International Forum on Diplomatic Training
45th Meeting of Deans and Directors of Diplomatic Academies and Institutes of International Relations
Washington DC, 19 – 22 September 2018

Wednesday 19 September

Ambassador Barbara Bodine, Director of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy and Co-chair of the International Forum on Diplomatic Training (IFDT), welcomed members of the Forum to the 45th Meeting, celebrating at the same time the 40th anniversary of the Institute.

Dr Joel Hellman, Dean of the Walsh School of Foreign Service, welcomed the group to Georgetown University, at a reception held in the panelled beauty of Riggs Library, ‘the university’s homage to Harry Potter’. The School of Foreign Service, founded in 1919, was the oldest school of international affairs in the United States, and the first dedicated entirely to educating a new cadre of global leaders in the tools of diplomacy and trade.

In an era of disruption and discontinuity, there was a pressing need for diplomacy, ‘the acquired art of dealing with people in a sensitive and effective way without arousing hostility’.

Dr Hellman acknowledged with gratitude the contribution to the development of the School and the Institute of Dean Emeritus Peter Krogh, Ambassador Robert Gallucci and Dr Hans Binnendijk, all present, as well as former Dean Casimir Yost. He thanked also Bennett and Shannon Stichman for their generous support of this year’s Meeting.

Thursday 20 September

Ambassador Emil Brix, Director of the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna and Co-chair of the IFDT, noted that, especially in times of disruption, while the tools and the actors might change, the objectives did not – to try to understand the international system in convulsion, and to do what we could in an even better way to help our students to learn.

Ambassador Barbara Bodine welcomed the sixty participants from thirty-five countries and two international institutions. She thanked the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the oldest think tank in Washington DC, for providing the venue for the Meeting, and for setting the standard of good scholarship. She was grateful, also, to the staff of the Institute of the Study of Diplomacy – Wei Zhang, Kelly McFarland, Jim Seervers, Vanesa Lide and Bianca Kemp.

The Forum Meeting had been designed in two parts:
day 1 – emerging issues, partnerships and challenges – the ‘what’?
day 2 – training and education opportunities – the ‘so what’?

Keynote speaker

Ambassador Bill Burns
former Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Assistant Secretary of State for the Middle East, Ambassador to Jordan, Chief of Staff to the Secretary of State, now President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

It was true that Washington could be self-absorbed: a place where you could still see someone walking down lovers’ lane holding their own hand.

In this transformative moment – a diffusion of power and politics – there was an increasing need for diplomacy.
First, the moment, which came about once or twice in every century – the disruption of the old international order, and the emergence of the new. At this pivotal juncture, there was increasing uncertainty of the role of the United States, now one of the principal disrupters.

There had been a period of relative stability – the three last decades of the Cold War, and the brief decade of dominance of the United States between 1989 and 2008.

For the last decade, 2008 to 2018, a new multipolar order had emerged, characterised by diffusion of power, the resurgence of Russia and the rise of China.

The Arab Spring seven years ago had generated a set of vacuums, of which al Qaeda, ISIS, Sunni Arabs trying to keep hold on power, predatory regional powers and outside powers, all had been trying to take advantage.

The rising power of China was colliding with role of the United States in Asia. (The role of statesmanship was to find a durable balance of power.)

Europe faced a set of existential challenges: Brexit, and a competition of ideas between Italy, France, Germany and others.

Europeans faced external pressures, as well: uncertainty of the US relationship, insecurity generated by immigration, a resurgent Russia, driven by grievance, insecurity and ambition, which would pose a challenge for years to come.

The international community was guilty of strategic inattention in Africa and Latin America. African influence, for good and ill, was on the rise in core issues of food, water, health and corruption. The population was set to double to 2 billion people. Good, committed people were needed to manage the problems that would follow. Latin American significance, too, would grow.

There was a further set of challenges beyond states – climate, extreme weather, rising sea levels – which required the efforts of the whole international community. The revolution in technology – Artificial Intelligence, synthetic biology – would dwarf the Industrial Revolution. There would be competition between open and closed states to maximise advantage.

These international changes intersected with uncertainty of the role of the United States. Whoever had been elected, the US needed to be adapting to the new landscape, re-shaping the framework of alliances and relationships, before it was shaped by others.

President Obama had been clear about the need to adapt – after seventy years of pursuing enlightened self-interest since the Second World War. President Trump had added to the disruption, believing that alliances left the country bound, like Gulliver. His policy of muscular nationalism was hollowing out the institutions that the US needed to serve its own interests: the Atlantic Alliance, the State Department (with six regional departments, only two Under Secretaries of State, and a quarter of US posts without ambassadors).

The American idea was being hollowed out, as well. The power of American example – an open, mobile society – had contributed more than preaching, but was being replaced now with self-injurious policies on immigration and other issues.

There was now a much more crowded and contested international landscape, requiring rapid, effective and direct communication. Yet the Gates Foundation had outpaced US foreign assistance programs. ‘Who needed diplomats?’ In a world of diffuse power, diplomacy was just as vital as truck drivers.

US diplomacy now faced three principal challenges:

1. to reinforce the core qualities of diplomacy:

We needed to understand once again how other societies worked. We had lost our way in the thirty years since the end of the Cold War. We had been complacent in the 1990s, when budget support for foreign assistance had been cut by 50%, mirrored by a cut in recruitment to the State Department.
Then, after 9/11, there had been an inversion of power and diplomacy, with an under-resourced role for the State Department, secondary to the military. In the 2000s, the staff of the National Security Council had increased tenfold, from 30 to 300. An over-centralized and militarised foreign policy had emerged, especially after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, a disastrously mistaken policy.

Diplomacy ought to be the tool of first resource. The United States needed to refocus on the core qualities of diplomacy: history, culture, understanding, persuasion, cajoling others in the right direction.

2. To get out of our own way:

Policy and diplomacy were being driven by considerations of security. A mundane issue required a page and a half of clearances. Posts were over-securitised. We needed instead to manage physical risk, to manage political risk. There was a newly urgent obligation to be honest, to speak truth to power.

The core qualities of diplomacy needed to be restored, and new skills acquired – not least technological – to deal with new international realities. We had been spending too much time ‘faking it’.

3. To reconnect with the American people:

There was a massive disconnect between the tribe inside the Beltway and the American people; the consequence of two long and costly wars, financial hubris and undisciplined American leadership. We needed to help bridge the chasm, demonstrating the need for active American leadership – demonstrating that effective diplomacy brought benefits to the country.

Despite this litany of troubles, it was still hard not to be an optimist. There had been huge advances in health and life expectancy. Hundreds of millions had been lifted out of poverty. It was possible still to count on the resilience of the American people. We would come through this complicated period of transformation, with a clear and honest appreciation of how to navigate a complex world.

In discussion:

- **Hollowing out of international institutions – how resilient were these institutions?**

Quite resilient, but with some self-harming policy, plus the uncertainty of the US role. But the world wasn’t going to stand by while the US got its act together. Rivals would move into the vacant space. The was no chance to turn the clock back to the pre-Trump era.

- **The world order had become used to a constructivist approach, with dominant norms, but realist policies were being adopted by authoritarian states and liberal democracies.**

There was a false distinction between realism and idealism. We needed to return to a policy of enlightened self-interest. The logic of America First was understandable, but self-interest was best applied when connected to the self-interest of others. It was difficult to get an audience for better norms, if setting a poor example ourselves. Others would do the same.

- **How to read the inconsistency between the White House, the State Department, the Pentagon and other institutions? No longer the policies of institutions, but of individuals?**

Such inconsistencies were not new – there had been pitched battles between Donald Rumsfeld, Colin Powell and their staffs. There was now, though, a significant disconnect between issues and style, the worst in three and a half decades: ‘Vacancies? Don’t worry, I’m the only person that matters.’ – the diplomacy of narcissism. It was not wise to be dismissive of experience and professional knowledge in shaping and executing policy. Diplomacy was ineffective if constantly surprised.
The rise of identity politics was hollowing out the values of diversity and inclusion, wrecking the international system. The populism impacting Europe, and now North America, was undermining the integratedness of the global community.

It took a special kind of diplomacy for the United States to alienate our closest friend, Canada.

This was a real and growing problem: citizens who didn’t feel that globalisation had worked for them, that change wouldn’t lift all boats. The Financial Crash had caused people to turn inward, to protect themselves, carrying a sense of grievance that the economic system reinforced inequalities over time. It was a system wrongly taken for granted by the winners.

There was a need to convince people that you were really trying to do something to fix it. You needed to work harder with Congress, helping them to understand ‘abroad’; to be more proactive with governors, mayors and civil society. Diplomacy needed to have deeper roots than Presidential tweets. This was not a project of a year or two – it would take a long time of sustained effort.

Apart from the withdrawal of US leadership, smaller states were rising, eg South Korea. Were we returning to a pre-atomic realist order, from social democratic to neo-liberal?

It had never been a truly unipolar order – more an extension of the bipolar system.

Inequality had cut to the core in many contexts – the sense that the global system was rigged against the poor.

Some regional powers had been positive, such as South Korea. Others had been destructive: Russia’s intervention in Syria in a telescoped, focused way, had had a huge impact. The approach of the United States, grudging and incremental, without concerted focus, had had less impact.

Relaxation of discipline in NATO was opening space for new alliances to be formed.

There were more profound forces shaping the world: demographic transitions, ageing, youth bulge, migration (inter-African migration ten times more than Africa to Europe); the pillars of peace and security, multilateralism and sustainable development were under threat.

Demographic challenges demanded a collective response: there were 68 million internally displaced people, and 25 million refugees. The US was no longer absorbing its earlier share. A key source of American influence had been the relative openness, mobility and youth of US society.

The technological revolution, AI and automated manufacturing were going to accelerate the movement of people, in search of jobs.

Multilateralism had to be part of the solution, not only the problem. Reform of the UN system certainly was needed, but we needed to make the institutions more nimble rather than to undermine them. It was self-defeating to deny political reality, eg US blocking China’s role in the IMF, and resisting the creation of the AIIB. We needed to engage, reshape, in a more constructive way.

How to help European powers to deal with the United States, its thin-skinned President, and wallowing US diplomacy?

Think in practical transactional terms, focus on trade and investment. Don’t use a public trumpet, but be honest.

Widen the lens of contacts in Washington, double down on contacts in other agencies, in congress, with governors and mayors.
Try to remember that this was a moment of uncertainty. Think through how governments could build healthier, collaborative relationships. Pay attention to the maintenance of multilateral institutions. Offset strategic inattention from Washington. Work effectively with governments in Africa to accomplish important things.

Preserve and strengthen habits of co-operation, while the US sorts itself out.

Panel Discussion 1

Shifting Political Topography: Globalisation, Retribalisation and Nativism

Salman Ahmed
Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Dr Emil Brix
Director, Diplomatische Akademie Wien, Vienna School of International Studies

Kate Jones
Director, Diplomatic Studies Program, Oxford University

Chair:
Chester A. Crocker
James R Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies
The Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University

Two framing questions:

1. What was the ‘liberal democratic order’ – was it a Westphalian order, to serve the interests of states? a liberal order, from states in the West? whose order, how accepted or imposed? was it inevitable? had states needed institutions to exert sovereign interests in a global community?

2. What had happened? Why had this order become as controversial and contested within and between states, after having done so much for prosperity, development and conflict resolution?

Emil Brix

It was not good enough just to be an optimist. You couldn’t bring back the goods of the old diplomatic order. (Sergey Lavrov on the return of realism: ‘I am not paid to be an optimist.’)

The problems of the liberal democratic order had been illustrated when the reputation of the editor of the New York Review of Books could be destroyed on an unsubstantiated accusation. It was a problem of over-political correctness; a closing of the open liberal mind.

We needed to go back to Karl Popper – ‘The Open Society and its Enemies’; to understand more profoundly what the liberal order entailed, (cf Friedrich Hayek).

Salman Ahmed

There had been no single liberal order – different states had had different perceptions, different interests and polities. So the concept of ‘order’ needed elasticity, within limits. Those limits were now being tested, but there had been strain for quite some time.

The Charter of the United Nations had been variously interpreted according to sovereign interests. Charter reform was now more difficult, if not impossible.

Superpower perceptions had become the dominant reference point. This had been illustrated during the Presidency of George H W Bush, when liberal interventionism had been predicated on five assumptions:
1. the United States could get Russia and China on board, while keeping the Western allies together; a positive sum outcome in response to common challenges
2. one could push China and others to embrace economic liberalisation
3. the international order was based on regional orders
4. non-state actors grew, but the state remained pre-eminent
5. the US could keep people on board, without the rallying cry to oppose the Soviet Union.

One by one, all those assumptions had proved groundless.

A post-Obama president might have said, ‘How do we manage these challenges?’ President Trump had said, ‘I never liked those assumptions, anyway.’

Kate Jones

What had happened?
[ Why had this order become as controversial and contested within and between states? ]

Three points –
1. The current crisis was thus framed because the US was in the state that it was. There had been questions before about accountability, and calls for reform of institutions, but not fundamental challenges to the order itself.

2. Globalisation hadn’t enhanced prosperity, but inequality, and had generated the sense of dispossession of ‘the left behind’.

3. However, assumptions of ‘re-tribalisation and nativism’ needed unpicking very carefully. It had been said that Brexit was evidence of the UK ‘turning in on itself’. It was true that there were fears of loss of sovereignty, and resentment at paying large sums into the EU. But the UK was not closed; it was open to trade and investment, and co-operation in security and economic affairs, adhering to the principles of the liberal international order. There had been no challenge to multilateral engagement, and continued support for the international order.

In discussion amongst the panelists:

- Commentary on the ‘liberal international order’ at a truck stop in Ohio: ‘I don’t like any of those three words.’
  
  The American people had memories of the Depression, recovery under the New Deal, victory in World War II, confronting the Soviet threat, and broad-based economic prosperity in first 25 years after World War II.
  
  Those foundations of confident optimism had been undermined from the 1970s onwards. The middle class was shrinking, income per capita had been dropping – it was not possible now to have a middle class life with non-college-educated artisan jobs. There had been a dramatic rise of income inequality, back to the Gilded Age, with wealth concentrated in the top 1%.

- Whatever happened, the US would continue to be the leader of the liberal democratic order. Would American exceptionalism survive? No. Empires waxed and waned, as for example those of Great Britain and Austria.

- Fairness, justice and equality needed to be addressed. Multiple visions intersected: the EU was a means of living with disorder; it was slow and steady. The US Constitution was ‘an invitation to permanent struggle’ between the institutions of governance.

- What could be done? Start with the role of diplomacy, serving the government of the day, while upholding the obligation to speak truth to power. But how to juggle reflecting official policy, and pushing values? We needed to focus on new means of exerting the diplomatic role, optimising the skills of the young. More attention needed to be paid to listening and understanding others, looking only then to persuade. The liberal order was not explaining itself well enough; we needed to advocate actively for the liberal order.
• How did you sell this to the trucker in Ohio? Why was it so difficult to sell, why so boring? It was a message from the elite who had benefited from the liberal order. You had to have a broader domestic and international strategy to rescue the left behind. You needed to lead by example – but you first had to prove that the system worked.

• Much hinged on China, poised to overtake the US as the world’s largest economy. You could sell ‘peace through strength’ vis-à-vis the US and China. But what was strength? You needed to rebuild strength at home, and to shore up relations with old allies.

• You had to take the argument to the populist right; to say why we believed in the liberal democratic order. It was a fair order. It was important not to repeat the Concert of Europe, which had served the interests of only five great powers. We needed to widen the scope of reference – it was too Western-focused; for many, a disguised colonial order.

• Two unfortunate traits in society could have a negative impact – (i) when things went wrong, it was natural for people to blame the outsider; discrimination and alienation followed, threatening the order; (ii) for politicians, it was easier to blame the outside forces, not the shortcomings of the domestic scene; there had been a tradition of scapegoating, eg of British politicians bashing the EU.

In wider discussion:

• Ninety-two most-distressed countries did not feel beneficiaries of the liberal international order. Thirty-nine small island developing states faced existential challenge as a result of Western industrialised countries’ walking away from climate change. What did African countries do? – turned to China for investment and support.

• Complacency about ‘world order’ had led to blindness to the opportunity of resolving the real problem in Serbia and Kosovo through territorial swaps. It had been opposed by the international community on the basis of non-violation of the principle of inviolability of borders.

• If trying to understand the emotion of separate identity, read the Spanish Islamic philosopher Averroes’ ‘Incoherence of the Incoherence’. Politics, though, was not about emotions, but about rules, about being a responsible global citizen – could one, for example, reject the European Union and be a global leader? (In the case of the United Kingdom, it was too early yet to know whether it could be done effectively.)

• Regional understandings (‘natural groupings’ based on history, geography, ethnicity) were increasingly important when global institutions were weakening. (cf Jean-Claude Juncker – ‘the time for EU sovereignty has come’).

• Regional organisations were stepping forward in conflict management and conflict resolution, in Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia – they were the new gatekeepers, shapers of the regional order. But who were the hegemons that would lead those regional orders?

• What was going to be the impact of the technological revolution on societies? Without addressing this transformation, we would not be thinking of relevant change.

• An intellectual discussion among elite civil servants and academics was not the same conversation as if politicians were in the room.

• How did we train and educate officials and diplomats to get to where this discussion had reached? Get them to read Nye, Fukuyama, Kennan? We needed to go back to the humanities, to history and geography; encourage them to read literature, novels – to analyse them, to broaden their frame of reference.

• We needed to concentrate on developing emotional intelligence, to put people into positions where they could learn from each other, seeing things through other people’s eyes.
Periodically, you had to give people time and space to reflect on when things had gone wrong, when mistakes had been made, when assumptions had proved unfounded.

Diplomatic services were fortunate to attract very high-calibre minds. It was essential to encourage them to think broadly and critically, to challenge assumptions, to get the best out of their diversity, while presenting a polished, unified diplomacy to the outside world.

Panel Discussion II

Weaponization of Trade and Tech

Ambassador Dr Sergiy Korsunsky
Director, Hennadii Udovenko Diplomatic Academy of Ukraine

Molly McKew
Consultant

Catherine Novelli
Centennial Fellow, Georgetown University
former Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy and the Environment, and former Assistant US Trade Representative

Chair:
Roxanne Dubé
Director General and Dean, Global Affairs Canada – Canadian Foreign Service Institute

Catherine Novelli

There was a long history of using trade to compel changed behaviour (at least since 423 BC, Athens vs Corinth, precursor to the Peloponnesian Wars, and the destruction of Athens’ power).

Unilateral sanctions rarely worked well. Multilateral sanctions could have a bigger impact. But the use of tariffs, subsidies and sanctions had in the long run proved counterproductive.

The application of national security justification to tariff regimes opened Pandora’s Box. It added to challenges to the rules-based international system, not least from China, who were operating already according to alternative rules.

But the problem for many diplomatic services was that few diplomats understood economics. They needed also to understand better how one’s own citizens thought and felt about globalisation, and were impacted by it.

Molly McKew

Technological advancement was driven largely by commercial considerations. But it also had security implications. Information-sharing, data analysis and data mining were influencing societies, civil society and elections.

Aggregating social media was an essential element of the work of a diplomatic service. But it was no longer just state actors that were using surveillance, targeting individuals and groups. Companies were being employed to manipulate election outcomes. Hacking caused disruption; erroneous disinformation undermined legitimate governance. Intelligence operators were manipulating conversations in chat rooms, targeting recruits, getting inside systems.

There had emerged a new inequality of technological capability; to manage what was known and knowable, New skillsets were needed to deal with these security challenges. Collaborative efforts were growing to see off those seeking to undermine democratic legitimacy.
Ukraine had been under threat from Russia since the Munich Conference in 2007. The muted reaction to Russian hybrid warfare in Moldova, and later in Georgia, had encouraged further Russian adventurism in Ukraine. Russia had serially violated 120 agreements signed and ratified, including the Budapest Memorandum, 1994, abrogated with impunity.

Working with G7 partners, Ukraine had launched a multimedia counterattack, to bring the truth into public consciousness.

The Ukraine Diplomatic Academy had been transformed from a small university to a large practical training enterprise – teaching how to weaponise technology, to counter cyber-attacks, to defend against hacking.

A country’s physical border now was paralleled by its cyber-border – used for disseminating disinformation, undermining institutions from within, attacking vital infrastructure vulnerable to pressure.

Undermining the basis of truth destabilised society more fundamentally than perhaps any other means.

In discussion:

- **Technology advanced so rapidly. How could you keep training up to date?**

  You could incorporate technology in language re-training, providing helpful re-briefing on new information warfare. It was no longer possible to leave empty space; you had to fill the narrative all the time. Ukraine, Estonia and Lithuania were using information in smart and swift ways.

- **Diplomats had been too slow to adopt and use new technologies. How would diplomatic relations be affected by new technologies, in a post-hydrocarbon age?**

  Having your own natural resources of renewable energy changed the dynamic of power and dependence.

  It was increasingly important to engage at the sub-national level.

- **Was there a basis of international law to regulate and counter cyber-security attacks, state on state?**

  Hacking of critical infrastructure was now the greatest challenge to state security and the integrity of civil society. An international framework, a rule book was needed. It would be the subject of the next big international convention – similar to those on climate change and chemical weapons.

- **How to raise the level of economic literacy?**

  Ensure that every diplomat took at least one course in basic economics.

- **How to reach out more effectively to one’s own citizens?**

  It needed to be made a formal part of the job description, and essential training. Service officers should go into schools, talk to the kids, give them a sense of the wider world.

  Diplomacy began at home, training other government departments in international affairs. Diplomatic training courses could be offered to the general public. Roundtables could be mounted in high schools, universities and community centers, to explain foreign policy issues and process.
Panel Discussion III  
Science and Diplomacy:  
Charting New Partnerships for the New Global Commons

Mark Giordano  
Director of the Program, Science, Technology and International Affairs  
Cinco Hermanos Chair, Environment and International Affairs  
Associate Professor of Environment and Energy  
The Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University

Dr Rebecca Katz  
Associate Professor and Director  
Center for Global Health Science and Security, Georgetown University

Jeremy Mathis  
Director, Arctic Research Program  
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Climate Program Office

Chair:  
Professor Paul Arthur Berkman  
Director of Science Diplomacy Center  
The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University

The Transarctic Treaties had been concluded at the end of World War II. After sixty centuries of human activity, there was now an opportunity in one century to address things on a planetary level, with an international, inter-disciplinary approach.

New questions were being asked, building common interest (though with asymmetric responses across the world). There was evidence thus far for analysis, but not for policy and action. Actions came from options, informing decision-making. Informing decision-making was the apex of the diplomatic task.

Pressure on the environment was growing. There had been a 1000% increase in global population since 1800. Now there were 8 billion people – 12 billion by the end of this century.

Mark Giordano

Training for diplomats at Georgetown once had been an SFS zone (safe from science). Twenty years ago, however, the Program in Science, Technology and International Affairs had been inaugurated. Since then there had been a promising transition in student applications from non-interest in science with international affairs, now to keen interest, many with higher maths than verbal scores. The problem still was, though, that barely half went on to careers in the public service; most went into consultancy or to Wall Street.

Dr Rebecca Katz

Georgetown offered training in how diplomacy could help health security, and vice versa. A case in point had been the outbreak of the ebola virus in the DRC. It had required diplomatic collaboration. Negotiating agreements had demanded technical knowledge as well as negotiation skills. Aid had been co-ordinated through embassies.

Yet health security still was not regarded as a core part of the diplomat’s job. Science typically was not part of programs in international affairs.

Jeremy Mathis

The Arctic Council had been created to foster knowledge, and to integrate indigenous peoples in the process. Now security, commercial and transport interests increasingly trumped science.
There was, nevertheless, strong recognition of the importance of integrating diplomatic effort with scientific research. For example, Russia controlled fifty percent of the Arctic, requiring co-operation and collaboration with the Russian government and scientific community. Science controlled the diplomacy; diplomacy then controlled the application of science in practice.

Arctic research and co-operation was a model of the intersection of science and diplomacy. A new Treaty [the Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean] had come into force in 2018.

In discussion:

- A number of academies were promoting science diplomacy. The European Commission was providing grant-funding to academies, eg for the study of migration, or the preservation of cultural artefacts. It was essential to encourage scientific literacy.

- The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia fostered an innovation exchange on development and global issues, incorporating Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) scientists in diplomatic training. They were promoting the skills needed to provide scientific awareness.

- Diplomats should take a course in any science, and wrap it into the policy discussion – eg, nuclear, climate, epidemiology. You then would know whom to call, and when to call. Patience and tolerance were needed to engage across cultural boundaries – diplomats could help the scientist to understand what the policy officer needed in terms of information.

- It was important to understand the planetary scale, where time was measured over decades and centuries. Science was an early warning system – UNCLOS, Pt III, had been a source of innovation and commercial enterprise. Science helped to understand the connections. Awareness of the ozone hole had led to the Montreal Protocol [on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 1987].

- The World Health Organisation (WHO) was a key actor, yet not necessarily engaged in emergency response. Why not? Global health governance communities were actively addressing this problem. The WHO had not responded effectively to the first ebola crisis. They were now attempting needed reform, in the Health Emergencies Program. A number of different global events were being held – some addressed purely health issues, some health and humanitarian issues together, some health, humanitarian and every other issue combined.

- International sanitary conferences had been held since 1851. Many agreements were in place, but had not been implemented, and still were not discussed among nations.

- A major advance had been made in 2014: the Global Health Security Agenda. Originally the US with just twenty-seven countries, now sixty countries were exploring the diplomacy of pandemics in bilateral and multilateral partnerships. The world, though, still was not adequately prepared to manage pandemics; not even close.

- There was even less agreement on water management. There was no international water law, only vague principles. But countries did refer to each other and their neighbours; there was co-operation among riparian states.

- Scientists were coming together under the auspices of the NATO Council (seventeen countries promoting co-operation and attempting to prevent conflict), in a NATO advanced research workshop. They were addressing a continuum of urgencies, in different timescales – some at Twitterspeed, others that will require decades to resolve.

- Global inter-connected humanity couldn’t avoid addressing trans-national challenges. Track 1 diplomacy necessarily was integrated in Tracks 2 and 3. Scientists had the privilege of objectivity.
• An Arctic Science Research Ministerial had been held in the last year of the Obama administration. There had been great interest from many countries, beyond the Arctic littoral countries, including China, India, Italy, New Zealand, Singapore and Spain. Science academicians had worked together to convince the government of Russia to take part, as well.

• The US had had an Arctic envoy in the last administration, Denmark was working with Greenland, the EU had done good collaborative work – now there was a need to build on those connections.

• The Chemical and Biological Weapons Convention offered an ongoing example of the intersection of the geo-political and the scientific, transcending political obstructions.

• A similar example could be seen in the management of the rivers and irrigation canals that crossed the borders of post-Soviet landmass. The engineers knew each other, had worked together. These different networks added to the Track 1 process.

• Was it perhaps easier to train a scientist to be a diplomat, than training a diplomat to be a scientist?

• Asking scientists to be advocates was problematic, as it undermined their objectivity. You could try training them to be more diplomatic in presenting knowledge. But the strength of science diplomacy was specifically not advocacy, removing the political dynamic.

• MIT aimed to enhance science diplomacy through a research workshop to be held in October 2018 – studying changes in decision-making in science and governance on the built infrastructure. They were in a sense training people to be diplomats, managing change across boundaries, with trans-disciplinary action.

• Science was not a hermetically-sealed separate activity; it was the exercise of power through scientific relationships, the politics of science.

• The scientific community used exploration to change the world. Their values were not necessarily the same in science as in political communities trying to dominate the world. How to manage the conflict of interest?

• Spheres of international space had been created – the Convention on the High Seas, 1958; Antarctic, 1959; moon, outer space and celestial bodies, 1967; deep sea, 1971. 70% of global space was global commons, not under sovereign jurisdiction.

• Climate science was driven mainly, though, by the North, governed by the interests of the North. Tropical countries might have different priorities. There was a need to move from studies to policy influence. Conflict resolution was the core of diplomacy; science started from common interest. The handshake could be productive.

Gala Dinner
A Celebration of Diplomacy

The glittering centrepiece of the Meeting was a gala dinner attended by Deputy Secretary of State John J. Sullivan. It was held in the magnificent Benjamin Franklin Room, atop the US Department of State, overlooking the Potomac River.

Members of the Forum were joined at the dinner by senior members of the US foreign service and of the diplomatic corps in Washington, as well as by junior diplomats new to the foreign service, representing in themselves the future of diplomacy, the object of the IFDT.
Jennifer Bradley offered three observations on the rise of cities, and of local leaders:

1. From supplicants to standard bearers
Cities had been a mess, crime-ridden, weak, needing funds. Suburban sprawl had been celebrated. Cities had been expected by some to disappear – serious people were moving to the mountains and the coast, and would engage by telecommunications.


City governments, with responsibility for universities, hospitals and businesses, were seen increasingly to be the targets of investment, not the recipients of handouts. There was concentrated intellectual energy in densely populated places. They were vital nodes of global commerce.

2. The need for speed
It was easier to convene in cities, with linkages and networks. Their governments could decide at speed, delivering strategic action with flexibility and adaptability.

Cities made abstract ideas tangible (eg, Earth Hour, begun in Sydney in 2007, was now observed by tens of millions of people in 180 countries around the world). They offered an everyday nudge to public thinking – keeping political commitments alive. They transcended the periodic pivots of policy at national level, being more steady and consistent over time.

3. Practitioners of everyday diplomacy
Michael Ignatiev had noted that cities brought the international and the local together in a common space. Leaders were balancing competing interests every day, negotiating property regulations, resolving ethnic/racial disputes, dealing with real life. (There was no Democratic or Republican way to fill a pothole.) They were realists and idealists at the same time, high-minded and practical, illustrated in a values-based approach to the introduction of new technology.

It was increasingly important to recognise the contributions of sub-national actors to international diplomacy.
As long ago as 1908, President Teddy Roosevelt had convened a non-partisan advisory group of sub-national leaders. The OECD now was reaching out to sub-national level actors to play an important part in economic development, building on their already robust diplomatic relationships.

During difficult times at the national level, relationships were being sustained at the local level. Representatives of German industry were engaging with the governments of Oklahoma and West Virginia on questions of tariffs and trade. Nevada had launched a joint mining venture with Poland in Africa, contributing to economic development. Arizona was building positive cross-border links with the Mexican state of Sonora.

Sub-national leaders were interacting with leaders all over the world, educating citizens on global issues.

Dr Stewart Patrick

The sovereign territorial nation state might be the organising block of the modern international system, with legal recognition under the UN Charter, but many national constitutions delegated authority to sub-national actors, enabling them to take independent action in their own right, without reference to the central government.

There was a growing ‘new medievalism’, reminiscent of the great city states of Italy under the Medici, and of the Hanseatic and Lombard urban leagues (cf, Hendrik Spruyt, ‘The Sovereign State and its Competitors – an analysis of systems change’, 1994).

Why? ‘glocality’ – growing global awareness of the impact of globalisation on people – eg, mass migration. National governments were flailing, failing to respond; cities were filling the vacuum, managing the consequences. Mayors had been elected to fulfil practical needs; they were results-oriented, less ideological (cf, Justice Louis Brandeis: states were ‘laboratories of democracy’; cities, laboratories of innovation).

In response to the US election in 2016, foreign lenders and city governments had been reaching out to their American homologues with requests and proposals. They were moving beyond an insular, populist, nationalist, protectionist federal government, which was not representative of the whole of the United States.

Sub-national trade diplomacy was growing, both formally and tacitly. The governments of Mexico and Canada were increasing contacts with agricultural and manufacturing states across the border. Kenya had been represented at a conference in Santa Fe. As the federal government put up barriers, state legislators and governors were stepping into the gap, with more than two hundred international agreements (cf. Washington Quarterly).

Were there downsides? Might the coherence of US foreign policy be undermined, with many voices rather than one? Should the national government of a unitary state speak with one voice? Or a glorious cacophony of complex, heterogeneous parts of the governing system, getting on with the job of managing the daily life of citizens.

Ambassador J S Mukul

India had little more than a thousand diplomats, Singapore only eight hundred, as compared to the foreign services of the US or China, with 15,000-20,000. This presented a unique challenge for a small foreign service, needing continually to innovate, to keep up with the latest changes. They had to make up in quality what they lacked in quantity of resource.

The Indian foreign ministry was managing five innovations, at the direction of the central government:
A states division had been created, with branch offices in state government capitals (so far in only five or six) – focusing on the promotion of trade, investment and tourism for the 29 states and seven union states. (The largest, if a nation state, would be the sixth largest in the world.)

Resident commissioners of states were being posted in the national capital, facilitating two-way linkage.

Every diplomat was being assigned a state for life – you were an ambassador of that state as well as of India when you went abroad.

They had embraced the para-diplomacy of sub-national actors – twinning with sister cities (Delhi with Chicago, London, Moscow), and working with governors and mayors in co-operative federalism across national boundaries.

They had launched ‘Sameep’ (closeness), a student engagement program – going back to schools and colleges, engaging with young people about foreign policy issues, encouraging applications for the forty places in the Ministry of External Affairs each year from 500,000 applicants to the civil service.

The Foreign Service Institute was playing its part, offering training to 2,500 diplomats from 190 countries, principally from the global South, but also from OECD countries. They would welcome applications from members of the Forum.

In discussion amongst the panelists:

- Communications technologies allowed a flattening of hierarchies. Mayors and governors often had as high profiles as senators and federal cabinet ministers.
- Given the growing areas of activity at sub-national level, were there concerns about overwork, and over-stepping the policy area of the national government?
- What about the danger of ignoring human rights, if sub-national entities were negotiating trade deals as an essentially cowboy activity, sending mixed messages of commitment to national policies?
- On the contrary, mayors or governors might go beyond what was possible at the federal level – with divestment movements, and demanding higher standards on workers’ rights or environment.
- The leadership of foreign ministries could be complicated by other agencies – forty-nine US government agencies were represented in Pretoria – how were they to be co-ordinated? Putatively, the State Department might have the lead, but not in practice.
- In India, the federal government was clearly in charge of policy, but implementation was in the hands of the states – FDI, passport issuance, migration. It was essential to keep the states in the policy loop, with as much pre-consultation as possible.

In wider discussion:

- California was the sixth largest economy in the world; Los Angeles on its own was the sixteenth largest, a diverse, cosmopolitan society where forty percent of citizens were foreign-born.
- Cities were acquiring a stronger diplomatic footprint; each was an entity, clearly defined, with identifiable implementers, and a consular/diplomatic function recognised around the world.
- Consulates were a vital national resource, promoting trade, investment, cultural links and people-to-people exchange.
• Indonesia had granted greater autonomy to its regions since 1999. There was growing international activity, eg, exchange of products and services between West Java and South Australia, with political and personal engagement of governors.

• There was occasionally a problem of euphoria in local government in respect of diplomatic activity, eg, wanting to open offices in Taiwan and Beijing at the same time, without addressing the ensuing issues. A curriculum would be helpful to train local governments in diplomacy, with pre-meetings before a mission. Quality control was important.

• It could be equally helpful to train diplomats to deal effectively with sub-national actors, both foreign and domestic, including governors and congressional delegations (CODELS).

• Diplomats needed to be made aware that this activity was going on, to encourage synergy and constitutional probity. In the Obama administration, liaison offices had been created to facilitate communication (cf, the US Conference of Mayors).

• Programs that sent diplomats under training out to regions and provinces could be helpful, enabling young officers to get to know their own country, and the varied needs and priorities of its people(s).

• Diplomacy was no longer the preserve of a traditional twentieth century educated elite. It had become the organised management of helping your own people’s interests in relation to the outside world. Training was essential.

Panel discussion V

Professional Obligations and Personal Integrity
Do we need a Diplomat’s Code of Ethics?

Celeste Balatbat
Director General, Foreign Service Institute, Philippines

Dr Katarzyna Pisarska
Founder and Director, European Academy of Diplomacy

Uzra Zeya
Senior Non-Resident Fellow, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy
Consultant, Albright Stonebridge Group

Chair:
Ambassador Bernardino León Gross
Director General, Emirates Diplomatic Academy, Abu Dhabi

Were there universal rights and obligations? Was the current international rulebook essentially Western? Christian? There was an intra-Western debate on terrorism – how to manage it, without compromising our own principles. There was a deep debate about paying or not paying ransom for kidnapped people. There were the alternative ethical traditions of Bentham and Kant. The diplomat had to navigate a sensitive landscape.

Celeste Balatbat

For civil servants, there usually were simple choices between clearly right and clearly wrong, personal moral choices about lying or stealing. Things became more complicated when the difference between right and wrong was unclear: when the issue was speaking truth to power, or accepting a gift that compromised your objectivity. Where policy or government was contested, as in the People Power revolution of 1986, your response depended on your core values, which were essentially personal.
The Philippines had a Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards, not specifically for diplomats but for all public officials and employees. This law, passed in 1989, mandated commitment to public service, professionalism, justice and sincerity, political neutrality, patriotism, democracy and simple living. The Code also imposed penalties such as fines and jail time for violators, and provided for a system of incentives and rewards.

Did diplomats need their own code, separate from the larger bureaucracy, that applied equally to all countries? Were there existing codes that could be applied? Should they be aspirational, or lowest common denominator?

Beyond developing the knowledge and competence of the younger generation, much could be done to help shape the character and integrity of younger officers by mentoring, coaching, and leading by example. Senior diplomats had a bigger responsibility to serve as role models of authentic, ethical leadership, characterized by respect, service, justice or fairness, transparency and honesty.

Dr Katarzyna Pisarska

The presumption of the absolute immunity of agents of the sovereign state was eroding, as instanced by the creation of the International Criminal Court, levying justice on individuals acting under the orders of the state. It was essential, consequently, to include ethics, and the ethics of leadership, in the professional development of diplomats.

In the private sector, ethical leadership – creating trust, competence and resilience – was good for business. In the public service, the culture of the institution mattered – when senior people broke the rules, bonds of trust at lower levels also broke down.

There were pull and push factors in ethics. We were pulled towards ethical behaviour in our wish to make the world a better place, and for the most people possible. Were our choices going to promote or undermine the global public good?

Officials increasingly were pushed, too, towards ethical behaviour, because the state now was less able than a hundred or more years ago to protect the individual from retribution for an illegal order or unethical act. (eg, the Magnitsky Act had been a response to the torture and killing of a whistle-blower.)

A debate continued over the primacy of the national interest or the responsibility to protect. In training, external facilitators could encourage more open discussion, unconstrained by internal hierarchy.

Uzra Zeya

For twenty-seven years at the State Department, Ms Zeya had navigated between Republican and Democratic administrations – but shifts under the Trump Administration had been too great, and she had resigned. She had taken an oath to defend the Constitution against all enemies foreign and domestic. Article 2 designated the President as the pre-eminent actor in the state, responsible for the sound formulation of policy within the system. The next generation of diplomats would have to navigate through complicated systems, with elected authoritarians rolling back democracy.

An earlier example of acting on principle had been US junior diplomat Harry Bingham IV, Vice-Consul in Marseilles in 1940-41, when the Vichy regime had been rounding up Jews, and crushing opponents. Bingham had fought against it, mobilising a network of private Americans with whose help he had facilitated the evacuation of 2,500 refugees, including Hannah Arendt and Marc Chagal. The State Department had transferred him; he then had resigned, later to be honoured posthumously by Secretary of State Colin Powell.

Leaders had to be seen to be not only not tolerating unethical behaviour, but walking the walk themselves. Those who rose to the top needed to be role models of integrity, of effective and inspiring diplomatic leadership.
Reports from table group discussions:

• It was possible to have a diplomatic code of ethics, but it would take time. There was great value in building a profession of public servants, as with doctors and lawyers. It was difficult, though, to work across states with differing traditions. And people might come in at the top or middle, without having come up through the system.

• How to get to the code? List the temptations, and debate the responses in open and honest discourse.

• There was a difference between a moral temptation and an ethical dilemma: your citizen had been kidnapped, the family wanted to pay ransom. Was it your responsibility to stop them, or to get out of the way? Was there false moral equivalence in the choice?

• It was not always easy to reconcile universal human values with the national interest; as, for example, Canada decrying human rights abuses in Saudi Arabia, while earning billions from them in arms sales.

• The Iraq War in 2003 had tested the limits of ethics and legality, requiring every officer to weigh up the balance carefully, whether to agree with it or not. If you didn’t agree, it was still a dilemma, whether to follow the rules, or to oppose them; it was harder still when there were no rules. Ethical questions were often small, personal decisions.

• A strong media helped keep ethical issues to the fore.

Responses from the panel:

• Often people shied away from personal ethical dilemmas, the problem of cynical relativism – ‘others did it, why not me?’ It was important to train the young not to give in to cynicism, the death of conviction and of passion. You had to challenge people to make better decisions.

• A multilateral institution like the IFDT offered the benefit of learning from each other, having varying national interests. Were values universal? At Tubingen University, in 2003, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan had said:

> Every society needs to be bound together by common values, so that its members know what to expect of each other, and have some shared principles by which to manage their differences without resorting to violence.

> …we must also be clear about what [universal values] are not. And one thing that should be clear is that the validity of universal values does not depend on their being universally obeyed or applied. Ethical codes are always the expression of an ideal and an aspiration, a standard by which moral failings can be judged rather than a prescription for ensuring that they never occur….

> Human rights and universal values are almost synonymous — so long as we understand that rights do not exist in a vacuum. They entail a corresponding set of obligations, and obligations are only meaningful where there is the capacity to carry them out. “Ought implies can.”

• Fixed rules were not possible, but a set of principles could be put together in a form of words. In the twenty-first century, ethics were departing from Kant and Bentham, and entering the world of Habermas and Rawls. Public discourse ethics required the engagement of civil society in the conversation.

• It was important to guard against cynicism, and hold ourselves to a higher standard. This had been a ground-breaking topic; we needed to keep the conversation going.
IFDT Bazaar
A showcase of Innovation and Best Practice of IFDT Academies and Institutes

Armenia
It would be helpful if the IFDT were to put together a panel to draft a set of guidelines on diplomatic ethics.

Bulgaria
The Diplomatic Institute had initiated exchange programs with other southeast European countries.

DiploFoundation
New blended just-in-time courses were offered, based in particular issues, for people about to go to multilateral meetings. Time commitment: 5-6 hrs per week, for 6-8 weeks.

Indonesia
The Center for Education and Training was providing intellectual leadership through mentors and speakers, with programs as well on budgets, logistics and methodology.

Japan
Partnerships were essential to maximising the educational value of each diplomatic service, with other academies and with international institutions such as the UN University.

Qatar
The Academy had had a traditional suite of courses, but no reference points as to what should be offered to whom, and when. They were building a 'competency framework', identifying what was needed at each level.

Portugal
Online courses were offered on cyber-security; global health and diplomacy; science and diplomacy. Training was provided to colleagues abroad via video-conference, which could be recorded for later viewing. E-communities were developing to share experience.

Republic of Korea
A range of new initiatives was presented in the brochure introduced at the Meeting.

Singapore
The Academy was only eleven years old, and had eleven staff. Traditional courses had concentrated on remembering. Tech-savvy younger students learnt differently, and had a shorter attention-span. The Academy’s courses consequently were being transformed.

United Kingdom
The Diplomatic Academy of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the University of London's School of Oriental and African Studies had created a pilot online introductory course on diplomacy in the 21st century, hosted on the Open University’s Future Learn platform. Twenty-five foreign ministry diplomatic academies and six hundred individuals from all over the world were participating.

It was the first globally-available Massive Open Online Course (MOOC) on diplomacy, bringing high-quality education to practitioners all over the world, unlimited by time or place.

It offered structured learning in a comfortable common intellectual environment. It had a strong practitioner focus, with master classes, short lectures and guidance to missions overseas. Junior diplomats were a key target group.

The course had achieved a 90% completion rate over two years; examiners had been impressed with the quality of the student product.
United States

The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy had created a dual degree with the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, and a joint degree with the College of Europe (one year spent in each, with a built-in internship in governing institutions). They had established also a faculty and student exchange program with MGIMO, and an advanced program for senior Indian diplomats.

Panel Discussion VI

New Training approaches: New Educational demands

Dr Marc Ostfield
Acting Director, Foreign Service Institute, US Department of State

Sangpyo Suh
Dean of Education and Training, Korea National Diplomatic Academy

Chair:
Ambassador Barbara Bodine
Director, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University

A diplomatic academy could provide a wider framework – addressing the ‘why’ part of issues, the adaptive part beyond the ‘what’ and ‘how’, understanding the importance, for example, of history and economics. The student might be responsible for learning, but the academy encouraged the new diplomat to think more widely, to see multiple perspectives.

Academies encouraged more focused development of strategic thinking – identifying the problem, considering whether and how it could be solved, who needed be involved in the resolution, what resources were required. The academy helped to foster linkage between practitioners and academics.

Sangpyo Suh

Academies were considering how best to respond to the introduction of social media in the diplomatic space. The United States Foreign Service Institute was a good model of how to manage it.

Social media were proving to be helpful in dealing with consular challenges.

International incidents arose sometimes from the diplomacy of sub-state actors, eg, the import of a Siberian tiger from Russia by a regional government in South Korea, without knowing that it would take two years to process, owing to environmental regulations. Diplomats had been called in to smooth ruffled feelings.

Co-operation was needed in solving problems of training for new innovations in diplomacy.

Dr Marc Ostfield

The discussions over the last two and a half days had been models of optimism and idealism. Three broad conceptual challenges had emerged:

1. It was difficult to justify the outcome of training. Evaluation was imperfect. Of Kirkpatrick’s four levels of analysis (what you had liked / what you had learnt / how it had helped you to be more effective / what impact it would have in the workplace), the first two were easier to measure than the last two.
2. It was difficult to assess the relative value of different methodologies. The ‘sage on the stage’ still had a role, but hands on, experiential learning offered more. The student made an emotional, psychological investment in the process of active learning.

FSI had developed a four-day course on leadership, designed to help officers acquire emotional literacy. They had created an authority vacuum in the room, with twelve to fifteen students and no technology. It had been emblematic of student-centred learning.

For active learning to work well, you needed students with a basic level of talent, then commitment and passion, and a good coach – to help develop the talent. It was especially useful in building intellectual resilience to adapt to fast-changing circumstances.

3. It was difficult to marry the national interest with global public good. The challenge was to design training to appreciate how the two could be helped to coincide.

In discussion:

- What held you back from moving away from focus on the ‘sage on the stage’?
  1. Skillset of the workforce – poor education and training background of experts, lacking the knowledge, skills and attitudes needed
  2. Space – not configured for small-group work
  3. Technology – lack of online learning (PowerPoint was adequate for conveying information, but you needed much more varied material to engage modern young people)
  4. Funding – there was rarely enough
  5. Time – there was never enough
  6. International certification – lack of quality assurance

- The article, A whole new global mindset for leadership, by Mansour Javidan and Jennie L. Walker (2012), was a helpful work of reference for diplomatic academies.

- 70% of learning was gained in the workplace; 20% from social media; only 10% from formal training. The principal enemy was limited time. Short stints could be cost- and time-effective, such as the week-long programs offered at Harvard. You could bring in experts to facilitate workshops. Online courses were alright for financial and administrative tasks, with data-heavy presentations – but soft skill courses were harder to do well.

- Research was needed to provide substance to debate. It should not be an esoteric, high-level, abstruse activity. You were training people to think about the question, and to develop the capacity to find out.

- Academic research needed to be married to practitioner experience. The task was to reset the mind; to explode the bias that obstructed new thinking; to nurture independence of mind by bringing in different perspectives – business, NGO, military, development, science. Skills and knowledge intersected and overlapped.

- There were many new ways of helping participants in a course to interact, encouraging social learning from the other people in the room: strategic foresight, systems thinking, 4-5 minute videos, (no PowerPoints), Future Learn online (online platforms were evolving to a different level of sophistication), incorporation of games.
One of the most venerable Arabic specialists was developing an online language program in Arabic.

Online learning was not always preceded by defining desired outcomes. The bigger challenge was quality evaluation, brought in from the outside.

Courses needed to stimulate, to bring work to life, to discuss the key issues of the day.

How to overcome the problem of burnout at the 12-15 year mark? Break years could be helpful – at university, in a think tank, in parliament, in business – giving people time to sit back and think. It was essential to retain the very best in the service – but a difficult cost calculation.

Closing Remarks

IFDT co-chair Ambassador Emil Brix thanked Ambassador Barbara Bodine for the relaxed professionalism of the proceedings, and the skilful management of a diverse group, keeping up the spirit of openness in difficult times.

He thanked the members of the Forum for their active engagement in the conference, and Nadja Wozonig in particular for all the efficient organisation.

Institutions wishing to host a Meeting of the Forum needed to submit a written proposal from a sufficiently senior level of institution or ministry. The IFDT observed a tradition of geographical distribution of the Meetings by region.

The 46th Meeting next year would be held in Geneva, on 25-28 September 2019, co-hosted (appropriately, in a world of networks, partnerships and multilateral collaboration) by the Graduate Institute, the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, the DiploFoundation and UNITAR.

Saturday 22 September

A number of members of the Forum had the pleasure of joining an excursion by riverboat to Mount Vernon, for a guided tour of the home of George Washington, and an opportunity to visit the museum of his life and work.

John Hemery
Rapporteur
Visit to the United States Foreign Service Institute

On Wednesday, 19 September, prior to the formal opening of the Meeting, a number of members of the Forum had the privilege of visiting the US Foreign Service Institute, in Arlington, Virginia, where they were welcomed by the Acting Director, Mark Ostfield.

The Institute had been established just after the Second World War. It was situated in a leafy 70 acre site, with up to 2,000 students on campus each day, and a staff of 1,500 (800 of them in the Language School).

They provided training for a number of different audiences: foreign service officers, locally-employed staff from around the world, civil servants from fifty different agencies of the US Government, and the families of the foreign affairs community.

The Institute was structured in six parts:
- The School of Language Studies – offering tuition five hours a day in 70-75 languages
- The School of Professional and Area Studies – for political and consular officers
- The School of Applied Information Technology – for the study and practice of secure communications, and of the application of advanced IT to diplomacy
- The School of Leadership and Management – for officers at every level from new entrants to newly-appointed Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs of Mission
- The Transition Center – offering information for diplomats, partners and children
- The Executive Office – 350 people engaged in the management of FSI, and in the design and development of learning programs, including online learning

The visit, expertly organised by Leila Canberra, comprised a series of breakout sessions, each offering two options (from which participants chose one), followed by a campus tour.

Breakout Session 1:

Option A: Diplomacy Tradecraft: A Full-Spectrum Approach to Training

Representatives from the School of Professional and Area Studies (SPAS) and the School of Applied Information Technology (SAIT) outlined the full spectrum of tradecraft training provided to American diplomats throughout their career, and highlighted some of FSI’s innovative training methods.

Acting Dean Conrad Tribble explained efforts being made by SPAS to meet the diverse training needs of newcomers and experienced officers, generalists and specialists, policy-focused officials, and support staff. David Martinez, Chair of Negotiation Training, delivered a presentation on innovation in training for negotiation, and offered, with David Coddle, an active exercise simulating a bidding war, and lessons to be learned from it.

Dean Kathleen Lively described IT training provided by SAIT both to diplomats and to IT professionals, to empower them as they navigated a rapidly developing IT environment. Senior Instructor Marilu Copley engaged participants in an exercise on flipped classroom learning, and gamification with mobile devices. Participants were invited to download the ‘Kahoot!’ app on their personal device to participate in the game demonstration.

In response to questions:
- Training in the use of social media – knowing when, if and how to engage in the global conversation – had been offered since 2006.
- Three weeks leadership training was mandatory for ambassadors, one week for political appointees.
- Legal training was not provided at FSI.
- It was necessary continually to modernise training techniques, in line with emerging trends in learning, and the demands of trainees.
A range of instruction was required, for different ages and backgrounds. (Average entry age was 31-32.) People learnt differently.

Regrettably it was not possible to give public access to the collection of videoed interviews with senior diplomats, owing to the degree of candor in the interviews.

**Option B: FSI’s Leadership Training Continuum: Great Leadership Starts with Great Leaders**

*Gail Neelon, Acting Dean of the School of Leadership and Management (SLM), together with Don Jacobson and Mark Nachtrieb,* explained how FSI was helping to transform the development of leaders in the State Department, through the new Leadership Development Continuum. Leadership, including crisis leadership, was the indispensable ingredient to unleashing employee talents, managing uncertainty, and driving organisations to the highest levels of excellence.

**Breakout Session 2:**

**Option A: Enhancing Diplomatic Readiness by Enabling Transitions: Training and Support for Diplomats and Families**

FSI’s Transition Center (TC) led an interactive session on training in Life Skills to support families, and on Resilience to support diplomats. They described the resources that the Overseas Briefing Center provided to support US foreign affairs professionals preparing to relocate abroad, as well as to support those getting ready to retire.

Transition Center staff described training delivered through classroom learning, distance learning, and providing information resources (from embassies, community liaison officers and people returning from post), as well as training support for families in the foreign affairs community. The centre was open late at night and on weekends.

Training for children was offered in the form of young diplomat courses for 8-18 year olds. These provided information on, for example, what it was like to go to a new school, the dos and don’ts of social media, security, the role of the Marines at post and how to use the satellite radio.

Virtual training for spouses and children unable to attend FSI classes was presented in two webinars a week on topics such as travelling with pets, renting properties and opportunities for work.

For those transitioning to retirement, a month-long program included next stage of life planning, job searching, social security benefits and financing.

**Option B: Language Training: Overview and Incorporating Technology in the Classroom**

*Ann Keller-Lally, Associate Dean of the School of Language Studies (SLS), and Division Director James Bernhard* provided an overview of the challenges and issues that came with teaching over seventy languages to almost 2,000 foreign affairs professionals each year.

Audio, visual, and online materials were provided, according to the learner’s preference. The instructor served as facilitator and guide, whether one-to-one, or in a traditional classroom.

Mobile apps on consular work, public diplomacy and security had been developed to facilitate learning on the move. Individual iPads were provided for home learning.

German instructor *Patrick von Suskil* delivered a short demonstration of some of the most common and useful technologies that SLS used in the classroom to make the language learning experience interactive and interesting, while relating it as much as possible to current events. A maximum of five students were taught at the same time.
In response to questions:

- Language tuition was offered in five 50-minute sets per day, separated by 10 minute breaks and lunch. The aim was to reduce teaching time, and to increase reading and technology time, watching soap operas, a total of nine hundred hours of total immersion. ‘A change of activity was relaxation.’
- Textbooks were still used.
- Commercial apps were recommended, but not formally integrated in the curriculum.
- For most languages, in-country training was not provided. For the four main languages taught to Level 3 ILR, the first year was spent at FSI, the second in-country.
- Students obtained the posting first, then matched training to the language. (At Monterrey, it was the other way round.)

Campus Tour

The campus tour (in four groups) comprised four stops:

Consular Skills Training Space

*John Yoder* and *Cristin Heinbeck* briefed participants on US consular law, policy and customer service.

In 2018, the State Department had handled 12.4 million non-immigrant visa cases. 9.6 million non-immigrant visas had been issued, and 560,000 immigrant visas. 21 million US passports had been issued.

All foreign service generalists had to have consular training. FSI offered forty-seven six-week courses a year for up to 1,200 students. These included experiential role play of visa interviews and prison visits. (The briefing was presented in the barred prison cell built for these exercises.)

Overseas Briefing Center

Resource Specialist *Maureen Johnston* introduced the information held on such essentials as housing, schools, provision for special needs, jobs, pets, security and insurance, on more than 260 posts (including domestic posts in the United States for security officers). These were accessible in hard copy and online, and updated at least annually. Some materials were produced at post, including sensitive ‘personal post insights’ not available publicly.

Multimedia Lab

*Assia Naidji* and *Ilona Lantos* provided demonstrations of the language learning programs *SpeechTexter* and *WordArt*.

Educational Technology Innovation Lab

*Kia Reid, Matt Montagnino* and *Game Developer Alex Bozworth* introduced the immersive learning environment, a collaboration space where participants were able to experiment with virtual reality and smartscreen tools.

John Hemery
Rapporteur
ANNEX 2

International Forum on Diplomatic Training Platform  (https://forum.diplomacy.edu)
Report for the period 1 September 2017 – 31 August 2018

1. Report of Activities

Since the Meeting in Santiago in September 2017, the IFDT platform had continued to serve as the go-to place for information on the member institutions. The platform hosted an up-to-date directory of member institutions, reports and photos from the annual meetings, and content of interest to all members:

- Calendar of upcoming events
- Calendar of available training courses and programs
- IFDT map showing the geographic location of member institutions
- Announcements for the WebDebates
- List of diplomacy-related resources (DiplomaticLibrary)
- Blogs

The IFDT platform maintained the Twitter account (@ifdt_tweets) that had 130 followers. This account was used to spread news of members’ activities.

Monthly webinars, the WebDebates (https://forum.diplomacy.edu/webdebates), started in 2016, had continued throughout 2017 and 2018. On the first Tuesday of every month, diplomats, professionals involved in diplomacy and researchers from all over the world had met to discuss key topics related to the future of diplomacy and diplomatic training.

Since September 2017, DiploFoundation had organised nine Webdebates on behalf of the IFDT:

- Should we take ‘new diplomacies’ seriously?
- Exploring digital diplomacy as a ‘new diplomacy’
- Humanitarian diplomacy and the influence of new actors and new technology
- Digital diplomacy: new actors and technology in diplomacy
- What is the potential for big data in diplomacy?
- Strategies for African states in multilateral diplomacy
- Can we teach and learn negotiation skills online?
- Algorithmic diplomacy: better geopolitical analysis? concerns about human rights?
- #Cybermediation: new skills and tools for mediation

Numerous experts in specific fields had joined the online discussions, both as presenters and as active participants in chat discussion. Summaries and recordings of all WebDebates were available on the IFDT website (https://forum.diplomacy.edu).

The WebDebate upcoming in September would focus on questions related to space diplomacy.

At present, the majority of participants were not members of the IFDT. It was hoped that, over time, there would be a greater number of participants, and more of them from within the IFDT network.

2. Financial Report

The payment and administrative procedures adopted at the Meeting in Pretoria had continued to be in effect for the period to September 2018.

The principal purpose of the annual membership contribution (currently unchanged at EUR 200, subject to review), in addition to being an affirmation of commitment to the Forum, was to meet the cost of creating and managing the IFDT platform.
Collecting payments continued to be administratively difficult. Members were encouraged to help Diplo reconcile payments as follows:

*when making a payment (preferably by Paypal or credit card), the member institution should send an email confirming that payment had been made to Diplo’s Finance Team, for the attention of Patrick Borg (patrickb@diplomacy.edu).*

It was noted with regret that not all members had paid their fees for the current year.

3. **Plan for the next period**

DiploFoundation would continue to improve the online platform and enrich the content.

One of the main challenges was the lack of input from IFDT members. This had improved in the last reporting period, with a number of organisations sending updates on structural changes to their institutions, and on upcoming training and events. But responsibility for keeping the member’s portal up to date remained the institution’s website coordinator. Members were encouraged to promote their activities through the IFDT platform, and to use the opportunity it offered to profile their organisation.

Also, members could send proposals for topics and presenters for the WebDebates. These should be of practical relevance to all diplomatic training institutions, and focused on diplomatic training. Proposals should be sent to ifdt@diplomacy.edu.

There was potential in the Blog section for members to share their videos and photographs, as well as reflections that could be relevant to the IFDT audience.

An ‘IFDT Member in the Spotlight’ could be introduced, presenting a selected institution in more detail.

Greater member participation was essential if the platform was going to be relevant. The more information was shared among IFDT members, the more useful the IFDT online platform would be.

**CONTACT**

Tereza Horejsova, DiploFoundation (terezah@diplomacy.edu)

Mina Mudric, DiploFoundation (minam@diplomacy.edu)