

INTERNATIONAL FORUM ON DIPLOMATIC TRAINING

35th Meeting of Deans and Directors of Diplomatic Academies and Institutes of International Relations

**Instituto Superior de Relações Internacionais
Maputo, Mozambique
28 – 29 September 2007**

The 35th Meeting of Deans and Directors broke new ground in two important ways. It was the first International Forum on Diplomatic Training to be held on the African continent. And for the first time a significant number of African foreign ministries were represented. It was remarkable also for the contribution of the young diplomats and students of the host institution who gave the Meeting so buoyant an atmosphere.

Co-hosts' Welcome

Dr Patricio José, Rector of the Instituto Superior de Relações Internacionais, welcomed the members of the Forum to the Meeting. He observed that it was the task of diplomacy to produce solutions to current challenges, especially poverty alleviation and economic development. Mozambique had itself made a special contribution to the peaceful resolution of conflicts and to regional stability. The Forum now would continue to promote dialogue and to build bridges through the exchange of ideas. He hoped that this Meeting would be only the first of many in Africa, a catalysing event.

Ambassador Thandi Lujabe Ranko, High Commissioner of South Africa to Mozambique, offered a memorable welcome in song. She referred to the importance of diplomacy as a profession, and to the continuing contribution of former President Chissano as a diplomat for Africa as a whole. It was important always to continue to learn, in order to serve our countries well. She hoped that the discussions in Maputo would produce concrete results.

Forum Co-chairs' opening remarks

Ambassador Jiří Gruša offered initial thoughts on the nature, power and malleability of truth, and on the enduring challenge to guarding the truth in diplomacy, especially in the age of advanced information technology when the difference between fact and fiction could be blurred. After a time when the messenger had become safely separated from the message, the two were now becoming reunited. But the modern diplomat was more than simply a deliverer of vertical messages; rather an interpreter, a facilitator of horizontal, circular interaction. Diplomacy was a tree with many roots, bearing fruit.

Professor Casimir Yost thanked the joint hosts Mozambique and South Africa for all that had been done to bring this historic meeting to life. He offered a brief account of the history of the Forum. It had been in the early days an informal annual dialogue between directors of training centres in foreign ministries and deans of schools of international relations, only fifteen or twenty at the outset, bridging the academic–government divide and focusing on the practical aspects of training professional diplomats. Thirty-five years later it had grown to embrace every continent, meeting in magnificent settings, but the essence of the Forum's mission remained the same: whatever the topic, to keep to the core issue – how best to train young diplomats.

Reports from Regional Groups:

Asia (Ambassador Suzuki, rapporteur)

Twelve members had attended, representing eight countries. They had discussed the continuing co-operation of the ASEAN + 3 group, which had been initiated in 2004. The group had met in Tokyo on 19-20 June, 2007, and had discussed developments in training for multilateral diplomacy and international co-operation. The group would meet next in Thailand in May or June, 2008.

Ambassador Heng, Vice-President of the China Foreign Affairs University, offered a short report on three elements of activity: promoting mutual understanding through workshops and seminars; facilitating programmes of co-operation between foreign ministries; and developing programmes to address new challenges including consular affairs and non-traditional security issues such as public health, climate change and cross-cultural ethics. They were emphasising 'right-brain empowerment'.

Americas (Ambassador Fernando Reys, rapporteur)

Regional co-operation in diplomatic training had continued amongst the Mercosur partners. A programme of trilateral co-operation had been initiated with the Indian Diplomatic Institute and the Institute of Foreign Affairs in South Africa. A programme of exchange between the Foreign Service Institutes in Brazil and Argentina had begun and was to be extended. The Chilean foreign ministry was welcoming sixteen foreign students to their Institute.

In Latin America particular attention was given in training to the roots of culture, to literature and art and to social history, caring not only for current events but national identity. (It was important to keep the forest in view as well as the trees.)

Mid-career training was gaining in importance, equipping diplomats with new skills for new tasks.

Africa (Dr Patricio José, rapporteur)

An inaugural meeting of diplomatic training institutes from the region (an African Forum) had been held at the Diplomatic Studies Institute in Cairo on 5-6 March, 2007. This had served as the initial planning meeting for the 35th Meeting of the International Forum in Maputo.

Key objectives of the African group had included the promotion of research, the development of programmes of co-operation and exchange, and the establishment of a database of academies and institutes in Africa contributing to the training of diplomats.

Ambassador Saod, Director of the Institute of Diplomatic Studies, offered a short report on the work of the Institute, and on the Cairo Regional Centre for Conflict Resolution which since 1990 had provided programmes for African delegates. European delegates had joined the programme in 2006. Funding remained a challenge.

The African 'Chapter' of the International Forum would meet next in Kinshasa in 2008, when Professor Sera would be the Chair, followed by Algiers in 2009.

Europe (Dr John Hemery, rapporteur)

Fifteen members had attended, representing thirteen countries and five independent institutions. The preceding year had seen considerable change and development in a number of institutions.

The Czech Institute of International Relations had become a formal Diplomatic Academy within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They were building programmes of induction and mid-career training, and looking ahead to preparing officials for the Czech Presidency of the EU in 2009.

The Diplomatic Academy of Azerbaijan, created in 2006, had doubled in size and moved into a new building. It aimed to create a graduate school in 2008, and was keen to develop faculty exchanges with other diplomatic institutes.

The Netherlands Institute of International Relations (Clingendael) had been re-organised along thematic lines, with sections on diplomacy, Europe, security and energy, each engaged in research, training and public information. The Hague Journal of Diplomacy had quickly established itself as a leading journal in the field.

The Diplomatic Academy of Serbia, the successor to the Department of Education in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and now an independent institute, was developing programmes of co-operation with diplomatic academies in a number of regions, and had opened its courses to the civil sector. They were focusing on EU integration and regional co-operation, especially with partners in the Western Balkans.

The Romanian Institute of Diplomacy, formerly the Diplomatic Academy, was expanding, with courses for officials from Parliament, other Ministries and local authorities.

The Institute of Diplomacy in Portugal similarly had opened its doors to other Ministries following a change in the law governing appointment to posts overseas and enhanced need for training of non-diplomats.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office had created a new programme of diplomatic training for officials from all government ministries engaged in external relations and for locally-employed staff from British missions abroad, designed and conducted jointly by the Centre for Political and Diplomatic Studies and the National School of Government. Officials from other EU Member States and the European Commission were attending the course.

Keynote Speech:

The Diplomacy of Peacemaking, Peacekeeping and Post-conflict Resolution

H.E. Joaquim Alberto Chissano

Former President of Mozambique

Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary General

H.E. Jeremiah Kingsley Mamobolo

First Ambassador of the democratic South Africa to Zimbabwe, 1995-99

United Nations Deputy Director General for Africa

Dr Patricio José welcomed former President Chissano as the father of Mozambican diplomacy. He had been a founding member of the Mozambique Liberation Front, Frelimo, and Prime Minister in the transitional government which secured independence, fulfilling the Lusaka Agreement after 25 June 1975. As Foreign Minister he had created and nurtured the diplomatic service, and as President following the tragic death of President Macel he had led the state until peace and normality had been restored. He then had stood down, not seeking re-election. He had been and remained a shining example for Africa.

Dr Chissano sought in his remarks to differentiate between peacemaking – the prevention and resolution of conflict – and peacebuilding, the processes of reconciliation, capacity-building, settlement and restoration of the social tissue.

Fighting violence entailed having a vision of the peace to follow, establishing a sound base for social stability instead of war. The armed forces of the United Nations might be unarmed, but were a force nonetheless in their blue berets and white cars, inserted after peace had been achieved to facilitate the pursuit of common interests.

Diplomats were the facilitators of peace, mediators to silence the guns and promote dialogue. NATO, the European Union and the African Union could serve as interim guarantors of peace, mobilising force while simultaneously launching the normalisation process, assisting the repatriation of displaced persons and helping to train law enforcement authorities.

Diplomats needed to engage with civil society organisations. Women had a special role to play in peacemaking and peace-building, demanding the cessation of conflict and bringing a female perspective into governance. Not least for this reason diplomatic schools needed to select without gender bias.

Religious organisations such as the World Council of Churches also had a role to play as mediators and peacemakers, forging links between churches and working with traditional leaders, for example against the forces of the Lord's Resistance Army.

Blue berets were working in forty-five missions worldwide. But they were not always trusted, regarded as the agents of outside powers. It was essential that there should be co-operation rather than competition between regional authorities and UN forces. Peace was a regional responsibility; individual national interests had to be subordinated to the wider social needs of peoples in conflict.

Diplomats had a role to play in building a durable peace and development, drawing on local resources and private companies to promote long-term employment. They could be catalysts for peace, prosperity and the well-being of humanity.

Ambassador Mamobolo observed that much conflict was rooted in competition for access to and exploitation of scarce resources. Development thus was the key to peace. Hence development and reconstruction needed to be started even before conflict had been resolved. It was not possible simply to wait for stability; instability fed on resource scarcity.

The African Union and its member states could promote mutual security and stabilisation through the policy of *ubuntu* – capacity-building within and between regions. In the Great Lakes region, the Democratic Republic of Congo could deploy its resources to regulate competition, to share its riches in exchange for peace. The

Southern African Development Community had helped to produce the most stable region in the continent, through co-operation in energy, transport, crime, education and defence.

The source of conflict often was lack of vision, failing to see that more could be achieved by sharing than by plunder. Diplomats had a vital role to play in promoting tolerance and common sense. They had a dual task of facilitating conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction through regional co-operation.

In discussion:

- The problem with peacemaking, peace-building and post-conflict resolution was that they were all ‘post’ conflict. The main task of diplomacy should be to *prevent* conflict.
- Dag Hammarskjöld had observed that you could not prevent conflict – it was inherent in society.
- Diplomacy was a tool, an art which could ease tensions before conflict, but failure of political will could obstruct it. It could be helpful to identify support structures – especially NGOs – which complemented diplomatic efforts to determine *when* to act (if at all, for what purpose, for how long), *with whom* to act (a diversity of actors), and *how*.
- NGOs were an essential part of diplomacy, but it was important to limit the number of actors, especially the late-comers to post-conflict stabilisation.
- It was important, on the contrary, not to exclude *anyone* in the definition of policies, but to be in permanent contact with the whole people, demonstrating *movement* even if political and economic objectives had not yet been achieved.
- To make peace certainly was hard; you first had to win the war.

Development Diplomacy: The Challenges of Health Diplomacy

H. E. Kate Canavan

Ambassador of the United States to Botswana

The challenge of combatting malaria, tuberculosis and HIV-Aids was a world security issue, not simply a health issue. Disease and early mortality increased stress within governments, decreasing the capacity for effective governance and law enforcement.

American ‘transformational diplomacy’ focused on investment in people, through improved access to education, sanitation, public health care and protection of vulnerable groups. A five-year, USD 15 billion, multi-agency programme had been launched, 2007-12, perhaps doubling to USD 30 billion from 2009.

In respect of HIV-Aids, the objectives were to deliver anti-retroviral treatment (ARV) to two million infected, to prevent seven million new infections through voluntary testing and counselling, and to care for ten million individuals and Aids orphans. There were programmes also to combat malaria and the spread of avian flu.

The Peace Corps had launched a public diplomacy project in partnership with the Ministry of Youth and Sport and the Football Association, in which the national football team had promoted a programme of HIV-Aids testing and counselling.

The programme of support to the people of Botswana and to the wider region faced a number of challenges:

- cultural factors in health care and treatment
- government sensitivity to international interference in internal affairs (hence the importance of working with local authorities)
- healthcare being a lower priority than other social programmes
- intellectual property rights and the cost of ARV drugs
- shortage of trained health workers (many having been lured away by higher salaries in developed countries).

The American effort was integrated with the programmes of the host government, which offered free ARV treatment to its own citizens, but not to others (in contravention of UN standards on the care of refugees) in order to forestall a flood of migration. The US Embassy worked with the representative in Botswana of UNHCR, in co-operation with the Government of Botswana.

The United States pursued a policy in Africa of partnership rather than paternalism. They were keen to re-engage with SADC as a partner in development. They hoped to provide opportunities for progress and to encourage the trend to democracy.

In discussion:

- There was a downward trend in the HIV-Aids infection rate (from 37.4% to 32.4% over four years), though with ARV treatment prevalence went *up* as sufferers lived longer. The aim was that by 2016, fifty years after independence, there would be no new infections. But prevention was the hard part.
- It was important to co-ordinate the efforts of the public and private sector (for example, the Gates and Merck foundations), and to avoid duplication of effort.
- In Botswana the Ministry of Health was responsible for public health policy, while the Ministry of Local Government ran the clinics in the field and co-ordinated donor programmes at the point of delivery, often in co-operation with local churches or other civil society groups.
- United States efforts in support of public health care were complemented by those of the Nordic countries, the European Union and China. Donors met regularly with the government to discuss priorities.
- It was important to include public health in diplomatic training, in order to assist young and mid-career diplomats to understand the international diplomacy of philanthropy and linkages with government programmes, as well as the differing perspectives of non-donor countries on these issues.
- At the US Foreign Service Institute there was no single course on public health, though HIV-Aids and other health issues featured in courses on development policy and area studies.
- Consultation and co-ordination between agencies, both domestic and foreign, was a priority. Since 2004, the State Department had been the lead department in formulating and managing joint strategies.

The Role of Diplomacy in Managing International Migration

H. E. Dr Leonardo Simão

Migration affected all governments – the countries of origin, of transit and of destination. Two hundred million people were on the move globally, half of them women.

This was not a new phenomenon. 20,000 years ago people had moved for reasons of security or economic opportunity, or simply for adventure. The trend had been accelerated by the information and communications revolution, enabling people to see images of apparent prosperity, security and happiness elsewhere.

Returnees, having prospered, encouraged others to seek their fortune abroad. Many had little to lose, so were tempted to migrate. Traffickers found fertile ground, providing false documents, bribing authorities and promising jobs.

Migration could provide benefits to the sending country:

- Remittances were second only to foreign direct investment as a source of foreign income, ahead of trade. They grew in significance as global overseas direct investment declined.
- Returning migrants brought back new ideas, knowledge and skills. Their educated children stimulated the economy with improved job prospects.

However, these potential net benefits needed to be managed within a policy framework, provided in Mozambique, for example, by the National Institute for the Support of Migrants Abroad (INIS).

Receiving countries benefited, too, from migration, with the influx of cheaper, disciplined, skilled labour. This however could be a two-edged sword, as migrants were often regarded as inferior or 'uncivilised'. Crowded into ghettos with poor housing and low incomes, non-unionised and without negotiating power, they were weak, vulnerable and readily recruited into the black economy and criminal underworld – thus fuelling the prejudice that immigrants were the source of crime and unrest in the community.

Governments recognised the advantages of migration and, encouraged by civil society groups, might wish to provide rights, benefits, health care, welfare and enfranchisement. But benevolence tended to wax and wane with the electoral cycle – governments were tough on immigration when facing the voters, business-friendly when safely back in office.

Organised crime now managed migration flows with advanced information technology. Governments needed to match the sophistication of the criminal gangs.

Consensual international rules were needed, bilateral and multilateral accords which empowered legitimate stakeholders while marginalising the exploitative underworld. This was an important and permanent challenge to international order. Diplomacy was needed to meet the challenge.

Ambassador Kishan Rana

Former Ambassador of India to Germany

Migration was one of the most complex yet least addressed of international issues. It had many dimensions – demographic, economic, social, political, ethical and humanitarian. We all were migrants in one way or another.

The issues had been discussed at the four-day Global Forum on Migration and Development at Brussels in July 2007, with representatives from 120 countries.

In some destination states the population was falling, with birth rates below replacement level (some as low as 1.3 average). With the average age rising and the dependency ratio rising with it, more service providers and healthcare workers were needed. Migration was welcomed, though not without cultural unease.

In states with surplus populations, migration could be beneficial. Migrant remittances formed a vital part of the economy – a global total of USD 165 billion in 2005, rising to USD 205 billion in 2006 – higher than global foreign direct investment. (The overall total was higher still, as these figures did not include China.)

At the same time sending states suffered from brain drain, when those most skilled or innovative – perhaps two or three of every ten – failed to return.

There was, in addition, the involuntary mass movement of people – the ‘undocumented migrants’ – in response to famine, civil unrest and war.

Migration presented new challenges to diplomacy:

- Countries of origin (in the Global South and G77 especially) needed to form networks and coalitions to overcome asymmetry of bargaining power with the governments of the developed world.
- Regional associations could bring collective weight to bear.
- Ministries of Foreign Affairs had to create new structures and mechanisms, and to work closely with other home agencies in a ‘whole government’ approach.
- Specialist agencies, as for example the Ministry for Indians Overseas created in 2004, and the Council for the Promotion of Overseas Employment, could help to manage migration flows. (This could work to the disadvantage of foreign ministries, which lost control of policy and resources.)
- Consular work had to be upgraded and properly resourced. (In Japan and Mexico, for example, all young diplomats spent a year as a consular officer, gaining experience in this new area for creative work.)
- Public diplomacy could help to address the fears and resentments of local populations threatened by the influx of outsiders.

Migration was a volatile area of policy, emotion-laden and divisive. But in an inter-dependent world it was central to much else and so required an active diplomacy.

The Diplo Foundation planned to host a conference on Migration Diplomacy in Malta on 7-8 February 2008.

In discussion:

- The movement of peoples and of goods were both elements of vigorous trade, so it was helpful to trade to relax visa regulations. But unequal development in sending and receiving states could lead to fear in the receiving state of being overwhelmed, giving rise to xenophobia. It was necessary for the Global South to work together to combat the negative consequences of migration.
- Biological communities were naturally self-protective. There was a limit to their cultural as well as economic capacity to absorb others. (Georges Lukas had observed that when non-indigenous groups increased by twenty per cent or more, they were likely to prompt a fascist response.)

- Brazil had been formerly a receiving country, now was an exporter of its people. Globalisation offered the seduction of opportunities abroad. There were two million Brazilians living overseas, most in the United States, Paraguay and Japan. It had become a political issue. A new post had been created in the Foreign Ministry, Under-Secretary for Migration. The conference at Malta was a welcome initiative; a formal United Nations conference on migration was needed.
- Egypt had been for fifty years an exporter of people, to the Gulf states especially, in search of better employment. In the last ten years, though already over-populated, they had become a receiving state, with an influx of refugees from conflicts in Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine and Darfur increasing the pressure on the economy. An international conference was needed to address the problems of receiving states.
- The resolution of conflict could itself trigger migration. After fourteen years of war against Portugal and twenty-seven years of civil war, Angola was now a receiving state with people arriving from Europe as well as Africa.
- Migration arose out of misery. People didn't get up and leave for fun. The solution was to keep people at home, by investing in economic development.
- The problem was poverty differentiation. People gravitated to livelihoods. Governments could forcibly repatriate migrants whom they couldn't sustain, but they would come back illegally two or three weeks later, sometimes with the complicity of corrupt authorities (attending to their own livelihoods). A regional response was needed, pooling the efforts of neighbouring states. The co-operation of Northern countries was needed as well, investing in keeping people at home, helping to create the conditions for survival. It was in the end a development issue.
- A United Nations conference was needed to build on and draw together the initiatives already undertaken at regional level, for example by the OAS, the EU and Caricom. Regional associations could provide the platform for a common global approach.
- Religion both helped and hindered the assimilation of migrants. Co-religionists could facilitate integration. Differences of religion imposed additional barriers.
- Migration, which was self-generating and could be managed, was not the problem, but trafficking. More effective legislation (for the protection of the exploited) and enforcement was required.
- Better mechanisms were needed to enable societies to use well the funds remitted by citizens abroad for development at home.
- Diplomats needed to be trained in consular affairs before going to post.
- There was an inherent dilemma in diplomatic training: in helping staff to understand and to work abroad, both ministry and diplomat focussed on the foreign rather than the domestic. Migration was an intensely domestic issue, resonating within the internal dynamics of both sending and receiving states. The diplomat, whether working in the national capital or abroad, was largely disconnected from *home* culture and politics. (George Schultz, when Secretary of State, receiving newly-appointed ambassadors in his seventh-floor office, would ask, 'What is your country?' They would refer to country X or Y to which they had been posted. He would respond, 'No, you need to understand the United States first.') The Chinese foreign ministry, for example, rotated diplomats to provincial capitals for one to three years, re-connecting them with the society they were representing abroad and helping to bridge the domestic/foreign divide.

Managing Diplomacy in States with limited human and financial resources

Professor Jorge Braga de Macedo

Diplomacy reflected the physical and economic realities of the state, but enabled them to transcend their national limitations. Jean Jacques Rousseau had observed that those who couldn't communicate didn't exist. It was essential, therefore, to afford the costs of diplomacy.

Small, poor countries had of necessity a different, more limited diplomacy. Article 5 of the 1961 Vienna Convention had provided for the chargé d'affaires ad interim, with multilateral accreditation, effectively plurilateral representation. Article 6 had recognised the role of the 'interests section', which enabled poor countries to be represented without a formal mission. In December 1969, the UN General Assembly had institutionalised temporary missions, which helped those who could not afford permanent missions. Regional associations provided additional means of diplomatic presence for their member states.

It was essential that the countries of Africa were represented in key capitals and in the multilateral institutions, making their voice heard despite their resource constraints. Otherwise they ended up being invisible, merely objects of international relations rather than subjects.

In discussion:

- Donor governments assisted the development of diplomacy through programmes of capacity-building within ministries of foreign affairs, or facilitating attendance at international conferences
- Countries both rich and poor could save costs through shared representation, pooling accommodation and services
- The non-resident ambassador could be a cost-effective tool, home-based but visiting countries to which accredited two to four times a year, though this was a poor substitute for permanent representation.

Diplomacy and Terrorism: Dialogue amongst civilisations and cultures

Professor Armando Marques-Guedes

Prof Marques-Guedes offered an account of the modern history of terrorism, and an analysis of how contemporary terrorism affected traditional diplomacy.

At the turn of the nineteenth-twentieth centuries there had been a spate of terrorist attacks by anarcho-syndicalists on heads of state and government in Austria-Hungary, France, Greece, Italy, Russia, Spain and the United States. President Theodore Roosevelt had referred to terrorists as 'the enemy of all mankind'.

The FBI, the Metropolitan Police, Ochrana and others all had been created or expanded in this period as governments sought to suppress anarchism both at home, and in the diaspora. Thus from an early stage the fight against terrorism had been international, with cross-border co-ordination between national police services. Twenty-one states (half of the then international community) had been represented at an International Anti-Anarchist Conference in Rome in 1898, at which anarchism had been denounced as a merely criminal rather than political activity.

Anarchists, for their part, had had little ideological consistency or organisational structure. They had been isolated cliques, driven variously by nationalist, socialist and nihilist impulses, and riven by factionalism. They had been, in one sense, no threat at all to the state; yet in their attacks on symbolic targets (personified power) they had challenged the ‘cognitive conception’ of the state. The security services had been found to be frustratingly impotent against such fluid, inchoate groups, and had responded with disproportionate fear.

Terrorism in the late twentieth century had had a similar objective to that of the late nineteenth century – undermining state / imperial authority. But in an age of global communication the targets had become more democratic – citizens at random, society itself under attack, with the mass media as multipliers of fear.

The response of state authorities had been similar, too. In 1901, a hundred years before the assault on the Twin Towers, the American President had referred to terrorists as ‘the embodiment of evil’, ‘deadly foes of liberty’, ‘utterly depraved criminals hostile to a free people’. The actions of small cells of a few individuals thus had been inflated by the imperial scale of response into a generalised threat to society.

Being invisible and unreachable, yet capable of dramatic acts of destruction, terrorist groups had been depicted as a highly organised and co-ordinated criminal conspiracy, a network of networks which could be contained only by global mobilisation for war. Al-Qu’aeda represented the apex of these imagined foes. And by blurring the distinction between the terrorists and the societies from which they had sprung, counter-terrorism had come to resemble traditional inter-societal conflict – a ‘new tribalism’.

The question arose whether there was a role for diplomacy in the struggle against terrorist groups. They had no state, no population to protect and defend, no constituency of accountability. There was no entity with which diplomacy could engage – nothing to represent, hence no representative with whom to meet; no legitimacy, hence no-one with whom to negotiate; no public to inform.

A distinction could be drawn between the nationalist, secessionist, irredentist movements (Tamils, Basques, Renamo), and the trans-national forces of political Islam. Diplomacy could play an indirect role against the latter through monitoring and information, international law and law enforcement, and co-ordinated crisis management (‘soft peacekeeping’).

In contemporary international society challenged by terrorism, the balance between diplomacy and the use of force had still to be found – whether diplomacy backed by force, or force backed by diplomacy. In either case, it was clear that the comfortable Westphalian order had been swept away. It was not yet clear that diplomacy was ready to manage the tectonic shift.

Professor Doctor Joaquim Manjate reflected on the nature of Africa’s response to terrorism.

There were many different definitions of terrorism, not all of them political, not all violent. Some terrorist groups were ‘recognised’, occupied territory and commanded economic resources. There was no agreement on what constituted the legitimate use of force, hence no agreement on the legitimacy of the global war against terrorism. The problem was to *live* with the problem.

Diplomacy was a form of power. Its sources lay in the political economy of a people, in national will mobilised by national leadership. Its instruments were promises and threats, and negotiated agreements. But it was difficult to negotiate with terrorists while at the same time trying to destroy them.

In the insecurity of the post-Cold War world, a gap had emerged between state diplomacy and world diplomacy (increasingly needed, not yet working fully effectively). In the absence of a stable international order, coercive state diplomacy continued to be applied through economic and financial strength, command of strategic resources and technological supremacy. (In earlier times, the Bantu and the Inca had exerted such power.)

Terrorism afflicted all civilisations in which something was ‘out of order’. It could harm anyone, anywhere. Yet there was no agreement on how to counter it effectively. The rules had been defined thus far by the rich, powerful, Western states, which had dictated a largely military response. As a result, counter-terrorism had killed more people than the terrorists had (in, for example, the wars against Frelimo and the Mau Mau, and in the proxy wars fuelled by the superpowers during the Cold War).

Terrorism could not be eliminated by police work or military force. Urban societies found it difficult to combat terrorism, as their complex processes of decision-making made it difficult to respond coherently. Government secrecy and covert operations after the attacks of September 11 had undermined the bonds between governments and peoples. In the end, only communication and negotiation could resolve the ills which had spurred the terrorists to act. And as long as counter-terrorism was defined in military terms, the cost of military defence against it was forcing out the investment in development which was the only durable counter-measure.

African diplomacy had taken a different course. In the Blantyre Declaration in 2002, members of the Southern African Development Community had struck a compromise whereby they agreed to prohibit the use of their territories as sanctuaries for terrorists, to impose a weapons and financial embargo, to exchange information, and to fight against the *causes* of terrorism. This had built on the African Union Plan of Action agreed at Algeria in 1994, long before 9/11. They hoped to put diplomacy to the fore in controlling international security, clawing back from the United States the arrogation of counter-terrorism for national interests.

A civil-cultural approach to counter-terrorism was needed. All agreed that negotiation had to replace terrorist violence as the means of change. A multi-track diplomatic effort with stakeholders was required:

- peacemaking through diplomacy at government level
- non-government / professional conflict management
- business engagement – peace-building through commerce and job-creation
- personal involvement – conflict resolution at the grass roots
- religious communities assisting transformation
- professional development and training
- research
- resources
- media and communications enabling public diplomacy and strategic outreach

Global security could be restored only by better understanding and enhanced co-operation, the heart of intelligent development assistance.

In discussion:

- Terrorism was the negation of civilisation, contrary to the trend of human development.
- Diplomacy was an enterprise to maximise interests, to sustain order in the face of incipient anarchy and recurring conflict. It was necessary to talk with terrorists – they were after all humans with rights. You could not exclude them from the dialogue, though not all were motivated by high political ideals – some were simply gangsters. The difficult part was to engage them without encouraging them, and becoming an accomplice.
- The ‘end of Westphalia’ implied the breakdown of control of what happened within a state, and the acceptance of the right / obligation of intervention by the international community.
- It was necessary, nevertheless, to respect sovereignty. It was not enough to cite ‘human rights’ as a pretext for intervention.
- Terrorists denied the universality of human values. They aimed to create hierarchies of recognition and validity. Dialogue tended to flatten such hierarchies, undermining difference and seeking compromise.
- In the face of suffering you could not just cross your arms. Everyone would like to respect human rights and live in harmony, but when confronting the death of men and ideas at the hands of an external force, for the freedom fighter the only answer was force.

Training in Multilateral trade and Investment Negotiations

Professor Gerhard Erasmus

Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa (TRALAC, Stellenbosch)

Developing countries faced the challenge of an ‘uneven playing field’ in trade. They could benefit from technical training and capacity-building. But it was important for them to avoid ‘seagull syndrome’, high-cost consultants flying in and flying out, leaving only the bill behind. Sustainable change required home-grown knowledge, databases, networks and syllabuses delivered ultimately by local specialists.

Trade negotiation courses needed to explain the many ways in which free trade could be obstructed, whether by human agency, protectionist legislation or sophisticated technical standards (the most effective obstruction of all). Where parliaments became engaged, additional political obstacles could be raised.

The process of inter-state negotiation was complicated further by non-government actors and regional organisations with conflicting interests, incompatible policies and overlapping membership. (Multilateral trade talks were to be preferred to regional negotiations, which could lead to duplication of measures and fragmentation of trade relations in beggar thy neighbour policies.)

Multilateral trade talks covered many different dimensions of policy. All required careful preparation, with both offensive and defensive strategies for each. Negotiators needed to understand well substantive areas such as rules of origin, rules-based dispensation, WTO compatibility and different types of dispute resolution.

Complementary skills were needed in areas beyond negotiation:

- understanding the domestic policy framework, and how it related to regional and international policy
- effective communication between capital and the negotiating institutions, and with other capitals
- planning for the whole life of an agreement, including parliamentary ratification and implementation (Africa often had been disappointed with promised assistance, owing to difficulties of absorption and distribution.)

In discussion:

- Southern states were not always as effective in negotiation as they could be. There were two principal deficiencies:
 - lack of specialist technical knowledge within Ministries;
 - lack of effective regional mechanisms and consciousness.
- SADC, with common language, legal tradition and revenue pool, provided a unifying multiplier, helping to facilitate the integration of regional economies into the global economy.
- Secondments between ministries could help the development of inter-ministerial co-ordination necessary for effective international trade negotiation.
- Training was offered by a number of providers, including UNCTAD, UNITAR, the WTO, the EU and individual governments.
- The problem often was not so much availability of training as absorptive capacity. It was more effective in the longer term to build capacity by doing rather than just by learning. Training programmes needed to be linked to one another to avoid duplication and to ensure coherence.
- Inter-ministerial co-ordinating structures needed to be put in place to capture the experience of those from various ministries returning from Geneva and other international fora, and to use it effectively. Often such experience was scattered and the cumulative benefit was lost.
- Sometimes the state machinery was called upon to do too much, all at once, as the engine and promoter of national development. It was important not to lose sight of the value of small incremental expertise-building. (One such programme – two weeks of training in policy-making for mid-career officials – was being conducted at TRALAC by Trudi Hatsberg, in co-operation with the University of Cape Town Business School, funded by the Netherlands Government.)
- Any interventions by outside bodies had to resonate locally – facilitating home-grown capacity-building by doing.

Concluding Session

The generous offer of *Professor Paul Demaret*, Rector of the College of Europe at Bruges, to host the 36th Meeting of Deans and Directors, in association with the Vienna Diplomatic Academy, was accepted with gratitude. Dates to be confirmed.

Proposals for topics of discussion included:

- (*China*)
Training for non-traditional security issues, especially climate change and energy security
- (*Czech Republic*)
Concentrate more on practical problems of training than on intra-regional conversations

- (*France*)
Offer practical demonstrations of approaches to training, as in Vienna in 2006
- (*India*)
The evolution of diplomatic process – implications for training
How to enhance the work of junior diplomats in multilateral institutions
- (*Japan*)
Narrower, more practical topics
- (*Malaysia*)
More focussed on training and trends in training, eg for mid-career staff
Training for crisis management
- (*Pakistan*)
How to devise simulation exercises
- (*Serbia*)
Practical demonstrations of modern methods of training
- (*South Africa*)
Emerging issues of international relations
Knowledge management – capturing the wisdom of experience for future generations (*cf. the Oral History Project*)
- (*Sudan*)
The role of culture in solving problems
Contemporary challenges facing diplomacy
A comparative study of four training institutions in Africa
- (*Thailand*)
More time for informal dialogue; half a day for regional groups to report
Establish a permanent secretariat to capture the accumulated wisdom of the Meetings (*cf. the Reports of all IFDT Meetings since 1999 posted on the Forum website, www.diplomacy.edu/forum*)
- (*United Kingdom*)
Training in crisis management, as demonstrated in Washington in 2000
Concurrent panels, enabling the Meeting to address better the diversity of members' interests.

On behalf of all participants at the 35th Meeting, the co-chairs of the Forum gave special thanks to the team at the Instituto Superior de Relações Internacionais who had organised and supported the event with such skill, efficiency and enthusiasm.

The young people from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Institute were a great credit to African diplomacy. They were the ones who in the future would help to make the world a better place.

Never before had so much work been done on the Agenda, with a preparatory meeting in Cairo and significant work across the continent, led by the two host countries Mozambique and South Africa.

The topics chosen for the Meeting were the drivers of the contemporary international system – peacekeeping, health, migration, terrorism, multilateral trade. This year the Meeting had explored the challenges these issues posed to diplomacy, laying the foundations for discussions next year on the practicalities of training to meet those challenges.

Professor Casimir Yost thanked former President Chissano once again for his brilliant presentation (and graceful dancing), and all the hosts for the wonderful hospitality and generous welcome extended to members of the Forum. The Meeting had been a triumph of organisation, a model of regional co-operation and a tribute to African diplomacy.

Excursion

Following the Meeting, members of the Forum took part in one of two memorable two-day excursions by air and overland, to Kaya Kweru at Ponta do Ouro, and to the Pestana Lodge at Inhaca.

Dr John Hemery
Rapporteur