Diplomatic Academy
represented by its Director, Prof Dr Bojko Bučar

Sri Lanka:
Bandaranaike Diplomatic Training Institute
represented by its Director General, Dr Vernon Mendis

C. Introduction of New Representatives

Chile
Ambassador Dr Rolando Stein
Director, Academia Diplomática “Andrés Bello”

China
Ambassador Qiu Bohua
Vice-President, Foreign Affairs College

Colombia
Ambassador Fernando Alzate Donoso
Director, Academia Diplomática de San Carlos

European Commission
Mr Ari Sihvola
Principal Administrator

Indonesia
Ambassador Albert Matondang
Director, Centre for Education and Training

Japan
Ambassador Tomoyuki Abe
Director General, Foreign Service Training Institute

Republic of Korea
Ambassador Tae-ik Chung
Chancellor, Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security

Pakistan
Ambassador Alam Mansoor
Director General, Foreign Service Academy
D. Reports of Regional Groups

Asia-Oceana:

Attending: representatives of China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Republic of Korea, Oman, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Uzbekistan

1. Ambassador Chung reported that the group had observed a moment of silence for the victims of the assaults in America, had condemned the attacks and expressed sympathy for the victims and their families. Religion was not responsible for the tragedies. There was no justification for terrorism. The objective of diplomacy was to promote dialogue between civilisations. The group urged the international community to solve religious and international conflict through peaceful means.

2. Institutions of the Asia-Oceana Group continued to offer courses of training for junior diplomats and for foreign diplomats.

Europe:

Attending: representatives of Austria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Italy, Germany, Netherlands, Russian Federation, Slovenia, United Kingdom

1. Dr John Hemery reported that the activities of European institutions had a number of themes in common:
   - continuation and expansion of programmes of co-operation with EU Candidate countries (including twinning) and with developing countries;
   - growth of programmes for those outside the formal diplomatic profession (such as representatives of other Ministries and agencies involved in international affairs, regional officials and private business people), offering training in diplomatic skills and fostering greater coherence of national representation abroad;
   - innovation in practical simulation and in interactive training, especially in negotiation skills;
   - growing interest in developing mid-career training and programmes of training for trainers.

2. In institutional news of note the training programme of the German Foreign Ministry would be moving within the next two or three years from Bonn to Berlin, and the Institut International d’Administration Publique was shortly to become part of the École Nationale d’Administration. The Diplomatische Akademie Wien was
offering a module of the new EU-funded European Diplomatic Programme for serving diplomats from Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the Member States.

3. The Heads of Personnel and Training of the EU Member States had been invited to attend the Forum in Vienna, but regrettably their annual meeting in Brussels had coincided precisely with the dates of the Vienna meeting. It was hoped that a meeting of European members of the Forum with the EU group could be arranged, with a view to exploring the contribution Forum institutions might make to the European Diplomatic Programme and perhaps to the training of representatives of the External Service of the European Commission.

**Latin America:**

**Attending:** representatives of Chile, Cuba

**Ambassador Stein** reported that owing to events in the United States attendance regrettably had been limited to two representatives who had exchanged information on their programmes.

**Africa:**

**Attending:** representatives of Cameroon, Nigeria

**Dr Udoh** observed that the Africa group was not constituted formally, and hoped that there would be additional members attending the next Meeting who would be able to share experience.

**E. Keynote Address**

1. **Ambassador Georg Lennkh** gave the Keynote Address on *Conflict Resolution in Africa: Lessons learned from Burundi.* Ambassador Lennkh had served as Ambassador in Tokyo and as Foreign Policy Advisor to Dr Bruno Kreisky, and had been in charge of the post-conflict management phase of the negotiations on Burundi with President Nelson Mandela.

2. Amb Lennkh offered a brief introduction to Burundi and to the eight-year history of conflict and attempts at conflict settlement between 1992 and the Arusha Agreement in 2000. He observed that Burundi had suffered more violence and violation of human rights than anywhere else on the continent. It was an anomaly amongst the artificial states of Africa, an ancient kingdom with a continuous history, settled boundaries, common institutions and common loyalties; yet paradoxically it had proved more vulnerable than most to ethnic strife.

3. Formal negotiations had begun in June, 1998, at Arusha, involving Government, Parliament and sixteen political parties. Importantly, the process was headed by an African, President Julius Nyerere.
4. The negotiations had been pursued in four separate Commissions (Origins: Politics and Constitution : Security and Army : Land). Each had nineteen members and was headed by an outside power in order to moderate political sensitivities. The peace process had entailed 800 hours of negotiations over 18 months, at a cost of $10,000,000. (Cost-effective in relation to the cost of refugee management, at $2 million - $3 million per day.)

5. The key body had been the Political and Constitutional Commission. The main stumbling block had been the asymmetry between the majority Hutu and the minority Tutsi ethnic groups. Forty years of conflict had solidified the groups, yet there was no real way to define each or to distinguish between them. A pragmatic accommodation had been reached whereby the groups would be represented in the ratio 60 : 40 in Parliament and 50 : 50 in the Army.

6. Land also was a crucial issue; in particular the desire of refugees to return to their own land. It had been necessary to create a Land Register, and to address the questions of restitution and monetary compensation.

7. In October, 1999, President Nyerere had died unexpectedly, throwing the peace process into disarray. There had followed a frantic search for a new facilitator. President Mandela had not wanted to take on the task, but had been pressured into accepting grudgingly. He then had declared that it was a scandal that the small Tutsi minority should continue to dominate the huge Hutu majority, and that reconciliation was required. Yet for the locals it was impossible to let political prisoners responsible for mass slaughter go free. There had been no meeting of minds at all.

8. Nevertheless, important lessons had been learned in the peace process. There were, first, systemic issues: given the fact of conflict, development was impossible. It was necessary, therefore, to isolate the conflict in order to allow development to be pursued in parallel. Secondly, the Africans had to resolve their own conflicts, to be the masters of their own destiny. However, they needed mediators and resources in order to negotiate successfully.

9. Ambassador Lennk offered nine proto-conclusions from the Burundi experience:

- The United States and European states need to decide where they stand in relation to conflict in Africa; there is a danger of moving from disconnect to misconnect.

- When embarking on negotiations it is important to know what is going to be required: time, resources (both money and personnel), and an intimate knowledge of local realities which is built up only slowly (there is no use in imposing external solutions).

- A division of labour is needed on the part of the international community assisting in conflict resolution in different parts of Africa; not all to be engaged in addressing one conflict while neglecting the resolution of others.

- International efforts need to be made more coherent and less competitive (for example, four different organisations are responsible for the sensitive process of demobilisation in the Congo).
• Conflict resolution is a long-term process, making it possible to test different methods and approaches (diplomatic / military / mediation).

• Analysis is needed of the deeper roots of conflict: poverty, disillusionment, despair - leading to a low threshold of violence.

• Analysis is needed of conflict resolution and reconciliation activities (for example, bi-ethnic radio stations and football matches): what they cost, how effective they are, and how cost effective.

• Small details are important, especially logistics and communications in regions without electricity and where reaching someone may take two weeks.

• Conflict resolution is not one-dimensional; a multidimensional, overall holistic approach is required.

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F. Training of Diplomats in International Negotiation

Members of the Processes of International Negotiation (PIN) Project Steering Committee offered a series of presentations on their work:

1. **Professor Victor Kremenyuk** explained that the PIN group had originated in the early 1980’s working across cultural and ideological boundaries during the Cold War. The network now had some 4000 correspondents participating in joint research on negotiation on specific topics (such as international economic and nuclear issues) and in broader frameworks (dealing for example with power, culture, multilateral relations and preventive diplomacy). The network received financial support from the Hewlett Foundation.

2. **Professor Rudolf Avenhaus** reflected on the value of formal models in teaching negotiation, and introduced a paper on the subject. The debate over the role and benefit of formal models in training focussed on consistency, precision, empirical validity and originality. The process of modelling entailed assigning values to each criterion for each participant in a negotiation, though it was possible to take account of only a few key aspects of reality. (Paul Meerts observed that questions of emotion were not always sufficiently taken into account.) This limited the applicability of the theoretical model to practice, as did the difficulty of abstract symbolic reasoning for diplomats who may not have had an especially strong grounding in Mathematics. Nevertheless, the PIN project could serve as an ‘inventive go-between’, by disseminating the results of research and helping to bridge the gap between theorists and practitioners.

3. **Professor Gunner Sjöstedt** addressed the challenges for diplomats of working with those from other professional cultures, such as soldiers, lawyers, economists and environmental specialists. Professional culture was a composite phenomenon whose different aspects impacted on negotiations in different ways: the way you thought
about a problem imposed a particular logic on how to deal with it. Training could help to bridge these divides by improving understanding of different perceptions and approaches, and improve problem-solving capacity by aggregating these complementary qualities.

4. **Dr Guy Olivier Faure** reported on training in the cultural aspects of negotiation, helping diplomats to go beyond the mechanics of treaty-making, problem-solving and conflict resolution. Negotiation was a strategic interactive process by cultural actors within a cultural context. More than a set of techniques, it was a state of mind, a philosophy of accepting differences, accepting people as they are. Cultural training could help overcome stereotypic perceptions and responses and improve results, thus was a cost-effective investment. *Culture and Negotiation*, comprising thirty-four case studies from five continents, would be a helpful handbook translated into other languages. The different contributions reflected the creative imagination of different cultures, but also their essential unity of experience.

5. **Dr Paul Meerts** described a two-day workshop on negotiation which combined the discussion of theory with the engagement of students in practice. The programme focussed initially on the negotiation process, on different strategies and tactics, skills and styles. It also distinguished between distributive and integrative approaches, and evaluated mixed bargaining. On the second day a simulated multilateral negotiation involved both internal negotiation within delegations (establishing a mandate), and external negotiation between delegations (giving participants an opportunity of experiencing the particular decision-making format of a multilateral institution such as a Working Group of the European Union, and practising formulating and adopting resolutions). Debriefing both content and process was a vital part of the exercise.

6. **Professor William Zartmann** was to have presented a paper on the use of simulations in negotiation training but regrettably had been prevented by events from attending.

7. In the ensuing discussion a number of points were raised both about negotiation and about negotiation training:

**Negotiation:**

- it is important to identify who is negotiating and what their interests are, to establish whether there is anything to talk about, and to select a venue for the negotiations which has an atmosphere, tradition and record of delivering outcomes
- an organisation such as the UN can exert useful *convening* power in the pre-negotiation phase, calling conferences on difficult issues
- confidence-building measures in the pre-negotiation phase are an integral part of the negotiation process
- there are two principal strategic approaches: *normative*, with a set agenda and known goals, making it easier to plan and aim for a result as the choices of outcome are relatively narrow; and *exploratory*, with no fixed framework (*on s’engage, et puis on voit*)
• strong leadership is important in the early stages; someone needs to take responsibility for getting the process under way, especially when the parties to the negotiation are equal in power, or are greatly unequal in power, or when there is great hostility on one side as after a surprise attack
• never attempt to negotiate in the heat of battle; better to let the blood cool
• a prestigious intermediary can help to bring the conflicting parties to the table; and in the event of a breach of trust can side with the injured party to re-establish trust
• use respectful, considerate language, especially if the stronger party to the negotiation
• readiness to negotiate can be affected by cultural factors, for example if one party sent to negotiate is perceived as being too young and inexperienced, or has inadequate credentials; the parties to the negotiation may have different concepts of time
• gender similarly affects both perception and process; women and men negotiate differently - their cognitive maps are different; emotional intelligence is used better by women
• structural power is not always the same as symbolic power; the weaker party usually does better than expected (as Talleyrand at Vienna)
• negotiating style is affected by a number of factors including culture, nationality, age, gender, profession, the domestic political situation and the institutional context (e.g. a single negotiation, or the effectively continuous negotiation of a multilateral working group)

Negotiation Training:

• it would be helpful to develop a methodology on what training produces better negotiators
• there are plenty of books on evaluating the effectiveness of training (though few offer more than a ‘happiness scale’); the key measures are competence level change (in knowledge or attitudes), and change in ability to apply skills in daily practice (i.e. a professional competence increase); problems of measurement, however, include establishing accurate controls in advance, and assessing competence changes over time
• it is difficult to measure the success of a simulation exercise: whether by observed improvement in the process (appropriate formalities, successful positions, good time management, effective drafting), or by substantive outcomes (scoring, distribution of money)
• scoring is not always a reliable guide; a successful game shows players how to play; outcomes are only one guide
• the process is more important than the outcome; the exercise itself needs to be simple to understand, but should offer a challenging process; participants need to be able to reach agreement, but need also to worry that they might not
• it is useful to have exercises of different kinds: some fictional, others taking real negotiations forward in time
• it is essential to train not only for win-win negotiation, but also for zero sum negotiation; crisis management is a vital element
8. **Dr Paul Meerts** concluded the PIN session with a demonstration of a Self-Assessment Exercise in which members of the Forum responded to a battery of written questions on attitudes and preferences. The exercise yielded for each individual a series of numerical scores indicating which of four personal styles they exhibit. The debrief illuminated the contribution of each style to a negotiating team:

**Action-Orientated**: reliable, master of the dossier, pushing for results, needing agreement; *but*, may push too hard, forcing others to walk out and end the negotiation; the degree of push thus depends on how much you need agreement

**Process-Orientated**: good in plenary and in the Chair, essential guardians of the structured process; less good in the corridor, though; may not be imaginative enough to get results

**People-Orientated**: good networkers, good at using dinners and corridors; *but*, if too friendly, open to emotional blackmail (*beware the negative power of weakness; cf. children negotiating with their parents*)

**Idea-Orientated**: good at producing creative solutions, but full of dilemmas; possible to have too much complexity and not enough result

9. People usually scored higher on two of the dimensions than on the other two. Some scored relatively evenly across all four. Such people were valuable as they were able to switch channels; *but*, may prove to be unpredictable, thus to seem untrustworthy. (Skilled negotiators try to be predictable as it creates stability.)

10. Ideally a negotiating team would have representatives of all four styles, whose complementary skills and qualities would contribute to the overall success of the team.

11. The PIN Steering Committee looked forward to meeting next in Teheran in January, 2002.

(www.iiasa.ac.at)

12. **Lucille Dromer-North** described a major simulation of multilateral negotiations on global trade issues in the framework of the United Nations General Assembly. It had been designed by Professor Mario Betatti, Dean of the University of Paris II, Assas-Sorbonne, and former Head of the French delegation to the UN General Assembly. Briefing materials prepared by Prof Betatti and supporting documentation were distributed to the Meeting in French and English.

13. The exercise, conducted each year at the Institut International d’Administration Publique, is prepared by students over a period of two months and played over five full days. It deals with five main issues: raw materials, energy, trade, development, and monetary and financial matters. The main objectives are to enable students to
become familiar with the regulations and protocol of the United Nations, to master a substantial body of material on global trade, and to develop their skills in negotiation, drafting and personal presentation.

14. A notable attribute of the exercise is that it is run largely by the students themselves. IIAP staff observe, advise and adjudicate but do not direct. The Institut provides administrative, clerical and logistic support.

15. Some 80 - 100 students normally take part, with roles allocated by lottery. They are assessed on the quality of the country file compiled by each player, and on their performance in role. It was acknowledged that this was a difficult and inevitably partly subjective process.

16. The success of the exercise hinged on the energy, enthusiasm, imagination and commitment of the participants. One never knew whether it would work or not, yet somehow it always did.

17. In discussion a number of points emerged:

- views differed on the mode of role allocation: the lottery was transparently fair, but carried with it the risk of undermining the exercise if key roles were played by ineffectual individuals
- guidance and if necessary criticism were offered in private, never in public where in an international group both personal and national sensitivities had to be respected
- much of a delegation’s performance in real life depended on the nature and quality of instructions, and on the capacity of a delegation to respond to changing instructions; such exercises could not easily simulate this feature of diplomacy, especially if the students in role were formulating their own instructions
- views differed on the value of an exercise of this length: well-motivated students could gain a tremendous amount out of both the research effort involved and the highly detailed knowledge gained about the substance and process of negotiation in this field in a multilateral institution, but the opportunity costs were considerable
- the value of an exercise based on a real negotiation was enhanced if senior diplomats who had been involved took part in the debriefing, explaining what had happened in reality and why
- many simulations were set in large multilateral fora, yet most diplomats were posted to small bilateral missions where they dealt mainly with consular affairs; it was necessary to simulate as well the ordinary duties of the profession
- students themselves, while demanding and welcoming simulation exercises, also found them to be potentially frustrating: having been trained to be ambassadors, they then were sent out to be third secretaries and had to wait fifteen years to use the skills learnt
- simulation was thought nevertheless to be the most comprehensive form of training, enabling students to develop skills and to grow in confidence; active engagement in learning was more effective and long-lasting than listening.
G. Public Diplomacy

The Meeting had the opportunity of considering three presentations on training in Public Diplomacy.

1. **Dr John Hemery** observed that there was a growing demand for training in public diplomacy in response to changes in the nature of international relations and international communication. With the spread of democracy more governments were susceptible to the pressure of their electorates; information and communications technology encouraged global interdependence. It was self-evident that events were no longer controlled nor even managed effectively by states and governments. Instead they were mediated by and through all manner of avenues including governments, parliaments, private organisations, businesses and the media. The most powerful recent example was the dynamic political impact of the images of the events of September 11.

2. Government policies increasingly responded to, were to some extent determined by public opinion. It was necessary, therefore, to prepare the ground of opinion, to create a receptive climate for policy and a positive reputation whether for trade and investment, attracting tourism or securing support both domestic and international on key issues and in crises.

3. This was increasingly important as regional parliaments started to have a functional role in decision-making. Even non-parliamentary regional associations offered opportunities for governments that got their message right at home and abroad, and dangers for those who either got their message wrong or who hadn’t yet understood that communicating effectively with publics was essential to their interests.

4. The Centre for Political and Diplomatic Studies had developed an interactive programme of training in the strategy and skills of public diplomacy. At its core was a series of pre-recorded television broadcasts shown at intervals throughout the course, each followed by a thirty-minute meeting of students in small groups representing different states. This format provided students with recurring opportunities of assessing political developments, reflecting on how they impacted on their own and other countries’ interests, agreeing a line on each issue covered and responding to questions at interview by the media. Each student would be interviewed a number of times, and the resulting video recordings debriefed as to both political content and presentational style.

5. Interspersed with these activities the course offered lectures and seminars on developing a coherent strategy of public diplomacy, workshops on identifying a national image and the strengths and weaknesses of one’s state and government, and exercises in planning a targeted campaign.

6. This interactive multidisciplinary programme was designed to highlight the central importance of public diplomacy in contemporary diplomacy, and to encourage improvement in a number of key skills:

- political thinking
• media observation and analysis
• meeting management
• personal presentation
• interaction with the media
• negotiation both within a delegation and with other delegations
• developing tools of public diplomacy

7. Measurable outcomes of the programme included substantive materials for subsequent use in public diplomacy, and observable improvement in personal confidence and presentation. It was less easy to assess improvement in political skills and judgement in so short a time.

8. The course could be varied in length from two days to five days, depending on objectives and resources.

9. Sir John Johnson conducted a workshop on the public diplomacy of the NATO aerial campaign in Kosovo, using the BBC programme on the subject, ‘How the War was Spun’ as a vehicle for group discussion. It was a case study used in public diplomacy training at the University of Oxford.

10. The first half of the programme described how NATO had failed to get its message across effectively, and was losing the battle for public opinion:
• media pressures - journalists hungry for information
• difficulty over access to information - no clear photos on the ground
• retaining media trust - NATO was respected but scepticism eroded trust
• confusion and bureaucratic delays between NATO information sources
• inexperienced press spokesmen
• Serb strengths: direct access to the battlefield; ability to select newsworthy photos; manipulation of international journalists in Belgrade; experienced political and diplomatic spokesmen

11. Members of the Forum then were invited to suggest what could have been done differently and what subsequently needed to have been done to retrieve the situation.

12. It was noted that failure to appreciate adequately in advance the importance of the images and the message meant that the NATO media management team had been at the outset too small and too ill-equipped to do the job required. Failures of co-ordination and communication up the command structure in NATO had led to ineffectual communication with the public and to erosion of trust.

13. The second half of the programme then was shown which demonstrated how NATO had attempted to address the problem. Signals and image analysis had been improved. The command and communication chain had been shortened. A Media Operations Centre had been established with enhanced resources. Full political backing and high priority had been given to the media effort, with improved co-ordination between capitals. Images of refugees in Macedonia had illustrated Serb atrocities and had helped to regain media trust. The public had responded more positively to military personnel directly involved telling the story apparently straight than to officials perceived to be practising the dark arts of spin.
14. The second Forum discussion of the exercise then focussed on how and the extent to which NATO had managed to get its public diplomacy right in the end. A number of lessons for training were thought to have emerged from the campaign:

- there is no substitute for clarity and accuracy
- politicians and spokespersons need to communicate in concise sound bites
- it is essential to monitor the opposing media, and to issue immediate rebuttals of distorted reporting
- when mistakes occur admit fault, explain, apologise and move on
- a strategy group is needed to co-ordinate the public diplomacy effort, providing briefings, background articles and lines to take
- understand the media professionals and wherever possible give them what they need; don’t treat them as the enemy but, with appropriate prudence, as partners
- tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth; but get in media pros to tell you which pieces of truth are the important ones that will serve your message

15. The discussion emphasised that public diplomacy involved all diplomats. Policy creation and presentation was not solely for Ministers, ambassadors and spokespersons but needed to be developed from the bottom up. All should be able to do the job, even in Ministries where control of information was considered to be important. Otherwise a valuable asset for getting positive messages across would go to waste.

16. The Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave an illustrated presentation of Austrian public diplomacy:

17. Ambassador Christian Prosl, Under Secretary of State for Consular Affairs and Deputy Secretary General, observed that the need for public diplomacy was in a sense a consequence of the nature of state structures developed in the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, which typically had conducted more secret, confidential relations. The information society now influenced publics and the spread of democracy consequently required governments to reach out to them.

18. In the United States it was necessary to work with various publics at a number of levels. In Europe there was apparent proximity and intimacy amongst the Member States of the European Union, but in practice it was an illusion. In meetings of the Council of Ministers, there was no time for real personal talks, for sharing or influencing ideas. After concluding an overloaded agenda Ministers tended to go straight to the media with their own national line. Thus communication between them often was via the media.

19. It was necessary therefore to know your own country, its strengths and weaknesses, and to understand the country in which you were working, in order to get the message right. Each country had something interesting about it (whether nuisance value or added value) and had something to say.

20. Despite the capabilities offered by high-tech communications the human touch could not be replaced. Diplomats were not special people outside the normal bounds of behaviour and human relations; it was essential to establish trust.
21. Effective public diplomacy involved not so much what you knew, but getting your priorities right, managing such resources as you had efficiently, being outgoing, confident, daring and convincing in order to get the message across.

22. **Dr Martin Eichtinger** gave an account of the campaign of public diplomacy designed and conducted by the Austrian Embassy at Washington D.C. in 1998 and 1999. At the time Dr Eichtinger had been Head of Press and Information at the Embassy.

23. In developing the campaign it had been necessary to take into account international trends and current domestic issues in the United States, and to analyse the strengths and weaknesses of Austria’s national image in America. If the image was largely a pastoral caricature or politically negative, it was necessary to redefine it actively and positively.

24. In getting the message out, access was the Number 1 objective. With 170 embassies competing for attention it had been necessary to focus on Austria’s unique selling points and to get that message to the important people who influence opinion.

25. Campaign planning and management had concentrated on three simple questions: what? who? how?

26. ‘What’ entailed defining the political and economic messages to be promoted, and the projects which could get those messages out effectively and cost effectively. High profile charity events had been particularly successful, linking Austria with benevolent humanitarian efforts, and emphasising special regional expertise.

27. ‘Who’ entailed identifying the target groups. They had created a database of all those in America with Austrian family or business links. It had been a nationwide stocktaking in universities, think tanks, NGOs, SMEs and multinational corporations. The home front in Austria had been equally important, both for help in defining goals and for practical support.

28. ‘How’ concerned the infrastructural requirements and budget of the campaign. The programme had been co-ordinated by a public diplomacy officer, with responsibility for liaison, management and monitoring. Within an overall Action Programme for Austria (MAP) each Project had had a Schedule for reporting, control, budget and accounts.

29. The public diplomacy campaign had been widely judged a significant success, culminating in a Viennese Ball attended by the President and First Lady. It had helped to overturn prevailing uncertain or negative feelings about Austria, promoting a positive image and stimulating trade and investment.

30. **Dr Gerhard Reiweger** described the programme of public diplomacy training at the Diplomatische Akademie Wien. A one-and-a-half day seminar covered many of the key elements of the campaign carried out at Washington.
31. The programme stressed the importance of being active, goal-orientated, systematic and creative. It included analysis of the home and host countries, identification of target groups (and the value of systematic recording of contacts by name, topic and organisation), and evaluation of different instruments such as public presentations, media activities and charitable works.

32. The seminar also addressed limitations on public diplomacy, including the laws of the host state, the need to avoid the impression of interfering in internal affairs, and varying levels of public acceptance and norms of privacy.

33. Students then took part in formulating a public diplomacy campaign, in order to get a feeling for what diplomacy is in practice.

34. The Akademie’s programme thus addressed both the concept of public diplomacy and approaches to implementation, and offered an opportunity for personal skills training.

35. In discussion of the Austrian presentations a number of further points emerged:

- Public diplomacy is integral to an embassy’s activity, whether a large mission or small, but is especially useful in times of crisis.
- Consciousness of its central importance needs to invade the structure of the Ministry.
- It is equally important on the home front, where domestic support for a foreign initiative may need to be sustained.
- It is as important to remind the public at home of the work and value of the Foreign Ministry, and to gain their support both for the Ministry’s budget and for the political, environmental, trade and social policies which the country’s diplomats have to sell abroad.
- Government needs to work in partnership with the private sector, especially in export-orientated economies (for example in working out how companies will comply or not with bio-safety, environmental, social or tariff measures negotiated in multilateral institutions, and how progress or shortcomings will be presented).
- Public diplomacy can help to move the private sector beyond traditional trade partnerships by awakening them to fresh opportunities.
- There is a significant issue of sustainability; a public diplomacy campaign draws heavily on human and financial resources and carries opportunity costs; markets also change; it is necessary therefore to plan and pace the effort over time, and to be alert to both new and dying ideas.
- The number of events might be limited, but it was essential to keep up communication all the time; get alongside the right people regularly and all else follows (the point at which traditional diplomacy and public diplomacy coincide and are mutually reinforced).
- Small countries with limited budgets may find it helpful to offer creative ideas to trans-national corporations operating in their territory or region, using them as amplifiers of the message.
- Similarly, multilateral fora offer a large number of contacts, hence are cost-effective multipliers of influence especially for small countries; multilateral diplomacy is public diplomacy.
views differed on the value of hiring lobbyists: where a diplomatic service lacked key competences it might be necessary and useful; but it was expensive both in money and in briefing time and lobbyists could not always convey the unique cultural message that was needed to be most effective.

the nature and importance of public diplomacy impacted upon recruitment and appointment policy: enthusiastic, energetic extroverts were required with initiative and good communication skills, creative team players willing to share ideas; there was a place for the austere intellectual but not necessarily at the charity ball.

H. Business Diplomacy

1. **Lorenz Fritz**, Secretary General of the Federation of Austrian Industry, welcomed Members of the Forum and invited members of the Federation to the Haus der Industrie for a seminar on Business Diplomacy. The Federation also kindly offered their generous hospitality at a buffet reception afterwards.

2. Secretary General Fritz observed that trends in international business meant that private companies were working increasingly with governments and civil society organisations both bilaterally and in multilateral fora. They needed to understand international relations and the international rule-making bodies. Global business welcomed the integration of professional diplomats within companies, in the same way as governments appeared to benefit from the interpenetration of skills and ideas between business and diplomacy.

3. **Professor Raymond Saner** reflected on the forces impacting on traditional diplomacy:
   - globalisation
   - rethinking of state functions
   - increasing regulatory strengths of the institutions of international governance
   - growing linkage of non-economic issues (human rights, labour conditions) with trade concessions.

4. Traditional diplomacy thus was no longer an adequate instrument to support a country’s economic interests. Governments needed economic diplomats capable of working with and within national and international institutions both government and private. The private sector needed corporate or business diplomats in-house with comparable knowledge and skills. It was possible to begin to see strategic interoperability of the public and private sectors in international economic affairs as had been apparent for some time in the military-industrial complex.

5. Functions of business diplomacy included:
   - negotiation of international treaties and agreements
   - consultation with the business community in relation to domestic and foreign investment, including tariff, labour and legal frameworks
   - participation and lobbying in international standard setting
   - engagement with stakeholders in civil society
   - mediation between environmental and social groups and business
6. Growing interpenetration of professional diplomats and the business community could be seen in the profusion of secondments in both directions, inter-professional job rotations and the appointment of diplomats to MBA programmes at business schools. There was greater scope than had been realised yet for schools of diplomacy to provide training for business in international relations and diplomatic practice.

7. **Rodrick Wright** offered two case studies which reinforced the points Professor Saner had made:
   - in Russia the FATA Group had succeeded in developing a major integrated food programme in the Kuzbass, through building strategic partnerships with government and business at national, regional and local level
   - in South Africa during apartheid the aluminium industry had channelled millions of dollars into self-help micro-projects for the disadvantaged, legal assistance and programmes of support for emerging democracy; this had entailed multidimensional negotiation and mediation between government, civil society organisations, business and finance.

8. **Dr Lichia Yiu** introduced the results of a limited pilot study of American former ambassadors working at the interface between diplomacy and business.

9. The initial findings supported the conclusions of the earlier presentations:
   - both government and business were making a strategic response to the changing international business environment
   - environmental considerations, emerging human rights law, social issues and the threat of international terrorism all contributed to growing corporate responsibility
   - businesses were monitoring more closely the political, social and environmental dimensions of their operations
   - dialogue and consultation between business and public interest groups were increasing
   - government and business were working together to influence international organisations and regulations
   - it was becoming accepted that social responsibility was necessary to sustained business profitability; equitable development impacted on the bottom line.

10. A principal implication of these findings was that there is likely to be a growing demand from both government and business for studies in Business Diplomacy Management. Schools of diplomacy may find it worthwhile to adapt their curricula to the training of non-diplomats. Business schools may find that Business Diplomacy is a new required core competence.

11. *A fuller version of these presentations is to be found in the Academy of Management Executive, Vol 14, No 1, February 2000.* sanerviu@compuserve.com

12. In discussion a number of further points emerged:
   - business already was doing much along these lines; it was up to schools of diplomacy to reach out and seek partnerships
• given the growth of regulatory functions in international financial and other markets, the need and demand for representative functions on their part would not be long delayed, adding a further dimension to diplomacy beyond the established activities of such bodies as the IMF, World Bank and ILO
• the ‘financial governance system’ needed to become an integral part of the training of diplomats
• similarly, it was increasingly important for diplomats to understand how a transnational corporation functions, what the inter-relationships are between business, government and the international community and how they work
• the spread of such training opportunities in the North could have a negative impact on countries of the South who lacked training resources; co-operation was needed between North and South, funded perhaps by the WTO and the donor community, to enable poorer countries to develop much-needed business diplomacy; equitable development was in the interests of all, including global business.

I. Digital Diplomacy

1. Jovan Kurbalija provided an update on the evolving Forum Website:

http://diplo.diplomacy.edu/forum

2. There was a comprehensive Directory of member institutions and of Courses offered, as well as a Calendar of upcoming conferences on diplomacy. Students and staff also could post and exchange Research papers through the site.

3. Forum members were encouraged to provide details of their institutions, courses and current events. Each member institution had been provided with a password with which it was possible to access the site and update the institution’s entry directly. News for the Calendar needed to be sent to the Mediterranean Academy at Malta:

jovank@diplomacy.edu

4. Institutions were encouraged to appoint a contact person to monitor the Forum Website and to maintain their own entry. The contact person did not need to have advanced IT skills, only to know about the institution, its programmes and plans. It was important to remember that though the software itself might be complicated, the content and amendment of Websites could readily be managed by non-specialists.

5. In addition to developing the Forum Website, the Mediterranean Academy had conducted digital training programmes with students in Namibia and Yugoslavia involving one month of preparation online followed by a five-day workshop. A further programme was planned in Botswana in 2002 for member states of SADC.

6. The Academy also was developing an online postgraduate diploma course. The format had proved to be helpful to students especially in training for text-based negotiation involving rapid drafting and amendment. New modules could be created within days, making it possible to use contemporary events as teaching materials.
Being largely Web-based the programme was accessible to individual diplomats and institutions in countries lacking training resources.

7. The *Internet Guide for Diplomats* published by the Mediterranean Academy now was available in its Second Edition.

8. In discussion a number of points were raised:

- Web-based distance learning was a powerful tool, though it had its frustrations;
  - video conferencing could help students feel part of a real class
  - a mentor could be in touch by telephone or e-mail
  - a tutor could talk to students seeing the same screen, using the microphone to guide them, for example, through a search of an EU or WTO website
  - CD-Rom based courses helped overcome the technical problem of insufficient bandwidth for online programmes
- it was necessary to balance enthusiasm for the information available on the Web with the ability to integrate it usefully to solve problems and achieve goals
- site security was a growing problem; cyber-terrorism was a serious challenge
- negotiating by Internet had proved to be an invaluable tool for moving negotiations forward between meetings
- a key by-product of this process was a flattened hierarchy, with equal access of all to all and ideas superseding status
- one drawback of Web-based negotiation, however, was that it could introduce a certain rigidity into the process; once a position had been posted it seemed somehow more formally fixed than in the ebb and flow of human communication
- many diplomats still were suspicious of the Internet; more work was needed to help them understand how it could be a useful professional tool rather than a dangerous box in the corner.

9. On behalf of all Members of the Forum Ambassador Sucharipa thanked Jovan Kurbalija and the Mediterranean Academy for the remarkable work they were doing for the Forum, entirely voluntarily. They were making a serious contribution to the development of the profession and of new methods of training.

J. **30th Meeting, 2002**

1. The Meeting accepted with gratitude the kind offer of Ambassador Kamel Abu-Jaber and the Institute of Diplomacy to host the 30th Meeting of Deans and Directors at Amman, Jordan, on 23 - 25 September 2002.

2. The Co-Chairs at Vienna and Georgetown would formulate a draft agenda in consultation with Ambassador Abu-Jaber. Members of the Forum were encouraged to submit proposals for agenda items and speakers.

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K. 31st Meeting, 2003

Ambassador Franco Mistretta reiterated the generous invitation of the Instituto Diplomatico ‘Mario Toscano’ to host the 31st Meeting of the Forum at Rome in 2003. The Meeting would be followed by a programme at Dubrovnik kindly organised by the Diplomatic Academy of Croatia.

L. 32nd Meeting, 2004

The Forum would return to Vienna in 2004, to celebrate the 250th anniversary of the Diplomatische Akademie and the 400th anniversary of the Oriental Institute.

M. Closing

1. Ambassador Abu-Jaber spoke for all members at the Meeting in thanking most warmly the Director and all the staff at the Diplomatische Akademie for their kindness, hospitality and exceptional efficiency. The Meeting in Vienna had been once again a great success.

2. The Meeting was followed in the evening by a traditional Austrian Heurigen, generously hosted by the Diplomatische Akademie. Erica Stummvoll, Vice-President of the Vienna State Legislature, formally welcomed members of the Forum on behalf of the Mayor of Vienna, Michael Häupl; the people of Vienna cherished freedom and fellowship, and would continue to work for peace. In reply Ambassador Sucharipa spoke of the contribution diplomacy could make to greater cultural awareness, and of the contribution the institutions of the Forum hoped to continue to make to the diplomacy of the future.

N. International Conference:
The International System: Ten Years after the Cold War

Budapest Institute of Graduate International Studies
Budapest University of Economic Sciences and Public Administration
21 September 2001

1. At the kind invitation of Dr Zsolt Rostoványi, Director of BIGIS, members of the Forum travelled from Vienna to Budapest to take part in an international conference celebrating the tenth anniversary of the Institute.

2. The conference was opened by János Martonyi, Foreign Minister of Hungary, who spoke of the need to be conscious of new risks following the attacks in the United States. A quasi-universal coalition of mankind was needed to combat the violence of hatred, despite differences over globalisation, the role of the United States and the nature of Western society. He stressed the importance of strengthening trans-Atlantic unity, and of the contribution which Enlargement of the European Union could make to European security.
3. József Temesi, Vice Rector of the University, welcomed members of the Forum and students and staff of the University to the conference, which was co-chaired by Dr Rostoványi and Ambassador Sucharipa.

4. Distinguished speakers included:

László Kovács, former Foreign Minister, President of the Hungarian Socialist Party
Vojtech Mastny, Professor of History and International Relations at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars
Mária Ormos, Member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Pécs University of Sciences
Pál Pritz, Head of Department, Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Zsolt Rábai, Information Officer, NATO Headquarters, Brussels
István Szent-Iványi, Chair of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Hungarian Parliament
Réka Szermerkényi, Political State Secretary, Private Office of the Prime Minister
Heiner Timmermann, Professor of History, Europäische Akademie, Otzenhausen

5. Professor Mastny’s keynote address, Diplomacy and the Legacy of the Cold War, was distributed at the conference and is attached for the benefit of members unable to be present at Budapest at Appendix C.

6. Distinguished speakers from the academic staff of the Budapest University of Economic Sciences and Public Administration included:

Hanna Bokor Szegő, Professor Emeritus, Department of International Relations
Erzsébet Kaponyi, Associate Professor, Department of International Relations
László Kiss, Professor, Department of International Relations
Ferenc Kondorosi, Associate Professor, Department of International Relations
Hajna Lőrinc Istvánffy, Professor, Head of the Department of Europe
Tibor Palánkai, Member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences

7. Members of the Forum contributing to the conference as speakers and discussants included:

Dr Masud Eslami, Rector, School of International Relations, Islamic Republic of Iran
Sir Robin Fearn, Director of Diplomatic Studies, Centre for Political and Diplomatic Studies
Dalip Mehta, Dean, Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Service Institute
Ambassador Dr Ernst Sucharipa, Director, Diplomatische Akademie, Wien

8. Members of the Forum were kindly welcomed to the Hungarian Parliament by State Secretary Dr János Rápsac, who gave an account of recent Hungarian domestic politics and current foreign policy priorities. Gábor Kerekes, from the Office of the Prime Minister, gave a guided tour and commentary on the history of the Parliament.

9. The anniversary celebrations at BIGIS concluded, and with it this illustrious extension of the 29th Meeting, with a formal Ball at the University.
Dr John Hemery
Rapporteur