Wednesday 21 September

In welcoming participants to the Forum, former Ambassador James Batley acknowledged the traditional owners of the land, and paid respect to the elders of the Ngunnawal people, past and present.

The chosen theme of the 2016 Forum was ‘Diplomacy in the Asian century’. The programme addressed the challenges and opportunities all faced at global and regional level, and the skill sets needed to navigate the new international landscape. From the Asia-Pacific perspective, they wanted to understand what had contributed to the long peace in East Asia, and what could tip it into conflict.

As Professor Alan Henrikson had shown in his pre-Forum public lecture, ‘The US as a ‘Rising Power’ in the Asia-Pacific’ (full presentation available on the IFDT website at www.forum.diplomacy.edu/blog/united-states-rising-power-asia-pacific-region), there was much to learn from diplomatic history how rising powers behaved when assuming a greater role, and how war could be avoided.

IFDT Co-chair Ambassador Dr Hans Winkler observed that the regionalisation of the Forum had been one of its most important developments, helping to create new and productive networks worldwide. Co-chair Ambassador Barbara Bodine referred to the timely theme – a long peace under challenge. The study of how to educate, train and support diplomats in their work was critical to the way ahead.

HE Charles Lepani, High Commissioner of Papua New Guinea to Australia and Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, introduced the newly-published ‘The New Pacific Diplomacy’, edited by Hon Associate Professor Greg Fry, of the Australian National University and the University of the South Pacific, Fiji, and Dr Sandra Tarte, of the University of the South Pacific, Fiji.

High Commissioner Lepani drew attention to the new activism of Pacific island states in asserting their sovereignty and independence, working with NGOs and multilateral organisations to increase their collective regional voice.

Professor Fry highlighted the significant contribution of the leaders of the Pacific Small Island Development Group to the discussions at COP 21 in Paris, on the management of ocean issues and climate change.

Thursday 22 September

Dr Jochen Prantl, Director of the Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy, welcomed participants to the Meeting.

Professor Veronica Taylor, Dean of the College of Asia and the Pacific, The Australian National University, welcomed participants in the Forum to ‘the Martian Embassy’, the Shine Dome, home of the Australian Academy of Sciences.

The Australian National University had been created to be a research-intensive institution in the service of the nation; Australia would grow in status commensurate with its deep knowledge of the world. The Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy had been a flagship project, together with the National Security College, the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, and the School of Pacific Studies – all actively engaged in the rapidly expanding field of diplomatic studies. This Forum offered an opportunity to strengthen personal and institutional ties at a challenging time in international affairs.
Keynote opening address:

The Honourable Penelope Wensley AC, FAIIA
former Governor of Queensland and Australian Consul-General to Hong Kong, Ambassador for the Environment, Australian Permanent Representative to the United Nations, New York; High Commissioner to India and Ambassador to France

Ambassador Wensley congratulated ANU and the Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy on taking the initiative to bring to International Forum to the ‘fifth continent’, the only single-country continent, the only island continent, surrounded by three oceans – a unique vantage point from which to discuss the issues preoccupying governments and the international community not only on ‘the Asian Century’, but on the ultimate global challenge of conserving and protecting the environment.

It was encouraging to see in the list of participants an improved balance between countries of the North and the South, some represented for the first time. There were more Asian participants, though a number who would have benefited significantly from attending could not afford to come. This was perhaps an issue for discussion in the corridor and in the final session on the way ahead. It was important to listen to the insights of the Small Island Developing States, including on the training and development of their diplomats.

Ambassador Wensley remembered affectionately Ambassador Dr Ernst Sucharipa, for five years [2000-2005] Director of the Vienna Diplomatic Academy and energetic co-chair of the IFDT, who had been her fellow Permanent Representative to the United Nations at New York in the late 1990s. The relationship they had built exemplified the connection between individuals that was the absolute bedrock of successful diplomacy – and the raison d’être of the Forum.

The annual Meetings of the IFDT liked to look at the big picture, strategic context-setting – but also at new forms of diplomacy. Or established areas of diplomatic activity requiring greater attention or different emphasis, such as public diplomacy or the management of consular issues.

A plethora of new terms had emerged: transformational diplomacy, adaptive diplomacy, preventive diplomacy, frontier diplomacy, business diplomacy, economic diplomacy, conference diplomacy, environmental diplomacy, multi-stakeholder diplomacy, outreach diplomacy, in-reach diplomacy, as well as the diplomacy of regional groupings – EU, ASEAN, Small Island States, Pacific diplomacy.

It was like adjusting the lens of a camera: by changing the angle of approach and finding different ways of looking at the subject, including new technologies, it was possible to achieve better focus, and better outcomes.

The advantages of dual-lens cameras in smart phones offered a metaphor for these annual Forums – ‘greater depth of field, faster focus, better picture clarity, re-focus ability’. Members of the Forum were a highly disparate group, with enormous differences in size, history, levels of sophistication of institutes, numbers of people and scale of resources. But all could benefit from looking at things from a different perspective; all needed ‘better picture clarity’ in a world of fast-paced change, and above all, the ability to adapt and re-focus.

While focusing on these new areas, there was a need also to re-focus on the basics, the abilities and skills, the practices and activities that were the foundation for success in diplomacy. They might not be as exciting as all-new aspects of diplomatic practice, but they remained fundamentally important. Diplomacy, whether of country, region or cause, was founded on personal connection, requiring an investment of effort to put into practice.

There was a corresponding need for the development of inter-personal skills. Once new entrants had been recruited, too much was taken for granted. It was not enough to be personally engaging, outgoing and articulate; that formed only the base rung of the
leadership ladder. The goal of recruitment and training was to develop diplomats for success, to assist them to become good diplomats – and in the complex, competitive world of multilateralism, effective negotiators, able to influence outcomes and assume leadership roles.

Ambassador Wensley’s own career had been divided between bilateral and multilateral work: six bilateral postings, two as deputy head of mission, three as ambassador; and three major multilateral appointments: in Rome as ambassador for the environment, and in Geneva and New York as ambassador to the United Nations. She also had participated in or led Australian delegations to many international conferences, summits and negotiations.

Both bilateral and multilateral diplomacy had been rewarding, but the opportunities and challenges of multilateralism had been especially satisfying: to be able to represent your country, to engage with people of other countries and cultures, to work on political issues that mattered, to sit behind the national nameplate for the first time, to achieve the responsibility for speaking on behalf of your government and people, and to work on issues of national and global significance.

In all training activities, it was important to talk about the excitement, the satisfactions and personal rewards to be had in pursuing a career in diplomacy. Frank Moorhouse, in the first of his trilogy of books about the League of Nations, ‘Grand Days’, had referred to ‘the weary exhilaration of negotiation’ – and it was exhausting, often frustrating, requiring stamina, patience and persistence, but exhilaration was the perfect word to describe the feeling and effect of success.

Some found multilateralism trying, deterred by its elaborate rules and processes, and obvious complexities. Yet it tested to the full, and honed to higher levels, the fundamental skills of diplomatic tradecraft – communication, liaison, advocacy, observation, the ability to listen, to connect and empathise with people, to gain their confidence and respect, to gather, exchange, synthesise and interpret information. It was an intensely competitive environment, in which it was hard to have your voice heard, your views taken into account. In the UN setting, with 193 member states, and in regional groupings, it was harder still for small and middle countries to assert their national interest, to gain profile and influence. But it could be done if their diplomats were good, well-trained, and prepared to work hard.

In building her career, what had been the building blocks of success?

The first had been language skills, especially in three of the official UN languages. It had been a decided advantage to be a native English speaker. In every crisis, the final crunch negotiations, the deals made in the back rooms, had been conducted in English.

The second building block had been putting up her hand for jobs – starting small and building up, drafting, serving as rapporteur for working groups, which not only increased one’s knowledge of both issues and processes, but gave visibility and could lead to decisively influential roles. Being inside the inner circle, as gopher for more senior people, had been initially terrifying and bewildering, but it had enabled her to position herself effectively to influence processes. No matter what the subject, in every discussion, there was an inner circle of key players. A good diplomat had two jobs: to work out who those key players were, and then to find ways of connecting with them, to get into the inner circle.

The third building block had been the quality of personal relationships with colleagues, investing effort in building networks, not least with Australia’s Asia-Pacific neighbours. There were many ways to build personal connections – making introductory calls, attending national days, receptions and functions (it was enormously important to pay colleagues the honour of attending their events), accepting and extending invitations, including to people well outside the obvious bilateral contacts, for example the representative of a small country on the periphery of an issue, who later could offer reciprocal support in a crisis, or when seeking votes for a national candidate.
The final career building block had been working hard to gain greater cultural awareness and sensitivity. This had been once an optional add on; now it had become essential knowledge and skill. You had to take the trouble to read up the background – to recognise the faultlines, to know what the debate was really about: everything in the UN was about something else – why was the Indian delegate speaking? why was Israel addressing a different topic? You had always to look laterally, to work the by-ways. It had been helpful, for example, when ambassador in Paris, to have called on the leader of the Paris Mosque, and the head of the Arab World Institute, and to have hosted functions there, so when Islamic issues had blown up, they had been a source of information and perspective, making it possible to stay ahead of the game.

Making an effort to gain cultural sensitivity was especially important in the Asia-Pacific region, with its different approaches to time, and indirect way of leading into conversations.

In negotiations – what were the keys?

First, building strategic alliances and networks – for example, the women’s network – nine female ambassadors, including Madeleine Albright, who had started the network when ambassador to the United Nations in New York; they always had taken each other’s call, and had tried to support each other. Networks created great opportunities.

At international conferences, many were lost, or out of their depth. For example, the negotiations on climate change were not only about politics, but also about the science of meteorology. Some bigger delegations had banks of advisors, but some had lonely specialists listening to battles on systems and processes of energy generation. It had been helpful to go and identify the science representative on every delegation, to collect the lonely meteorologists, the diplomatic equivalent of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, and at the same time to get inside the delegations, building commonality of knowledge and expertise. This had paid real dividends for Australia, and for the overall negotiations. It was a simple example of marshalling everything possible to work through the minefield.

In leadership and chairing roles, what were the elements of success?

It was essential to know the substance, procedures and rules; always in the chair to be a step ahead of the room.

You needed to be able to read the mood, to pick up non-verbal signals and body language. (Women typically were excellent readers of non-verbal signals, men comparatively poor. Training and constant practice could help, for example by turning off the sound on the television.)

You had to learn – initially the hard way – when to push and when not (never to put a question until you were confident you knew the answer; never to force a delegate or group that was not ready, to state their position). You couldn’t force a compromise: for example, when chairing the UN Fifth Committee on finance and budget (reassessment of member state dues, getting the Americans to pay their arrears), with weak support from the Secretariat and advisors (‘oh, it is not possible, madam’), time management had been key. Money was being wasted starting meetings late, with long harangues and corridor discussions (some trying to hold things up). You could try to push delegations, but to no effect before they were ready. You couldn’t force the pace.

You needed to be clear – avoiding confusion, whether accidental or deliberate. (Some could be genuinely confused, others disrupting, distracting and delaying.) Unclarity could kill a negotiation, and/or your authority.

It was helpful to state the programme and summarise the situation at the outset, concluding the meeting with a summary of points agreed or processed, identifying outstanding issues and further points needing to be agreed (thus getting those points into the reports to capitals).
You needed to conscript good helpers, harness the bright troublemakers and show-offs by giving them a task, and break down the overall task into manageable delegated portions. It was essential always to stay calm and courteous, even when pressed. Measured language, reassuring tone; no jokes, no colourful language.

You needed to watch and learn from others, good chairs and bad. Ambassador Tommy Koh, from Singapore, had managed to resolve a deadlocked negotiation with OPEC countries by turning a Nelsonian blind eye when putting Agenda 21 to the vote. Placards were waving, but he had said, 'I see no objections... It is so decided.' It was a brave move to ride roughshod over obstructions to agreement, but then making it possible for delegations formally to register their dissent, while enabling something important to be decided.

It could be necessary to let something go; hard for yourself, involving risk. The UN negotiations on AIDS-HIV were fraught with taboos. NGOs were demanding more active engagement, determined to name the most vulnerable groups – same sex partners, injecting drug users. They had struggled on and on, but in the end the chair had decided to let it go, drawing much criticism from her own government, and from others, but had got through the final Plan of Action, a new Fund with new resources, and a new UN agency – a good example of the art of compromise.

The emphasis in these remarks on multilateralism reflected the increasing emphasis and focus of diplomatic work, in a globalised interdependent world, on trans-boundary problems. While bilateral diplomacy would always be important, developing the skills of operating in multilateral forums, regional or global, would be essential for all diplomats – not just for lawyers and UN specialists. As the challenges to global security became ever more evident, the training provided by diplomatic institutes and academies, and the work of the IFDT, would become even more important than it was now.

In discussion:

- **Highpoint example of learning on the job?**

Dealing with the Timor Leste crisis, and achieving the unanimous adoption by the UN Security Council of a Chapter VII resolution mandating an intervention force, to be led by Australia. Australia was not then a member of the Council; the Mission had had to work in the margins. Canberra marshalled a diplomatic effort around the world, in all major capitals. In New York, they had formed a contact group that worked quietly behind the scenes, cultivating the Security Council members. Netherlands, then President of the Council, took a bold step, reactivating an old selected group of members that went out into the field. US Ambassador Richard Holbrooke had played an important role, but behind the scenes. It was an enormous exercise in diplomatic co-ordination, pulling together in the task force in Canberra and in the Mission in New York the constant flow of reporting.

- **What role for middle powers? What current functional status of Nigeria, South Africa, Pakistan, or of ad hoc contact groups; or was the concept passé?**

The concept still existed, but was an under-tapped resource. Australia was always an ‘O’, an Other in WEOG, looking to form alliances with other middle powers, eg Canada. Groups were constantly forming and re-forming on different subject matters, aligned and opposed, but sharing the empathy of not being a big power. EU members spent a great deal of time working with each other to form a common position. Australia, schizophrenic in its European history and Asian location, was trying to move the UN to change the groupings, but so far without success. A number of emerging powers had ambition to become Permanent Members of the Security Council, so there was fertile ground to work cleverly to found another group. The agenda of the sustainable development talks had been set by the North. Australia had helped form the Bolivia Group, which met first in Bolivia – addressing the different challenges of the oceans and forests of the southern hemisphere. The group, which included Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, had formed a network, and virtual networks, for scientific research and exchange, which still existed.
Panel Discussion 1

Diplomacy in a non-polar world: cross-regional perspectives

Chair:
Ambassador Barbara Bodine, Director, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University

Panel:
Amb Dr Markus Tekle, Director General, Foreign Service Training Institute, Ethiopia
Prof Amin Saikal, AO, Director, Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies, ANU
Prof Jisheng Sun, Vice-President, China Foreign Affairs University, China
Amb Juan Somavia, Director, Diplomatic Academy of Chile

Amb Dr Markus Tekle, Director General, Foreign Service Training Institute, Ethiopia

Emerging powers were dependent on, rather than challenging the structures and powers of the international system. Third World countries had suffered a lot during the bipolar period, with its proxy wars. Transition to a multipolar world gave them now more room to pursue their national interests at the global level, focusing on economic cost-benefit analysis.

Emerging powers preferred to work through established institutions, or were creating new fora with networks of states and other partners not tied to concrete ideologies. Rather, they supported the smooth functioning of the international system. Non-state actors and transnational organisations were gaining influence and power, bringing diplomacy once again to the high table.

Asia was now more important for Africa. After long subordination to Western powers, they were looking to new partners offering more aid, investment and loans for infrastructure development.

Small countries were starting to compete effectively for influence, with more assertive diplomacy. The new diplomacy was conducted not only by foreign service officers, but by many institutions, advised by foreign ministries. They were trying to get beyond a simple sense of how they were seen, and saw themselves.

Prof Amin Saikal, AO, Director, Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies, ANU

The modern Middle East was amongst the richest regions, yet was a breeding ground for diplomatic failure: unresolved disputes between Israel-Palestine, Saudi Arabia-Yemen, Iraq-Kuwait, Morocco-Algeria, Iran-Saudi Arabia.

There had been triumphs, too: peace treaties between Israel and Egypt, and between Israel and Jordan, which had prevented a new war since 1973. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between Iran and the P5+1 was an example of the importance of personal connection, but also of the issues that motivated people to come to settlement:

Four factors had contributed to the successful negotiation of the JCPOA:

1. mutual need and vulnerability, in both Iran and US – dire Iranian economic need for investment and new technology, to overhaul old industries, and to end the sanctions imposed by the UN and the US since 2012; American desire for Iran’s help in resolving conflicts from Afghanistan to Yemen.

2. sanctions had not brought the Iranian government to its knees, but had had a profound impact on Iranian society; there was a need to rebuild the connection between the government of the Islamic Republic and its people.
3. both Iran and the US wanted to improve their standing in the region
4. consensus within the P5+1 to resolve the nuclear dispute.

By contrast, three issues impeded a political settlement of the conflict in Syria:

1. As in Iraq, Syria was a zone of conflict within a larger conflict. It was a war not only against the Assad regime, but between the Free Syrian Army, Jabhah al Nusra, Da’esh, between each other and regional actors, Iran and Turkey.
2. It was also a proxy conflict between the United States and Russia, two international coalitions operating with conflicting agenda.
3. There was no national or international consensus on how to solve the problem. Given the high level of distrust, neither great power was able to restrain their protégés sufficiently to solve the problem at three interlocking levels – national, regional and international.

The problem could be resolved only if you brought about a balance of forces on the ground. Syrian rebels needed effective anti-air defence, as in Afghanistan in the mid-1980’s. Diplomacy had not worked there until the UK and US had intervened to raise the costs of the war for the Soviet Union, which lost on average one plane a day for a year. That had not been achieved yet in Syria, but it was sine qua non for peace.

Prof Jisheng Sun, Vice-President, China Foreign Affairs University, China

The China Foreign Affairs University focused on non-polar, cross-regional perspectives. Their objective was to observe what was new, and to adjust training accordingly.

Non-polar did not mean that there were no poles, but the gap between the powers was shrinking. Emerging powers were mini-poles in multi-nodal systemic change in the distribution of power and world order. Power was increasingly diffused to non-state actors, including trans-national corporations. New communications technology contributed to cultural fragmentation. The Internet was a power in its own right.

People’s attitudes to globalisation were becoming more conservative; protectionism was rising. Global trade was declining, down by 3% since 2008, The Doha Round was in difficulty, as hidden barriers prevented global economic growth. This was an irrational development for the whole world, and a focus of the G20 summit. Other challenges included disease and terrorism. There was scope for improvement in global governance.

New technology offered interconnectedness, and greater interdependence. As a result, spillover effects were much wider than before – as in Syria, which had spawned the refugee crisis, big power confrontation, ushering the UK out of EU, leading perhaps to further regional disintegration – the butterfly effect. No-one was isolated from crises, anywhere.

New ways of dealing with issues, new mentalities were needed. This applied also to training – first, encouraging a sense of global community, partnership, and win-win shared responsibility for the future. No-one could meet the global challenge alone. If China and the United States co-operated, anything was possible – if not, nothing was. It was essential to train diplomats to co-operate.

The second emphasis needed to be on diversity and inclusion – looking, for example, at different interpretations of Chinese history and culture, with new questions, and a way of thinking and choosing based on one’s own experience.

Third, there were different ways of political decision-making. ISIS was driven by ideological factors, forcing outcomes. The EU was a framework of rules. Asia offered a comparatively loose approach, consensus-building step by step, making people feel comfortable, not just by voting.
Fourth, there needed to be greater emphasis on mutual-learning. China had lifted 700 million people out of poverty – a contribution not only for the people of China, but an example for the whole world. As demonstrated in ‘Diplomacy and the Making of World Politics’ [Sending, Pouliot and Neumann, eds, Cambridge University Press, 2015, ISBN: 9781107492004], diplomatic practice offered a unique contribution. Learning from others had great value: for example, there were many books on WTO structure and practice; China had been studying its rules and ideas for over thirty years, and still had much to learn. It was important to be patient; you couldn’t expect to learn everything overnight.

Fifth, differential concepts of power needed to be embraced. Fiji was not a traditional big power, but its diplomacy on climate change was much larger than its own footprint.

**Amb Juan Somavia, Director, Diplomatic Academy of Chile**

Poles hadn’t disappeared, but the distances between them had shortened. Different regions had different perspectives. In Latin America, in general, public opinion had become distanced from politics, political parties and power elites. With the loss of representative feeling, disquiet had now surfaced amongst those who had not been the beneficiaries of globalisation, of the free trade that had left many behind. There was a sense of unease.

There had been three attributes of globalisation: technological change, the emergence of new powers, and of new rules.

Neo-liberal thinking was a product of polar thinking over the last thirty to fifty years. The neo-liberal impulse undervalued the role of government in resolving people’s needs. The sustainable development perspective had forgotten people at the World Summit in 1995. The governance issue was now at same point: the Agenda 2030 goals were impressive, but had no strategies for implementation. Such transitive energy as there was came from the financial institutions, and was finance-led, not socially-orientated.

This had been seen in the response to the financial crisis – some things had been too big to fail (while some people had been too small to matter). Hence, the importance of dislodging the financial system from running the global economy, and putting the real economy back in the centre, linked to the household economy.

This was very far from the current reality. It was necessary to go from technical decision-making to proper connectivity with the way societies really were.

Hence the role of diplomacy, and of diplomatic training, on relations between the state, the market, society, and the individual. The elements of the SDGs were there, but public and private needed to be brought into balance. You could not look only at the dimensions of the global problem. The balance was going to be different in each region.

Convergence in diversity was a fact of life. We needed to go from simply understanding that, to making the adjustment to explain, to think forward, to making change.

**In discussion:**

- **Ambassador Bodine**

There had never been a unipolar world, except in the imagination. Now it was non-polar. Great powers were not declining, but rising powers were asserting middle-power status. Was this new restructured system more stable, balanced and equitable, or fundamentally unstable, a pre-institutional world with more local conflicts having global impact? Closer attention needed to be paid to the social cost of globalisation.
• **Ambassador Dr Tekle**

There was a limit to what great powers could do. Emerging powers needed to step forward to take more responsibility. The global order ought to be more stable, but there was some reluctance of great powers to accept challenge from new actors. Regional powers were trying to stabilise their own regions.

• **Professor Saikal**

There was increasing challenge to the legitimacy of governments: Syria, Yemen, Iraq, Libya might become the norm. The US and China needed to find consensus on these new instabilities – if not, extremist groups would mount a challenge both local and more widely. Syria was a small World War III in waiting, with a risk of explosion by accident, not design. Major global, regional and local powers were a combustible mix. Sharing space in a non-polar world posed problems: would the major powers give way?

• **Professor Sun**

There were many challenges, but the world was becoming relatively more stable – eg in Asia. The G20 offered a good example – expanded from G7, incorporating emerging economies, providing a platform for emerging powers to bring influence to bear. China wanted to supplement, not to supplant the United States: for example, by moving into the space the IMF and World Bank did not address – infrastructure development. The challenge lay in accommodating these changes.

• **Ambassador Somavia**

It depended on what you meant by stable. Some states were stable because they were finding their place, their identity, their own solutions. Stability in the Latin American region during the Cold War had been to aid and abet dictatorship, and the militarisation of governance in the region, which lost decades of democratic practice under military dictatorship.

People in every country wanted a space for family, and for work. The more advanced the society, the more conscious you were of the things you needed. Progress was alright, but people wanted to move forward faster. Revolutions arose out of rising expectations, out of impatience to get to the next stage (as in the *ancient régime* before the French Revolution). Loss of trust in governance now had enormous implications.

It was necessary to get away from the mindset of institutions, and concentrate on the people. Organisations that tried to help could themselves be oppressive. It was important to get to the grassroots, generating stability as you moved up.

• **What training was needed for the non-classical diplomats, the future decision-makers in the international system?**

**Ambassador Somavia**

Network diplomacy needed to operate across all boundaries. The diplomatic space had been both reduced and expanded at the same time. The essential challenge was effective co-ordination of international understanding.

Diplomatic training in Chile was at the disposal of the Chilean state and society – not just for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but for all ministries, drawing on their knowledge and perspective, while helping them to understand Chilean foreign policy. But they were providing training also for Chilean NGOs with international operations, offering an overview of how the world was seen from different perspectives. Some parliamentarians travelled a lot, others did not – so they were providing seminars for politicians to inform them of diplomacy; the same for trade union leaders.
Training also for military forces? They had their own programmes, but what efforts were being made to bring them into the fold?

Ambassador Somavia

The Chilean military academy and the diplomatic academy shared seminars. There was little real interaction, but an appetite for greater contact. In the Ministry of Defence, preparing for attack was not the same as working in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the maintenance of perpetual peace. (In the United States, there was such inter-penetration all the time, but not much evidence of its breaking down the military mindset.)

Panel Discussion 2:

ASEAN Diplomacy: between community-building and great power management in East Asia

Chair: 
Professor Peter van Ness, Visiting Fellow, Department of International Relations, ANU

Panel: 
Prof Evelyn Goh, Shedden Professor of Strategic Policy Studies, ANU
Dr Noel Morada, Director, Regional Diplomacy and Capacity-building, University of Queensland
Amb Salman Ahmad, Director-General, Institute of Diplomacy and Foreign Relations of Malaysia

Prof Evelyn Goh, Shedden Professor of Strategic Policy Studies, ANU

Southeast Asia was a continental connector, the geographical construct between China and India. It was also a focal point of maritime disputes, in the US strategic context.

Southeast Asian foreign policy imperatives arose from the nature of the collection of states:
1. post-colonial – with an incentive to prevent renewed hegemony (intra-mural or external, whether of China or of the United States)
2. a strategic thoroughfare (80% of oil transited the Malacca Strait) – hence, strategic diversification, keeping as many options open as possible; they did not have the luxury of picking one side only, they needed to keep the other involved
3. small states – their voice in international affairs was achieved better collectively (Indonesia might be large and populous, but was still small on the global scale).

Along a spectrum of approaches to the great powers, the United States and China:
1. US allies – Philippines, Thailand
2. China-constrained (by history, and economic dependence) – Cambodia, Laos
3. Hedgers (no alliance, and less constrained) – Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, Vietnam

There were three cardinal principles of ASEAN diplomacy:
1. Those who could hedge, would. (Those who couldn’t, couldn’t).

Myanmar and Vietnam had moved from China-constrained into the Hedger group. They now had more opportunities as a result of internal political change, and human rights reforms.
2. Most hedging strategies entailed long, hard diplomatic effort.

In the confrontation with China over the installation of an oil-drilling rig in disputed waters, Vietnam had pursued a two-fold approach: (i) she had joined the United States in the Proliferation Security Initiative; high-level Party officials had visited the US, and negotiated an easing of arms sanctions; (ii) she had embarked on talks with China, through back channels, trying to defuse the oil rig crisis.

3. In the short-term, apparently leaning one way or the other, but in the longer-term perspective, manoeuvring around the centre, always keeping open channels to the other side.

Philippines had a long history of hedging in the middle ground. In 1995, following a skirmish with China on Mischief Reef, they had re-thought the US relationship, restoring their role as a major non-NATO ally of the United States. President Aroyo then had re-built the strategic relationship with China. President Aquino had swung back to the US. President Duterte had turned again toward China. But no-one had burnt their bridges.

Dr Noel Morada  
Director, Regional Diplomacy and Capacity-building, University of Queensland

The challenge for ASEAN diplomacy had been to establish the ASEAN Way as the norm for East Asian international affairs (consensus decision-making, consultation; great powers respecting Southeast Asia as a zone of peace, prosperity and stability, and a nuclear-free zone).

After the Vietnam War, and the expiry of the Philippines basing agreement with the United States, the then ASEAN 5 had created the ASEAN Regional Forum. From 2003 until the present, they had engaged in East Asia community-building. Since 2010-11, however, with the growth of the South China Sea dispute, Southeast Asian diplomacy had come under strain.

In 2002, all ten ASEAN states and China had adopted the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC). Since then, they had been working towards a Code of Conduct. Progress had been slow and difficult, and was now further complicated by the ruling of the International Court of Arbitration supporting Philippines’ territorial claim, rejected by China.

Operationalising the ASEAN Way was challenged by the growing Great Power rivalry in the region, both in the South China Sea and in Northeast Asia.

There were two aspects to the rivalry:
1. freedom of navigation – part of the core interests of the United States;
2. whether dispute resolution could be achieved more effectively through bilateralism or multilateralism.

Did norms matter? Was norm-based diplomacy still relevant when Great Powers clashed? What did you do when China ignored the jurisdiction of the international court?

Was ASEAN still in the ‘driver’s seat’, or were other powers affecting outcomes by inducements? Was consensus necessary for ASEAN to operate? Were norms actually norms, or only aspirations? Where did the states of ASEAN go from here – without power?

There were challenges to fundamental assumptions about ASEAN centrality. Who would step up now? Indonesia? Would an altogether new set of principles emerge? Or would the national interests of member states supervene?
The aims and purposes of ASEAN had always been security, economic co-operation and community-building, starting in the Cold War as a counter-weight to China.

They had decided to concentrate on cultural diplomacy in building a cohesive region. Yet, of those three pillars, the social-cultural pillar was the least-developed, not least because it was the most complex and multi-faceted.

The East Asian community had developed, with new dialogue partners: ASEAN +3, the East Asia Summit, the East Asia Vision Group. But they hadn’t even been able to agree on a big C Community, so it remained a small c community. It was necessary to be patient.

On the management of great powers in the region, they were hedging against the uncertainty of the situation and of the direction of great power relations. They were leaning both ways, maintaining strong economic relations with both sides. Individually, small states needed constantly to re-balance, as the great powers adjusted their presences.

Through cultural diplomacy, it was possible to encourage discourse when other avenues were more fraught. They were not attempting to impose things on other communities; rather, they were enablers of cultural conversation, working with ministries of culture, media and sport, and with university networks, to grow the culture of community.

Diplomats needed to live in other cultures to understand the differences between peoples. To generate a feeling of oneness, you planted the seeds now, and might hope to reap the benefits in the longer term.

**In discussion:**

- ASEAN was criticised as being simply a ‘talk-shop’, but they had created a form of continuous negotiation. There was power rivalry in the region, but a balance of regional roles, with many layers of dialogue, across the range of issues. ASEAN had Free Trade Agreements with all major players, including with Australia. The ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting was another instance of deploying all possible means to improved community-building. The cultural dimension was growing.

- Norms-based values-driven, or interests-driven foreign policy? Given the disparity of size and power of competing economies, interest-based negotiation was to the fore. In the security field, however, ASEAN norms and values came to the fore – stability, non-interference, respect for sovereignty, comprehensive security, human development.

- What should ASEAN diplomats know, learn, do? Concepts? Skills? How did you link the two? Consensus-building, saving face – was that a skill, or a conceptual norm?

The Australian National University trained diplomats and officials from around the region. This was not simply ‘club diplomacy’, old men doing the same old thing – but personalised cultural diplomacy, still relevant and necessary. What was new was the attempt to resolve the disjunction between international relations education (dominated by European history, Western-centric IR theory, and American strategic thinking) and the practicalities of diplomacy. Small state actors were needed, thinking in new ways, from their own perspectives.

Some cherished norms were being challenged – eg non-interference, versus the growing acknowledgement that it was the primary responsibility of the state to prevent crimes against humanity. Good governance and the rule of law enhanced the legitimacy of the state. You had to address the root causes of conflict; if you didn’t, you had to deal with the international community intervening against you.

Effective diplomatic training brought abstract concepts down to earth.
• Received wisdom from Western thinking still predominated in diplomatic studies. There was tension, however, between theory and practice. Non-western countries had not yet sufficiently presented their prospectuses on alternative diplomatic practice. But progress was being made: Singapore, the dynamic ‘Little Red Dot’; India, with its energetic economic diplomacy; Kenya, drawing on the early experience of the pioneers of their diplomatic service; Malaysia, whose training institute offered study tours for foreign diplomats, all were important cases in point.

• Diplomatic academies were still mostly traditional – they taught negotiation skills, but harboured a narrow mindset. They needed to learn how to introduce new thinking at the strategic level.

• At the Australian National University, the Asia Pacific College of Diplomacy and the Strategic Studies Centre were collaborating to offer executive training in strategic thinking and diplomatic practice.

IFDT Bazaar – Showcasing IFDT diplomatic academies and institutes

The Bazaar was conducted in a new format, run by the team of ANU volunteer Student Ambassadors, in which members were given a strictly-policed two minutes each to present recent developments at their institutions.

Armenia
The Diplomatic School was seven years old, and had trained so far about one-third of the foreign service of Armenia. They had produced recently a comparative study of institutions of diplomatic training, published in Global Affairs [Aug 2016, issue 2, vol 2, pp 223-231].

Australia
The Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy, within the Australian National University, was eleven years old. It had three pillars: postgraduate education, research, and executive training for diplomats and defence attachés. They were contributing to network-building within Australia and beyond, offering short-courses from one day to four weeks, on contemporary challenges.

Austria
The Diplomatic Academy of Vienna offered a graduate MA in International Studies. Seventy percent of their students were from foreign countries; all were taught in English. 10-15% went on to careers in their diplomatic services; a further 10-15% went into international institutions.

Bulgaria
The Academy was a member of EU training and research bodies, and focused on programmes of regional co-operation in the Western Balkans and the Black Sea Region. They offered pre-deployment training for international institutions including the EU and NATO, and were preparing officials for the Bulgarian Presidency of Council of the EU in 2018.

Chile
The Diplomatic Academy of Chile ‘Andrés Bello’ was 61 years old, providing training to serve the whole society, and challenging old myths. Their international course welcomed participants from 76 countries; Spanish was the new English. They looked forward to hosting next year’s IFDT meeting.

China
The Foreign Affairs University had been established in 1955, at the suggestion of Zhou Enlai. It had now 2,000 students and some 500 faculty and staff members, with three functions: 1) degree courses, both undergraduate and postgraduate; 2) in-service training for Chinese officials and others; 3) a think-tank engaged in academic research, policy analysis and active track-two diplomacy. Degree majors included diplomacy, world politics, international relations, international law, international economy, international trade and finance, and foreign languages such as English, French, Japanese and Spanish.
The Diplomatic Academy had been created only this year. It was responsible for training Chinese diplomats and other civil servants, as well as for international exchange and co-operation. It drew on the faculty and staff of the Foreign Affairs University in offering 36 full-time courses to some 2,900 trainees, including a one-year graduate entrant programme, with specialist training at all levels. They followed the principle of 'diplomats training diplomats', with case studies and interactive group exercises. They had a lot still to learn, and welcomed conversations with IFDT colleagues.

Estonia
The Estonian School of Diplomacy was not integrated with, but operated in close cooperation with the MFA. (One of its alumnae had just been elected President of Estonia.) They offered a nine-month course in International Relations, this year for 28 diplomats and civil servants from eleven countries, as well as tailor-made short courses for people from many institutions and countries.

Ethiopia
The Foreign Service Institute was a young institution, only three years old, needing to build collaboration, exchange and experience-sharing. They were working on programmes at entry-level and for junior diplomats; they would welcome support in designing courses for senior diplomats.

Georgia
The Diplomatic Academy of Georgia was three and a half years old, and in the process of cultivating a new generation of diplomats. They welcomed new co-operative arrangements with other diplomatic academies, using cultural diplomacy and study tours to share best practice.

Indonesia
The Diplomatic Academy had been established in 1949. It had two sections, one providing compulsory training for Indonesian diplomats to progress beyond the level of First Secretary, the other offering programmes to other government departments and foreign nationals.

Lao PDR
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs conducted research on international policy, and provided training for specific requirements, such as pre-posting.

Malta
The Diplo Foundation were the gurus of text-based e-learning. Their mission was to help build diplomatic capacity.

Montenegro
The School was an independent institution within the Ministry, training national diplomats. The Vuković summer school welcomed participants from all over the world. In this anniversary year, they had celebrated a thousand years of statehood, and ten years of independence. The School had been mentioned by President Obama and UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon as an example of contributing to regional and global stability.

Netherlands
The Clingendael Academy focused on the training of Dutch and foreign diplomats, and international officials (EU, military, etc). Each year six hundred diplomats from all parts of the world were trained in The Hague, with a specific method of integrating substance, competence and work processes in tailor-made programmes.

Philippines
The Centre for International Relations and Strategic Studies carried out research, and trained all foreign service officers in a cadetship programme. They provided also pre-posting orientation for all agencies, such as defence and labour. For further information, members were encouraged to consult fsi.gov.ph.
Singapore
The Diplomatic Academy of the MFA of Singapore had been established in 2006. They offered short courses on current topical issues.

South Africa
The Diplomatic Academy of the Department of International Relations and Co-operation conducted policy research, and provided training from cadets to mid-career officials to ambassadors. It worked in collaboration with regional colleagues, offering programmes on Women and Youth, Peace and Security, and training in mediation.

Spain
The Escuela Diplomática, founded in 1911, had developed recently two new courses: (1) a nine-month course for professional journalists with the aim of increasing their knowledge of international relations and of Spanish foreign policy; (2) a course on Latin America for EU diplomats, offered in collaboration with the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, the Mexican diplomatic academy Instituto ‘Matias Romero’, and the Real Instituto Elcano.

Thailand
The Devawongse Varopakarn Institute of Foreign Affairs, within the MFA, was 54 years old. They provided training to Thai diplomats at all levels, to civil servants going abroad, as well as to diplomats from other countries, providing opportunities for networking at junior and mid-career level. They offered training in practical skills, leadership and management, and had programmes of technical co-operation with a number of countries in Southeast Asia and Africa.

Trinidad and Tobago
The Institute of International Relations had been founded fifty years ago, now with some 5,500 graduates. Both the Institute and the Caribbean Diplomatic Academy, two years old, were based at the University of the West Indies in Trinidad, offering onsite and online modules to all agencies in the Caribbean.

UNITAR
The United Nations Institute for Training and Research had principal centres in Geneva and New York, and fifteen bases around the world, offering face-to-face and online training in all topics. They had many partnerships already, and would welcome new ones.

United Arab Emirates
The Emirates Diplomatic Academy was the newest institution in the IFDT. The UAE was a young country, changing fast, its identity exemplified by its diplomacy. They trained some sixty diplomats per year, including a growing number of women. The programme, including executive training, offered a balance of academic and practitioner experience.

United Kingdom
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office had created the Diplomatic Academy in 2015. They were investing in diplomatic skills development, and building networks with colleagues in other institutions. They were developing a suite of online learning and digital resources, accessible to the three-quarters of the workforce based overseas, and promoting social learning in groups. They had the ambition to turn single courses into linked programmes.

United States
Georgetown University
The School of Foreign Service had launched a Certificate in Diplomatic Studies, offered at both undergraduate and postgraduate level, designed not just for those who aspired to careers in conventional diplomacy, but also for those in fields that sought to affect or were affected by diplomacy.

Tufts University
The Fletcher School continued to develop its work in the field of public diplomacy, under the direction of Admiral James Stavridis, former Strategic Allied Commander Europe. They offered a new programme, 'Preparation for a Digital World'. Scholarships were available for candidates from overseas.
Gala Dinner at the Australian War Memorial

Members of the Forum had the privilege of a guided tour of the Australian War Memorial and its exhibits, hosted by Major General (rtd) Mike Smith, Vice-President of the United Nations Association of Australia, former Director, Security Sector Advisory & Coordination Division, United Nations Mission in Libya; former Deputy Force Commander for the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor, former CEO of ActionAid and founder of the Australian Civil Military Centre.

General Smith noted that in the War Memorial there was no glorification of war, of victors and vanquished; it was a shrine of remembrance of the individuals who had given their lives for their ideals.

The group was welcomed by an Elder of the Ngunnawal people, Jeanette Phillips, who recalled that four generations of First Australians had fought in the two World Wars, and in Korea and Vietnam.

The keynote speech was given by Dr the Hon Brendan Nelson, Director of the Australian War Memorial, former Australian Ambassador to Belgium, Luxembourg, the EU and NATO; former Minister for Defence; former Minister for Education, Science and Training and former President of the Australian Medical Association.

Dr Nelson observed that engagement in the First World War had created Australia’s sense of itself as a nation. From a society of fewer than five million people, nearly half a million had volunteered to fight, of whom more than two hundred thousand had become casualties.

President John F Kennedy had said that a nation revealed itself in whom it chose to lead, and whom to honour. The War Memorial, with its stories of individual self-sacrifice, revered the idealism and heroism of ordinary Australians, equal in death. It now served to remind all Australians who they were as a people, and what they valued.

Iain ‘Fred’ Smith (son of Maj Gen Mike Smith), diplomat, award-winning musician and author of ‘The Dust of Uruzgan’ [Allen & Unwin 2016, ISBN 978 1 76029 221 8], the first comprehensive on-the-ground account of Australia’s mission in Afghanistan, completed the gala evening with a suite of memorable images, stories and songs.

Friday 23 September

Panel discussion 3:

Voice, representation and minilateralism in global governance

Chair:

Professor Michael Wesley, Director, Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, ANU (from 3 October, Dean of the College of Asia and the Pacific)

Panel:

Ambassador Armando Alvarez Reina, Ambassador of Mexico to Australia
High Commissioner Fook Seng Kwok, High Commissioner of Singapore to Australia
Dr Jeni Whalan, Senior Research Fellow, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Queensland

Professor Wesley recalled Innes Claude and ‘parliamentary diplomacy’ – the equal voice of all states in global governance; all were represented, and had a say. There were problems of co-ordination, and difficulties of decision-making and implementation. Hence, the value of minilateralism, to get things done in smaller groupings.
Armando Alvarez Reina, Ambassador of Mexico to Australia

MIKTA was a new, innovative international partnership formed by Mexico, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Turkey and Australia. [http://mikta.org/about/vision.php]. They had different neighbourhoods, languages, religions, cultures and political systems. Yet they had shared values and interests. They were consolidated democracies, with growing economies.

As middle powers, they carried international weight. They were members of the OECD and the G20, with more than 500 million people producing 8% of global GDP.

Their short-term goals were to strengthen bilateral relations, co-ordinate common positions, and foster joint co-operative projects. Their foreign ministers met three times a year, at G20, at UNGA, and in the country holding the chair (in 2016, Australia). They looked to incorporate other actors, including their parliaments, academia, media, youth and business leaders.

Mexico had been the first chair of MIKTA, in 2014. They were a supporter of multilateralism, a defender of international peace and security, and a promoter of sustainable development. They were in favour of UN reform, to make it more agile, accountable and representative.

MIKTA was a new pillar for international governance, seeking to foster an innovative, constructive diplomacy, building bridges between nations and regions, and supporting global causes through dialogue and co-operation.

Fook Seng Kwok, High Commissioner of Singapore to Australia

A country had to train its diplomats to operate in the world as it was, not how they would like it to be. How could small nations make their voice heard more loudly?

Many international organisations were exclusive. Some states still assumed they could exert influence from outside the room – but if you were not at the table, you were not heard. The old boys club was failing. The WTO Green Room was not what it used to be – non-members used to accept direction from the insiders, but since Pascal Lamy, no longer. 160 states had asked to join, to achieve their goals.

There had been a similar change in climate diplomacy. COP 10 in Copenhagen had been exclusive. COP 21 in Paris had been inclusive and transparent – wholly changed from six years before.

Things now got done through platforms and coalitions. Singapore was a member of the Association of Small Island States (AOSIS), the G77, the G20, the Global Governance Group (3G) and the Forum of Small States (a loose grouping, a safe space to feel included, having a stake in the process).

When big countries got together, they each had separate frames of reference, and excluded the viewpoints and realities of smaller states. Yet no matter how big, they couldn’t hijack the forum completely – therein lay the value of multilateral coalition, gaining access and information, and enhancing the credibility of the small state.

It was important to find a point of balance between private and public diplomacy – you had to keep working at both ends, building trust even if you disagreed. Some negotiators never spoke to their enemies. It was a fatal mistake – ‘frenemies’ needed to be engaged.

Megaphone diplomacy was not necessary. You didn’t have to repeat the same point doggedly; you were speaking to different audiences. But you could no longer get away with inconsistent messages to different partners.
Influence had to be earned. It was an endless process of working to sustain credibility; as soon as you stopped the effort, you lost throw-weight. You just had to be crystal clear about your own interests and objectives.

If you took a position helpful to someone else, you had something to trade. But you had also to remember the global commons, to work out what was best for the rest of the world, including your own state.

If you were not at the table, you needed to get yourself invited – you had to be seen and heard, and trusted. You could never rest.

**Dr Jeni Whalan, Senior Research Fellow, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Queensland**

The least representative of the global groups was the United Nations Security Council. It was the leading authority, an exclusive club, representing an old order from which the rest of the world had moved on.

Ten elected members represented 188 others, on the Council for only two years, struggling to make their voice heard over the five permanent members who had written and still controlled the rules of the game.

Constraints on the effectiveness of the elected members of the Council lay in its formal rules, its composition, the power of the veto, and an expansive agenda that made it difficult to exert sustained advocacy. The Council worked at a furious pace; decisions were taken at speed, often behind closed doors. The P5 controlled the informal practices and rules, for example in the allocation of the penholders responsible for drafting resolutions. By virtue of their permanence, the P5 had greater capacity, more staff and experience of the operation of the institution. The P3 (US, UK and France) were skilled at media politics, framing issues through briefings and leaks to the press – as, for example, on intervention in Libya under the responsibility to protect.

What hope was there for the 188? How could they make the Council more representative, and influence its decision-making? Structural reform? The proposals were old, and politically infeasible. The real problem was the gulf between the powers of the Security Council and of the General Assembly.

The answer lay in the need of the Security Council for legitimacy. The P5 needed the elected members, needed them to be effective, and representative of the broader UN membership. Without legitimacy, the Council lost its authority. If it were only a vessel of manipulation, states would ignore it; solutions would be found through other institutions – eg increasingly the African Union for African peacekeeping.

The binding effect of Security Council resolutions needed voluntary co-operation, whether enforcing sanctions or providing peacekeepers. This gave the non-members of the Security Council an opportunity to seek more direct access to the Council, demanding a larger consensus, and a voice for regional organisations.

What did this mean in practice? There were four ways in which the elected members could exploit the need of the Council and its permanent members for legitimacy, and influence outcomes:

1. improving the quality and diplomatic capacity of their missions in NY, ensuring that they were capable of responding quickly, effectively and autonomously;
2. the longer an issue was considered, the greater the opportunity for elected members to have an impact, for example, in the negotiation of humanitarian relief into Syria, in which Jordan, Luxembourg and Australia had managed to push through resolution 2165 at a time of great power deadlock;
3. small state associations and regional organisations, aggregating their interests and influence, forming ad hoc coalitions, and increasing their representativeness;
4. creative and innovative problem-solving, providing new solutions to new issues, with sound, principled argument, generating support for useful outcomes.

**In discussion:**

- The dynamics of legitimacy changed. Multilateralism itself was dynamic – diplomats needed to be agile and adaptable. They needed to understand how public policy and its priorities evolved day to day. It was no good just sending people off to do Masters degrees. You needed to be able to spot and cope with change, or to resist change – a fine line, depending on where you stood.

- Small states often made better elected members of the Security Council (eg New Zealand, Luxembourg, Jordan) They were better-focused, worked very hard, had clarity of interests to pursue, and no other means of influence than getting the job done in the moment, in the institution.

  To achieve this level of competence, you needed a good diplomatic academy, providing solid foundation training (as at Brazil’s Instituto Rio Branco, and Mexico’s Instituto Matías Romero), plus practice.

- Elected membership of the Security Council conferred a legacy of institutional learning, and influence. An elected member was at its most influential when just off the Council, back in the pack, as an aggregator of influence. The political co-ordinators were respected for their operational effectiveness as problem-solvers. A reputation for professional effectiveness could be laid down.

- Four inter-related observations:
  1. the increasing democratisation of international affairs since the Concert of Europe – the capacity of the Great Powers to dominate was decreasing
  2. the increasing role of civil society
  3. the importance of ‘being at the table’ – if you didn’t want to be on the menu
  4. the importance of the quality of the diplomacy – the smaller the state, the more important. If you didn’t have the money to bribe, or the military to bully, you had to rely on the skill of your diplomats to protect your interests and project your values.

  There were obvious Implications for diplomatic academies – the big players too rarely looked to smaller states for innovative ways of making a difference.

- The quality of a country’s diplomacy gave states a measure of effectiveness often underestimated. Singapore offered an example of the power of advocacy disproportionate to its size. Yet ministries of foreign affairs everywhere were under pressure of funding cuts.

  A doctoral dissertation had no relevance to diplomatic practice. The indicator of effectiveness of a ministry of foreign affairs was the quality of its diplomatic training.

- It was important for heads of training to be practitioners. You needed to keep line managers focused on continuous professional development (‘it took a village to make a child’); you had to spot talent and grow it; work with what you got, and know what you wanted to produce.

  Diplomats needed exposure on public policy, not just expertise in international relations; an MA in public policy was more useful.

  Good leaders nurtured their team, giving them space to think, to re-orientate, to gain perspective, to understand the difference between strategy and tactics; and space to rest – if you didn’t sleep, you didn’t learn.
In a big delegation, as for climate change negotiations, ten or more line ministries would be represented, responsible for implementing later whatever had been agreed. It was in the enlightened self-interest of diplomats to help other ministries understand, and to be engaged in what they were doing – foreign was domestic, and vice versa.

- Was a good diplomat a product of nature or nurture? Training assumed that nurture trumped nature, but was this so?

- Democratisation of international affairs conferred legitimacy, but there was a risk of atomisation and fragmentation in the development of smaller coalitions of states. In a rules-based environment, the Security Council remained the only legitimate body; but it needed to recognise and embrace change, and adapt to it.

- There was no contradiction between the UN and MIKTA. Both served as a bridge between developed and developing countries. MIKTA was reinforcing multilateral action, building networks of interest in a multi-polar world. Different constellations were needed to deal with activities in different issue areas.

- Was the identification of MIKTA as a group of ‘consolidated democracies’ still valid, after the purges in Turkey following the attempted military coup? What were the implications of change for the association, as the character of the parties changed? Would the rest of the partners continue to pursue its objectives?

- Minilateralism was an essential element of the new world order. Its effectiveness came down, in the end, to the quality of the individual diplomat.

Panel discussion 4:

**Small Island State diplomacy in the Asian century**

Chair:

*Dr Katerina Tea*

Associate Professor, Department of Gender, Media and Cultural Studies, School of Culture, History and Language, The Australian National University

Panel:

*Professor Emeritus Greg Fry*, Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy, ANU

*Ambassador Isikeli Mataitoga*, Ambassador of Fiji to Russia, Japan and Philippines

*Dr Mark Curtin*, Senior Lecturer, University of the West Indies

**Professor Emeritus Greg Fry, Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy, ANU**

Small state collective diplomacy: the Pacific case

The small island states of the Pacific included eight of the most aid-dependent countries in the world; their association was no CARICOM; they were burdened by all the usual constraints of size (they had had relatively few delegates at COP21 in Paris from fourteen different countries), yet they were remarkably successful at acting together.

There had been two distinct periods of effective Pacific small state diplomacy: the 1970s and 80s (when they had successfully challenged colonial control of the regional diplomatic forum, the South Pacific Commission, and had negotiated the Tuna Treaty giving jurisdiction over migratory species, and compensation), and from 2009 to the present, with a frustrating period of doldrums in between.

There had been a paradigm shift in Pacific diplomacy in the years 2009-2016. The Pacific Small Island Developing States group (PSIDS) had been created in 2009, without the dominant voices of the regional great powers, Australia and New Zealand. In 2013, they had lobbied successfully for oceans management to be included in the Sustainable Development
Goals, and had been energetic advocates in the climate negotiations at COP21 in 2015. They had concluded a new Tuna Treaty with the United States in 2016.

The success of their diplomacy had been based on a coherent sense of regional identity, with strong and determined leadership asserting the rights of sovereign peoples. They had forged strategic alliances with large powers (leveraging their voting bloc in multilateral fora), and had waged effective public diplomacy campaigns. The PSIDS had emerged as a serious deliberative organisation, with a collective voice committed to global leadership. By shrewd positioning, they had managed to get both their act and their arenas right.

**Amb Isikeli Mataitoga, Ambassador of Fiji to Russia, Japan and Philippines**

Fiji held the Presidency of the UN General Assembly in 2016. They were seeking to develop their own priorities, with strategies that made sense within limited resources (a population of only 900,000, with an economy dependent on agriculture, fisheries, tourism and remittances). They placed a high premium on sovereign independence; they were not interested in pressure from anyone, anywhere; they knew what they wanted and needed.

Their diplomacy had to be prioritised, planning outreach to maximise the return on their investment. They supported the UN framework, but were developing their own framework, transcending former colonial boundaries. They were constantly reviewing where they were, in relationships, in groupings, deciding whether to stay or go, opening new dialogues and trying out new approaches (‘even if you crashed, you had learned new lessons’). You had to be an agenda setter, to be in the committee, at the table.

To produce the diplomats who would deliver this, they had created their own training course, six years in development. They sought naturally resourceful, nimble multi-taskers, IT savvy, able to develop new and different skills and think on their feet. No pin-stripped suit was required. The development of cultural, language and inter-personal skills was a priority.

**Dr Mark Curtin, Senior Lecturer, University of the West Indies**

The Caribbean was a complex region of fifteen diverse coastal and island states, with both converging and competing interests. There had been several efforts at integration (OAS, ACS, UNASUR, GULAC, CARICOM), especially during the period of decolonisation. The process of widening and deepening the Caribbean common market continued today. With small economies, now challenged by climate change, they were aware of the need for collective diplomacy. In particular, they had been conscious of the need to bridge the divide between Caribbean and Latin American states.

Since the 2000s, there had been new integration efforts, and new developments within SELA (the Latin American and Caribbean Economic System), re-thinking the role of oil and gas in the petro-Caribbean, in the post-Chavez period.

The growing engagement of China in the region posed questions about the management of the relationship for mutual benefit. India and Brazil were increasingly important partners. There were concerns about the impact that Brexit might have on aid flows to the Caribbean.

Some issues still constrained progress in the region, including trans-national organised crime, drug-trafficking (more and more drugs were staying in the Caribbean, impacting economies and social services), and new security threats such as the radicalisation of young fighters (more than 100 already) by ISIS recruiters.

A collective diplomatic effort was needed to represent the common interests of the middle income and developing countries of the region, whether in negotiations with the IMF and World Bank, or mitigation of the impacts of climate change. They were conducting a diplomacy of engagement with the emerging economies of the global south. The Caribbean Diplomatic Academy was helping to develop the skills needed.
In discussion:

• The Blue Economy initiative brought together six countries of the Caribbean, Indian and Pacific Oceans all fighting against the water, developing systems of coastal protection and sustainable management of their maritime resources.

• The Blue Economy was too vague a notion, a bit poetic. The Oceans Management SDG was better-focused, dealing with the specificities of legal regimes. (The UNESCAP Regional Meeting on Climate Change and Migration in the Pacific was to be held in Suva in December 2016.)

• The core issues were independent, and needed to be addressed separately, avoiding political dirigisme and interference from commercial interests.

• A number of separate efforts were being made (by the Australian and US governments) to deal with the explosive remnants of war in the Pacific Ocean, but there was no coherent approach. A diplomatic initiative was needed at the United Nations to agree a methodical plan to clean up the ocean bed.

• It was a difficult and complex issue to address, involving a legal case against the United States. There was as yet no political will to put it on the agenda. It could be useful to widen the discussion.

• The size of the Pacific Ocean space allowed flexibility of relationships, without challenging identity. Fiji’s diplomacy reflected independence of mind, grappling with challenging issues, solving problems on their own. They had been host to a range of international and regional bodies; the need for a competent and robust civil service to manage these flows of international actors had grown out of this role. Suva had become a regional and international centre. (Papua New Guinea, by contrast, had been more dependent on outside help, and had not developed so flexible an approach.)

• Was Cuba the Singapore of the Caribbean? There had been forty-three years of interchange in the region, and multi-layered collaboration, for example in the training of doctors, in trade, tourism and information technology. The Caribbean-Cuban Commission for SME development offered the Caribbean as an entry point to the Cuban market – as interlocutor, mediator and English-language partner. It was a synergistic relationship.

• Diplomatic training in small island states was limited, but growing. In Trinidad and Tobago, the Institute of International Relations was training people who became senior international players, but largely by accident. The new Caribbean Diplomatic Academy was providing new programmes, but small ministries found it difficult to release their diplomats for even five days. Much needed to be done by online and blended learning.

In Fiji, the starting point was the MA in International Relations offered by the University of the South Pacific. They were thinking through the specific interests of each country in the region, and the needs for professional development that followed from them. It was essential to work with the whole public service, not just with five or six people in the foreign ministry. It was important also to address cross-cultural human relations, not just state and inter-state affairs.

• Diplomatic training could be achieved through self-help, with determination simply to forge ahead. ‘The New Pacific Diplomacy’, edited by Greg Fry and Sandra Tarte, was a useful resource, available free online from ANU Press.
Working Group:

Skill sets required for the Twenty-first Century Diplomat

Facilitator:
*Ambassador (rtd) Peter Rodgers, Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy, ANU*

Digital diplomacy

- A priority was responding to changes in public diplomacy, developing training for digital diplomacy – two-way conversations between MFAs and the rest of the world.
- Twitter was useless for diplomats – there were a lot of *so-what* tweets, and no gain of important information. The official positions of government were known, so you were not adding anything new. If you were expressing an interesting view, you were useful, but probably also in trouble.
- Trolls could distort and undermine the digital conversation. This was a high-risk activity – not diplomacy.
- It was a necessary tool; all diplomats had to know how to use it. Digital diplomacy was here to stay, and it was our obligation to teach it, and expand its reach – providing online courses for officers at all ages and stages, in particular helping older diplomats.
- Leadership mattered. The permanent secretary could set an example in his or her own blog, and encourage more junior staff to have the courage to try. They then needed training in how to do it properly and effectively.
- *Richard Boly*, the first Director of the Office of eDiplomacy in the State Department, had observed, ‘The world was talking to itself; we had to go out and join the conversation.’
- Diplomacy now wasn’t just for diplomats; rather, social media offered platforms for people with no foreign policy training. Diplomats could make an informed contribution to that global conversation.
- Web-based activity was a helpful multiplier for small foreign ministries without the resources to have a large physical presence.
- Often, though, its use was limited to consular affairs and old-fashioned presidential communications.

Inter-departmental co-ordination

- Leadership was not dictatorship. You had to create an operational environment to achieve your objectives. To do that, you had to understand the internal dynamics of the system. That was what needed teaching.
- It was essential to know your own domestic context. The diplomat played the role of co-ordinator, with a broader strategic sense of the national interest, imposing discipline on the plethora of other voices running off in different directions. This required strong intellectual skills, thinking holistically, marshalling resources and ideas. You had to be not only a manager but a true leader. Otherwise you would be run over by the Ministry of Defence and the Treasury.
- The role of the foreign ministry, especially of small countries, had been diminished. Once having been the leader, then the co-ordinator, now sometimes they did not even know
what was going on (as, for example, in the climate change negotiations, which had been conducted beyond the ambit of the ministry of foreign affairs).

- A key contribution of diplomatic academies was to provide training for specialist people in the basics of diplomacy. There was a reverse question of how much you needed to provide diplomats with specialist knowledge of economics, energy or defence.

- Foreign service officers needed sufficient knowledge to carry authority in the inter-departmental conversation. They needed to be part of a team, rather than just obedient followers. They had to know enough about what everybody was doing, to be able to pull it all together. They played the role of the conductor. The score was the public policy; their task was to understand what story it was telling, to recognise what each instrument brought to the piece, so to ensure that people were not duplicating their parts, nor playing different tunes.

- The conductor also needed to know where the music was going in the longer term, looking ahead twenty to twenty-five years to understand the underlying trends, for example on water and energy, and their impact on international power.

- The ambassador was not necessarily the best player, but needed to produce harmony. Having no sectoral interest, he or she could decide the focus and direction of the moment, identify the main interest, and enable people to pursue it.

- Training people from different ministries in the same programme could be a transitive integrator, helping to break down departmental silos.

- Too many diplomats were simply spinning their wheels, without a sense of mission. They needed to be much less risk averse. Training needed to focus on proactivity, empowering people to go out and achieve real things for their country.

Political appointees

- Politically appointed Heads of Mission sometimes had few skills, and no training. It was difficult to help them to be operationally effective.

- The burden of leadership usually fell on the Deputy Head of Mission. The responsibility and workload were enormous.

- Political appointees could be helpful in a crisis, good at representation and interaction with the community. The trick was to bolt on advice from the professionals on political and strategic issues. It required subtle skill to manage up, as well as back to capital. It was perhaps harder still in small missions.

Panel discussion 5:

Diplomatic Theory and Diplomatic Practice: A Tale of Two Worlds?

Chair:
Professor Ramesh Thakur, Crawford School of Public Policy, Australian National University

Panel:
Professor Geoff Wiseman, Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy, ANU
Odo Rene Mathew Manuhutu, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia
Petr Blizkovsky, General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, Brussels
Professor Geoff Wiseman, Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy

Both theory and practice were moving progressively away from their former focus and dependency on sovereign state actors.

There clearly still were two worlds – international relations academics, and diplomatic practitioners – theory and practice professionals talking past each other.

In one sense the gap between them was narrowing. There was a burgeoning academic literature moving closer to practice. There were many new diplomatic academies drawing more on theory. Still, both sides had epistemic blindspots.

One of them was rank careerism. In the narrow world of the scholar, some were more interested in getting on, than in building knowledge in the context of the real world. The practitioner, too, was getting on with getting up, and not paying enough attention to the conceptual context of their profession.

Scholars looked at the national interest concept as a highly contested social construct. Diplomats behaved as though it were self-evident. A constructivist would look at Brexit, or what it meant to be British, as an identities question. A diplomat was part of an international society. Diplomats from ASEAN states represented not only the national interest, but collective goals to the rest of the international system. Diplomats needed to be aware of two interlocking games, at home and abroad.

What could the academics do? Institutions had to open up much more to practitioners, publish books with chapters written by practitioners, and journals with case studies by practitioners. Focused practical tradecraft needed to be meshed with statecraft from an academic perspective. Diplomatic academies could get the two worlds talking together.

[ See the collection of essays in The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy, edited by Andrew Cooper, Jorge Heine and Ramesh Thakur, where theory met practice. ]

Petr Blizkovsky, Council Secretariat, European Union

Were theory and practice really two different worlds? There was a confusion of vocabulary – there was no theory of diplomacy, only of international relations. Was diplomacy an art or a science? Tradecraft had a scientific basis, but the rest was an artistic performance.

Would theory improve efficiency in doing the job? Would it provide useful knowledge, or be too long, too boring, with too little relevance to operational reality? Without functional utility, there would be no effective cross-pollination. Joint participation in research projects could be worthwhile, using the perceptions of the practitioners to help shape theory, making it congruent with practical reality.

Were the diplomacies of the EU and Asia different? Each had its own cultures and practices, but all diplomats were essentially communicators, negotiators, facilitators. EU diplomacy was legalistic and institutional, trapped in the media spotlight. Stakeholders and think-tanks played too big a role; endless consultation made it difficult to reach agreement. Asian diplomacy appeared to be more softly-spoken in its diverse settings; more flexible, with greater acceptance of non-binding agreements.

Three suggestions on training:
1. Locate training in practice, bringing practitioners into classes, and trainees into the day-to-day process of diplomacy. Make it iterative, building sequentially, cumulatively, a week at a time.
2. Train the diplomat to be a horizontalist, capable of doing whatever was needed. The most important task was to get the mandate right, spending time on the internal dialogue
with the authorities. An ambassador was not elected, but had to be able to frame his or her own mandate; they had the most information, spoke to the most people, knew best the political terrain.

3. Help the trainee to bridge the gap between diplomats and politicians. They needed to understand the two very different worlds – organise job-shares, get them into the minister’s office, where they could see at first hand the pressures and priorities.

**Odo Rene Mathew Manuhutu, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia**

The digital world was challenging the analogue world. The high-speed transfer of information now demanded instant response. The diplomat was always On, always behind…

Despite the frenetic pace of events, it was essential to have a framework of systematic analysis as the basis of policy advice.

Diplomats needed also to be trained to communicate, to be part of the global digital conversation.

A third priority was training for leadership in a changing and chaotic world. You did not need to be a superman or woman, but agile, adaptable and fast-thinking, capable of managing uncertainty (‘creating a new regional order in a 7/11 convenience store environment’).

Training needed to encourage creativity, with time built in for reflection. (They were training their senior diplomats to do yoga.)

**In discussion:**

- To be a complete diplomat, you had to go back and forth between the bilateral and the multilateral, each with their own requirements and constraints. To operate effectively, you needed to be trained to understand the differences of substance, procedure and process.

- The best diplomats would be conceptualisers. If you couldn’t see your country’s place in the world, you would be condemned to the detail, the banal.

- Part of the study of diplomacy was to map the changing terrain within which to work, to highlight the different tools required, such as social media. R2P was an interesting example of a norm that had become an operational practicality.

- The gap between theory and practice might be widening, but the number of people going back and forth across the divide was growing.

- Part of the problem in bridging the gap was that performance indicators for advancing academic careers offered no incentive to engage with agencies of the state. Individuals might by chance be interested or have more flexibility, or find fruitful linkage between their research objectives and contacts in the field.

- Similarly, there was little incentive for diplomats to engage with scholarly research, unless it happened to make the job easier, or faster. The problem with most journals was that the assessors were self-referential; practitioners were not consulted, making the findings less accurate, and less useful. It was necessary to involve and connect with practitioners, if you wanted to get it right.

- With its ‘Bridging the Gap’ initiative, the Carnegie Corporation of New York was providing major grants to encourage exchange of research and expertise between academics and policy people.
• Academic journalese deterred diplomats from engaging with ideas. Think tanks helped bring abstruse theory down to earth, in accessible language. Foreign ministries increasingly were bringing academics in to brief, to discuss, to provide conceptual construct. The academic world was less good at bringing in the practitioner – the lowest in the caste system – not part of the faculty, merely hired help. Scholars needed to welcome professional standing more, making it a two-way bridge.

• The growing academic field of diplomatic studies offered a bridge, reflecting on events over time, understanding context, while avoiding abstract meta-theories of diplomacy. It focused on what diplomats did, offering theory of negotiation or of public diplomacy, operationalised in teaching.

• There was scope in foreign ministries for the role of academic liaison officer, perhaps having already a doctoral qualification, tasked with going out into the academic community to find and connect with those who could be useful to the policy process, helping practitioners to identify problems, to get beneath the surface, to understand the social dynamics of a political issue.

• Functional interaction could help: a university creating a case study for the ministry; young diplomats encouraged to study for degrees. (A 20 year-old student was training senior diplomats to use social media.)

• It was important to remember the wider community of actors in international relations. Business leaders at Davos influenced policy through debate. Investment and trade diplomacy resolved problems. Any good network had many non-state actors. The collective interest embraced more than just the national interest.

Final Session: Future of the IFDT and Closing Remarks

The co-chairs thanked the hosts, Dr Jochen Prantl and Ms Andrea Haese, and all the people involved in the preparation and implementation of the Meeting. The next hosts had a difficult act to follow.

The Forum was operating well under the new system, with an annual membership fee of EUR 200. More institutions had registered, and paid, than had been able to come to Canberra. The IFDT wanted to grow, so would welcome members’ promoting it in their regions as a useful platform for networking and exchange of views.

The membership fee had been levied to provide a better and more professional website. It was much improved, but was not yet used enough. It was open to all, with a closed part accessed by password, where members could promote their institutions, announce new initiatives and engage in debate between Meetings. The Forum was grateful to Dr Jovan Kurbalija and his team at the Diplo Foundation for their efforts in getting the new website up and running.

Dr Kurbalija gave an online commentary from Geneva on developments in the Diplomatic Training Platform in the year August 2015 to September 2016. (The text was available online, and in hard copy at the Meeting.)

The website had been re-designed into a more practical, material-responsive platform that supported mobile devices. Content coverage had deepened: in addition to the directory of member institutions and reports from the annual meetings, the platform now included an IFDT map showing the geographic location of member institutions, a calendar of upcoming events and courses, announcements of the WebDebates, a list of diplomacy-related resources, and blogs. The IFDT platform also maintained the Twitter account @ifdt_tweets.

The most important update since the Warsaw Meeting had been the introduction of monthly webinars, the WebDebates. On the first Tuesday of every month, thirty to forty diplomats, professionals involved in diplomacy and researchers from all over the world met online to
discuss key topics related to the future of diplomacy and diplomatic training. Since April 2016, five WebDebates had been organised (was a diplomatic service still needed; could diplomacy be learned from books; was research on diplomacy relevant and useful; could diplomacy be learned only on the job; why and how to teach negotiation). The next WebDebate, on 4 October, would discuss the key skills needed by the next-generation diplomat. Further events were planned for the Americas, Africa and Asia.

Dr Kurbaliija presented the first annual Financial Report. In the startup year, costs of EUR 14,049 had exceeded total income of EUR 9,067. This initial deficit, owing to non-recurring up-front costs, would be paid down by membership fees in the coming year.

The Diplo financial management team urged members to notify the IFDT coordinator, Mina Mudrlic (minam@diplomacy.edu), when a payment (preferably by Paypal or credit card) had been made. Tracing the origin of payments had proved to be time-consuming and costly.

Future Meetings of the Forum were planned two years in advance. In 2017, the Meeting would be held in Santiago, on 6-8 September, a little earlier than usual to avoid Chilean national holidays. In 2018, the Meeting would be hosted in Georgetown, on the 45th anniversary of the Forum, of which it was the co-founder, dates to be confirmed.

A decision in principle had been taken to hold the Meeting in 2019 in Geneva, co-organised by UNITAR, the Diplo Foundation, the Graduate Institute and the Geneva Centre for Security Policy. Commitments for 2019 and beyond remained flexible. There had been a number of expressions of interest. Given the growing membership of the Forum, and wider regional representation, it was important to keep the venues diverse, each one bringing a fresh perspective. All else being equal, it was intended that the Meeting would not be held on the same continent twice in a row.

Ambassador Dr Winkler bade farewell to the Forum. It was to be the last of his nine Meetings. Co-chairing the IFDT had been one of the most fascinating tasks in his post-diplomatic career. The Meetings of Deans and Directors had been a wonderful idea (his own Director had been one of the originators), and the Forum was assured of a bright future.

Ambassador Bodine expressed the warmest gratitude of the whole Forum to Hans Winkler for all he had done over those nine years, helping to build the IFDT with effective leadership from Vienna.

In a message from former co-chair Peter Crowe in Washington, the Forum recognised and thanked Ralph Feltham, one of the original founding fathers, who had passed away. His 1979 pamphlet, ‘Training for an international career’, was still as current and fresh on almost every point as when it had been published, addressing the qualities of intellect and character needed in diplomacy – ‘the essential profession’ to safeguard peace, security and prosperity.

Ambassador Juan Somavia welcomed members of the Forum to Santiago. The Asia Pacific College of Diplomacy had delivered a superb Meeting, not least in the moving evening at the War Memorial, which had helped the group to understand the meaning of Australia, and had reminded them all of the importance of diplomacy in avoiding war.

Canberra had set the bar high, but there was nothing better than a challenge in diplomacy. The IFDT was an institution that continued to prove its worth, as at this Meeting, and they looked forward to reinforcing it in Santiago.

Elder Jeanette Phillips closed the Meeting with a vivid account of the history and diplomacy of her people, and of their struggle to recover their language and traditions. ‘Great Spirit bless every one of you. Leave something of yourself behind. Welcome to Ngunnawal land.’

John Hemery
Rapporteur