Wednesday 18 September

Tour of the UN Palais des Nations: Arts and History

High-Level Dialogue on Diplomatic Training: the skills, knowledge, and talents needed by multilateral diplomats in 2030

This session will set the stage for the IFDT discussion on training for multilateral diplomacy, including questions such as: what are the critical (and missing) skills for fast-changing multilateral diplomacy? What is the interplay between traditional and new skills needed in multilateral diplomacy? Inputs by heads of international organisations will trigger discussions involving directors of diplomatic academies, and practising ambassadors involved in Geneva’s multilateral diplomacy.

Tatiana Valovaya
Director General
United Nations Office at Geneva

Dr Francis Gurry
Director General
World Intellectual Property Organization

Mr Filippo Grandi
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNHCR

Nikhil Seth
United Nations Assistant Secretary General
Executive Director
United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR)

Moderator:
Ambassador Valentin Zellweger
Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the United Nations in Geneva

Tatiana Valovaya
Director-General
United Nations Office at Geneva

1. Ms Valovaya welcomed members of the Forum to the Council Chamber at the Palais des Nations.

2. Diplomacy had traditions, which were useful for continuity and wisdom, but they were conservative. It was essential to be ready to adapt.

3. Diplomatic practice was responding to three key changes:
   - in format and structure, in response to the digital revolution;
   - in substance, requiring new specialist knowledge of science and technology;
   - and in the conduct of a new multilateralism, understanding many partners and identifying areas of possible agreement.

4. Sometimes diplomatic education lacked new realities. Specialist knowledge of multilateral institutions and in multilateral negotiation were now essential, as well as digital facility.
Dr Francis Gurry  
Director General  
World Intellectual Property Organization  

5. Literacy in science and technology, competence in the practical application of science, were now indispensable in diplomacy. C P Snow’s ‘two cultures’ were now inextricably intertwined.

6. Paraphrasing T S Eliot, wisdom had been lost in knowledge; knowledge lost in information; information lost in data. Diplomats needed facility in knowledge management, given the speed, volume and variable integrity of information acquired from the networks without intermediation.

7. The methodology of institutions was now based wholly on information technology, (though secretariats could still be frightened of it). It was essential for secretariats in multilateral institutions to understand how to use new communication tools, how to reflect the views of member states, when the states themselves might not have views, or no agreed views.

8. Training in management of human resources was also essential, in order to deliver services effectively.

Filippo Grandi  
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees  
UNHCR  

9. Managing the global challenges of poverty, inequality and mass migration (including 71 million refugees and displaced people) required complex responses. Diplomats operated now in a context requiring co-operation, a ‘we first’ approach, rather than country-specific, inward-looking national agendas.

10. Humanitarian action could be a useful entry point for diplomacy where political relations had become stuck, when peace processes needed to be progressed. It was important to instil in the young a sense of everything being about people – all of government and politics was, but in diplomacy this simple truth was sometimes forgotten.

11. In a world of aggression, provocation and insult, the language of diplomacy needed to be quiet, reasonable and patient, lowering the temperature of debate generated by political megaphonism.

Nikhil Seth  
United Nations Assistant Secretary General  
Executive Director  
United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR)  

12. Diplomatic training needed to address three changing skill sets:  
   - how to understand interlinked, interconnected spheres of knowledge, from health to biodiversity and crime;  
   - how to deal with more complex networks and partnerships across government, business, academia and civil society;  
   - how to make an ally of information technology, understanding the infrastructure, drawing on systematic data analysis to get the right message to the right people.

13. Without greater understanding of global issues, and of the interface between different pillars of the multilateral system, diplomats would be swept aside by the pace and scope of change.

14. Many academies were well-equipped to deal with new entrants; often less so with mid-career officers who might be slower to learn, or stuck in twentieth-century mindsets. Lifelong learning was needed to motivate and incentivise them.
In discussion:

**Moderator:**
*Ambassador Valentin Zellweger*
Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the United Nations in Geneva

15. Scientists could inform policy, but often were too diffident in presenting their case. They needed training in diplomacy, just as diplomats needed training in data analysis.

16. There was simply no alternative to robust multilateralism in dealing with radical extremism.

17. Managing the complexity of international affairs was challenged by the simplification of political discourse, exaggerated by social media. Diplomats could lift the discourse by providing useful messages.

18. Political messages needed to be quick and simple. The job of the diplomat was then to get to work on the practicalities, with well-informed, reasonable, evidence-based responses, talking to the general public and to governments, to translate language back to the political leaders.

19. CRISPR-cas 9, genome editing, offered an example of a development with implications both benevolent and malign. The most active in this debate were scientists, not governments or intergovernmental institutions. Diplomats needed to join that world of scientific discourse; it required literacy in all these fields.

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**Welcome reception**
*Restaurant des Délégués, Palais des Nations*

**Thursday 19 September**

**Welcome remarks by IFDT co-chairs and representatives of host organisations**

**Co-chairs, International Forum on Diplomatic Training**

*Ambassador Barbara Bodine*
Director, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University

*Ambassador Dr Emil Brix*
Director, Diplomatic Academy of Vienna

20. The IFDT was most grateful to the four hosting organisations; a timely example of multilateral collaboration.

21. The Forum was thriving, a growing organisation with new members in different regions, including Australia, Bahrain, Maldives and Norway.

**Heads of host organisations:**

*Prof Philippe Burrin*
Director
Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies

22. The Graduate Institute, amongst the oldest members of the Forum, was proud to be hosting the Meeting.
23. International institutions had played a key role in advancing responses to climate change and environmental challenge. What was unique now was that liberal values were being eroded if not attacked from the core of that system.

*Christian Dussey*
Director
Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP)

24. GCSP was a direct by-product of the thawing of relations between Reagan and Gorbachev in 1985. It had been a sign of hope for a new generation engaged in peace and security.

25. Since then, there had been a great increase in the range, diversity and complexity of issues, plus technological advancement. The audience also was sometimes too busy to learn. It was a dangerous syndrome, like riding a bike with your nose to the ground and not seeing the next turn.

26. It was vital to deliver the learning that people needed to manage their roles in the new international system.

*Dr Jovan Kurbalija*
Executive Director
DiploFoundation

27. Our discussions needed to be provocative. Double talk was counterproductive, and dangerous for the future of the planet. Honest, frank exchange was necessary; there were very few places and times when training could be discussed thoroughly. The Forum was finally getting back to its original purpose.

*Nikhil Seth*
United Nations Assistant Secretary General
Executive Director
UNITAR

28. UNITAR had been established in 1963 to provide training to the diplomatic corps and professionals in twenty-seven new states. They were now providing training in policy and analysis in many fields central to the work of the UN.

29. They were helping diplomatic academies in India, Kenya, Maldives and Saudi Arabia to develop their programs of learning and training. They were moving into digital and frontier technologies. Cross-fertilisation of ideas at this Forum was crucial to the spread of ideas.

**Keynote address:**
*Diplomacy in different shapes and roles*

*Peter Maurer*
President
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
(25 years as a senior diplomat, serving in Geneva and New York; State Secretary of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs; Head of ICRC (head of state status) since 2012)

30. It was not often that a head of the ICRC spoke in public about the nature of diplomacy. More usually there were discreet conversations, quiet dialogue, building relations of trust, exploring the possible shape of agreement within divergences of interest.
31. The object of humanitarian diplomacy was convening all to act in the interests of vulnerable people, building diplomatic relationships to gain support for humanitarian action and adherence to international law and the norms of decency.

32. 190 states were working together with 420 non-state groups to assist the 50-70 states currently engaged in conflict.

33. The fragmentation of the international landscape presented more actors to influence – economic actors, shareholders in conflict zones, clerics, academics.

34. The ICRC had a unique role to play, as guardian of the Geneva Convention. Its activities were grounded in law and political neutrality, but responding to pressing needs. Their work was framed between principle and pragmatism: keeping the use of weapons under control, keeping to the laws of war.

35. The ICRC Report in December 2018 had focused on the legal challenges of today’s conflicts: the urbanisation of warfare, the use of explosives in built-up areas, cyber attacks, conflict and climate change. It highlighted the link between needs in the field, responses to need, and diplomatic activity to defend norms.

36. The conflict in Syria, and the crisis of refugee flows, was emblematic of the failure of intergovernmental action to resolve conflict. The war was broadcast through social media into the international space. The protagonists used energetic propaganda on social media to generate hate and division between communities.

37. Wars were lasting longer, urban conflict involved state and non-state armies employing any and all means including terrorist action, with systemic failures in the delivery of humanitarian services. 136 million people were in need, with two billion more living in fragility, conflict and violence.

38. Continual engagement by state and non-state actors was needed to sustain humanitarian work and adherence to international law. Yet there was no longer consensus among states; humanitarian issues were now polarised, resulting in failure to resolve conflict, or to respond effectively to crises caused by extreme weather.

39. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon had hoped that the World Humanitarian Summit (2016) would be consensual, but it had turned out to be one of the most controversial – more so than those convened to address sustainable development and climate change.

40. Humanitarian diplomacy had been dragged out of the shadows of discreet conversations among professionals to open conflict between governments. There was a growing need to bring different orientations together, but it was more difficult than ever to engineer consensus, given the explosion of stakeholders and diverse actors.

41. The ICRC had a critical contribution to make, drawing on its practical experience in eighty countries, publishing evidence, drafting policy recommendations. They were building on the work of their founding fathers in the 19th century, in the battlefields of Solferino, where tens of thousands had been killed in a matter of days. Their mission had been then, and continued to be, to humanise warfare by helping its victims, through political, legal and operational responses.

42. Those three core functions had been transformed and expanded to respond to current challenges in a fragmented political landscape. They were engaging in direct dialogue, working with local leaders who could provide humanitarian access.

43. In Yemen, with five offices and hundreds of people on the ground, they were facilitating dialogue between front lines, working with coalition partners in villages in the line of fire, and in detention facilities. They were active in diplomacy at all levels, including contributing to discussions in the UN security Council.
44. In May 2016, together with Médecins sans Frontières, their advocacy, informed by experience on the ground, had helped the adoption of Security Council Resolution 2286 on the protection of medical facilities and personnel.

45. Three years later, their efforts had had little impact – health workers and facilities were still being attacked. It was outrageous. There was a pressing need to sustain progress towards full implementation, working with militaries, holding international discussions on the education of health professionals on how to respond when attacked or compromised.

46. Their objective was to ensure that the texts of international humanitarian law were applied on the ground. Success in humanitarian diplomacy had to be measured in better outcomes for people, not outcomes in conference rooms.

47. Diplomats were adept at distracting and delaying decision-making, arguing about including a word or a comma, instead of implementing what was needed on the ground.

48. Wars were being fought with local proxies, supported with finance and materials by states fighting at arm’s length. The ICRC focused on translating resolutions into action, adapting strategy to changing battles, encouraging state actors to respect international humanitarian law, reminding host states of their obligations to refugees, negotiating the technical aspects of food distribution. Both types of negotiation needed to combine discussion with state leaders and work on the ground.

49. In 2016, the ICRC had worked with Médecins sans Frontières, the UN World Food Program and the Centre on Conflict Resolution to develop strategies and tactics in fragile states and conflict zones. It was important to link the different levels, front lines and political institutions.

50. A word of caution in conclusion. Diplomacy was an art, not a science. The practice of humanitarian diplomacy was no different. There were skills to master – understanding multilateral institutions, negotiating, writing resolutions. There was also the vital business of building relationships, feeling the atmosphere, knowing when to push on or hold back. You needed personal relationships in place when the process broke down. A balance was needed between knowledge and skills, and intuition and empathy.

51. Academic and other institutions sought for truth. Politics and diplomacy were about finding solutions – what was feasible (perhaps also true). Our collective task was to narrow the gap between the feasible and the true.

**In discussion:**

**Moderator:**

*Prof Cédric Dupont*

Director Executive Education

Graduate Institute

Q1. Did the ICRC have modules that helped sharpen both intuition and skills?

52. The ICRC conducted extensive peer exchange and review, the systemic collection of experience through 5-6 hour confidential debriefs, which were then anonymised and systematised, enabling the creation a chart of the conflict landscape.

53. This was different to transferring knowledge and teaching skills. In the end, intuition derived from lived experience. The ICRC tried to build a community of practice by combining traditional forms of learning with the legitimacy of frontline experience.
Q2. How to respond to young people?

54. The ICRC tried to share the experience of uniting the two dimensions of humanitarian diplomacy and action on the ground. Typically, frontline negotiations were not conducted by professional diplomats. You needed to experience the specific frontline challenges. You couldn’t escape moving from one side of a border to the other. You had to have negotiated a resolution to know how to negotiate a resolution.

Q3. Perversely, might humanitarian action help to prolong conflict, making war liveable?

55. This discussion was as old as modern humanitarian diplomacy. Experience showed that, in the end, people wanted to end war – just on their own terms. It was good to avoid torture in detention. It was better to be out of detention when the conflict was over. There was so much conflict, simply mitigating the most extreme suffering was still worthwhile.

56. The dynamics of conflict were durable. Humanitarian diplomacy looked to work at the political level to provide a framework to help end conflict, while demonstrating at the same time the importance of mitigating suffering.

57. Political negotiation started with confidence-building measures intrinsically linked to humanitarian intervention. For example, exchanges of prisoners brought parties to conflict together.

58. The exchange of seventy Ukrainian and Russian prisoners had needed structures on the ground, people organising the transfers, medical checks to avoid false charges of ill-treatment in detention.

59. It had offered also an entry point for political action, building a foundation to go further, to do more to end the conflict, in the grey zone between neutrality and pragmatic engagement.

IFDT Bazaar 1 (new format, three at a time)

Lan Heping
Vice-President
Diplomatic Academy of China

60. The Diplomatic Academy had been founded in 1979, forty years ago. It offered five main forms of training:
   i. a six-month pre-employment orientation induction, for some 400 trainees per year
   ii. one- or two-weeks pre-promotion training for directors general and deputy directors general, chiefs and deputy chiefs, during the year of probation or confirmation; tailor-made programs also for new ambassadors
   iii. training required for promotion, according to a system of credits, each level with particular requirements
   iv. practical skills training, for example in negotiation skills and humanitarian diplomacy
   v. online training for some 4,000 trainees, mainly at post

Dr Yayan Mulyana
Director
Centre for Education and Training, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia

61. The Centre had developed a new program, Diplomacy 4.0, promoting technological and environmental literacy.

62. The program focused on knowledge, skills and attitude.
Ambassador Dr Kazuyumi Katayama
Director General
Foreign Service Training Institute of Japan

63. Two important events had shaped Japan’s approach to diplomatic training:
   i. the Paris Peace Conference at the end of World War I, in which Japan had been unable to play a full part owing to lack of language skills
   ii. defeat in World War II, which had resulted from failure to analyse and adapt correctly to changes in diplomacy in the 1930s

64. The Diplomatic Service Training Institute had been established in 1946, to help avoid making the same mistakes again.

**Diplomacy in the digital age:**
how to train diplomats to negotiate cybersecurity, e-commerce, AI, and other aspects of emerging digital geopolitics

Artificial intelligence, cyber-attacks, fake news, and e-commerce are becoming part of diplomatic reality and diplomatic training. Leading practitioners of digital diplomacy will outline the training needs: skills and knowledge that digital diplomats should have. Based on the needs, the discussion will address training approaches and methods for diplomacy in the digital age. In particular, it will focus on the interplay between traditional skills (negotiations, representation) and new ones (interaction with tech companies, understanding of digital technology).

Anne-Rachel Inné
Executive Director Government Affairs and Public Policy
American Registry for Internet Numbers (ARIN)

Torbjörn Fredriksson
Chief, ICT Policy Section, UNCTAD

Christian Simm
Director, Swissnex Boston

Jivan [Lujcho] Gjorgjinski
2019 Chair of the UN CCW GGE on LAWS [Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems]

Moderator:
Dr Jovan Kurbalića
Director, DiploFoundation

Anne-Rachel Inné
Executive Director Government Affairs and Public Policy
American Registry for Internet Numbers (ARIN)

65. The missing link for most people was understanding the technology, how the infrastructure worked, how data was processed, and its connections to governments and governance.

66. Few knew that by going on the Internet we shifted our paradigm of how we experienced the world, whether in respect of service, delivery, recourse or law. Much was going on behind the interface that we neither knew nor understood.

67. We agreed to terms and conditions – without reading them. No-one properly learnt how the systems worked, yet we engaged as a full actor, effectively blind. What was the domain name, what was the IP address, who controlled it? For individual, community and global well-being, people needed to learn about the tools on which they had come to depend.
68. Small island states did not have the resources to manage the traffic. Small delegations in multilateral institutions wore many hats, having to prioritise what they focused on, leaving the rest untended. The system was unstable, insecure and dangerous. In developing countries where systems were insecure, they were targets and magnets for malpractice.

69. The challenges were huge. Solutions were to be found in the UN Secretary General’s report, *The Age of Digital Interdependence* (June 2019).

**Torbjörn Fredriksson**  
Chief, ICT Policy Section  
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)

70. UNCTAD was at the crux of the process, taking a step away from e-commerce as a narrow activity. We were at the start of a new way of how business was done, founded in data analysis and artificial intelligence. These were development issues, not just questions of trade.

71. E-commerce was worth some USD 29 trillion; mostly domestic, only 15% across borders. A fundamental change was under way in how products were designed, made, sold and distributed.

72. The challenge was how to create and capture value (a problem for developing countries in particular). There had been an explosion in the speed and volume of digital data. In 1992, 100Gb had been flowing per second. Now, 46,000Gb per second. Five years from now, 150Tb per second.

73. We were not prepared. Diplomats had a responsibility to inform governments what was happening, presenting the latest evidence, fostering linkage between governments.

74. The United States and China owned 90 percent of digital enterprises, and conducted more than 75 percent of blockchain transactions. The EU had 3.6 percent, South Korea somewhat greater. Africa and Latin America were absent from the picture.

75. We needed to monitor the growing risks and opportunities of new trends, and policy formulation in progress. On digital tax, for example, there had been no agreement at the OECD, nor in the EU, so a new French national law had been created.

76. A key challenge was to help developing governments to navigate this new space. At present, only five percent of content about Africa on Wikipedia had been drafted and provided by Africans.

**Christian Simm**  
Director  
Swissnex Boston

77. What skillset should diplomatic academies provide to their people? The diplomat’s task traditionally had been to understand what others were thinking and feeling, accomplished mostly by talking to other diplomats. It was different when interacting with Silicon Valley denizens.

78. Silicon Valley people had been trained to think for the best; every new invention and innovation would succeed, every start-up would prosper. Conceptual artistry would save the world. It was a libertarian attitude that saw government as an obstacle to development.
79. The business model was to be faster than government. You produced 3000 scooters overnight – the city government then had to say, ‘What do we do with these?’

80. Digital enabled a different form of business – the biggest hotel network didn’t own a single hotel; the biggest taxi company didn’t employ a single driver or own a single car. The challenge was how to get in touch with them. It required an open-door place, a neutral space to have conversations on this, a new way of connecting with the people who were framing our world now.

81. The Swiss government had established the Swissnex network, linking public policy and practice, with two offices in the United States, two in China, and one in Brazil.

82. Paradoxically, they were using low-tech, person-to-person engagement, not using tech to engage with high-tech people. It was the opposite of being in pyjamas all day – you had to get out and interact with people.

83. It was a diverse workforce, steeped in art and culture, using words to describe an increasingly complex reality for which there was as yet no language. Two favourite books in Silicon Valley were Paulo Coelho’s ‘The Alchemist’, and Mikhail Bulgakov’s ‘The Master and Margarita’; also Evgeny Morozov’s ‘The Folly of Technological Solutionism’, and Juval Noah Harari’s ‘Homo Deus’.

84. How did you go about training Jedi diplomats?

85. Things were going to keep on changing, not only in the volume of Gb, but in the ways in which society and social behaviour were adapting to this new reality.

86. There still was miscommunication between the Two Cultures – science and arts, and a pressing need to interpret one to the other. You had to be minimally-literate in the fields in which you operated.

87. The High-level Dialogue had focused mainly on skills. It might be necessary to add meditation and yoga – put this in the curriculum, how to absorb a gigantic volume of information and be able to do something useful with it.

88. When working in the UN, you needed to go deep into the rules, to focus for a long time, concentrating on single significant words, maintaining authority in command of the process.

89. You needed also to have a passion for the world, understanding the global environment. It was essential to get beyond promoting and defending the national interest, to the global interest, which would deliver the national interest.

90. Diplomatic academies could help governments transcend tribalism, training enlightened diplomats, with empathy and intuition.

In discussion:

Moderator:

Dr Jovan Kurbalija
Director
DiploFoundation
91. Gender awareness could be improved by psychological role-play, as a means of developing the capacity to empathise, the first stage to open conversation between people coming from different cultures.

92. Small states were more likely to be ready to listen, to empathise (a characteristic often quickly lost by those in power).

93. Uber was now in consultation with Volvo to build cars – moving to their own platform. Technology was not deterministic. We had to figure out what we wanted tech to do, and how. It had the capacity for ill (Cambridge Analytica) as well as for good.

94. New conversations were needed on new issues, needing new responses. There was no user-point that solved problems. Most countries dealt with digital issues at lower levels in ministries; many simply rang their mission in Geneva for guidance.

95. Very few players had the capacity to digest the tsunami of information. Facebook and Google had understood and monetised it. The best algorithm was one that gave answers and information accurately and quickly. Governments and businesses would come to be completely dependent on the providers of big data.

96. We needed translators of new concepts and language on key issues to end-users (ARIN, Intelligent Tracking Prevention (ITP), tech community meetings): how to use big data to help achieve the SDGs? how to define what was health and well-being? how to determine who was sick, where and why, owing perhaps to lack of food and sanitation? Tech could help.

97. There was value in immersing people from different communities in conferences. We needed to break open silos to listen to and work with each other – ‘beer-to-beer’ learning to improve peer-to-peer transfer of experience. The trade community needed to work with the Internet governance community, sharing knowledge and experience in digital for development.

98. Not all these challenges were new. In the 19th century, multi-stakeholder conferences had created the International Postal Union, the International Telecommunication Union, and had standardised time zones. There were lessons to be learned from diplomatic history.

99. Diplomats needed to reach out to the messianic tech disruptors to warn them of the consequences, to help them understand that not all disruption was good. Part of the problem was that they didn’t have people within the group that better reflected the real world (only 30% female, even less ethnic diversity).

100. It was important to avoid painting the Silicon Valley tribe as the bad guys. (One in four start-up founders was female.) Techies were passionate about what they did. You had to understand the passion, work out how to get in touch with it, and bring your own passion to the conversation.

101. Diplomats needed to sense faint signals coming at us from the future, make an intelligible and accessible story out of it, and sell it to decision-makers. Facilitating problem-solving could help restore some of the trust in government lost in recent decades.

**Inclusive diplomacy:**

*partnerships and networks with business, academia, and civil society*

As diplomacy progresses with the evolution of global issues, developing partnerships become more pivotal in addressing diplomatic challenges. This provides diplomats with the opportunity to create robust partnerships with stakeholders across various sectors in order to implement global solutions. These stakeholders must come together to discuss methodologies of how to find common grounds in order to pursue substantial partnerships in accordance with the Sustainable Development Goal number 17: Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development. In this session, panelists will explore how to develop viable and dynamic partnerships between civil society, private sector, academia, and governments.
102. All fields of human endeavour were becoming more and more technical. Knowledge now was so vast, deep knowledge had to be developed over many years. Yet governance needed cross-cutting assimilation of new initiatives at increasing speed.

103. The 20th century response had been to create a new institution or organisation. Now knowledge crossed boundaries, you needed to break down silos, adopt systemic organisation and action. So there was a tension between specialised knowledge and the need to build bridges between knowledge and action.

104. Three examples of the collaborative mechanisms needed:

i. For the negotiation of the 2018 resolution to create a global co-operation framework on anti-venoms, especially in tropical rural communities in the South, a partnership had been built with the University of Costa Rica, which had specialist knowledge on snakes, venom, and anti-venoms. They had come to Government to learn how to lead the solution process. Their specialists had been integrated in all the delegations, explaining the whole gamut of snakebites and their consequences. In turn, they had learnt about the process of multilateral negotiation, leading to a resolution adopted by consensus. Supply-chain stakeholders had engaged in the project, helping in the funding of the research on anti-venom. Hence, government, academia and private sector working together.

ii. In negotiations on nuclear disarmament, there had been concern to raise the level of knowledge of small nations with small delegations. Academics from Princeton University and the Graduate Institute in Geneva had been integrated in the discussion, easing tensions by introducing new knowledge, building knowledge bridges.

iii. The Geneva Academy on Human Rights and Humanitarian Law had been engaged to envisage new ideas and knowledge to inform the quality of discussion on human rights treaties. Ten independent treaty bodies had been brought together to formulate twenty recommendations to the General Assembly. The by-product of these partnerships had been a new treaty body next year.

105. The skills needed to inform the process of integrated collaboration included specialist knowledge, negotiation skills and management skills. (Regional integration helped, too.)
106. The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) was the face of business diplomacy in Geneva, the capital of global governance hosting eighty-seven international organisations, some five hundred NGOs and over a thousand trans-national corporations. Partnership between state and non-state actors was part of the DNA of chambers of governance.

107. Four examples of practical partnership:
   i. the World Bank had nominated private sector operators to assess large infrastructure projects
   ii. the World Trade Organisation had worked with the ICC to mobilise 12,000 chambers of commerce in the Chambers Coalition for Climate to address SDG climate goals
   iii. during Finance Week in Geneva, the ICC had reached out to the local community of large financial and banking actors to contribute to achieving SDG climate goals
   iv. the ICC had worked to leverage large private sector headquarters in Geneva in support of the UN Global Compact Initiative.

108. There was no magic recipe for successful commercial diplomacy, but three key criteria:
   i. agility: quick to adapt to change, without a siloed approach
   ii. expertise: knowledge in specific fields, to be able to engage authoritatively
   iii. motivation: passion was the most essential fuel in all human endeavour. 1+1=3 no-one could do anything on their own.

109. Until the mid-1990s, partnership had been a relatively isolated event, for example on the eradication of poliomyelitis.

110. By 2018, with the diversification of governance, the World Health Organisation had 80 partner organisations, UNICEF had 89, the World Bank had 133.

111. This trend had had an impact on states. Some were reluctant still to accept the participation of the Gates Foundation in international meetings, undermining the authority of the states. There were worries that non-state partners might limited the incentive for governments to do their job, if others would do it for them.

112. It was not a question of better or worse, it was just a fact now – this was how international governance was done. Partnerships involved negotiation between the two domains.

113. The UN once had been a one-stop shop, a tree trunk; now it was a shopping mall, with many aspects of issues contributing to solutions. The state was as important as ever, with the capacity to navigate options. Diplomats and policy-makers needed to take up the challenge.

114. For Public Private Partnerships to work, public finance was essential, sovereign wealth funds contributing as much as 70-90% of funding. But private finance was needed, too. NGOs provided legitimation.
Mr Jos Verbeek  
Manager and Special Representative to the UN and the WTO in Geneva  
World Bank

115. The World Trade Organisation was the partnership organisation *par excellence*. How had this happened? In the mid-1980s, it had been an arrogant organisation that dictated to governments how to receive pre-digested solutions. Latterly, the Bank had gone through a process similar to that which had produced the SDGs; it had become more flexible and less prescriptive. The financial envelope that once had been calculated according to measurements of developing countries, now was more a negotiation with middle income countries, who would decide how much to accept, for what and why.

116. The Bank was an evidence-based organisation, but its programs were not getting the growth and higher living standards expected. The components of the Washington Consensus had made sense, like family housekeeping, but still were being dictated to client countries, as reflected in program titles: Structural Adjustment; Development Policy Framework; Country Assistance (now country partnership channels).

117. NGOs had begun to recognise that ownership was missing. If a budget was to be co-financed, you could force-feed the funds, but if the other half was missing, nothing happened.

118. The Bank had had to start listening and talking to beneficiaries before investing. Impact and social impact assessments had been adopted. Implementation units had been transformed to building capacity for *self*-implementation, for example for poverty-reduction in China and elsewhere in East Asia; (much less, so far, in Africa).

119. Pressure for change had come from both inside and outside. The Heavily-Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC) had comprised bilateral projects supported by World Bank co-finance initiatives. Writing off debt was still difficult for the Bank, but the partnership ethos was growing.

120. It had been thought that the SDGs could be financed by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), through bilateral aid, but it hadn’t worked out like that. Of the eight Millennium Goals, only four had been achieved. The SDGs were focused on people first, but encompassed everything. But nobody could do everything. The World Bank now tried to structure partnerships at different levels of intensity, and with multiple partners.

**In discussion:**

**Moderator:**
**Rabih El-Haddad**  
Director  
Division for Multilateral Diplomacy, UNITAR

121. The Republic of Korea was a strong advocate of integrated activity between government and civil society. Following the global financial crisis, diplomatic training had focused on participatory diplomacy, engaging with civil society and the private sector. The World Bank might contribute to training in partnership with World Bank projects.

122. SDG17 was global and local; both had to work with each other. The onus was on ministries of foreign affairs, and voluntary national efforts. Policy decisions might be made in governance mechanisms, but progress was to be made only if projects were integrated, interdisciplinary and inclusive.
123. Jurisdictions ranged from international, national, to subnational. It was possible that the rise in national populism had been in part a response to increased capacity at international and subnational level – national administrations were being frozen out, were resentful, and pushing back.

124. How had we solved such things in the past? The human condition didn’t change. The mercantilist spirit was on the rise again; how had diplomats resolved and transcended it before? (see ‘New Ideas from Dead Economists’, Todd Buchholz)

125. Was inclusive diplomacy now old diplomacy? The state was back in town – as in the United States and Hungary. France and Austria were stiff-arming Mercosur. Brexit had been a function of tribal politics.

126. The WTO might have gone overboard on inclusiveness – one country one vote. Reform might entail voting by shares, so there could be a veto on some issues, but consensus on others. There could be abstentions by big players who might not welcome an initiative, but would enable things to go forward. One small country ought not to be able to stop progress toward needed outcomes.

127. Politics was at the core of diplomacy. Precisely because of this, Track Two diplomacy had grown in importance, quietly building capacity which, when there was a moment of breakthrough, could surface and become the focal point of a new agreement. For example, on climate change there had been deadlock for ten or fifteen years. In the meantime, the World Bank had launched climate finance initiatives, which later had morphed into the Green Climate Fund under UNFCCC green goals.

128. There were three key requirements for effective inclusive diplomacy:
   i. mini-lateral diplomacy, small scale initiatives which encouraged new partnerships
   ii. substantive partnerships, not window-dressing; taking the time to understand each partner’s comparative advantage
   iii. ‘total diplomacy’: if you sent the No 3 or 4 in the MFA, nothing would happen. You needed to wheel in the Environment Minister, the Energy Minister, the Foreign Minister, better still the Prime Minister. Then people would sit up and take notice.

129. Indonesia was practising ‘total diplomacy’ – managing themes holistically, with multiple stakeholders. As the MFA had the co-ordinator role, diplomats were being trained in engagement with local government. A ‘total diplomacy’ mindset was needed.

130. In an era of enhanced transparency, it was important to identify any inefficiencies in the Public Private Partnership process. You needed to set out the rules clearly in advance; benefits needed to be clearly aligned. Private actors focused on yield, and return on investment, in addition to philanthropy. They needed to be able to measure outcomes.

131. Switzerland had derived its prosperity from being outward-looking, concluding Free Trade Agreements with China and others. But local partners in Switzerland could also push back, as for example on ratifying an FTA agreement with Mercosur.

132. You needed to pay attention to pressure from sub-state actors. Local activists had become better-informed, better-organised, better-integrated and more capable of disruption. You needed to speak out, otherwise the only voice was the cacophony of the disruptors.

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The future of diplomacy:
strategic thinking for training institutes

In a complex and increasingly uncertain world, diplomatic training institutes should be prepared for different possible futures. Foresight offers a range of tools to envisage those futures, and this session will use some of those tools to stimulate strategic thinking on the future of our respective institutes.
Facilitators:

**Prof Cédric Dupont**
Director of Executive Education, Graduate Institute

**Valérie d’Hoedt-Meyer**
Deputy Director of Executive Education, Graduate Institute

133. A practical session in two groups, in separate rooms each with a facilitator. In each room, participants were gathered at four tables, with post-it notes and boardmarkers. Large sheets of paper had been distributed to each table on which to gather the post-it notes generated in discussion at each stage of the exercise.

134. The exercise was conducted in four stages, supported by a PowerPoint presentation:

i. **Signals of change: evidence of the future in the making**
   In table groups, participants brainstormed ‘signals’, writing one on each post-it note, then transferred them to the plenary display on the wall.
   In debrief, the facilitator drew attention to the meaning of each note, removing duplications and ‘trends, or too general’ (specific election results, not ‘elections’; massacre in Sri Lanka, not ‘ethnicity’; ‘# me, too’, not ‘women empowerment’)

ii. **Signals cluster**
   Participants re-arranged the randomly-positioned post-it notes into clusters of signals of specific change, eg Brexit, or US-China trade war

iii. **Strategic foresight: Diplomacy 2030**
   Presentation of a tool useful for imagining futures: a horizontal double-curve showing possible cross-over from mainstream to holdovers / innovations to mainstream

iv. **Insights for diplomatic training institutes**
   Using the double-curve tool, participants mapped change in their own institutions:
   - organisational elements and/or historical strategies supporting the way things were done today
   - today’s innovations and initiatives
   - things we needed to keep; residual assets
   - things needed to reach the future we wanted

   In the centre of ‘the future’ – a box of indicators of change that led to innovation or to stasis

135. A dynamic interactive session, with active engagement by every individual. Helpfully diverse groupings of countries at each table, bringing different (and the same) perspectives and perceptions to each stage of the exercise.

136. Well-facilitated by Prof Dupont and Ms d’Hoedt-Meyer, pushing on from stage to stage at speed, to demonstrate the whole process, providing guidance to groups on methodology along the way. A valuable addition to the Forum agenda.

137. Clearly, in a longer training program, the foresight methodology merited a half-day, a whole day, even two days to draw the most from participants, and to generate the ideas and changed mindsets that foresight could deliver.

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**Gala dinner**

**Hôtel Beau-Rivage**

Keynote remarks:

**Ambassador Valentin Zellweger**
Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the United Nations in Geneva
138. If you wanted to look into the future, it was best to look at the past. Bus 9 would take you to a small suburb, Colonie, where you could zoom back to 1816: the year without a summer, after the eruption of Mt Tambora in Indonesia. Storms, cold, famine, Swiss government emergency measures.

139. Three Brits had been in Colonie, Lord Byron plus two colleagues. It had rained torrentially every day. Mary Shelley had written ‘Frankenstein’, the first literary book about artificial intelligence.

140. Those two elements were still current: AI and climate change. Now in Geneva, we were discussing the core challenges for our own governments and for mankind. These needed to be included in the diplomatic training curricula of the future.

Presentation:
Ambassador Barbara Bodine
IFDT Co-Chair

141. Ambassador Bodine recalled kindly the contribution to the IFDT of John Hemery, during his twenty years as Rapporteur. The Reports of the annual Meetings constituted a history of the evolution of diplomatic training in an era of dramatic change in international affairs and in the profession of diplomacy.

142. Dr Mark Robinson, Tutor in Science Diplomacy at the Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, had accepted appointment to be Rapporteur, commencing at the 47th Meeting in Abu Dhabi.

Friday 20 September

Innovative learning: methodologies for diplomats, policy-makers, leaders and decision-makers

Integrating the latest learning tools into diplomatic trainings to encourage knowledge sharing represents both a fundamental challenge and an opportunity for diplomatic academies and institutes. Leveraging learning and best practice from academia and governmental sectors can act as a strong benchmark of the roadmap to achieving progress in this field. Throughout this session, participants will engage with the most recent developments in innovative learning methodologies and how to implement them in diplomatic training activities.

Jaime de Aguinaga
Vice Dean for Management and Development
Global and Public Affairs School, IE University

Dr Jessica Dehler Zufferey
Executive Director
Center for Learning Sciences, École polytechnique fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL)

Thomas Neufing
Training co-ordinator responsible for UN learning, UNITAR

Jerome l’Host
Senior Consultant, UNITAR

Moderator:
Rabih El-Haddad
Director, Division for Multilateral Diplomacy, UNITAR

Jaime de Aguinaga
Vice Dean for Management and Development
Global and Public Affairs School, IE University
143. When dealing with complexity, as in negotiating with the Taliban in Afghanistan, you were not paid to think, but to make decisions. Decisions had been the important thing. You had to be totally immersed in the place needing solutions; once you were there, you began to understand the dynamics of the conflict; if not, not.

144. You had needed a huge toolbox to manage complexity and make a difference; somehow to find the right answer, in the right place, at the right moment.

145. The future of work was not going to be about knowledge and routine. We would have to interact with machines, and deal with that greater complexity.

146. It was essential to integrate substantive knowledge with practical experience. The focus needed to be on skills development, integrated in the learning process: learning by doing, workshops on protocols. Or question-based enquiry – focused on finding solutions, different groups applying all their different knowledge and paradigms. Simulations offered rehearsal of problem-solving in real time (fail, fail better, succeed).

147. Learning was not only about experience, also about emotions – fear, happiness, confusion – the source of remembering. We needed to take into account bias, the baggage we brought to problem-solving, and to bring together people from different backgrounds to change mindsets.

148. New technology helped bring knowledge to learning, but the human side came first, bringing academics and practitioners together to exchange and conjoin expertise, always testing and re-testing.

149. [ short video with Martin Boehm on the WOW Room at IEC, with cameras, robots and holograms, introduced by Jolanta Golanowska, Director of Learning ]

Dr Jessica Dehler Zufferey  
Executive Director  
Center for Learning Sciences  
École polytechnique fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL)

150. The Centre for Learning Sciences at EPFL was a new enterprise, linking research with practitioners. Digital learning was the heart of the work, but not by itself. Tools, robots, AI would only amplify, not replace pedagogy.

151. MOOCs were a popular means of maximising learning – but they could be slow and difficult to follow, more difficult still to complete. Yet even with a completion rate as low as 5-10%, at least people were learning in some way – and for free, if they didn’t need a diploma.

152. The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office had collaborated with the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London, to create and make available online a MOOC on the practice of diplomacy.

153. The DiploFoundation offered a regular series of WebDebates on topics of core interest to the development of diplomatic training, attended online by some forty participants worldwide.

154. Experiential learning was knowledge that you built yourself, supported by technology.

155. [ Demonstration of ‘Simpliquidity’ – enabling play with the software, a hook to curiosity. It combined pure constructivism and mixed constructivism, with time for telling (cf ‘Learning Science’) ]
156. It was important to let learners fail. They were then open to learning, listening to alternative solutions. But they needed immediate digital feedback before trying again, considering different propositions, comparing solutions.

157. Teachers / trainers, too, needed help to evolve, with support for interactive innovation. An example was the Go-Lab, at the Centre for Learning Sciences, that focused on the co-creation and co-exploitation of enquiry-learning solutions.

_Thomas Neufing_
Training co-ordinator responsible for UN learning
UNITAR

158. Not all innovative learning was tech-focused. Simulations of negotiation could be conducted with leaders and staff; a masterclass, with the by-product of networking between those responsible for mandate and budget, and those doing the implementing.

159. The Knowledge and Learning Commons was a low-tech platform drawing on the UN Library at Geneva, merging its resources, and using the library staff to reach out to a new clientele. They encouraged informal learning, offering collaborative knowledge exchange. The UN staff in Geneva were all in the same place, so could access the learning physically.

160. It could be a challenge to move from instructor-led to self-led learning. It was a generational question as well. The average age of staff in the Palais des Nations was 49; younger staff had different learning expectations – short term, activity-based, visual.

161. UNITAR was interested in partnering with others in Geneva to develop further the use of the beautiful space in the Palais.

_Jerome l’Host_
Senior Consultant
UNITAR

162. The best training was the one that worked for the learner – a more profound observation that it might sound. The fundamentals did not change – the language might change, but the alphabet remained. Emotion was a key factor – it was the role of the trainer to create that emotional connection.

163. There were four traditional learning styles, not determined by human agency. They were shaped increasingly by the culture – especially by the acceptance or not of interactivity and tech-based learning.

164. Millennials, tomorrow’s leaders and diplomats, were connected and quick to learn, (and quickly bored). You needed to provide them with a clear objective valid for them.

165. [ visual presentation ‘New Learning Approaches’: project-based / problem-solving learning, two-thirds out of the (flipped) classroom; micro-learning (five-minute how-to videos); gamification; (http://ncase.me/trust/ : https://en.todoist.com/karma ) ]

_In discussion:_

_Moderator:*

_Rabih El-Haddad_
Director
Division for Multilateral Diplomacy, UNITAR
166. The School of Oriental and African Studies had established a benchmark in digital training, with its MOOC on global energy and climate diplomacy. The program had reached hundreds of thousands of learners, with tens of thousands of completions. Some had taken the course several times. The largest number of participants had been in the United States, second in India, third, in the United Kingdom.

167. There was still a certain academic snobbery in traditional institutions about MOOCS. But they were going to proliferate, as they met learners’ needs, whether the poor farmer in Bangladesh or the New York banker.

168. It would be helpful to know how well open MOOCS could be integrated with closed in-house programs of online training.

169. There were different kinds of MOOC – large / small, open / closed. The key was clarity of objective, not the category of technology.

170. There was a groundswell of resistance to the 70:20:10 paradigm. It had sounded good, but it had been based on a narrow survey of twenty successful executives wanting to demonstrate their success in developing their own career. The weight of informal learning had not been taken into account. Was only 10% of learning by face-to-face training really appropriate? It was an invalid mantra that we had bought into blindly.

171. It was difficult to know whether it was worthwhile to invest in managing the process of transferring learning from the classroom to the workplace. The objective was clear, but might not match the budget allocation. A new methodology was needed to close the gap between value and valuation.

172. Part of the answer was to bring the transfer into the classroom: to present authentic, complex exercises, and see what people were capable of doing. But it was difficult and costly to design, update and recreate these exercises.

173. The Foreign Service Institute in Washington DC was moving away from talking heads to experiential learning. The transition was going to be conducted over a period of months, creating cohorts and networks of learners over time. It was difficult to evaluate how effective it would be.

174. Impact assessments often concentrated too much on efficiency, and not enough on effectiveness. Follow-up was difficult and costly. The fifth level beyond Kirkpatrick’s four, return on investment, was rarely measured.

175. But even simple measures of professional performance could be illuminating: how long did the leader spend in meetings? how many meetings were there? were decisions taken? (It could be helpful to change the plate on the door from ‘meeting room’ to ‘decision room’.) what was the satisfaction level of subordinates? how much difference was there between what people said and what they did?

176. It was important never to overestimate people’s knowledge, nor to underestimate their intelligence. Good common sense was often not noticed, hence not measured.

177. Retired ambassadors and representatives of civil society could transfer practical life experience, but they were not trained trainers. They could be offered training in instructional methodology in the classroom, but the result was not always as optimal as might have been hoped.

178. There was no magic bullet to train experts to be good trainers. Their value lay in sharing their experience, transmitting the emotion. It was helpful to bring researchers, trainers and experts together when designing new programs, drawing fresh questions from a case study.
179. The secret of success in training was substance and relevance. New approaches were fine, but of no use if not meaningful to the learner. You needed to attract forward-looking people who were fascinated by their subject, to work out with them what was likely to be emerging in the coming five years, and use foresight methodology as the learning vehicle.

180. The trainer’s personal qualities remained the key determinant. Training was the music, based on the vision of the composition that had come before.

**IFDT Bazaar 2**

*Ambassador Dr Abdulaziz bin Mohammed Al-Horr*
Director
Diplomatic Institute, Qatar

181. Not all were great diplomats, athletes or musicians – only 8% of the population. So the Institute did not exist to deliver to gifted people – they were dealing with the 92%.

182. They had tried to discern what, of the seven levels of diplomacy, it was essential to know, and how they could provide it. They had created a comprehensive competency framework, drawing on feedback from surveys of bilateral partners and international organisations.

*Suh Sang-pyo*
Dean of Education and Training
National Diplomatic Academy, Republic of Korea

183. International co-operation between diplomatic training institutes had expanded, in the context of the IFDT and amongst the ASEAN+3 countries.

184. [The Academy had distributed to the Meeting a one-page hard-copy account of a four-week program of on-the-job training at overseas missions.]

*Ambassador J S Mukul*
Dean
Foreign Service Institute, India

185. The Institute had made three innovations in outreach:
   i. thematic programs for diplomats from other states, including the P5 and developing countries. An annual program on disarmament diplomacy would commence in January 2020.
   ii. a triangular program with China to train Afghan diplomats, with conditionality
   iii. demand-driven programs for foreign diplomats in Delhi, including familiarisation programs for new ambassadors from Latin America, Africa and Asia.

**Science diplomacy:**
*a practical approach and a training needs assessment*

Science diplomacy follows growing relevance of science for development of societies worldwide and addressing global issues such as climate change, food production, energy and sustainable development. Diplomats and scientists interact more frequently than in the past. The session will discuss how to train diplomats to both deal with scientific issues and interact with scientific communities.

*Prof Paul Berkman*
Director
Science Diplomacy Center, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University

practitioner, chaired Arctic Treaty negotiations 2009
**Charlotte L. Warakaulle**  
Director of International Relations  
European Organisation for Nuclear Research (CERN)  
*formerly Chief of UN Library, historian by training*

**Moderator:**  
*Dr Katharina Hoene*  
Senior Lecturer and Researcher  
DiploFoundation  
*(standing in for Dr Tereza Horejsova, Director Project Development, DiploFoundation, indisposed)*

**Prof Paul Berkman**  
Director  
Science Diplomacy Center, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University  
*practitioner, chaired Arctic Treaty negotiations 2009*

186. Science diplomacy aimed to bring together C P Snow’s two cultures, helping to develop diplomatic skills for scientists, and helping diplomats to understand science. Science in diplomacy aimed to inform global governance.

187. During the Cold War, despite animosity, the United States and the Soviet Union had co-operated in Antarctica and outer space. They had shared a joint responsibility for the planet.

188. It was important to define terms: policy was product; diplomacy was process. Science was the study of change, identifying patterns and trends. Natural science included physics, biology, chemistry. Social science had a different set of measures and methods.

189. Decisions were made because there was change to be addressed, understood and managed. You did not just bring in scientists as experts – they were there to engage in the process of responding to change, generating the insights to manage change.

190. The conference on science and diplomacy at Wilton Park in 2009 had laid the groundwork for a network of scientific advisory groups for foreign ministries in the United States, France, Japan, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, created in 2016. The International Science Council (2018) and the European Science Advisors Forum (following the Madrid Declaration on Science Diplomacy, Feb 2019) emerged soon after. In an increasingly complicated world, these specialist bodies, facilitating knowledge transfer in different fields, fostered a globally connected civilisation operating into the future.

191. Science was an inclusive tool, crossing all boundaries, international, inter-disciplinary and planetary. It offered a holistic process of informed decision-making on sustainable development and conflict resolution, balancing political and security risks, national and common interests.

192. An example of diplomatic collaboration through science had been between NATO and Russia in 2009, on security in the Arctic. Seventeen nations had come together at the level of ambassador, convened by a simple lecturer at Cambridge. There had been no prior agenda, no political dynamic.

193. Scientists had offered decision-makers options without advocacy, starting with an assumption of common interests, which then by triangulation had revealed the methodology. They had provided the data to answer questions. Data had been the product of research; evidence had integrated the data and the questions. Where the evidence had been incomplete, decision-makers had had to take responsibility to progress from considering options to taking informed decisions across a continuum of urgency – from security timescales to sustainable timescales.
194. Diplomacy built trust across borders. Science built trust through collaboration. Where there was lack of trust in science, trust in science diplomacy was undermined – though that had not been seen in practice so much on the ground.

195. Some scientists claimed that hard science was the only science. It was not so simple; there was no exclusivity of roles.

196. CERN had been created in 1954, by visionary scientists and politicians advocating science for peace in the aftermath of World War II. It had a network of collaborations with over fifty countries.

197. The role of CERN as a multilateral player had begun in 2012. The Director General was a member of the board of Davos, a platform for stressing the value of science and advocating investment in science and research. Life-long learning was a means of achieving informed decision-making.

198. There had been some over-estimation of what science could achieve, so it was important to be clear-eyed about how much could be done.

199. Diplomacy was about managing ambiguity. Deliberate ambiguity was a tool to bridge gaps, to get to common ground. Science was about weeding out, limiting ambiguity. The grey area between the approaches made common understanding difficult.

200. What skills were needed in training for science diplomacy?
   i. understanding how to bridge the gap between the way in which different communities communicated knowledge
   ii. understanding the dense network of international scientific organisations
   iii. understanding governance – top down and bottom up
   iv. understanding how to facilitate open exchange, enabling scientists to come together without limit (consular sections were vital, facilitating visas for experts to participate in scientific exchange)
   v. collecting knowledge, and making it rise to the top (line ministries and foreign ministries often were not well-connected).

In discussion:

Moderator:

Dr Katharina Hoene
Senior Lecturer and Researcher
DiploFoundation

201. Science diplomacy was now embedded in schools of public policy, enabling policy people to have intelligent conversations with the scientific community on process and substance.

202. An increasing number of diplomats had begun their careers as scientists. There was greater receptivity to science, though political leaders could use or ignore it to their own purpose. The Popperian view that every hypothesis was contestable had opened the way for any crackpot view to have equal validity to well-founded, evidence-based views.
203. Science diplomacy had focused on natural disasters, though not many students had thought about how they had been managed. On 25-27 November 2019, the Vienna Diplomatic Academy was convening a three-day conference on challenges and trends in science diplomacy, including sessions on global health and infectious diseases, bringing together diplomats, policy-makers and scientific experts.

204. In the Canadian experience, science informed the diplomacy of trade, and humanitarian response. They had avoided drawing science into traditional diplomatic or political purposes.

205. There had been five meetings with Putin since 2010 on Arctic governance issues. None had had an agenda. Each side had brought to the discussions specific skills and authority of knowledge. It had been a process of building on common interests, identifying patterns and trends which became the basis for decisions.

206. Religion and science were often seen to be in opposition, but questions of planetary survival had brought together archbishops with politicians, in the same way as security concerns had brought the United States and the Soviet Union together.

207. In a world of complex challenges, the natural sciences had brought analytical skill sets into foreign ministries, triangulating between policy, research and leadership. Analytical ability was the common denominator.

Lunch at the World Meteorological Organisation

Trends and practice of training for multilateral diplomacy: leadership, preparation for multilateral postings, maximising the offer of training by international institutions

The session will start with outlining training trends in international organisations; it will be followed by an analysis of leadership awareness-building and training; it will be concluded by outlining a training approach for diplomats posted to multilateral centres such as Geneva.

Ambassador Petru Dumitriu
Inspector
United Nations Joint Inspection Unit

Christina Orisich
Deputy Director and Head of Executive Education
Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP)

Ambassador Salman Bal
Director
Centre d'Accueil de la Genève Internationale (CAGI) (Geneva Welcome Center)

Moderator:
Dr Jovan Kurbalija
Director
DiploFoundation

Ambassador Petru Dumitriu
Inspector
United Nations Joint Inspection Unit

208. The Joint Inspection Unit was an independent external oversight mechanism, with twenty offices for reviewing and assessing performance. They reported only to the General Assembly. Their role was more research than inspection, analysing and translating lessons learnt into recommendations for the efficient use of resources.
209. They had recommended that 2% of staff expenses be used for training. So far, only two of twenty organisations had reached the 2%; from 0.4 to 2%, average 0.6%. Some organisations had no budget at all for training. (The number of staff was measured, not so much the quality of the staff.)

210. There was little systematic record of impact, nor return on investment. Only a tiny minority, two organisations, reached Kirkpatrick Level 4.

211. Learning managers were professional, but needed more resources, infrastructure and time than they had. Longer-term accountability was weaker than annual budget targets and indicators. (The UN had borrowed a business model that did not quite apply to the reality of an international organisation.)

212. There was little motivation to learn – only in the context of individual promotion prospects; not intrinsic motivation for the improvement of the organisation.

213. Outsourcing was indifferent. Not all consultants were useful. Academic institutions were reliable, but their effort often was limited to keeping staff in their comfort zones.

214. Learning services offered to UN agencies was kept separate from services delivered to member states and associated institutions. It could be helpful to use the learning process as an integrator mechanism, helping UN staff to understand other organisational cultures.

Christina Orisich
Deputy Director and Head of Executive Education
Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP)

215. GCSP was an international institution founded in 1994 to promote peace and security, funded mainly by the Swiss. They offered programs to governments, but increasingly also to stakeholders in all sectors, focusing latterly on leadership training.

216. There still was lack of strategic prioritisation on leadership in diverse organisations comprising different generations and cultures. Too much training focused on substance and content, procedures and processes; not enough on team leadership in achieving outcomes. Organisations typically were risk averse, fearing loss of funding or public support. They were focused on protection and preservation, rather than on foresight and anticipation.

217. There were four core leadership competences:
   i. self-awareness – could be nurtured; how to act with intention; what impact was your leadership having
   ii. influencing skills – the crucial role of engendering trust; not only authority and expertise, but empathy, rather than self-interest
   iii. communication skills – learning agility; everyone was too busy to learn, so it was necessary to get past that know-it-all sense
   iv. resilience – giving your brain the space to be creative.

218. Erica Hopper had said, 'In times of rapid change, the learners will inherit the world, the knowers will inhabit the world that no longer exists.'

Ambassador Salman Bal
Director
Centre d'Accueil de la Genève Internationale (CAGI, the Geneva Welcome Center)
Geneva played host to hundreds of diplomatic missions, national, international and commercial organisations. It was the home of the diplomacy of health, labour, climate and human rights:

- 178 UN member state missions, plus two observer missions
- 37 headquarters of international organisations
- up to 100 offices of international organisations
- more than 400 NGOs with access to UN discussions
- visits by some 4500 state secretaries, ministers and heads of government per year
- 10-20 conferences convening at the same time
- 260 diplomatic missions:
  - some countries had three missions covering the WTO, Disarmament, and the Human Rights Council
  - 90% of states had only one mission, covering all topics plus bilateral and all of Europe
  - 70-80% had five or fewer diplomats; some had 10-20; very few had 30-50 or more

Most new arrivals had no idea how to navigate the Geneva landscape. They were up against people who had been doing the same specialist job for twenty of thirty years. If you didn’t understand the substance, you would be elbowed aside, paid no attention.

You needed specialist knowledge plus the generalist view, to connect the dots. Operating effectively in Geneva required a whole-of-government approach, covering all aspects of life, so you could at least ask the right questions, even if not having the answers.

It had been said that Geneva was the kitchen where the food was prepared. New York was where you ate it.

The Geneva Welcome Centre (CAGI) served to support new arrivals. 48,000 officials of international organisations, national missions and NGOs lived in boxes, often without family members.

CAGI offered a housing service, helping with contracts for sale and rent, including subsidising costs for those coming from poor countries. They organised social events to enable new arrivals to meet others. They tried to bring together the people of local Geneva with international Geneva, with information on what there was to do in the evenings and at weekends.

Life could be difficult for spouses and partners who were not delegates. CAGI helped them to find job and learning opportunities, sending information to people before they arrived.

In discussion:

Moderator:

Dr Jovan Kurbalija
Director
DiploFoundation

Norway had a middle-sized mission covering three institutions, and three committees in the WTO. They were working with other small countries to share experience, networks and knowledge. They needed to develop capacity for negotiating in the margins, outside the main meeting.

Security of communications was a challenge, especially for smaller, poorer countries. Sixty percent of UN missions in Geneva had commercial email addresses – gmail, yahoo, bluewin, all of which were entirely insecure.
228. The importance of the welfare of partners and spouses was underestimated, affecting performance on the job. Under stress, families without support could fall apart; friendships fractured. Training institutes needed to have a more holistic approach to preparation for postings.

229. Geneva offered a wealth of opportunities for educated spouses. They could attend courses and build networks with other people in transition. GCSP conducted executive-in-residence programs.

230. Sixteen hundred trans-national corporations had offices in Geneva, many of them offering job opportunities that didn’t need work permits – a carrot for international dual-career partners. Network.com (created originally by Nestlé; now with more than 100 corporate members) offered practical help and advice useful to new arrivals, such as how to write a cv, how to write an influencing letter in a way that would carry weight in the Swiss context.

231. Multiculturalism was not so much a structural problem. System-wide co-operation was obstructed instead by an accumulation of rules and regulations, constructed within projects, in small inward-looking offices.

232. Most of the resources for training in UN agencies were spent on mandatory courses, notably languages, ethics, sexual harassment or prevention of HIV/Aids. There was little consultation with staff about what they wanted to learn, hence little institutional incentive to learn. A key criterion for some was where the course was to be offered; Florida was popular.

233. Improving ethical behaviour was a challenge in hierarchical institutions where harassment and other abuses were rife. Firm, clear policy was the essential starting point, led by example from the top. Training could help, with mandatory courses for all women and men. These might include guidance on how to protect yourself when the object of abuse; and for those in command, guidance on how to help change deeply-ingrained attitudes and behaviours of entitlement.

234. When something bad happened, the normal reaction was silence. You needed to surface the issue, and demonstrate determined response. If, every month, you publicised the numbers sanctioned, you would help people to feel that wrong-doing was being noticed, and acted on.

235. More instruments were needed to address the psycho-sociology of power, dominance and exploitation. One difficulty, though, was lack of resource, in competition for scarce UN money for training or project funding of any kind. A leadership co-ordination framework could help secure priority for ethical issues.

The transformation of work and diplomacy

This session connects our debates on the future of diplomacy to the debates/concern about the ongoing disruptions in the workplace. The focus will be on two key questions: first, how (and to what extent) will the work of the diplomats be disrupted by the ongoing transformations of the workplace? Second, what role can diplomacy play in managing/mitigating the disruptions to the workplace across the globe? It will draw upon the insights from all previous sessions with the aim to end with a collective discussion on the toolkit of skills needed by diplomats in line with the range of challenges they will face in the future.

Dr Ekkehard Ernst
Chief, Macroeconomic Policy and Job Unit
International Labour Organization

Moderator:

Prof Cédric Dupont
Director of Executive Education
Graduate Institute
236. Were routine jobs to disappear, overtaken by automation? Even accountants were overworked, as regulations changed all the time, and clients needed updating advice.

237. On the 100th anniversary of the ILO, a global Commission on the Future of Work had been launched, with a hundred national dialogues amongst governments and social partners. There was huge diversity of concerns – from the impact of digitisation, to the collapse of the informal economy and traditional agriculture, to the disappearance of countries and livelihoods as a result of climate change.

238. Those who feared the loss of jobs to AI and robots over-estimated the capacity of automation to take over human tasks. They couldn’t yet be creative and adaptable. Even something apparently as simple as driving was highly complex – so AI was unlikely to disrupt as much as we imagined.

239. The more important issue was inequality. Since the opening of world markets, many manufacturing jobs had been lost for good, replaced by the growth of the service sector.

240. The incidence of job loss to automation had been much worse in emerging economies such as China and India, where there were more routine, repetitive tasks than in advanced economies. The jobs lost were mainly middle class jobs; highly-skilled jobs could not easily be replaced.

241. The key Commission recommendation had been to anticipate that people could not rely on the skills they had learned aged 20; they had to update their skills continually over a working life of forty years or more.

242. Workers would need help in transitioning from one job to another. Government and the private sector would need to focus on their role in assisting lifelong transitional upskilling.

243. The principal competition was now not between companies, but between digital companies versus the rest. Control of intellectual property had now been lost; it had proved to be too easy to copy. The challenge was to imagine how to manage, much less regulate, the winner-take-all market.

244. This was bread and butter for diplomatic discussion. Some kind of international digital competence was needed. But it was essential to bring information and expertise back to national decision-makers, where national mechanisms no longer worked in the global economy.

245. We needed to encourage local means of using new technologies, adapted to local needs, drawing on and developing local competences. International co-operation could facilitate the spread of new solutions, especially to emerging and LDC economies.

**In discussion:**

**Moderator:**

**Prof Cédric Dupont**

Director of Executive Education

Graduate Institute

246. Life-long jobs within one company or role were a thing of the past. Now, the young were likely to have six or eight job identities in a career. How did this apply to the foreign service? Could people go in and out of a foreign service, bringing in external knowledge and skills? Yes, but how to do that, connecting the dots? How did academies address the challenge of job disruption, accentuated by digital disruption?
247. A revolving door in a foreign service had some attractions. The problem was that the jobs were changing so much, new fields were opening and closing. It was not as simple as going back into a milieu that had not evolved while you had been away. The challenge for every individual lay in morphing skills, not changing them dramatically, but seeing where else they could be used now.

248. A further impediment to seamless job transition was the problem of moving away from home, from settled community and families.

249. Mobility was an issue everywhere – lack of information on the local job market and schools, and on the availability of jobs even in nearby cities and towns. A clearing house was needed, data companies helping to develop tools for job-seekers.

250. A bigger challenge still was changing careers altogether. If you went out, some jurisdictions prevented you from coming back.

251. The foreign service once had been a highly competitive recruiter. Now the private sector was offering much more competitive opportunities. Young people came in on the trade side, gained knowledge and new skills, and then jumped into the better-paid private sector.

252. In certain occupations, you were part of a thought community. You could enter the World Bank, and once in you were moulded in a certain way. Many occupations couldn’t easily be codified; they had non-transferable knowledge and skills.

253. There were nevertheless some essential transferable skills – Internet on-the-job skills without which you couldn’t move, either sideways or up.

254. The Secretary-General’s report on digital co-operation noted that still only half of humanity had access to the Internet. It was necessary to strengthen the Addis Ababa agenda, and narrow the gap.

255. New jobs created in the gig economy were undermining the whole concept of national control. The power balance still was loaded in favour of the developed countries, and especially the private digital monopolies.

256. The ILO was aware of the impact of digital in LDC economies, including on labour standards, which could easily be circumvented. Partnerships across boundaries often didn’t know about the ILO and its standards.

257. Was the labour movement, nationally and internationally, an agent of change, or Luddite?

258. Where unions had been on the board, labour movements had been favourable to change, and open to the evolution of jobs. Labour union leaders were working in international organisations. Protection of freedom of association remained one of the key objectives of the ILO.

259. In LDC and emerging economies, however, labour had had much less access to decision-making. The informal economy, with its smaller companies and home working, made it more difficult for unions to reach out to people, and give them a collective voice on terms and conditions of service.

260. It had been suggested that digital spelt the end of hierarchy. Hierarchies in fact were strengthened by the Internet, even if changed.

261. Hierarchical structures had been designed for stability, hence were more difficult to change. New structures had been designed to change, to morph flexibly, with flattened hierarchies, rapidly changing bosses, or no boss at all (Patagonia, Gore-Tex). The question was whether diplomacy was one of those professions that retained a stability-model, or was becoming more flexible and porous.
262. The ‘unique’ skills of the diplomat were less and less unique. Were they still custodians of the national interest? What was ‘national’ about the interest that was open, global and interdependent?

263. Was the work of diplomats likely to disappear? Would it be reduced simply to consular issues? Or was there to be a continuing role for creativity in the management of complex human relationships in highly uncertain circumstances?

264. In the end, the opportunities of the digital revolution outweighed the downsides and obstacles.

Closing remarks

Ambassador Barbara Bodine
Director
Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University
IFDT Co-Chair

265. Ambassador Bodine thanked the hosts for a terrific conference. Four organisations had brought together an enormous array of talent with richly diverse perspectives from Geneva and beyond.

266. There had been ongoing discussion of continuity and change in diplomacy, especially of the impact of technology on traditional work in all areas. Almost all were beyond the competence of a single state to manage. They were dealt with by formal multilateralism, coalitions of the willing, co-operation and collaboration. Thus a core ongoing responsibility of diplomacy was to provide the linkages. Narcissistic foreign policy was unsustainable and counterproductive, an obstacle to peace, stability and prosperity.

Ambassador Bernardino Leon Gross
Director
Emirates Diplomatic Academy, Abu Dhabi

267. The dates of the 47th Meeting in Abu Dhabi might be a little later in the year than usual, in late October or at the beginning of November, to coincide with the EXPO in Dubai starting on 20 October, 2020.

268. It was to be a celebration of UAE innovation, host of an international agency for renewable energy, a regional centre of SDGs, an exemplar of cultural and humanitarian diplomacy, and of religious tolerance.

Ambassador Dr Emil Brix
Director
Diplomatic Academy of Vienna
IFDT Co-Chair

269. Ambassador Brix thanked the participants for their interest in the issues, and for their challenging questions. The IFDT still believed in multilateralism and internationalism. Academies also had to look after their students, to speak out for the national interest, and to give them a head start in their foreign services as standard-bearers of the diplomacy of the future.
Saturday 21 September

Excursion

270. Members of the Forum had the privilege of a guided tour of the Museum Bodmer in Colonie, an exhibition of five thousand years of civilisation in manuscripts, followed by an opportunity for sight-seeing and wine-tasting.

Valedictory

This is the twentieth and last of my Reports of the annual Meetings of the IFDT. It has been a privilege to take the record of a unique series of discussions, chronicling dramatic changes in international affairs, in the profession of diplomacy, and in diplomatic training as academies and institutes have risen to the challenge of innovation.

It has been a great pleasure working with eight distinguished co-chairs and innumerable kind colleagues in all parts of the world. I am most grateful to have been given the opportunity of making a small contribution to the IFDT as it has grown and strengthened.

I wish the Forum and all its members every success in the ongoing pursuit of excellence.

John Hemery
Rapporteur
1999 – 2019