

# INTERNATIONAL FORUM ON DIPLOMATIC TRAINING

## 37th Meeting of Deans and Directors of Diplomatic Academies and Institutes of International Relations

**Diplomatische Academy  
Vienna School of Diplomatic Studies  
23 – 25 September 2009**

The 37<sup>th</sup> Meeting of Deans and Directors returned to Vienna, one of the two founding and sustaining pillars, with Georgetown, of the International Forum.

The new Director of the Academy, *Ambassador Dr Hans Winkler*, welcomed members of the Forum. He had been a student at the Academy at the outset of his career, and was proud and grateful to have the honour now of leading it. He remembered with gratitude the contribution to the development of the Forum of former Director, the late *Ambassador Dr Ernst Sucharipa*.

*Professor Paula Newberg*, newly-appointed Director of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University, reflected on the objectives of the founders of the Forum, representing both academic and diplomatic institutions, to bring together the study and practice of diplomacy. The Forum met now at a time, under a new Administration in the United States, when diplomacy had been brought once again to the fore, and when co-operation in international affairs was needed more and more.

*Professor Alan Henrikson* offered an appreciation of *Professor Casimir Yost* during his tenure as Director at Georgetown and co-chair of the Forum. [*Prof Yost* had been appointed Director of Long-Term Strategy at the National Intelligence Council.] Georgetown was, with the Fletcher School at Tufts University, one of the two oldest centres for the study of diplomacy in the United States, and *Cas Yost* had continued the great tradition begun by *Dean Peter Krogh* and *Edmund Gullion*, leading the American pillar of the partnership with grace, knowledge and success. On behalf of all the members of the Forum, he commended and thanked him.

*Ambassador Dr Winkler* thanked warmly *Mag Gerhard Reiweger*, who in his twelve years at the Academy had contributed greatly to the preparation and conduct of the Meetings in Vienna, and congratulated him now on his appointment to be Austrian ambassador to Bulgaria.

He generously thanked also *Dr John Hemery*, Director of the Centre for Political and Diplomatic Studies (UK), for his work as Rapporteur of the Meetings.

### **Keynote Address**

*Ambassador Johannes Kyrle*, Secretary General of the Ministry of European and International Affairs of Austria, welcomed members the Forum to Vienna, one of the three seats of the United Nations. Austria was now a non-permanent Member of the United Nations Security Council, and a reliable contributor to peace and dialogue.

The Diplomatic Academy of Vienna had a role to play in that process, helping to prepare experts with the knowledge and skills needed in peacekeeping and the protection of human rights under the rule of law.

EU Member States faced an important moment in the evolution of the Union with the possible ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon, which would bring changes in EU

decision-making on foreign and security policy, and the creation of a multi-national foreign service. Here, too, the Diplomatic Academy looked forward to playing a role, in close co-operation with institutions in other member states, in providing training for the European External Action Service. The Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs would support the Academy in contributing to the growth of Europe's capacity to play a global role.

The European project was not yet completed. Countries of the Western Balkans awaited accession to the Union. Reforms were needed; all had to meet the criteria of entry, but the door had to remain open. They had Austria's support, not least through programmes of twinning, exchange and training. Since 1990, more than six hundred officials from the region had come to the Academy. Programmes of training co-operation were now under way with the EU's near neighbours Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and the countries of the South Caucasus, financed by the Austrian Development Agency.

### **Reports from Regional Groups: the regional dimension of diplomatic training**

#### **Africa** (*Ambassador Bonaventure Mpasi, rapporteur*)

The Africa group had developed rapidly since the 34th Meeting of the Forum in Vienna in 2006, where discussion of creating an African Chapter had begun. Eight countries now were represented.

The first African meeting had been held in Cairo in 2007 to determine the agenda of the 35th Meeting of the Forum, held for the first time in Africa, in Maputo later that year under the joint auspices of the governments of Mozambique and South Africa. The African group would meet for the third time in Kinshasa in 2009. The fourth regional meeting would be held in Algiers in December, 2010. Each meeting was to concentrate on a particular theme, economic or other forms of diplomacy.

As new diplomatic academies were being established in African countries, they were keen to develop new frameworks of co-operation both amongst themselves and with partner countries and institutions from around the world. There were plans to develop, through the African Union, a protocol of African diplomatic training.

#### **Middle East / Asia-Pacific** (*Ambassador Hasmy Agam, rapporteur*)

Sixteen participants from thirteen countries, including for the first time Australia, had discussed developments in skills training, especially in negotiation, leadership and crisis management. New programmes were being developed for training spouses, senior managers and foreign diplomats. Training increasingly needed to reach out beyond the foreign ministry to other ministries. Given large distances and the limited resources of some governments in the Asia-Pacific region, there was scope for further development in computer-based and online learning.

The group had discussed also the importance of increasing the focus of the annual Forum meetings on other parts of the world, rather than just on Europe. More consultation was needed on the agenda.

#### **North America / Caribbean** (*Cherryl Gordon, rapporteur*)

Representatives of institutions in the United States, Canada and Jamaica had discussed in particular pre-deployment training for people from a number of ministries and agencies being posted to zones of conflict. Topics had included the challenge of working with a profusion of 'diplomatic actors', many of them by-passing state channels and establishing their own multinational networks. (An example was *Business for Diplomatic Action*, which offered internships and training in the United States to young businesspeople from abroad.)

Changes in American policy had led to renewed emphasis on training for multilateral diplomacy, and increased interest in co-operation with African institutes of diplomatic training, and potentially with Cuba. A new programme of training for public diplomacy had been developed at the Fletcher School, reaching out especially to the Islamic world. Global issues such as climate change were spawning new training, for example in the diplomacy of the Law of the Sea. The group had been interested also in the new challenges presented by the emergence of a conjoined European diplomatic service.

**Latin America** (*Ambassador Juan Salazar Sparks, rapporteur*)

Representatives of five countries had discussed the development of e-learning programmes, especially for people at post, and comparative studies of different regions of the world. There was scope for further development of training for the regional multilateral organisations, such as Mercosur. There was a long tradition of co-operation amongst the diplomatic academies of the region. The group would meet next in Santiago in November, 2009, to discuss a regional joint programme of research, publication and syllabus development.

The diplomatic services of the region were becoming less elitist. Academies were reaching out to civil society, offering courses to the media, business and political parties. New entries were increasingly diverse. There were fewer lawyers and economists, more scientists and social scientists. They brought greater professional knowledge to the foreign ministry, but diplomacy was no longer a vocation, now ‘just a job’. The flair of being a representative of the country had lost some of its lustre.

**Europe** (*John Hemery, rapporteur*)

Thirty-five members of the Forum from twenty-six countries and two international organisations had discussed new developments, new issues and new ideas:

*New developments:*

- An Armenian diplomatic academy was being established in Yerevan.
- Estonia, Finland and Sweden had established a joint scholarship fund to enable diplomats from Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine to study in Tallinn.
- Unitar was opening its programmes of training to participants outside the UN family of organisations.
- The European Commission was expanding its programmes of training bringing together diplomats from EU Member States with officials from the EU Institutions.
- A number of foreign ministries were drawing on the expertise and differing perspectives of corporate, sub-national government and civil society actors in developing training for an increasingly complex international environment.

*New issues:*

- The Forum, with its mix of representatives from foreign ministries, international organisations and academic institutions, reflected both the opportunity and the difficulty of effective co-operation between institutions having differing constituencies, approaches and priorities. There was too big a gap between knowledge and skills, theory and practice.
- Measurement of value for money in training was sometimes a challenge.

*New ideas:*

- The Forum could pay greater attention to non-traditional diplomacy, between state, sub-state, private sector and civil society actors.
- Governance was larger than governments; training was needed for working within proliferating multilateral institutions, for ‘managing globalisation’.
- As the nature of sovereignty was increasingly blurred, training was needed to operate in the space between national and multiple shared identities.

- The state nevertheless remained the predominant actor in the international system. Small states were potentially disadvantaged. Training was needed on how to make your voice heard, with limited resources. A practical handbook could be developed for people covering many dossiers.
- The Internet, e-mail and social networking were transforming the ways in which people interacted. Training needed to follow trends in the nature of communication, including the interplay of face-to-face and online exchanges.
- A great deal of attention had been paid to the training of new entrants and mid-career diplomats. More needed to be done to develop programmes for senior staff.
- As the prospect of a European diplomatic service grew closer, there was scope for developing programmes of exchange between academic and practitioner institutions – an Erasmus of diplomacy.

**Following the presentation of regional reports,** points raised in discussion included:

- The fundamental shift to those coming into the foreign service as a job rather than as a profession for life presented ministries with major challenges of discontinuity. Work needed to be done on how to retain people.
- Not all countries were experiencing difficulties in retention. With increasing national wealth, many diplomatic services were growing. The profile of the diplomat was changing, but competition was keen and the quality of new entrant remained high.
- It was important to build working alliances with the international media. If they didn't know or understand what went on inside international conferences, their reporting could be unhelpful at best.
- Journalists argued that no-one wanted to hear about the process of diplomacy. The Diplo Foundation had offered a workshop for journalists in Geneva, explaining the work of the diplomat, with its core values of compromise and conflict resolution. The training had proved useful in pricking the prejudices of envy and ignorance.
- It could be helpful to recruit working journalists to serve as press and public affairs officers in key embassies abroad.
- The agenda of Forum meetings should focus on new issues such as global health diplomacy, and on consequent changes in training syllabi.

Panel discussion:

**The European External Action Service:  
a new instrument in the conduct of the EU's external relations**

*Patrick Child,*

Chef de cabinet to Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Commissioner for External Relations

*Sir Brian Crowe,*

former Director General for External Relations, General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, Vice-Chairman of Chatham House

*Axel Wernhoff,*

Deputy Head of the European Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Sweden (currently holding the rotating Presidency of the Council of the EU)

**Patrick Child**

It was important to recall that the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) hinged on the outcome of the referendum in Ireland on the Treaty of Lisbon. If ratified, the Treaty would bring important changes to institutions and structures designed to enable the EU to be a more effective, coherent, serious international actor.

A new figurehead, the High Representative/Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP), would combine in one person (*not* a Minister) the roles now carried out by the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (currently Javier Solana) and the Commissioner for External Relations (currently Benita Ferrero-Waldner.) The HR/VP would chair the monthly meetings of Foreign Ministers and oversee the co-ordination of the Commission's external activities. The EEAS would take over the role of the country holding the rotating Presidency in working with third countries and international institutions.

This development was strongly supported by European citizens, who wished to see the EU play a stronger part in dealing with global issues such as climate change and managing the financial crisis.

The EEAS would not be starting from scratch. The EU had already a range of strategic partnerships in crisis management, civil-military intervention, international development assistance and the promotion of democracy and human rights.

Nevertheless there were complex personal and inter-institutional issues to be resolved which would require a constructive, imaginative approach to change. A number of principles had been agreed between the Member States (MS) and the Commission:

- All wanted the EEAS to work, to be effective, hence it would need to look and be able to act like a foreign ministry, with administrative and budgetary autonomy while remaining closely connected with the EU institutions.
- There would be geographical desks covering all regions, and functional desks dealing for example with the United Nations and human rights.
- Trade, development and EU enlargement would remain within the competence of the Commission.
- The EEAS, under the responsibility of the HR/VP, would become the primary source of foreign policy advice to the President of the Council, the President of the Commission and the HR/VP. It would serve in this respect also the Member States and the European Parliament.
- The 135 Delegations of the European Commission would develop naturally into EU embassies. They would need additional resources, and staff would need new skills to take on the tasks now carried out by the missions of the MS holding the Presidency of the Council (co-ordinating EU positions and representing the MS in third countries).
- It was to be a shared enterprise by equal stakeholders – Commission, Council Secretariat and Member States – with a joint interest in its success.

A number of issues remained outstanding:

- the scope of responsibility of the HR/VP and of the EEAS, for example on questions of budget and consular affairs;
- the schedule of transition; complex questions of staff regulations, financial regulations, reorganisation and recruitment had to be addressed;
- staffing (especially senior appointments) and other elements of transition from European Commission Delegations to EU Embassies;
- training (of EU staff in diplomacy, and of MS diplomats in EU law, lore and practice).

### **Sir Brian Crowe**

The media were apt to focus, wrongly, on the EEAS. The key reform in the Treaty of Lisbon was the creation of the post of HR/VP. The EEAS was there to serve that person; it had no other function in the Treaty.

It was a key interest of all to enable the HR/VP to function well. But there were a number of problems:

- The double- or triple-hatting of the role of the HR/VP made it a virtually impossible job, and undermined the separation of powers under the Treaty of Rome;
- The HR/VP would require the confidence of the MS in Council, especially of the larger MS without which the EU could have no credible foreign policy; but also of the smaller MS without whom there would be no consensus, no ‘European voice’ to articulate European interests in global affairs;
- Jealousies within the Commission and between MS could lead to the EEAS being seen as a threat, undermining the lines of authority through the HR/VP;
- The European Parliament, with enhanced powers under the Lisbon Treaty and in assertive mood, could seek to exert a measure of control over the EEAS, if not directly then through its budgetary powers;
- The bulk of staff at post would be Commission officials unschooled in diplomatic practice.

The challenge was *how* to make the EEAS work well for the HR/VP. It would require:

- strong management
- a proper career structure
- appointment of the best from Commission, Council Secretariat and Member States
- effective co-operation with the diplomatic services of the MS, building on national experience and technical skills
- training in the basic bureaucratic skills of drafting, reporting, lobbying, negotiating
- training in how the EU functions.

The objective was to provide a service to the HR/VP as good or better than national foreign services, so that the MS would have confidence in it.

### **Axel Wernhoff**

The Swedish Presidency was proceeding cautiously with scenario-planning, conscious of the sensitivity of the issue in Member States and the EU institutions. Since May 2009 they had been holding informal bilateral conversations with all MS on the design of the EEAS. The objective was to reach political agreement on the parameters and political principles of the service. Shared ownership was essential to the legitimacy of the new institution.

There were six principle dimensions of political agreement:

1. **scope:**
  - there were to be strong geographic desks and thematic units, but it was not yet clear how far the EEAS would have an independent administration, or would draw on Commission structures;
  - there was no agreement on how far the EEAS would be involved in financial programming, development co-operation, enlargement and crisis management
2. **staffing:**
  - the Lisbon Treaty provided only for the constituencies from which the staff would be drawn (Commission, Council Secretariat, diplomatic services of the MS), but not in what proportions or how selection would be made; existing contracts had to be respected, and new contractual arrangements drawn up

3. **budget:**  
no-one yet knew how much it would cost; the only question was how much the MS would *let* it cost under the present financial perspective; the service therefore would not be fully fledged until its budget was written into the new financial perspective in 2014; major synergy gains were to be made from the merger of Commission and Council Secretariat functions in foreign affairs
4. **delegations:**  
the role and responsibilities of EU embassies in relation to MS missions in third countries, lines of reporting and the tools at their disposal remained to an extent opaque;
5. **timetable:**  
given the ratification of the Treaty, the President of the Council and the HR/VP would be appointed in December; the HR/VP would hope to present formal proposals to Council by April 2010; in the meantime and for months thereafter detailed work (and inter-institutional agreement) would be needed on staff and financial regulations, housing and every aspect of bureaucratic administration; the service might hope to be up and running by early 2011;
6. **legal status:**  
the EEAS was to be a *sui generis* service, a quasi-institution housed separately in Brussels, with budgetary authority from the European Parliament

The overall objective could be expressed in three key words: to give the EU more *coherence*, more *clarity* and more *clout*.

#### **In discussion:**

- the responsibilities of the HR/VP probably exceeded the capacity of any one individual; a penumbra of senior officials would be needed – deputies, special advisors, special representatives;
- there was bound to be some pushing and pulling between the institutions and amongst the new roles as the system developed, requiring pragmatic accommodation of shared and competing interests;
- appointments to the new service would be made on merit in open competition; senior managers were alert to charges of back room deal-making;
- over time the EEAS would develop a shared diplomatic culture; a diplomatic service was more than simply an efficient bureaucracy;
- it would not replace foreign ministries and chancelleries; the machinery for managing national interests and arriving at common positions remained largely unchanged; Member State posts would continue to report to their own hierarchies in parallel with EU mission reporting;
- much would hinge in the early days on benevolent personal relations and a spirit of co-operation at post, as the EEAS became integrated in the tapestry of European relations with third countries.

#### Panel discussion:

##### **What training for the EEAS?**

*Ambassador Dr Hans Winkler*, Director, Diplomatic Academy of Vienna

*Dieter Mahncke*, Director of Studies, College of Europe, Bruges

*Jaap W. De Zwaan*, Director, Netherlands Institute of International Relations

*Stella Zervoudaki*, Political Advisor, DG External Relations, European Commission

*Axel Wernhoff*, Deputy Head of EU Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Sweden

Chair: *Dr John Hemery*, Director, Centre for Political and Diplomatic Studies, Oxford

### **Jaap W De Zwaan**

Training programmes would need to fill the respective gaps in professional knowledge and skills of those joining the new service from different constituencies: diplomats from the Member States would need to build their knowledge of how the EU institutions worked; officials from the Commission and Council Secretariat would need to develop the diplomatic skills of lobbying, political reporting, media relations and negotiation.

The EEAS would need to develop its own programme of professional development, *sui generis*. A common mindset needed to be engendered.

### **Stella Zervoudaki**

Training for a common European diplomacy was in some respects already well-advanced. Over the preceding ten years training courses in each Member State and in the EU institutions had been opened progressively to each other. Programmes of secondment and exchange were flourishing. An informal programme of co-operation, the European Diplomatic Programme, brought together each year young diplomats from all Member States and officials from the Commission and Council Secretariat in a series of five modules over a span of eight months, organised by the Member State holding the Presidency of the Council. The European Commission provided a suite of diplomatic training courses for representatives of the three constituencies making up the EEAS to exchange experience and build networks.

An EEAS training programme would build on this foundation. Its objectives would include preparing diplomats for the future tasks of the EU in a globalised world, and providing an instrument for a shared approach to policy. It would not seek to repeat what existed elsewhere; rather to provide an integrated curriculum of best practice.

The timing of such training had still to be addressed: whether it was better to offer training to prospective candidates who then came into the system with a common grounding, or to provide a programme which built a shared ethos after joining.

### **Dieter Mahnke**

The Department of European Union, International Relations and Diplomacy Studies at the College of Europe offered a case in point. It had been created to respond to the development of the EU as a global actor whose external relations went beyond the realm of the common foreign and security policy. It met, too, increased demand for training for service in international institutions more generally. (They received each year some six hundred applications from fifty countries.)

Their one-year MA course concentrated on the institutional workings of the EU in such fields as foreign and security policy, environment, transport and trade. It was essential to understand the mechanics of governance in order both to understand policy and to operate effectively.

A core aim was to help officials to internalise a co-operative mindset. They would be representing a Community with common interests and common objectives. They would have a larger, longer-range responsibility than the pursuit of national interest.

## Axel Wernhoff

Sweden offered an example of a Member State conscious of the urgent need for training its diplomats in EU decision-making, including the complex system of regulations governing the work of the institutions, if they were to contribute effectively to the EEAS.

In the same way, the Commission needed to enhance its own diplomatic toolkit, to equip its officials with the tricks of a new trade.

The EEAS would need to develop an esprit de corps, a sense of common destiny, with common reflexes. But you couldn't train people for this; you simply had to let it emerge over time, aided by good managers who would help to redefine loyalties. (Stairs were swept from the top down.)

The business of the service was *external* action. It would require language training for operating in the world beyond Europe. An early task would be to identify strategic partners who could provide first-class training in Arabic, Chinese, Russian and other languages.

## Hans Winkler

The creation of a common foreign service confronted afresh the duality of the EU as a supranational and an inter-governmental body. With or without the EAS, the EU would continue to be inter-governmental; the majority of its citizens didn't want a federal authority. The essential dichotomy of an ever closer union of enduringly sovereign states was destined to continue.

Might the EEAS make things better? It could. But precisely what it represented had an impact on training. What were people being trained to do? at what levels? Were the needs of Commission and Council officials different from those of Member State diplomats, beyond the simple acquisition of knowledge and skills? Who best to provide this training? in-house? de-centralised? outsourced? a mixture of these?

### In discussion:

- there was a role for institutions outside Europe to assist EEAS diplomats' understanding of other cultures, other perspectives
- the development of an EEAS culture would affect how the outside world *heard* the EU, melding the voices of the Member States
- it was challenge enough to draw together the different perspectives of twenty-seven Member States; but creating a spirit of co-operation and mutual confidence across the *rue de la Loi* (separating Commission and Council) would make the fall of the Berlin Wall look like an afterthought.

At the close of the first day, members of the Forum were made welcome at a **Reception at the Austrian Federal Ministry of European and International Affairs**, hosted by the Secretary General for Foreign Affairs, *Ambassador Johannes Kyrle*.

### Training for Peace:

**the scope and pivotal importance of conflict resolution knowledge and skills, as part of diplomatic studies curricula**

*Dr Yolanda Kemp Spies*, Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Pretoria

Diplomacy had always had a normative component, transcending political differences, delivering, codifying, maintaining peace.

The nature of both conflict and peace had changed, though, as the role of the state, hierarchy of command and issues of high politics had given way increasingly to messy low-level wars in which the social fabric disintegrated. Civilians became the

primary targets of ill-disciplined insurgent forces with little centralised control. Peace agreements became more difficult to achieve as they could not be imposed by executive order.

Africa was particularly vulnerable to organised violence. Seventy percent of the agenda of the United Nations Security Council, and ninety percent of UN peacekeeping efforts were devoted to the continent. Under-development and conflict went hand in hand.

It was necessary to embrace a more complex idea of peace – for example, Johan Galtung’s distinction between negative peace (the temporary absence of violence masking the seeds of future conflict) and positive peace (the promotion of social solidarity and shared destiny based on human rights, addressing the root causes of conflict).

Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s *Agenda for Peace* (1992) had added to the three traditional peace processes (preventive diplomacy, peace-making, peace-keeping) a fourth – peace-building, focused not on the short-term, superficial causes of conflict, but on underlying social, economic, environmental and cultural issues.

Westphalian respect for state sovereignty was beginning to be challenged as norms of human rights and human security gained ground, encapsulated in the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect* (2001), promoting the responsibility of the wider international community to try to *prevent* conflict, to *react* to the plight of its victims, and pro-actively to *rebuild* fractured societies.

The growing acceptance of this new global norm had an impact on diplomatic method, through the elaboration of legal frameworks in regional and global multilateral institutions, post-conflict mediation in-country, and complementary ‘polylateral’ diplomacy with non-state actors. Diplomats, as state representatives accountable to publics, played a crucial role in negotiating, validating and managing the growing network of complex multi-layer, multi-actor agreements.

There were ten reasons to include conflict resolution in programmes of diplomatic studies and training:

1. diplomats were well-placed to contribute to the growth of conflict resolution, having legitimacy, global networks and institutional support;
2. given the responsibility to protect, it was the *right* thing to do;
3. it enhanced the legitimacy and would help build the capacity of regional organisations in carrying out their own mandates;
4. it would help build networks, as a wider clientele drew on the training;
5. being inter-disciplinary, it would reinforce training in other diplomatic skills such as policy analysis, communication and public diplomacy;
6. it was well-suited to joint-venture projects (public/private; donor/poor states);
7. it encouraged linkage between ministries and academic institutions in research and programme development;
8. it was useful to all: raising the profile of small states, facilitating the bridge-building role of middle powers, redeeming the hegemonic;
9. being readily monitored, it was an appropriate use of development funding;
10. it saved money – prevention was less costly than conflict.

## Reports from Workshop Sessions

Following the pattern inaugurated by the College of Europe at the 36<sup>th</sup> Meeting, participants were given the opportunity of attending two of four workshops offered (twice) concurrently on a range of topics:

1. Interest-based negotiation skills in conflict situations
2. Integrative conflict transformation: supporting peace processes
3. Crisis management: simulation of historical UNSC decisions
4. Crisis management: simulation of a meeting of the Political and Security Committee (PSC) of the EU

### Workshop 1. Interest-based negotiation skills in conflict situations

*Sonja Rauschütz*

Executive Director, Vienna School of Negotiation

Ms Rauschütz drew on her work with Roger Fisher and the Harvard Programme on Negotiation to deconstruct the process of negotiation.

The elements of negotiation included the people involved, the substance at issue and the process. Each needed managing. Process was the heart of the negotiation: complexity demanded structure.

In designing the process, it could be helpful to keep in mind four Ps:

- *Participants*  
each negotiation was specific to the interlocutors, their relationship with each other and to the issues
- *Purpose*  
it was important to be clear whether you were there to exchange information, to explore others' interests, to make decisions or simply to build relationships
- *Product*  
you needed to define an acceptable and achievable outcome
- *Process*  
the parties needed to agree time, place, format, roles

A fifth P, *Preparation*, was essential to the effectiveness of the other four.

Integrative negotiation entailed building relationships of trust through sharing information, explaining your respective interests, motives and needs, recognising each other's rationale, and actively seeking common ground to create win-win solutions.

All negotiation involved relations of power. Outcomes were governed by how differential relations of power were managed.

It was important to remember as well the human side. There were usually five key emotional concerns in a conflict:

- to have your status recognised
- to have your autonomy respected
- to have others communicate their appreciation
- to build affiliation
- to be able to choose fulfilling roles

Successful negotiation entailed addressing the need behind the position.

Ms Rauschütz completed the workshop by demonstrating the Thomas/Kilman conflict management exercise. Participants had the opportunity of assessing their own approaches to conflict resolution through five negotiating strategies (competing, accommodating, compromising, avoiding, collaborating). Different outcomes depended on the issue and the relationships of the protagonists.



(attitudes and assumptions)

(incompatible goals)

The Dialogue Process was problem-orientated and solution-focused. It comprised a double-dialectic of analysis and therapy in three dimensions: present, past and future:

### **I. To understand the goals**

*Establish trust*

1. What was the conflict about? (analysis of the present)
2. How had it occurred? (analysis of the past)

### **II. To differentiate the goals**

*Awake empathy*

3. What else had it been about? (therapy of the past)
4. How would it continue? (analysis of the future)

### **III. To integrate the goals**

*Foster creativity*

5. What could be an overarching formula? (therapy of the future)
6. What was the action plan? (therapy of the present)

The workshop offered a case study of conflict resolution in Sri Lanka between 2002 and 2009, identifying what could have been done differently in order to have avoided the breakdown of official negotiations and of the larger peace process. Key lessons had been learned:

- the need for inclusion
- transparency
- dissemination of information
- trust and confidence-building measures
- the need for a positive peace
- third party involvement
- empathy
- organisational mechanisms
- content

Taking into account the lessons learned and the general peace-building gaps, participants considered the dimensions of a new peace process for Sri Lanka:

- which third parties could play a role, and what those roles would be?
- which issues would a comprehensive peace process need to address?
- what strategies could be used to enhance inclusivity and transparency?
- how to incorporate trust and confidence-building measures?
- how to ensure that the legitimate grievances of the conflict parties and stakeholders were addressed effectively?

### **Workshop 3. Crisis management: simulation of historical UNSC decisions**

*Michael Platzer*

Liaison Officer, Academic Council on the United Nations System in Vienna (ACUNS), former Chief, Operations Branch, UNODC

*Helmut Prantner*

University of Vienna

The workshop offered an initial discussion of the purpose of simulation, and examples of how different types of simulation were used variously in academic and other institutions.

Participants then took part in a robust simulation, set in late November, 1992, of the negotiation over authorising the United States to use military force in Somalia under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

The facilitators conducted a debrief of the case in its historical context and in relation to current issues of Darfur, the Responsibility to Protect and larger political questions both international and domestic of humanitarian intervention.

#### **Workshop 4. Crisis management: simulation of a meeting of the Political and Security Committee (PSC) of the EU**

*Ambassador Franz-Josef Kuglitsch*

Director, Department for Eastern and Southeastern Europe, Southern Caucasus and Central Asia, Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; former Austrian Representative to the Political and Security Committee of the EU

The workshop considered the development and structure of EU crisis management mechanisms in the context of EU decision-making in foreign, security and defence affairs.

Europe had the ambition to be capable, in the years ahead, *inter alia* of deploying 60,000 men and women in 60 days for a major operation, and of planning and conducting simultaneously:

- two major stabilisation and reconstruction operations, with a suitable civilian component, supported by a maximum of 10,000 men and women for at least two years;
- two rapid response operations of limited duration using *inter alia* the EU's battle groups;
- an emergency operation for the evacuation of European nationals (in less than ten days)
- a maritime or air surveillance/interdiction mission;
- a civilian-military humanitarian assistance operation lasting up to 90 days;
- around a dozen ESDP civilian missions (*inter alia* police, rule of law, civil administration, civil protection, security sector reform and observation missions) in a rapid reaction situation, including a major mission (up to 3,000 experts) lasting several years.

For its operations and missions the EU would use the resources and capabilities of Member States, of the EU and if appropriate for its military operations, of NATO.

The facilitators offered a fully worked-up simulation of a meeting of the Political and Security Committee of the EU considering possible intervention in a civil conflict in the fictitious territory of *Alisia*. Exercise materials included detailed objectives, risk assessments and recommendations from the Civilian (CIVCOM) and Military (EUMC) Committees, and position papers with guidance for each of the Member States represented.

The simulation demonstrated the challenge of decision-making amongst sovereign states with conflicting interests, and the importance of focusing on the larger objective of wider security.

#### **Impact and evaluation of conflict management training programmes: best practice guidelines, including a facilitated discussion of lessons learned from the workshop sessions**

*Beatrix Schmelzle*, Director of Programme Development, Vienna School of Negotiation and Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management

The twin objectives of the session were to provide an opportunity of reflecting on the process of conflict management, and to demonstrate an approach to course evaluation.

Participants were invited to reflect on their own experience in the workshops, to focus on one significant moment of individual learning – it might have been positive or negative – and to share that perception with a neighbour.

Two questions followed from that personal exchange: (i) had the learning experience impacted on both participants in the same way, or differently? (evaluation was highly specific); (ii) was the learning achieved transferable to real life? (if not, its value was limited).

In this interactive way programme developers could engage participants in assessing the relevance and effectiveness of their training.

#### **In discussion:**

- the purpose of the Forum was to provide a clearing house of new ideas and best practice in diplomatic training; workshops needed to be grounded in diplomatic practice, not in business theory;
- the subject matter (conflict resolution and crisis management) had been relevant; more time might have been given to exchange of experience and discussion of new techniques;
- it had not been sufficiently clear whether the workshops had been intended to offer training, or to offer demonstrations of training methodologies; if the former, they had been targeted at too junior an audience; if the latter, there had been too little opportunity of discussing the qualities of a good exercise, and of how to develop and manage them successfully;
- views differed on the value of engaging senior managers in demonstrations of exercises designed for more junior colleagues; participants represented divergent pedagogical traditions;
- the current programme was the latest response to growing demand from participants over the years that the Forum concentrate more on training than on issues, and more on practice than on theory;
- the workshops had been fine in theory, but had not addressed training for the priority issues of different regions, such as health diplomacy or negotiating economic partnership agreements;
- it would be helpful if there were wider consultation in the formulation of the agenda and format of each meeting.

#### **Wrap-up and end of seminar / time and location of next Meeting**

*Ambassador Dr Hans Winkler, Professor Paula Newberg*

*Professor Newberg* observed that the Forum had become a larger, more complex institution than at its outset. Participants now represented many different kinds of organisation with varying professional focus, from different regions with differing priority issues. They consequently brought to the Meeting differing needs, desires and expectations.

With two new co-chairs it was an opportune moment to consider the structure and governance of the Forum. It was an informal professional association which needed to

think collectively about its future. What would be on the agenda of each meeting? Who would be in charge? Where would it be held?

The proposed venues for the coming few years were as follows:

- 2010 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
- 2011 Boston, United States of America
- 2012 Baku, Azerbaijan
- 2013 The Danube, from Vienna to Belgrade

A small working group reflecting the geographical and professional diversity of the Forum would consider the way forward. Contributions to its thinking would be welcome from all members of the Forum, by e-mail.

*Ambassador Winkler* observed that the Forum had been transforming every year. Was it an organisation? That had yet to be decided. It was a loose association of training institutions, still essentially a club by invitation, as originally conceived. But whom to invite and where to draw the line had become more complicated. The co-chairs looked forward to the discussion with participants by e-mail.

In closing, *Professor Newberg* remarked that while the Forum notionally had two co-sponsors, the lion's share of the work had been done by the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna. Georgetown resolved to take a greater share of the load.

Members of the Forum thanked *Ambassador Winkler*, Deputy Director *Gerhard Reiweger*, Director of Administration *Gabriele Schultze*, and all the staff of the Academy who had organised and supported the event with their usual skill, efficiency and friendliness.

The Forum concluded with a traditional 'Huerigen' generously given by the City of Vienna.

## **Excursion**

At the weekend a number of members of the Forum journeyed to the city of Linz, Cultural Capital of Europe 2009.

A highlight of the visit was a guided tour of the exhibitions at the new Ars Electronica Centre, an internationally unique platform for digital art and media culture. It comprised four divisions: an avant-garde festival, a competition which functioned as a showcase of excellence, a museum dedicated to imparting knowledge and skills, and a media art lab which made artistic expertise available for R&D purposes ([www.aec.at](http://www.aec.at)).

The city itself, heart of the Austrian steel industry, offered a sparkling example of urban and environmental regeneration.

John Hemery  
Rapporteur